





# Opinions on Professor Butler's Writings.

## ENGLISH REVIEW.

"The name of Professor Archer Butler is well known to the theological world in connexion with a very able series of Letters on the Doctrine of Development, which made their appearance in the Irish Ecclesiastical Journal. That series of Letters gave evidence of the possession of powers and attainments from which the most brilliant results might have been anticipated. That series of Letters established at once Mr. Butler's reputation on this side of the Channel as an eminent divine and a profound thinker."

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## DUBLIN UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE.

"Who can adequately estimate the fame of which the departed, the example and the works, of which the survivors have been deprived? The contemporaries of Professor Butler do not, and, thanks to the volume which has suggested our Paper (Mr. Thomas Woodward's judicious selections from his manuscripts, and admirable Memoir), posterity will not require to be told why these emotions are associated with his name. Poet, orator, metaphysician, theologian,—'nihil tetigit quod non ornavit,'—in the prime of life, just as a fitting field opened for his mature powers, and all the fond anticipations with which we followed his intellectual progress seemed about to be realized, this distinguished ornament of our Church and country was removed."

[Continued on next page.]





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# Opinions on Professor Butler's Writings.

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## EDINBURGH ECCLESIASTICAL JOURNAL.

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“His Letters (on Development) in the Irish Ecclesiastical Journal are very powerful.”

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## THE ENGLISH REVIEW.

“All that we have read of these Sermons impresses us with a sense of their singular depth and power. We feel in perusing them that we are in contact with a mind of superior range, which can embrace in its comprehensive view the most extended relations of the subjects on which it touches, and which possesses the power of eliciting from the most complicated questions the general laws or principles which enable us to solve the various difficulties presented to us. Butler understood the office and the manner of a preacher; and, judging from the Discourses before us, and from the account of his delivery given by his biographer, we should think that he could have been equalled by very few men of his time.”

## ENGLISH CHURCHMAN.

“Mr. Butler was a very sound churchman, and a most able and philosophical writer. His Letters which appeared in the Irish Ecclesiastical Journal, upon Mr. Newman's Theory of Development, contain some of the most clear and masterly criticisms on that work which have come under our notice.”

## DUBLIN EVENING POST.

“We regret that our space does not permit a detailed notice of the Sermons here laid before us. All who remember the late Professor Butler will rejoice in even this faint reflection of that living eloquence—so grand, yet so tender—so uncompromising, yet so winning—whose echoes still linger in our ears.”





# LETTERS.

[Such is the looseness of reasoning, and the negligence of facts, which ALL writers more or less exhibit, who consider that they are in possession of a *sure hypothesis* on which to interpret evidence, and employ argument.—J. H. NEWMAN.]

[It is visible wherein the strength of his performance lies, and what it is that he chiefly trusts to. It is not *Scripture*, it is not antiquity, but a PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE, to which Scripture, Fathers, everything, must yield.—ARCHDEACON WATERLAND.]



*With the Publisher's Compliment*

# LETTERS

ON

## THE DEVELOPMENT

OF

## CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE,

In Reply to Mr. Newman's Essay.

BY THE

REV. WILLIAM ARCHER BUTLER, M.A.,


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
HODGES AND SMITH, GRAFTON-STREET,

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DUBLIN:  
Printed at the University Press,  
BY M. H. GILL.





## PREFACE.

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IT was the intention of my lamented friend, Professor Butler, an intention expressed not long before his death, to have republished the following Letters, in a separate form, with corrections and additions. But a mysterious Providence has overruled that purpose, and an early grave has closed on all his promises of widespread usefulness. It has devolved upon the Editor to carry out the design, however imperfectly. Circumstances, over which he had no control, have hitherto delayed the execution of this interesting, though melancholy task, which he unaffectedly regrets has not been committed to a better hand.

The Letters were originally published in the columns of that ably conducted periodical, the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*; but a wish, too general to be disregarded, calls for their re-appearance in a more convenient form. They were written at intervals, between the close of 1845 and the commencement of 1847, and were the

work of hurried moments, snatched from labours of beneficence to the starving crowds who daily flocked around their Author's residence. The famine, which during that period was at its height, had visited with fearful intensity the parish and neighbourhood of Professor Butler, and he was indefatigable in remedial efforts. Such a scene, so beset with harassing interruption, so far from intellectual converse, was indeed almost incompatible with calm processes of subtle reasoning, and erudite investigation. The composition of such a work, under disadvantages so overwhelming, is in truth no small evidence of Butler's extraordinary power of thought. That some few traces of haste should not be perceptible, it would of course be impossible to expect. Some oversights have been corrected in the notes. Several quotations, taken at second-hand from text books, have evidently not been considered in their context, and have been employed in a significance varying considerably from their *real meaning*. In throwing in guards and qualifications, in endeavouring to place the quotations in the light originally intended, the Editor has been conscious that he was doing what Professor Butler would have earnestly desired to have done. That most candid and most truthful mind would have been the last purposely to support his argument by unfair citation, or overstrained interpretation, or by making the words of any author



seem to convey an impression different from what they were designed to produce.

The appearance of Mr. Newman's celebrated *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*<sup>a</sup> was the occasion which urged Professor Butler, at such inconvenience to himself, to undertake the publication of these Letters. They treat, however, of topics which possess a general and perpetual interest. They are replete with arguments and principles which extend far beyond their primary object of refuting a particular disputant. It is, perhaps, an unavoidable result of our position between two opposite extremes, and on the defensive against both, that our Anglican Theology is cast, for the most part, in a controversial mould. Its richest treasures must be carefully picked up by the student, not arranged in didactic treatises, but scattered as they lie through Defences and Replies, through Apologies and Vindications. Thus the reader, who feels but little interest in their polemical bearings, may still peruse these pages with profit and delight; may find here disquisitions upon topics the most engaging, philosophical as well as ecclesiastical, adorned with the richest drapery of imagination, and clothed in language of unexceeded power and beauty.

<sup>a</sup> An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. By John Henry Newman, Author of Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church. London, 1845.

But these Letters, although thus occasioned by it, are not to be regarded as a Reply to the single Essay of Mr. Newman. They are a comprehensive refutation of a *System*, of which he indeed was the ablest exponent, but which many other thinkers had partially propounded as absolutely necessary for the preservation of the Romish cause. In the present state of critical learning, the spurious authorities, and the misquotations from genuine writings, which too often formed the case of Romish controversialists when appealing to antiquity, can no longer obtain even a temporary currency. The Theory of Development is a last effort to buttress the novelties, which can find no sanction in ancient Catholicity, by a still more novel speculation. Mr. Newman is the spokesman of a powerful *School*, who have surrendered the claim of antiquity, and substituted this theory in its stead: that the Christian Revelation was at first intentionally incomplete ; “that the original doctrines of the Christian Church were intended by its founder to be subsequently developed into a variety of new forms and aspects ; that such a development was antecedently natural and necessary ; that the process was conducted under infallible guidance; and that the existing belief of the Roman Communion is its mature result”<sup>b</sup>. To this entire School,

<sup>b</sup> See *infra*, p. 3.

and to their whole system of argument, the following pages supply a full, and still unanswered, refutation.

Whatever *novelty* may justly be attributed to the performance of Mr. Newman, it is matter of history that he was not the *originator* of the Theory which he so elaborately advocates. He has, however, reduced to systematic form, and expanded into logical proportions, the rude outlines and imperfect sketches of other thinkers. "Though the evidence," says Dr. Wordsworth<sup>c</sup>, "is abundant and strong, that the Theory of *Development* is the only *consistent* theory of *Romanism*, yet it has never, I believe, been propounded so distinctly, or worked out so elaborately, as by the author of this volume. Your theologians have sighed for it, and have cherished it secretly, but they have been afraid to own it publicly. This theory has had many a Copernicus among you, but he is its Newton ; and we would indulge a sanguine hope, that the cause of truth will be promoted in due time by the unreserved manner in which *this* theory, and this *only* theory, of Romanism, has been stated in this Essay." The power of the *present Church* to develope new Articles of Faith has long been maintained by Romish theologians. It was alleged by a writer<sup>d</sup> of the fourteenth century, as the preroga-

<sup>c</sup> Letters to M. Gondon, p. 26.

<sup>d</sup> Augustinus Triumphus de Anconâ. *Summ. de Eccl. Pot.* q. 59, Art. 3.



tive of the Pontiff, *novum symbolum condere, novos articulos supra alios multiplicare*. “That which I charge upon the Roman doctors,” says Bishop Taylor, “is, that they give to their Church *a power of introducing and imposing new articles of belief*.”—*Diss.* (p. 287 : Ed. Cardwell.) Such a claim was shown by our divines to be wholly incompatible with any settled *Rule of Faith*. It was proved to be an abnegation of the authority both of Holy Scripture and of Catholic Tradition. “Our most beloved Mother, the Church of England,” says the admirable Dr. Hammond<sup>e</sup>, “is certainly solicitous to avoid, with all cautious diligence, this ROCK OF INNOVATORS. It is her ambition to be distinguished through the whole Christian world, and judged by an equitable posterity, under this character, that, in deciding controversies of faith and practice, it has ever been her fixed and firm resolution, and on this basis she has rested the British Reformation, that, in the first place, respect be had to the Scripture; and then, in the second place, to the Bishops, Martyrs, and Ecclesiastical Writers of the first ages. Therefore, whatsoever hath been affirmed by the Scriptures in matter of Faith; whatsoever, concerning ecclesiastical government, she hath discovered to be the appointment of the universal Church throughout the world, after the

<sup>e</sup> Quoted by Bishop Jebb, *Appendix to Sermons*, p. 393.

Apostles, these things she hath taken care to place, as fixed and established, among the Articles of Religion, determined never to permit her sons to *alter or abolish* what hath been thus decided." (Translated from Hammond's *Works*, Vol. iv. p. 470.)

To the readers of this controversial work, it may be interesting to learn something of its author's sentiments upon an important practical point, the desirableness of polemically assailing the faith of the simple and destitute Romanists by whom he was surrounded. The following pages, indeed, are sufficient evidence that Professor Butler was alive to the importance of the doctrinal differences between us and Rome ; that he was cordially attached to the principles of the Reformation ; and ready to spend his best powers, under circumstances of peculiar trial, in vindicating those principles against an accomplished and most formidable antagonist. But though he was thus zealous, before meet audience, to give a reason for his faith, and in its defence to bring forth out of his treasures things new and old, it was his opinion (an opinion which derives peculiar weight from the circumstance that he himself was a convert from Romanism, and intimately acquainted with the whole controversy), that no small degree of mental cultivation was required to understand the points in debate, and the arguments employed


in their discussion. In cases where universal *ignorance* overspread the mind, respecting the first principles of Christianity, he thought that there was room for *instruction*, but that it was absurd, *ex vi termini*, to talk of proselytism, for that there could be *no change* of creed, when *no creed* at all had been received. And with respect to those who were not uninstructed in their own system, and were endeavouring to serve God as they thought right, the minds of peasants such as these, he shrunk from disturbing and unsettling in their *faith*. He feared lest, in the attempt to pluck out the tares, he might root up the wheat also ; lest this process of disturbance might eventuate in total scepticism, and so the last state of the convert become worse than the first. He especially deprecated the idea of employing a season of unwonted distress as an opportunity of controversy, and mingling temporal relief with exhortations to conformity. Such ill-timed projects he deemed far more likely to corrupt the necessities by hopes of gain, than to win them over to the pure and undefiled religion of the Gospel. His feelings on the subject are best expressed in his own language, which I am glad to embrace another occasion of repeating. “For my own part, I will not scruple to say, though, perhaps, it is scarcely wise to enter upon such a topic without more room than I can now demand, to



explain and defend my meaning,—it is not without fear and trembling that I should at any time receive into the Church a convert from any of the forms of Christianity outside it, *whom I had known to be sincerely devoted according to the measure of his light.* The duty of so doing may arise ; and, when the duty is plain, it must of course be done ; I only say, that I should feel very great anxiety in doing it. Men ought never to forget how fearfully heavy is the responsibility of a new convert. You have unsettled all the man's habitual convictions ; are you prepared to labour night and day to replace them with others as effective over the heart and life ? If not, you have done him an irreparable wrong. Motives to righteousness, low, mixed, uncertain, as it may be, are greatly better than none ; and there can be no doubt that he who has lost so many he once possessed, requires constant, earnest, indefatigable exertion on the part of the teacher who undertakes to supply their place. What care, what skill, what persevering patience does it need to repair the shattered principle of Faith in one whom you have succeeded in convincing, that all the deepest practical convictions of his whole past life are delusion !”

My best acknowledgments are due to the Rev. Richard Gibbings, rector of Raymunderdoney, in the diocese of Raphoe, for most valuable assistance afford-

ed me in preparing for publication this work of our mutual friend. A considerable number of annotations, kindly furnished to me by that critical and accomplished scholar, will be found in the sequel, and may be distinguished by the letter G., subjoined.



CONTENTS.

LETTER I.

	PAGE.
Occasion of the present work, . . . . .	1
Object not detailed investigation of Mr. Newman's authorities, and why, . . . . .	2
Mr. Newman's theory of development stated, . . . . .	2, 3
I. Opposed to the received doctrine of the Romish Church, . . .	3, 4
Möhler, De Maistre, and La Mennais, . . . . .	4
Earlier forms of the theory already condemned, . . . . .	5
Case of Petavius, . . . . .	ib.
Case of Bossuet, . . . . .	6, 7
Opposed to the Tridentine Canons respecting the <i>sole matter of</i> <i>Faith</i> , and <i>interpretation of Scripture</i> , . . . . .	8
Council of Trent invariably appeals to <i>perpetual tradition</i> , . .	9-11
The same is the doctrine of the chief expositors of Romanism, .	11
Mr. Newman's attempted defence of his hypothesis from <i>philo-</i> <i>sophical analogies</i> , . . . . .	12
Condemned by anticipation by the Romish authorities, . . . .	ib.
<i>Disciplina arcani</i> admitted by Mr. Newman to be inadequate to solve the "difficulty" of the <i>variation of mediæval from primi-</i> <i>tive Christianity</i> , . . . . .	12-14
Mr. Newman's theory is an attempt to account for this difficulty,	14
This <i>variation</i> is a "difficulty" only to the Romanist, . . . .	15
II. Development theory is a plain surrender of the claims of Romanism to satisfactory evidence from antiquity, . . . . .	16
Developments are admitted not to be themselves primitive doc- trine, . . . . .	ib.
"Deification of St. Mary," . . . . .	16, 17
Mr. Newman rejects the rule of Vincentius, . . . . .	18



	PAGE.
Charges the Ante-Nicene Fathers with inaccuracy respecting the	
Trinity, . . . . .	ib.
His unfair treatment of the Fathers, . . . . .	19
The <i>Syrian School</i> , . . . . .	ib.
Testimony of Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Facundus, against	
Transubstantiation, resolved into peculiarities of that school, 20, 21	
Mr. Newman's instances of the <i>completion of primitive views</i> :	
"Deification of St. Mary;" Purgatory, . . . . .	21-24
It follows from Mr. Newman's argument that it is positively inju-	
rious to study the early writers, . . . . .	24
Mediæval religion, according to him, an improvement upon pri-	
mitive Christianity: in doctrine, . . . . .	ib.
In practice, . . . . .	25
"Expurgating" Fathers is consequently the obligatory function	
of the growing Church, . . . . .	ib.
Application of this argument to the Bible, . . . . .	26, 27
To the teaching of our blessed Lord, . . . . .	27
Mr. Newman's decisive admissions respecting the <i>late introduc-</i>	
tion of Image Worship, . . . . .	28
Worship of Saints and Angels, . . . . .	ib.
Worship of the Virgin Mary, . . . . .	ib.
Purgatory, . . . . .	29
Evidence of Ignatian epistles to the <i>definiteness of doctrine from</i>	
<i>the very first</i> , . . . . .	30-32
Importance of Mr. Newman's admissions, . . . . .	32
Peculiarity of his position and value of his testimony, . . . .	32-35

## LETTER II.

Mr. Newman's theory contrary to the Tridentine Canons, . . . .	36
His Book formally implicated in the anathema of Trent, . . . .	37
His mode of Scriptural interpretation forbidden, . . . . .	ib.
Early anticipations of his theory, . . . . .	38
Fisher on Purgatory and Indulgences, . . . . .	38, 39
Cardinal Cajetan and Durandus on Indulgences, . . . . .	39
Alphonsus de Castro on Transubstantiation, . . . . .	40
Peter Lombard and Sirmondus on Transubstantiation, . . . . .	40, 41
Similar views to Mr. Newman's entertained by Salmeron, . . . .	42
Traces of Mr. Newman's doctrine in Gregory VII. . . . .	ib.
Gregory I. traced his developments to a different source, . . . .	43

Proved by Stillingfleet, that the assertion of unbroken Apostolical Tradition, <i>as a separate source of articles of belief</i> , is, in the Roman Church, comparatively modern, . . . . .	44
Gradual elevation of Tradition to coordinate authority with the written Word, . . . . .	44, 45
Forgeries employed to gain credit for Romish Traditions, . . .	45, 46
Effect of the forged Decretals, . . . . .	46, 47
New measures rendered necessary by their exposure, . . . . .	48
“ Mediæval development” now substituted for “ Apostolical Tradition,” . . . . .	ib.
Inconsistency of Mr. Newman respecting the “ leading idea of Christianity,” . . . . .	49, 50
Analysis of Mr. Newman’s argument, . . . . .	50
“ Development of an idea” explained, . . . . .	ib.
Kinds of development, . . . . .	ib.
“ Moral developments” explained, . . . . .	51
Unfair citation of Bishop Butler, . . . . .	ib.
Instances of moral development, . . . . .	51, 52
Tests of genuine development, . . . . .	52, 54
Antecedent probability of developments, and of a developing authority, in Christianity, . . . . .	54, 55
Term development used ambiguously by Mr. Newman, . . . . .	55
There are “ legitimate developments” of doctrine in Christianity, . .	ib.
Of two kinds, intellectual and practical, . . . . .	56
Intellectual developments, or logical inferences, explained and illustrated, . . . . .	57–60
Practical developments explained, . . . . .	60
Two elements in their production, the Divine truth, and the human recipient, . . . . .	60, 61
“ Practical developments” may grow from the corruption of human nature, . . . . .	61–64
No <i>universality</i> or <i>permanence</i> , of admitted innovation can be sufficient to authorize it, . . . . .	64
Example of idolatry, . . . . .	65, 66
Mr. Newman’s principle an invention; his facts cannot be reduced under even that invented principle, . . . . .	67
His principle, . . . . .	ib.
His facts, . . . . .	67, 68
He prepares the way for his principle by arguing the antecedent probability of developments in Christianity, . . . . .	68
But he only proves that there are <i>such</i> developments as none deny, . .	68–70
Kind of developments which Anglicans deny, . . . . .	70

	PAGE.
Mr. Newman's alleged analogy of prophetic revelation, . . . .	71
Failure of the analogy; prophecy distinguished from doctrinal teaching, . . . . .	ib.
Mr. Newman's perverted use of the parables, . . . . .	72
Scriptural statements respecting the completeness of the original revelation, irreconcilable with his <i>doctrinal development</i> , . .	72, 73
How far, according to him, the Apostles were acquainted with the developments of modern Romanism, . . . . .	73, 74
Argument from their silence respecting them, . . . . .	74, 75
Unfair appeal to Bishop Butler, . . . . .	75
State of the case between Anglican antiquity and Roman develop- ment upon the supposition that the Apostles were ignorant of these new doctrines, . . . . .	76, 77
Application of the principle of development to our Lord's own teaching, . . . . .	77, 78
Recapitulation, . . . . .	78-80

### LETTER III.

Inadequacy of the development hypothesis unless combined with the <i>further hypothesis</i> of an infallible directive authority, . .	81, 82
Coincidence of Mr. Newman's "moral development" with various fanatical and heretical extravagancies, . . . . .	82
Found in its perfection in Tertullian's Montanism, . . . . .	82, 83
Necessity of an external authority to warrant Roman developments,	84
Inconsistency of this authority with the theory of development, . .	ib.
Mr. Newman's chief art is the substitution of historical eventuation for <i>logical connexion</i> of disputed with admitted doctrines, . . .	85
Tendency of his theory to perplex all the evidences of religion, . .	86
Identity of Kant's and Newman's "process of development," . .	86, 87
<i>Positive</i> tendency of Mr. Newman's development does not vindicate it from Rationalism, . . . . .	88
Formal nature of Rationalism, . . . . .	88, 89
Rationalism of superstition, . . . . .	89
Internal spirit and scope of Mr. Newman's theory, . . . . .	ib.
The Church's office of instruction lies not in unlimited development but in cautious moderation, . . . . .	90, 91
This alleged <i>incompleteness</i> is the perfection of practical wisdom, .	90
It was Christ's <i>intention</i> to withhold information on certain subjects,	91
Real limits to our knowledge, . . . . .	92
Claim of infallibility leads to irreverent scrutiny into the divine mysteries, . . . . .	ib.



Feeble and ambiguous decisions of Rome inconsistent with infallible authority, . . . . .	93
<i>Restraint within appointed limits</i> is characteristic of the Church's wisdom and humility, . . . . .	94-96
Limitation and mystery the will of God for the discipline of man, .	96
Human pride and curiosity dissatisfied—twofold result, . . . .	ib.
Romish development debases the true sublimity of Christianity, .	96, 97
True development would be a <i>progress</i> from simpler to sublimer things, . . . . .	98
Romish developments, e. g. image-worship, are a descent and retro- gradation, . . . . .	98, 99
God's reality sublimer than man's imagination, . . . . .	99
Apostolic and mediæval Christianity contrasted, . . . . .	100, 101
The "dark ages" the great period of development, . . . .	102, 103
Mediæval Christianity Mr. Newman's ideal of perfection, . . .	104
What was the character and condition of the average instructors of the middle ages? . . . . .	104, 111
Council of Aix-la-Chapelle, . . . . .	106
Archbishop Hincmar, . . . . .	106, 107
Theodulphus, . . . . .	107
Ratherius, . . . . .	107, 108
Gregory VII. . . . .	108-110
Application to the argument of this test of the intellectual and moral condition of middle ages, . . . . .	111
Mr. Newman's hypothesis cannot be referred to <i>any historical</i> tests, .	112
May be applied by any sect to the proof of <i>anything</i> , . . . .	113
This new rule of faith clouds the evidences of Christianity, . . .	ib.
Mr. Newman's gloomy picture of the difficulty of knowing what to believe, . . . . .	114
Import of his maxim, that "principles are responsible for doctrines," .	115
Any doctrine may be thus proved by evidence of antiquity, . . .	ib.
Illustrated by an imaginary sect of sun-worshippers. Application of Mr. Newman's principles to prove sun-worship a true develop- ment of Christian doctrine, . . . . .	116-123
The burning of heretics proved to be a true development according to Mr. Newman's principles, . . . . .	125-127
Application to this doctrine of his seven tests of a true development, 127-137	
Fearful consequences of this theory of development, . . . . .	137

## LETTER IV.

The theory of development stamps with inspiration <i>equally</i> the whole succession of doctrines in the Latin Church, . . . . .	138
--	-----

	PAGE.
All Romish developments authorized by the same authority,	139, 140
Mr. Newman's hypothesis "accounts for" the Creed of Pope Pius	
as well as for that of Athanasius, . . . . .	140
His rule of Faith must apply to all the Romish peculiarities, or can	
apply to none, . . . . .	141, 142
Fundamental error of his system is, making history the law of doc-	
trine, . . . . .	142
Confounds the functions of historian and divine, . . . . .	143
Pernicious practical results of this fundamental error, . . . . .	143, 144
"Philosophy of Romanism" derived from this error,—definition of	
it, . . . . .	144
The past history of the Church thereby made the model of perfec-	
tion,—examples, . . . . .	145, 146
This criterion of Faith must be applied universally, . . . . .	146, 147
The development theory employed by Mr. Newman to defend the	
authority of the past, but really tends to endless alteration, . . . . .	147, 148
Impossible to set any limits to this progression of doctrine, . . . . .	148
Examples of possible future developments, . . . . .	148-152
Infallible decisions of the Church no check to innovation, . . . . .	152
Development theory sanctions <i>other great changes</i> , as well as the	
formation of Roman system, . . . . .	153
Case of the Reformation, . . . . .	154
From the beginning Christianity combined <i>two powerful</i> principles,	
individual Obedience and individual Inquiry, . . . . .	ib.
Principle of individual Inquiry sanctioned in the New Testament, . . . . .	155
Recognised by the primitive Church, Tertullian, Cyprian, Firmi-	
lian, . . . . .	156, 157
Universal perusal of Holy Scripture enjoined by Chrysostom, Au-	
gustine, and Gregory I., . . . . .	158, 159
First synodical prohibition of the general use of the Scriptures, . . . . .	159
If the papal supremacy be the development of the principle of Obe-	
dience, the Reformation may be of the principle of Inquiry, . . . . .	159-163
The <i>cessation</i> of the Papacy may be a development as well as its	
growth, . . . . .	163
Gradual depression of the papal power correspondent to its rise, . . . . .	163-168
Mr. Newman's theory triumphantly vindicates the <i>principle</i> of the	
Reformation, . . . . .	168
The same argument applies to <i>place</i> as well as <i>time</i> , . . . . .	169
The bond of the Papacy <i>has always</i> slackened in proportion to the	
distance from Rome, . . . . .	ib.
The <i>independence</i> of the Anglican Church may thus be a develop-	
ment, as well as the first <i>local extension</i> of the papal connexion,	
	169, 170

	PAGE.
Phocas and S. Gregory the Great, . . . . .	170
<i>Genuine</i> historical development to be traced in the progress of the Anglican Church, . . . . .	171
Analogies of civil and ecclesiastical government, . . . . .	172
Resemblance in their respective objects and means, . . . .	172, 173
Presumption that nations may be left to see their way with the <i>same</i> <i>comparative perspicacity</i> in both, . . . . .	173
Connexion and unrivalled excellence of the Anglican civil and eccle- siastical constitution, . . . . .	173-175
Mr. Newman's limitations of progressive revelation are altogether arbitrary, . . . . .	175
His system justifies <i>all</i> developments as well as the Roman, .	175, 176
Collateral supposition of Romish Infallibility is an abandonment of his principles, . . . . .	177, 178
Those <i>principles</i> sanction <i>Lutheran</i> as much as <i>Roman</i> develop- ments, . . . . .	178-181
Gradual formation of the papal power, . . . . .	182
Justification of the Anglican separation, . . . . .	183
Mr. Newman's theory is the philosophy, not of one form of Chris- tianity, but of all, . . . . .	183, 184
Application of it to the Greek Church, . . . . .	184
Difficulty of determining precise amount of difference between the doctrines of Greek and Latin Churches, . . . . .	184-187
Theory of development inconsistent with the undeniable differences between East and West, . . . . .	187-189
Their separation not a mere schism, . . . . .	189
The East is in <i>heresy</i> , if Rome be infallible, . . . . .	189, 190
Other important disagreements, . . . . .	190-192
Bearing of the single fact, that the East rejects the <i>Romish unity</i> on the theory of development, . . . . .	193, 194
History furnishes a true <i>experimentum crucis</i> between . . . .	195
Rival suppositions of Rome and England to explain facts in the his- tory of Christianity, . . . . .	195, 196
The testimony of the Eastern Church confirms the Anglican hypo- thesis, . . . . .	196, 197
The theory of development, as an internal principle evolving truth by uniform processes, cannot stand the test of history to which it appeals, . . . . .	197, 198
Mr. Newman has substituted a fond hypothesis about the Roman peculiarities for a theory of the universal Church, . . . . .	199
Circumstances, under God's high providence, have equally moulded the religious history of East and West, . . . . .	200, 201



## LETTER V.

Principle of development in its nature <i>unlimited</i> , . . . . .	202
Romanist restriction not only arbitrary, but destructive of the principle, . . . . .	203
Mr. Newman's system is Rationalism under Roman colours, . . .	204
His inconsistency, and probable causes of it, . . . . .	205
Natural result of the development theory, . . . . .	ib.
Its inapplicability to Mr. Newman's purpose, . . . . .	205, 206
The history of <i>speculative philosophy</i> has probably given rise to and illustrates danger of this theory of Christianity, . . . . .	206
Variation of doctrine in the ancient teachers, . . . . .	207
They delivered not definite <i>doctrines</i> , but <i>ideas</i> to be developed, . .	208
Analogy of Christianity, according to Mr. Newman, and consequent uncertainty, . . . . .	ib.
The doctrines of Christianity alleged to be only <i>samples</i> of its <i>ideas</i> , . . . . .	209, 210
If so, the Apostles had but a defective knowledge of Christianity, .	211
Imperfect information of the first centuries according to this theory, . . . . .	211-213
The Apostles <i>knew</i> and <i>communicated</i> all necessary doctrine, . . .	214, 215
Their account of the high attainments of the primitive Christians incompatible with this theory of development, . . . . .	216-219
No <i>speculative</i> difficulties can disprove that all necessary doctrine was delivered by the Apostles, for it is asserted by them, . . .	219-222
Alleged errors of the Anti-Nicene Teachers, . . . . .	222, 223
Function of the early Councils in respect of doctrine,—to define and condemn, but not to <i>reveal</i> , . . . . .	224, 225
Grounds on which the four first Œcumenical Councils professed to proceed. Council of Nice, . . . . .	225, 226
Constantinople, . . . . .	226
Ephesus, . . . . .	226, 227
Chalcedon, . . . . .	227-230
They re-stated and defined Church's primitive belief, . . . . .	230
Same principles avowed in subsequent Councils, . . . . .	230, 231
In the <i>form and disposition</i> of the doctrine, the resolutions of Councils will differ considerably from Scripture expressions, . . . .	231
Reason of this difference, . . . . .	231, 232
They may present Christian doctrine in <i>new aspects and relations</i> , .	232
Special measure of divine blessing to be anticipated for Councils assembled under just conditions, . . . . .	233, 234

Peculiar claims of the <i>early</i> Councils to authoritative decision on fundamental doctrine, . . . . .	234-237
The controversy respecting the ancient digests of Christian doctrine resolves itself into <i>two questions</i> ; one, regarding the <i>Obligation</i> ; the other, the <i>Matter</i> , of these dogmatic decisions, . . . .	237, 238
The work of systematizing and applying doctrine, by Synods and Doctors, is the <i>reality</i> which Mr. Newman distinguishes under the term Development, . . . . .	238

## LETTER VI.

Process by which Christian doctrines have become gradually syste- matized, . . . . .	240
Concession that theological knowledge is capable of a real move- ment, . . . . .	ib.
This movement takes place in two ways :	
1. By logical development, . . . . .	241
2. By positive discovery,—examples of, . . . . .	241, 242
Process of logical development accounts for the history and the errors of dogmatic theology, . . . . .	242, 243
Unlikely, from nature of the case, that the form of Christian doc- trine should continue exactly the same during the inspired and subsequent uninspired period, . . . . .	243
Inspired men would not require a systematized creed, . . . .	ib.
Uninspired teachers would require <i>formal scheme</i> of doctrines, . .	244
Presumption against the inspiration of elaborate definitions of doc- trine, . . . . .	244, 245
General character of inspired teaching,—Prophets, our Lord, S. Paul, . . . . .	245, 246
Important that the unscientific statements of Scripture should come before their logical version, and why, . . . . .	246-249
Difficulty of regulating the proper exercise of this systematizing process by <i>a priori</i> canons, . . . . .	249
In what senses logical development may introduce doctrines appa- rently new, . . . . .	250, 251
Difficulty in certain cases of deciding upon the novelty or antiquity of doctrines, . . . . .	252, 253
The conciliar determinations were the results of a process of syste- matizing begun by <i>individual</i> teachers, . . . . .	253
Importance of a due estimate of these first systematizers, . . . .	ib.
Their advantage, in recent inheritance of original doctrine, . .	254-256
Their disadvantage in inexperience, and its consequences, . .	256, 257

The evidence of antiquity is not the same in amount for all the doctrines we are bound to receive, . . . . .	258
Quantity of historical proof varies in different cases, . . . . .	259
Vincentian rule not to be strictly interpreted, . . . . .	259, 260
Judicious generality of terms in the canon " <i>Concionatores</i> ," . . . .	260
Amount of evidence required for doctrine is not revealed, and must be determined inductively, . . . . .	261
No antecedent reason to suppose that even the most important doctrines will be sustainable by the same amount of proof, . . . .	261, 262
The apparent plausibility of the Romanist claim of certainty in religion is traceable to an ambiguity of the word "Faith," . . . .	263
This word Faith used in two senses, . . . . .	ib.
Both forms of belief equally applicable to all modifications, true or false, of revealed religion, . . . . .	263-265
A constant sophism of Romish controversialists is to confound these two senses of Faith, . . . . .	265, 266

## LETTER VII.

Mr. Newman's attempt to sustain his hypothesis of Development by the auxiliary hypothesis of a "Developing authority in Christianity," . . . . .	267
Statement of his argument, . . . . .	267, 268
His argument for the <i>likelihood</i> of developments framed with a view to the very developments to be accounted for, . . . . .	268, 269
Antiquity would have disowned this <i>a priori</i> argument, . . . .	269, 270
His whole argument is a <i>vicious circle</i> , . . . . .	271
Examination of his arguments for a Developing Authority, . . . .	ib.
The Infallibility at issue is that alleged to be <i>vested in the Church of Rome</i> , . . . . .	271, 272
Importance of remembering that the real question is the <i>localization</i> of Infallibility in Romish Patriarchate, . . . . .	272
No connexion between Infallibility of the <i>Universal Church</i> and Romish Infallibility, . . . . .	273
Theory of development viewed in connexion with <i>local</i> Infallibility:	
I. Alleged necessity of papal Infallibility to guide Development, . .	274
And yet the Papacy itself admitted to be a development, . . .	274, 275
II. Fallacy involved in making one development give authority to others, . . . . .	275, 276
III. The Roman tribunal, which is supposed necessary to guide Development, did not arise until <i>after</i> period when it would have been most necessary, . . . . .	276, 277
Such a tribunal most needed in first centuries, . . . . .	277, 278



And no allusion is made to any such in those ages, . . .	278-281
More needed in East than West, . . . . .	281
IV. First development of the Roman Supremacy not doctrinal, but disciplinary, . . . . .	281, 282
V. The <i>history of dogmas</i> contradicts the fancy of regular development guided by this <i>local</i> directory, . . . . .	282
Examples of various developments <i>inconsistent</i> with such infallibility of Rome, . . . . .	283-288
History of heresies contradicts infallibility of Roman See, . . . . .	288, 289
VI. Christianity admits of "Historical Development" (See Lett. II. p. 60), . . . . .	289
These historical developments are adaptations to diversities of circumstances, . . . . .	ib.
A <i>local</i> infallible authority incompatible with such developments, . . . . .	289-292
Out of this incompatibility arose the Reformation, . . . . .	292, 293
VII. This principle of <i>local developments</i> explains the exterior similarity between present and ancient Church of Rome, . . . . .	294-296
Probable impression which present Romanism would produce on primitive saints, . . . . .	296-298
This power of adaptation a proof of divine origin of Christianity, . . . . .	298
Unalterable in doctrine, Christianity may vary in external presentation, . . . . .	ib.
Rome exactly reverses this rule, . . . . .	298-300
VIII. The most specious claim of the Papacy, its <i>expediency</i> , really contradicts its <i>permanence</i> , . . . . .	300, 301
Foregoing observations directed to the specific theory of <i>Roman</i> infallibility:	
<i>Roman</i> falsely assumed as synonymous with Catholic infallibility, . . . . .	302, 303
Infallibility never consigned by the Universal Church to Rome, . . . . .	303, 304
Such a consignment would involve the power to withdraw it, . . . . .	304
Utter insufficiency of the alleged proofs that the Catholic Church thus surrendered <i>its right</i> to the Papacy, . . . . .	305-307
Permanence of Rome as a sacred locality not without parallel, . . . . .	307
The Papacy, as an historical fact, not more unaccountable than the sacerdotal sovereignty of the Thibetian Lama, . . . . .	307-310

## LETTER VIII.

The development hypothesis considered in connexion with Church infallibility in <i>general</i> , . . . . .	311
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The principle of development in Germany is a general law of progress equally serviceable to all schools, . . . . .	311-313
Limitation of the principle as connected with claimed infallibility, .	313
No contradiction in the abstract conception of a knowledge <i>always right</i> and always progressing, . . . . .	314
But this sort of progress is essentially inapplicable to the history of the doctrines in controversy, for two reasons, . . . . .	ib.
Preliminary observations on the state of the question, . . . . .	315
<i>Comparison</i> of development hypothesis with <i>rival hypotheses</i> , as a concession to Mr. Newman, . . . . .	ib.
Problem: to connect the actual facts of Church History with the original revelation, <i>by some general view of the way it was meant to operate</i> , . . . . .	316
Three hypotheses for its solution:	
1. The Anglo-Catholic, . . . . .	316, 317
2. The Roman, . . . . .	317, 318
3. The development, or Rationalistic-Roman, . . . . .	318-320
Consideration of the <i>positive</i> merits of the development hypothesis combined with infallibility. Examination of the consistency of the combination, . . . . .	320
Even granting progression of doctrine, and its danger without special direction, the alleged <i>infallible</i> guidance does not follow, 320, 321	
Assuming infallibility, then progressive discovery of doctrines supposes previous <i>errors</i> of doctrine and practice, at variance with such infallible guidance. Examples. Divinity of Christ and Holy Spirit, 321	
Corruption of human nature, . . . . .	322
Invocation of saints and angels, . . . . .	322, 323
Separate state of the blessed, . . . . .	323
Purgatory, . . . . .	324
Adoration of the Host and images, . . . . .	324, 325
Five additional sacraments, . . . . .	325
These are difficulties as regards the past in the hypothesis which connects perpetual infallibility with perpetual development: difficulties as regards the future, . . . . .	326
Decisions of a developing Church can be only provisional, .	326-330
May be set aside by the "Church of the future," . . . .	330-332
<i>Practical</i> working of infallible development as an ecclesiastical principle, . . . . .	332
Use of infallibility is <i>authoritative</i> guidance; but the exercise of authority is incompatible with hypothesis of development, .	332, 333
Three conceivable relations of an infallible authority to a developing Church: examination of development hypothesis under each of these relations, . . . . .	333


	PAGE.
1. Supreme Authority viewed as <i>dependent</i> on general movement of the Church, . . . . .	334
The infallible Authority cannot decide on a subject <i>insufficiently developed</i> , . . . . .	334, 335
Infallibility thus made dependent on the <i>date</i> of the decision,	336-340
2. The supreme Authority viewed as <i>independent</i> and controlling general movement of the Church, . . . . .	340
But, by the hypothesis, the <i>process of development is itself inspired</i> , . . . . .	341-343
No authority, therefore, can control what is itself divine, .	343, 344
3. The supreme Authority viewed as the <i>organ declarative</i> of the Church's belief, . . . . .	344
Such an organ is no directive <i>authority</i> ; but varies as the Church itself, . . . . .	344, 345
Preceding observations refer to the exercise of authority in the regular way of Councils, . . . . .	345
But infallible Authority, if essential to the Church, must have preceded Councils, . . . . .	346
How exercised during the interval of Councils, i. e. during almost the entire existence of the Church? . . . . .	346, 347
<i>Authority</i> , of any kind, an inconsistency <i>within a developing</i> Church, . . . . .	348
Position of an individual speculator in the Roman Church on this hypothesis of development, . . . . .	348-351
Mr. Newman's system <i>incurably sceptical</i> , . . . . .	351, 352

## LETTER IX.

Examination of Mr. Newman's arguments for an infallible developing authority resident in the Roman Church, . . . . .	355
General object of the first, or theoretical, part of his treatise, . .	356
Summary of his arguments, . . . . .	356-358
Charge against Barrow of logical deficiency, . . . . .	359
Mr. Newman's self-contradiction with respect to the primitive evidence for the Papacy, . . . . .	359, 360
His instances of hypotheses similar to his own, . . . . .	360-363
Admission of Mr. Newman's <i>general principles</i> respecting moral evidence, . . . . .	363
They are applicable only under certain qualifications:	
Qualification 1, . . . . .	363
Qualification 2, . . . . .	364
Qualification 3, . . . . .	364, 365



	PAGE.
Mr. Newman's proofs of an infallible director of developments, . . . . .	366
1. Presumption that there <i>must be</i> such an authority to distinguish true developments, . . . . .	367
Reason and sympathy as competent to decide on the developments as upon the authorizing infallibility, . . . . .	367, 368
Mr. Newman admits that the idea of a revelation includes all clear <i>conclusions</i> from the truths originally revealed, . . . . .	368, 369
2. His second and third heads of argument are answers to objections against <i>infallibility</i> resting upon moral certainty, . . . . .	369
His misconception of this objection, . . . . .	370, 371
3. His answer to the objection that the supposed infallibility would destroy probation by dissipating all doubt, . . . . .	371-373
Bishop Butler has foreclosed all anticipations of what God will or must do in giving a revelation, . . . . .	373
Mr. Newman's attempt to show that Butler's reasoning does not apply against his presumptions, . . . . .	374
Plainly opposed to the assumption of a necessary infallibility, . . . . .	375, 376
Analogy of the Jewish Church ; a <i>developing</i> system, yet without an infallible directory, . . . . .	376, 377
4. Main distinction, according to Mr. Newman, of natural and revealed religion, and consequent necessity of a visible and permanent infallible authority, . . . . .	377, 378
Inaccuracy of his distinction between natural and revealed religion ; confounds rule of right and obligation of the rule, . . . . .	378, 379
Special evil of this confusion ; exalts <i>authority</i> above <i>conscience</i> , . . . . .	380
5. Various advantages alleged as secured by an infallible external directory, . . . . .	381, 382
The chief force of this hypothesis lies in contrasting it with an opposite extreme equally gratuitous, . . . . .	383
Importance of Church decisions even without infallibility. Opinions of Vincentius, . . . . .	384-388
Superintending Providence, not absolute infallibility, is the Church's true gift, and the true key to ecclesiastical history, . . . . .	389
Sublime <i>ideal</i> of Christianity to conceive it originally delivered in its full perfection, . . . . .	390
Proof of its Divine origin that it provides for all possible variety of circumstances, . . . . .	391



# LETTERS,

&c. &c.

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## LETTER I.

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DEAR SIR,

When I had last the pleasure of seeing you, you were so good as to request me to give you an opinion of the work<sup>a</sup> of Mr. Newman, which has been so long and anxiously expected. I am at present obliged to undertake the fulfilment of my promise at some disadvantage as to time and leisure. I have, however, *read* the work with the attention which the performance of such a writer, at such a crisis, justly demands; and I trust I can answer, that any observations I may offer you shall be the result of a tolerably unprejudiced estimate of its merits. Absolute impartiality can, indeed, seldom be secured, except at the heavy cost of absolute indifference; and I cannot pretend to be indifferent to the fearful amount of evil, which (with of course the purest intentions) the Author of this work and his companions are exerting all the energies of accomplished minds to achieve. Mr. Newman, in a very solemn and affecting address at the

<sup>a</sup> [Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. Lond. 1845.]

close of his volume, warns us against undue prepossessions; bids us "not determine that to be truth which we wish to be so, nor make an idol of cherished anticipations." Alas! the Author is, doubtless, too humble-minded to think it strange, that many will rise from his work with the profound conviction, that had not the mournful delusion against which he cautions us been his own, the book itself had never been written!

The reasonings and speculations of this remarkable volume suggest a multitude of considerations, for which it would be unreasonable to expect you could supply space. I shall, therefore, confine myself as much as possible to observations of a very general character, such as I may trust to make tolerably intelligible within a narrow compass. Detailed investigations of Mr. Newman's citations and authorities will, I doubt not, be furnished abundantly in the progress of the controversy. This latter part of the inquiry, moreover, appears to me of the less importance, that the volume does not seem to add many new contributions to the passages already so familiar to every student of the Romish controversy; and because, granting the genuineness and authenticity of every single passage cited, the conclusion intended by the Author appears as hopelessly inadmissible as it could be conceived to be by the denial of them all.

The same limitation of space must induce me to depend, that a majority of your readers, having already perused the book, will not require a detailed exposition of its argument. Those who have not, must be content to learn, that Mr. Newman's theory is simply this:—That the original doctrines of the Christian Church



were intended by its Founder to be subsequently “developed” into a variety of new forms and aspects; that such a development was antecedently natural and necessary; that the process was conducted under infallible guidance; and that the existing belief of the Roman communion is its mature result. Those who have but this conception of Mr. Newman’s views can, of course, scarcely do full justice to his argument; I must, however, add, that this limited acquaintance with his performance is almost as injurious to the full appreciation of the *objections* to it. I should certainly desire no other reader than one who had carefully studied the whole volume from beginning to end; not only because such a perusal can alone make objections fully intelligible, but because I think I could safely rely, that on the mind of every such reader, if sufficiently unprejudiced, would crowd, in forms more or less palpable, the very objections I am about to state.

I. I must, in the first place, observe that it is much more than doubtful, how far Mr. Newman’s doctrine is at all the received doctrine of the Roman Church, or would be regarded by its authorities as any other than a most perilous innovation. Convenient as it may now be to tolerate it (or anything else from the same author), for temporary purposes, and to meet the present state of speculation, I shall be much surprised if, as the controversy proceeds, it be not in substance disavowed<sup>b</sup> as a private and unauthoritative hypothesis.

<sup>b</sup> [Mr. Newman’s Theory has been already denounced by the first authorities of American Romanism as subversive of the Catholic Faith, and of revelation itself. It has been assailed by their leading organ, *Brownson’s Quarterly Review* (Boston, U. S.), in a series of very

It has been said that Möhler<sup>c</sup> and De Maistre<sup>d</sup>, to whom Mr. Newman refers as having adopted somewhat similar views (p. 27), have not at all met with universal concurrence among the members of their own communion ; yet, neither of them has dared to approach

able articles. “We have consulted, says the reviewer (Jan. 1847,) as high living authorities on the subject as there are in this country, and they all concur in saying that the Church can propose only what was revealed, and that the revelation committed to the Church was perfect.” This revelation is divided by Romish theologians into Scripture and Tradition, but all, except the new school of development, have agreed as to the *perfection* of the revelation. In direct opposition to the Americans, and to the consentient teaching of the Romish divines, Dr. Wiseman and the *Dublin Review* warmly espouse the cause of Mr. Newman, and assert the incompleteness of the original revelation.]

<sup>c</sup> [This celebrated Bavarian professor of theology was born in 1796, and died in 1838. In his *Symbolik*, Part i. chap. v., he expounds his theory of development (edit. Tübingen, 1832; Munich, 1838).—*Vid.* Hagenbach’s *Hist. of Doctrines*, Vol. ii.]

<sup>d</sup> Mr. Newman might, perhaps, have added the eloquent, enthusiastic, wrong-headed La Mennais : “On la voit (la religion) toujours ancienne et toujours nouvelle, conserver son unité *au milieu des développemens successifs* par lesquels elle passe.” “Elle n’a pas changé en passant d’une révélation à l’autre ; elle n’a fait que se développer et paraître avec un nouveau degré de lumière et d’autorité, &c.” La Mennais, however, applies the principle *chiefly* (where it is perfectly legitimate) to the progressive character of the three dispensations in relation to each other ; and but faintly and secondarily to any imaginary progression of doctrine in the last.—[*Essai sur l’Indifférence.*]

[It is a mistake to regard De Maistre as a favourer of the theory of development. On the contrary, he contends “that there is *nothing new* in the Church of Rome, and that she will never believe anything which she has not always believed.”—*Du Pape*, Liv. i., edit. Paris, 1841. See Dr. Wordsworth’s Letters to M. Gondon, p. 31.]



the candid and courageous avowals of Mr. Newman. The more cautious and long-sighted theologians of the Roman communion have always discountenanced the earlier forms<sup>e</sup> of the present venturous hypothesis. The case of Petavius<sup>f</sup>, and the cordial adoption<sup>g</sup> by the Gallican Church of even his heretical refuter, will at once occur to every one. [I have but to add, for the fact is instructive, that on the question then at issue

<sup>e</sup> [For an interesting sketch of the rise and progress of the theory of development, see Dr. Wordsworth's Letters to M. Gondon, pp. 23-36.]

<sup>f</sup> [Petavius and Newman both employ depreciation of *ancient Christianity* as their best defence of modern Romish corruptions. They both contend that the Tridentine Creed is a correction of its errors, or an enlargement of its imperfect knowledge. The words of Bishop Bull respecting Petavius might have been written for a description of the development school. From the supposition, that the primitive fathers were in error, or imperfectly instructed in Christian doctrine, says the learned Bishop, "Hæc duo facile consequentur ; 1. Patribus trium primorum sæculorum, quos imprimis appellare solent Catholici Reformati, parum tribuendum esse : utpote quibus nondum satis perspecta et patefacta fuêrunt præcipua Christianæ fidei capita. 2. Concilia œcumenica potestatem habere *novos fidei articulos condendi*, sive (ut Petavius loquitur) constituendi et *patefaciendi* ; unde satis prospectum videatur additamentis illis, quæ regulæ fidei assuerunt quæque Christiano orbi obtruserunt Patres Tridentini. Sed istius scholæ magistris nulla religio est pseudo-catholicam suam fidem super fidei vere Catholicæ ruinas ædificare."—*Def. Fid. Nic. Proœm.* § 8.]

<sup>g</sup> [The thanks of the Gallican Church, synodically assembled at St. Germain en Laye, for Bull's *Judicium Ecc. Cath.* (pour le service qu'il rend à l'Eglise Catholique en defendant si bien le jugement qu'elle a porté sur la nécessité de croire la Divinité du Fils de Dieu), were communicated by Bossuet, in a letter to Mr. Nelson, who had presented the volume to the Archbishop, dated July 24, 1700. The letter is given in Nelson's *Life of Bishop Bull*, p. 330, Oxford, 1846.]



Mr. Newman appears fully to sympathize with the rejected doctrine of Petavius; *e. g.* p. 12, &c. 297, where he distinctly denies any Ante-Nicene *consensus* on the doctrine of the Trinity, “as the word (*consensus*) is now commonly understood”—whatever that qualification may import. See also p. 398.] In the memorable first edition of Bossuet’s<sup>h</sup> “Exposition,” suppressed, and recovered<sup>i</sup> by our excellent Wake<sup>j</sup>, the following passage occurred (*Wake*, p. xxiv.):

<sup>h</sup> [Bossuet was, however, no favourer of the doctrine of *progressive* Christianity. In his controversy with the Calvinist, Jurieu, (*Avertissemens, passim*), he explicitly condemns the theory of a progressive religion, which was advocated by that minister, and which agrees in many particulars with the new theory of development.]

<sup>i</sup> [Archbishop Wake should not receive credit for having been the earliest observer of the variations which are manifest upon a collation of the first and second editions of Bossuet’s book. The discovery had been made thirteen or fourteen years previously by M. de la Bastide; and though the *Réponse* to Bossuet, published by this writer, appeared without the author’s name, yet the learned and accurate Bayle did not fail to trace its origin.—See his *Epist. ad fin. Deckherri De Scriptt. ades. Conjectur.*, p. 398. Amstel. 1686.—G.]

<sup>j</sup> [Archbishop Wake (*Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England in the several Articles proposed by M. de Meaux, &c.*, 3rd edit. London, 1687) states that Bossuet’s *Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church* first appeared in manuscript, and was composed either to “satisfy or seduce the late Mareschal de Turenne,” wanting then the chapters “of the Eucharist, Tradition, the Authority of the Church and Pope, which now make up the most considerable part of it.” The other parts were so loosely expressed, that “Protestants who saw it generally believed that Mons. de Meaux durst not publicly own what in his Exposition he privately pretended to be” the doctrine of the Church of Rome. In the beginning of 1671, the Exposition, having been approved by the Archbishop of Rheims and nine other bishops, was sent to press. Previously to

“For M. Daillé, he thinks fit to confine himself to *the first three centuries*, in which it is certain that the Church has left many things to be cleared afterwards, both in its *doctrine* and in its practice.”

This was erased by the doctors of the Sorbonne, as wholly inadmissible, even with the authority of a Bossuet to back it: what would they have said to Mr. Newman's enterprise, which risks the authority and obligation of nearly all the chief differences between us and the Roman Church upon the fortunes of a theory, *itself* a more novel “development” of theological teaching than even they, by his own admission, are now conceded to be? Where has the Church of Rome ever sanctioned such a solution of its controversial embarrassments? Its authorized doctrine is unquestionably that *the very teaching* of the present hour, in all its fulness and precision, has itself been uninterruptedly preserved from the days of the Apostles.

“Hæc veritas *et disciplina* continetur<sup>k</sup> in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, *quæ ipsius Christi ore ab*

publication, Bossuet, anxious to obtain the *imprimatur* of the Sorbonne, submitted it to some of their doctors, who “marked several of the most considerable parts of it, wherein the *Exposition*, by the too great desire of palliating, had absolutely perverted the doctrine of their Church.” At the end of the same year, an altered impression was struck off, and published as the *first edition*. And Archbishop Wake adds: “Since a copy of that very book so marked, as has been said, by the doctors of the Sorbonne, is fallen into my hands, I shall gratify the reader's curiosity,” &c.—*Pref.*, p. iv. At the end of the Preface follows, “*A collection of passages altered by Mons. de Meaux*,” from which Professor Butler quotes in the text.]

<sup>k</sup> [“Synodus Tridentina . . . . perspicuensque hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri.”—G.]



*Apostolis acceptæ*, aut ab ipsis Apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante, *quasi per manus traditæ*, ad nos usque pervenerunt." . . . . . "Traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem, tum ad mores pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas, *et continuâ successione in Ecclesiâ Catholicâ conservatas*, pari pietatis affectu [ac reverentiâ] suspicit [et veneratur] (Synodus)." — *Concil. Trident. Sess. iv.*

And a little after this clear statement of the sole matter of faith, the Council adds, with relation to the interpretation of the Scriptures (a solemn prohibition, to which I beg to draw Mr. Newman's attention, as bearing on his views of the vision in Rev. xii., the Second Commandment, and some other critical novelties he has hazarded or sanctioned), that no one "*contra unanimem consensum Patrum ipsam Scripturam sacram interpretari audeat.*" Mr. Newman, himself, if admitted into the Roman communion according to the usual "Form of reconciling Converts<sup>1</sup>," has solemnly sworn and professed that he would "never take and interpret the Scriptures otherwise than *according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers;*" a vow palpably irreconcilable with the theory, that on many most important points of doctrine, proveable (as Mr. Newman asserts *all* true doctrine is by *all* admitted to be, p. 323) from Scripture, the Fathers had *no definite consciousness at all.*

<sup>1</sup> [The absolution of an heretic is a matter specially reserved for the Pope; (*Sacerdotale*, foll. 42, 44. Venet. 1579.) and in the Pontifical, where the "Ordo ad reconciliandum Apostatam, Schismaticum, vel Hæreticum" is found, there is not any such oath or obligation enjoined as that which was prescribed, in the year 1564, by the Bulls *In sacrosancta* and *Injunctum nobis* of Pope Pius IV.—G.]



Accordingly, to this test of *perpetual* tradition, rightly or wrongly affirmed, the Council *invariably* appeals: “Ea verba (*Rom.* iii. 28, &c.) in eo sensu intelligenda sunt, quem *perpetuus* Ecclesiæ Catholicæ consensus tenuit et expressit.”—Sess. vi. Cap. 8. In the administration of the Eucharist,—“qui mos tanquam *ex traditione apostolicâ descendens* jure ac merito retineri debet.”—Sess. xiii. Cap. 8. [De Euchar.] Of Confession to a Priest.

“Universa Ecclesia *semper intellexit*, institutam [etiam] esse a Domino integram peccatorum confessionem, et omnibus post baptismum lapsis *jure divino necessariam* existere.”—Sess. xiv. Cap. 5. [De Pœnitentiâ.]

I cannot but interrupt my citations to ask Mr. Newman—does he, with his knowledge of ecclesiastical and ritual history, *believe that* assertion? To proceed—Of Extreme Unction [Sess. xiv. Cap. 1. De Extrem. Unct.]

“Quibus verbis [James, v. 14, 15,] *ut ex apostolicâ traditione per manus acceptâ* Ecclesia didicit, docet materiam, formam, proprium ministerium, et effectum hujus salutaris sacramenti.”

Once more I cannot help asking the writer who has found a theory of development absolutely necessary to account for the actual phenomena of Romanism, does *he* believe *that* affirmation of the infallible Council?—does he believe that direct apostolic authority taught the Church in these words the matter, form, minister, and effect of a sacrament as real and universal as the Holy Communion; and that this belief, in all its fulness, *was uninterruptedly held in the universal Church*? But again—Of the entire Doctrine of the Mass (including the ordination of priesthood at the

Last Supper, the celebration of masses to obtain the intercession of saints, the custom of masses in which the priest alone communicates, the custom of whispering the words of consecration and other parts of the “Canon Missæ,” and the mixture of water with the wine), it declares—not merely that such beliefs and practices are legitimate, are allowable deductions from other tenets, are enacted by simple authority, are correct developments of primitive beliefs, but that they are a “*fides fundata in sacrosancto evangelio, apostolorum traditionibus, sanctorumque patrum doctrina,*” which last, it has been previously assumed, must be “*unanimis*” to be authoritative. Sess. xxi. [xxii.] Cap. 9, [De Sac. Missæ], et Canon. Of all the inferior orders of the ministry it declares that—

“*Ab ipso initio Ecclesiæ sequentium ordinum nomina, atque uniuscujusque eorum propria ministeria, subdiaconi scilicet, acolythi, exorcistæ, lectoris, et ostiarii, in usu fuisse cognoscuntur.*”—Sess. xxiii. Cap. 2. [De Sacr. Ord].

Of Marriage as a genuine sacrament, as real as Baptism, conferring an ineffable grace as certain as the Eucharist, the Council affirms, that “*Concilia et universalis Ecclesiæ traditio semper docuerunt*” this truth, and that the heretics, who hesitate to admit that somewhat startling proposition, “*multa ab Ecclesiæ Catholicæ sensu et ab apostolorum temporibus probatâ consuetudine aliena* [scripto et verbo] asseruerunt.”—Sess. xxiv. [De Sac. Mat.] Of Purgatory it pronounces that it teaches it “*ex antiquâ Patrum traditione.*”—Sess. xxv. [De Pur.] Masses for souls in Purgatory are “*juxta apostolorum traditionem;*” as we are infallibly assured.—Sess. xxii. Cap. 2. [De Sacrific. Missæ]. The interces-

sion of saints, the *invocation* of saints, the honour due to relics, and even the “*legitimus imaginum usus*,” the Council gravely declares to be “*juxta [Catholicæ et Apostolicæ] Ecclesiæ usum a primævis Christianæ religionis temporibus receptum*.”—[Sess. xxv. De Invoc. &c.] And even in admitting, as the notoriety of the fact compels, that the half-communion is an innovation, it reduces the alteration under the principle that the Church has power over the mere circumstantial of the sacraments (which, of course, in its right application, we all admit), “*licet ab initio Christianæ religionis non infrequens(!) utriusque speciei usus fuisset*.”—Sess. xxi. Cap. 2 [*De Commun.*]

Such are most of the principal passages of the Council in which its views with regard to the rule of Catholic faith are stated or illustrated. And these are not to be mistaken. The distinct dogmatical enunciation of the fundamental principle at the outset, and all its subsequent applications to special cases as they arose, are quite sufficient to evince that between Mr. Newman's theory and the views of the Tridentine Synodists there is an irreconcilable discrepancy; that *they* assuredly would never have tolerated his venturesome surrender of antiquity; that those who are induced by his statements to accept the theology of Rome, are in fact adopting for that theology an hypothesis her gravest authorities have, by their solemn and *inspired*<sup>m</sup> decision, for ever precluded.

And this is notoriously the doctrine of the chief *expositors* of Romanism. They nearly all earnestly

<sup>m</sup> [“*Sacrosancta Tridentina Synodus, in Spiritu Sancto legitime congregata,*” *passim.*]



maintain that all her tenets, not expressly delivered in Scripture, are, in the clear literal sense, genuine apostolic traditions; that the Holy Virgin was worshipped, that images were publicly bowed before in the churches, that saints and angels were solemnly invoked, by the immediate disciples of the apostles. How they have insulted at times, and in particular instances, the venerable writers of antiquity, is indeed well known<sup>n</sup>; but it was only *after* the most laborious efforts to force upon their words the modern sense; and always with the *general* assertion that the “unanimous consent of the Fathers” was strictly their’s.

Indeed Mr. Newman himself seems in some degree aware that his hypothesis requires some apology. He proceeds to defend it by *philosophical* analogies; without at all remembering that, whatever may be its interest or value as a philosophical speculation, it is by anticipation condemned by the very authorities to whose support it is devoted. After admitting that the *Disciplina Arcani*<sup>o</sup>, so long the favourite resource of

<sup>n</sup> See for a cluster of instances, the Fourth Part of James’s Treatise on Romish “Corruption of Scripture, Councils, and Fathers,” &c. (p. 359, edit. 1688—On “Contemning and Condemning of Fathers.”

<sup>o</sup> [An excellent account of this matter may be found in Bingham’s *Antiquities*, Book x. Chapter v. The most celebrated treatises on the Romish side of the question were published by the Vatican librarian Schelstrate, and the Benedictine Scholliner; the former, Romæ, 1685, and the latter, typis Monast. Tegerns. 1756. Daillé maintains that the ancient Discipline was not introduced previously to the year 260; (*De libris suppos. Dion. et Ignat.* i. xxii. 142.) but Tertullian has plainly spoken of the silence observed with respect to mysteries. (*Apol.* Cap. vii.) It remains, nevertheless, for Romanists to adduce even the shadow of a proof that the peculiarities of their

Roman controversialists, is utterly inadequate to solve the admitted "difficulty" of the "variation" of mediæ-

system were among the sacred truths in which catechumens were gradually initiated.—G.]

[See Faber's *Apostolicity of Trinitarianism*, Book i. Chap. viii., also Newman's *Arians*, Chap. i. sect. iii. To the objection of the Reformed, that the Roman peculiarities are not to be found in the early records of the Church, Schelstrate replied by this bold assertion, that all these (e. g. Transubstantiation, Seven Sacraments, Image Worship, &c.) formed part of the *disciplina arcani*, and were not committed to writing, lest they should come to the knowledge of the uninitiated. It is hard to say whether this or the development hypothesis is the more daring and comprehensive. "It is but working with this admirable tool, called *disciplina arcani*, and then all the seeming contradictions between the ancient doctrines and practices of the Church universal, and the novel corruptions of the modern Church of Rome, will vanish and disappear."—*Bingham, ubi sup.*

The origin of this secret discipline seems to have been the distinction between prepared and unprepared hearers, in conformity with our Lord's precept, "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs." This rule of communicating religious knowledge was developed into a regular *system*. Allusions to a certain *reserve* occur in preceding writers, but Tertullian first speaks of the discipline as a formal system. He points it out as a characteristic of heretics (*De præscr. Hær.* xli.) that they are "without *discipline* ; it is doubtful who is a catechumen, who a believer ; they have all access alike, they hear alike, they pray alike. Even if heathens come in upon them, they will cast that which is holy unto dogs, and pearls, false though they be, before swine."—*Oxford Transl.*, Vol. x. p. 476. In after ages we have a detailed account of the *mysteries* which were concealed from catechumens, viz.:—1. The manner of administering Baptism. 2. The unction of chrism, or Confirmation. 3. The Ordination of Priests. 4. The manner of celebrating the Eucharist. 5. The Divine Service of the Church. 7. The mystery of the Trinity, the Creed, and Lord's Prayer, until they were ready for Baptism.]

val from primitive Christianity, or, in other words, to account for the difference between the general systems of doctrine of which Rome and England are the existing representatives—he proceeds, p. 27:

“It is undoubtedly an hypothesis to account for a *difficulty*; and such are the various explanations given by astronomers, from Ptolemy to Newton, of the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies. But it is as unphilosophical on that account to object to the one as to object to the other. Nay, more so; for an hypothesis, such as the present, rests upon facts as well as accounts for them; and independently of the *need* of it, it is urged upon us by the nature of the case. Nor is it more reasonable to express surprise, that at this time of day a theory is necessary, granting for argument sake that the theory is *novel*, than to have directed a similar wonder in disparagement of the theory of gravitation or the Plutonian theory in geology. Doubtless, the theory of the Secret and the theory of Developments are *expedients*, and so is the dictum of Vincentius, so is the art of grammar or the use of the quadrant, it is an expedient to enable us to solve what has now become a necessary and an anxious problem.”

And he adds, that “the reception of the Roman doctrine cannot be immediately based on the results” of the theory; an assertion which (however incompatible with the declaration in the postscript to Mr. Newman’s prefatory advertisement, that a “conviction of the truth of the conclusion to *which the discussion leads* superseded further deliberation” about joining the Roman communion), is undoubtedly true, if it be



certain the Roman doctrine of tradition flatly contradicts the new theory.

It will, I think, be moreover admitted that the passage just cited is somewhat obscure. The "difficulty" of which Mr. Newman speaks as if it were a perplexity common to us all, is surely a difficulty to none but a person who has embraced *the Romish theory*; to *him* (and Mr. Newman abundantly discloses the feeling) the variations in question are indeed a most formidable difficulty; to others they bring but the regret which charity must ever prompt when it witnesses the noblest gift of God—His holy and unchangeable truth—abused and sullied by the wanton perversity of man. And then the theory of Gravitation, in which the Principle and the Facts to be explained thereby are both unquestionable realities of experience, is compared to a solution resting upon two enormous hypothetical assumptions,—infallible guidance to a particular Church, and a divine design of constantly manifesting new progressive forms and varieties of doctrine in the history of the Church at large<sup>p</sup>. What the nature of the analogy may be between Vincentius' Rule<sup>q</sup> (which

<sup>p</sup> "Some hypothesis," says Mr. Newman, "all parties, all controversialists, all historians, *must* adopt, if they would treat of Christianity at all."—p. 129. And he then mentions the supposition of Papal Infallibility as a hypothesis of the sort that a historian *must* adopt. This is, in truth, to confuse the proper and undoubted office of the philosophical historian (to reduce his facts as well as he can to general principles of human nature or divine government) with that which is the very essence of false philosophy—the invention of *gratuitous* and *superfluous* suppositions,—suppositions which can neither be previously proved to *be* facts, nor are required *by* the facts.

<sup>q</sup> [In ipsâ item Catholicâ Ecclesiâ magnoperè curandum est ut id

simply expresses what he considered the ideal of perfect historical evidence) and the hypothesis of development, I am really unable even to conjecture.

II. In the mean time I am, I apprehend, perfectly justified in affirming, in the second place, that this theory—whatever judgment may be passed by the Roman authorities upon its prudence or validity—is in reality what I have called it, a plain *surrender* of the claims of Romanism to satisfactory evidence from Antiquity. The claim of antiquity and the hypothesis of development (in Mr. Newman's application of the term) are absolutely incompatible. They are so *ex vi terminorum*. Even conceding (what no human ingenuity will ever make commonly plausible to unprejudiced minds,) that the mediæval corruptions are legitimate developments of primitive doctrine, it is manifest that they are admitted not to be *themselves* primitive doctrine. Unless the acorn be the oak, the doctrine of the Incarnation is not "the deification" of St. Mary;"

teneamus, *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus*, creditum est.—*Advers. Hæres.* Oxon. A. D. 1631, Cap. iii. fol. 8.]

<sup>r</sup> I adopt Mr. Newman's own most awful expression, p. 405, *et seq.* The phrase itself, except as a metaphor, belongs to the extravagances of mystical theology, in which it was built upon a preposterous application of 2 Pet. i. 4. Mr. Newman's use of it is, however, different from that of Rusbrock or Harphius; and infinitely more dangerous and unwarrantable.

[Mr. Newman honestly confesses the "Deification of S. Mary" to be the doctrine of the Romish Church, a confession which would have saved previous controversialists an infinity of toil. The Bishop of Exeter, in the second of his admirable "*Letters to Charles Butler, Esq.*," has proved but too clearly how correct is the term used by Mr. Newman to express the Romish *cultus* of the Blessed Virgin.



—unless the oak can be “developed” from the acorn, yet be with it simultaneous, these doctrines did not originally exist together. I have, indeed, not the least doubt that this theory will but add another to Mr. Newman’s retractations before long, its controversial inconveniences being so pressing and palpable; but, in the mean time, be it remembered that the concession has been *made*—made by a writer whose competency in point of learning no one, I suppose, will doubt, and who has proved, by the most decisive of all tests, his attachment to the system whose peculiarities he thus candidly admits to have no distinct and definite model in antiquity.

And having once adopted his theory, Mr. Newman

But on no point have Romish polemics spent more subtilty, than in denying this deification, and reconciling the denial with their teaching respecting her whom we, as well as they, call blessed.]

[Dr. Milner (*End of Controv.* Letter xxxiii.) cites with approbation the following words which occur in Bp. Challoner’s abridgment of Gother’s *Papist misrepresented and represented*: “Cursed is every Goddess-worshipper,” &c. It is remarkable, however, that Justus Lipsius, in his *Virgo Hallensis*, has frequently styled the Virgin Mary “Goddess;” (Molinæi *Iconomach.* 94. Tenison *Of Idol.* 230.) and Cardinal Bembo, writing in the name of Pope Leo X., has also given to her the same name. (*Epistt.* viii. xvii. 294. Basil. 1566.) No longer then can it be said with truth, that “inauditum est Catholicis Mariam pro Dea colendam.” (Canisius, *De Maria Deip.* iii. x. 300. Ingolst. 1583.) Bellarmin does not hesitate to declare that the Saints are “Dii per participationem;” (*De cult. Sanctt.* iii. ix.) and this is likewise the doctrine of Cajetan. (*In S. Thomæ Secundam Secundæ*, Quæst. lxxxviii. Art. v. fol. 145, b. Lugd. 1540. Conf. Hadr. Lyræi *Trisagion Marianum*, p. 10. Antv. 1648.) Accordingly in the preface to the second *Book of sacred Ceremonies* mention is distinctly made of “Divorum nostrorum Apotheoses.” (fol. 148. Colon. Agripp. 1557.)—G.]



is too candid, his unquestioning "faith" too fearless, to evade the admission. We have already seen how he styles his hypothesis an "expedient" to remedy the great and oppressive "difficulty" of the "apparent variation" of the Romanism of Pius IV. from that of Clemens Romanus. He follows the difficulty through all its *details*. At the outset he meets and rejects the time-honoured canon of Vincentius; how much trouble would have been spared our divines, had this honest policy been adopted in earlier days! The rule of Vincentius is "hardly available now, or effective of any satisfactory result."—p. 24. He argues, with abundance of references, that the ante-Nicene fathers spoke vaguely and inaccurately about the Trinity; apparently forgetting, that if these citations do not express positive error of doctrine, they can be of very little real service, in a question where the scriptural evidence is so clear, to his argument as against the Anglican Rule of Faith; and that if they *do*, they are utterly incompatible—1, with the doctrine of *perpetual* infallibility; 2, with that of "the *unanimous* consent of the Fathers;" and 3, with the theory of development *itself*, unless (admitting the early Church in partial error, and the latter wholly right) we hold that a germ can be "developed" into its own *contradictory*. Mr. Newman, indeed, seems to consider it a sort of proof of the vitality of (what he calls) Catholicism, that it can survive incessant self-contradictions. "The theology of St. Thomas, nay, of the very Church of his period, is *built* on that very Aristotelism, which the early fathers denounce as the source of all misbelief, and in particular, of the Arian and Monophysite

heresies.”—p. 451. And he exults, that the Roman Church can achieve these mysterious transmutations of belief, with a dignity, grace, and security the various sects would emulate in vain: an argument of divine protection which can only be compared with its *moral* counterpart, the celebrated inference of Baronius<sup>s</sup> from the wickedness of the Popes of the tenth century, that the See of Peter *must* be the object of special favour from heaven, to have outlived such unparalleled monsters. As might be expected from this course of argument, Mr. Newman treats the lights of the early Church with strong general approbation and keen particular censure. When it becomes apparently dangerous to admit a doctrine of great importance to be altogether a modern “development,” the ancient testimonies that oppose it are easily resolved into the peculiarities of a “school.” Thus there was (which, indeed, is true enough) the “Syrian school”<sup>t</sup>, p. 287: and this Syrian school appears to have been strangely blind to the Lateran dogma of “Transubstantiation;” for “certainly some of the most cogent passages brought

<sup>s</sup> [See Ussher’s Works, Vol. ii. p. 69: Ed. Elrington.]

[The allusion is to the Cardinal’s observations in his Annals of the end of the ninth and the commencement of the tenth age. He attributes the evils of that dismal period not, of course, to the Papacy itself; but he laments, as the greatest misfortune, the arrogance of some ungodly Princes, who usurped the power of electing to the Pontificate, and through whose tyranny even into the see of Rome were intruded “visu horrenda monstra.”—G.]

<sup>t</sup> [The Syrian School is meant by Mr. Newman to express not any localized institution (such as the school of Alexandria), but a “method characteristic of the Syrian churches,” which method was an application to the critical and literal sense of Scripture, as distin-



by moderns against the *Catholic* doctrine of the Eucharist, are taken from writers who are connected with that *school*;" in support of which Mr. Newman specifies St. Chrysostom's memorable letter to Cæsarius<sup>u</sup>, (of great importance, as being a direct *dogmatical* statement, of perfect clearness and simplicity, and so forming a key to all that great preacher's lofty meta-

guished from the mystical and allegorical. Of this school Dorotheus was one of the earliest teachers; its great exegetical doctor was Theodore of Mopsuestia. Mr. Newman refers further to this school S. Cyril of Jerusalem, and also S. Chrysostom and Theodoret, both Syrians.]

<sup>u</sup> ["Sicut enim antequam sanctificetur panis, panem nominamus; divina autem illum sanctificante gratia, mediante Sacerdote, liberatus est quidem ab appellatione panis, dignus autem habitus Dominici Corporis appellatione, etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit, et non duo Corpora, sed unum Corpus Filii prædicamus," &c. (*Opp.* Tom. iii. p. 744. edit. Bened.) The Epistle of S. Chrysostom to the Monk Cæsarius was adduced in controversy by Peter Martyr about the year 1548, and he deposited a transcript of it, taken from a Florentine manuscript, in the library of Abp. Cranmer. After this Prelate's death the document was destroyed or lost, and Cardinal Du Perron availed himself of the opportunity thus presented of pronouncing it to be a forgery. (*De l'Euchar.* pp. 381-3.) However, after much discussion and recrimination between the contending parties, the letter was published at Paris, in 1680, by Emericus Bigotius, in company with Palladius's *Life of Chrysostom*. This proceeding was not acceptable to some Doctors of the Sorbonne; and they actually caused the printed leaves to be exterminated, without providing anything to supply their place. An *Expostulatio* with reference to this disreputable conduct of the Parisian Divines was prefixed by Peter Allix to S. Anastasius *In Hexaëmeron*, Lond. 1682; and a very minute description of the mutilation may be found in the Preface to Mr. Mendham's *Index of Pope Gregory XVI.*, pp. xxxii-iv. Lond. 1840. Le Moyne put forth this important Epistle at the end of the first volume of his *Varia Sacra*, in 1685; and the



phors in other places,) Theodoret's<sup>v</sup> similar and irresistible statement, and Facundus<sup>w</sup>. At other times, he admits that the earlier writers were "left in *ignorance*," and subsequent teachers "*completed* their work;" and he proceeds to specify the following instances of a "completion" of primitive views, which will give your readers a fair exemplification of the meaning of the "theory of development," and its admirable uses in controversy:—

"Clement MAY hold a purgatory, yet tend to consider all punishment purgatorial, . . . . . St. Hilary may believe in a purgatory, yet CONFINE IT TO THE DAY OF JUDGMENT . . . . . Prayers for the faithful de-

reprint by J. Basnage appeared in 8vo., at Utrecht, in 1687. At length a Jesuit, Hardouin, came forward as a publisher of it in the year 1689; and in 1721 it was edited by the Marquis Maffei from a MS. in the library of the Dominicans of S. Mark at Florence. See it in the *Lectiones Antiquæ* of Canisius, according to Basnage's impression, Tom. i. pp. 233–237. Antwerp. 1725. Cf. Routh, *Scriptorum Eccles. Opusc.* ii. 127. Oxon. 1840.—G.]

<sup>v</sup> [Ἀυτὸς τὰ ὁρώμενα σύμβολα τῇ τοῦ Σώματος καὶ Αἵματος προσηγορίᾳ τετίμηκεν, οὐ τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλὼν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει τὴν χάριν προστεθεικώς.—Dial. i. Tom. iv. p. 18: edit. Lutetiæ, 1642. (For a powerful argument on these words, see Taylor's *Real Presence*, Sect. xii. 30.) And again (Dial. ii. p. 85): Οὐδὲ γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἁγιασμόν τὰ μυστικὰ σύμβολα τῆς οἰκείας ἐξίσταται φύσεως· μένει γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ σχήματος, καὶ τοῦ εἶδους, καὶ ὁρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἅπτα οἷα καὶ πρότερον ἦν.]

<sup>w</sup> ["Potest Sacramentum adoptionis adoptio nuncupari, sicut Sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Ejus, quod est in pane et poculo consecrato, corpus Ejus et sanguinem dicimus: non quòd propriè corpus Ejus sit panis, et poculum sanguis; sed quòd in se mysterium corporis Ejus sanguinisque contineant." (Facundus, Episc. Hermianens., *Pro defens. trium Capitulor.* Lib. ix. Cap. v. p. 144. Paris. 1679: vel inter *Opp.* Sirmondi, Tom. ii. col. 507. Venet. 1728.)—G.]

parted may be found in the early liturgies, yet with an INDISTINCTNESS WHICH INCLUDED ST. MARY and the Martyrs in the same rank with the imperfect Christians, whose sins were as yet unexpiated, . . . . . and succeeding times might keep what was exact, and supply what was *deficient*.<sup>x</sup>—p. 354.

“Deficient!” The belief that it might be right to solemnly commend the faithful dead to the care of God, and to *include* among the number the Virgin Mary, as one of God’s honoured servants who had departed this life “in the true faith of his holy name,” was a *deficient* belief, because it did not add to that tenet and practice the further *supplementary* belief that the Virgin thus commended to God’s care and mercy in the general roll of His deceased, was, in reality, already exalted to the throne of the universe, to be prayed *to*, not (without unspeakable insult) prayed *for*—“the refuge of sinners,” the “channel of all graces to man,” the “*deified* St. Mary!” In other words, the early notion was deficient, because it did not include its own direct contradiction. Again: it was “deficient” because it commended to God the care of His holy servants as those who alone were fitly to be commemorated in the meetings of the Christian household, and forgot to *add* another *completory* state-

<sup>x</sup> Other instances of a different kind, and bearing no direct reference to Roman doctrine, are mingled with these. Mr. Newman forgets that in *those* cases there is (so far as they were errors—one is not quite satisfied about corrective “developments” of the *Athanasian Creed*, *ibid.*) abundant *contemporary* evidence to oppose individual errors; whereas the Roman innovations can produce none, or next to none, in their favour *synchronizing* with the testimonies that oppose them.

ment of a fact, in its whole spirit diametrically *opposed* to the former, and which, itself an absolute invention, is now formally founded upon a theory of *satisfactions* wholly unknown to primitive times. To take another of the cases specified,—among those who did, vaguely and indecisively, venture to speculate about possible purifications after death, St. Hilary<sup>y</sup>, as a private conjecture, thought some passages in Scripture (as Mal. iii. 2.) seemed to point to some universal trial of all mankind (Hilary specially included the Virgin Mary) by fire at the day of judgment. Now St. Hilary's notion was “deficient,” because he should have *combined* with his conception of an universal fire of probation at the day of judgment the *additional* idea of that fire *not* being universal at all but particular; not at all at the day of judgment, but directly after death, and for hundreds of thousands of years; not at all probatory, but *punitive*; as well as devising for it further *reasons*, objects, and purposes of which the good man never dreamed, and which were equally and manifestly inconsistent with his own notions; with (to crown all, in this simple and uniform process of natural development) a firm belief and clear perception that the substituted doctrine was no longer, as *his* had been, a matter of free though interesting speculation, but a tenet of such fundamental importance, that no man could at all understand Christianity without it, and no man have the remotest chance of salvation who

<sup>y</sup> [The language of St. Hilary (Homil. 22, 26) is wholly irreconcilable with the Romish Purgatory. “He that can reconcile them will be a most mighty man in controversy.”—Bp. Taylor's *Dissuasive*, Part ii. Book ii. sect. ii.]



denied it. This is what Mr. Newman calls “the Fathers *fixing their minds* on what they taught, grasping it more and more closely, viewing it *on various sides*, trying its CONSISTENCY, weighing their own separate expressions,” and thus arriving at further perceptions of truth (p. 353). With such specimens as these (and these are far more plausible than some others on which Mr. Newman boldly tries to fit his theory) of the facility with which modern Romanism may be seminally found in the records of early Christianity, who shall any longer regard as extravagant the “shoulder-knot” argument in Swift’s ludicrous parody<sup>z</sup>?

There is a conclusion which must at once occur to every one in perusing such speculations as these of Mr. Newman; namely, that if things be really as he represents them, it must be not only useless but positively *injurious* to study the early writers at all. Useless, surely—for who that can enjoy the noonday would linger in the dawn?—but, moreover, pernicious, for in so faint a twilight not only the eyes are injured by straining the vision, but *objects themselves* are liable to be seen in the most mistaken and distorted aspects. Whether considered doctrinally or practically, Mr. Newman manifestly thinks the religion of the middle ages a vast improvement on the religion of St. Cyprian and St. Irenæus. As regards DOCTRINE, this is plainly and confessedly the substance and tendency of his whole argument; he, undoubtedly, holds it was given to Aquinas and Scotus to reach dogmatic apprehensions, of which those “children in understanding”

<sup>z</sup> [Tale of a Tub, sect. 3.]

above-mentioned had sometimes imperfect conceptions, sometimes no conceptions at all. If there be a difference of any sort between Augustine and Liguori (and if there be not, what becomes of Mr. Newman's theory?), it must manifestly be incalculably to the advantage of the latter. Nay, as persons of feeble powers of vision, in the midst of a bright and abounding illumination, will see better than the strongest eyes in glimmer and haze, minds of very inferior *faculties* now-a-days must be strangely wanting to themselves if they are not far advanced in theological attainments beyond such beginners as Basil and Chrysostom; to compare the catechetical schools of Alexandria, Antioch, Cæsarea, with our Irish Maynooth, would palpably be an insult to the latter, too gross for even the licensed bitterness of religious controversy. While again, as to PRACTICE, Mr. Newman explicitly speaks of such men as St. Bruno and his fellows as specimens of an excellence of which early days presented but immature *types*; nor, indeed, if doctrine be eminently practical, can it be doubted that with the increase of doctrinal development piety must have, on the whole, proportionably increased; and thus the primitive martyrs and confessors come to be but meagre models of perfection after all. It will also very plainly follow, that the custom of "expurgating" Fathers, which we have so long ignorantly regarded as the vilest process of dishonesty extant in the history of religion, is no other than the obligatory function of the growing Church. What mature mind would allow its juvenile efforts at authorship to circulate uncorrected? But, now, is this inference capable of no *further* applica-



tion? Have we yet seen the termination of the prospect it opens? An Object stands at the end of this long vista of the past history of the Church's dogmatical and devotional literature,—an Object venerable, indeed, yet scarcely more venerable than the Church's own conscious belief at any epoch, if *both* be alike inspired. What can subtract the Bible itself from the grasp of this argument? If the developed organism should fitly supersede the elementary germ, to no book does this latter character (according to the very spirit of this theory) more perfectly apply than to the Holy Scriptures themselves. If the Athanasian Creed, authenticated by an infallible Church, was, as Mr. Newman observes in a place already alluded to, susceptible of alteration, on what conceivable principle should the Bible be respected? Can one infallibly authorized document rank higher than another? or is the Bible, consisting chiefly of insinuations and hints of doctrine rather than express enunciations, as we are perpetually told, clearer, plainer, more distinct as an expression of truth, than the Athanasian Creed? When we weigh all this, we can see some consistency in the principles which in the Roman expurgatory Index<sup>a</sup> led to the

<sup>a</sup> [More accurately the *Index of prohibited books*, issued by Pope Clement VIII., Romæ, 1596. §. ii. De correct. libror.—The letter of this law, which may, perhaps, be considered scarcely objectionable, seems to be a carrying out of the Tridentine *Decretum de editione et usu sacrorum librorum*: (Sess. iv.) “Post hæc temeritatem illam reprimere volens, qua ad profana quæque convertuntur et torquentur verba et sententiæ sacræ Scripturæ; ad scurrilia scilicet, fabulosa, vana, adulationes, detractationes, superstitiones, impias et diabolicas incantationes, divinationes, sortes, libellos etiam famosos, mandat et præcipit [Synodus,] ad tollendam hujusmodi irreveren-



jealous precaution, "*Expungi etiam oportet verba Scripturæ sacræ, quæcunque ad profanum usum impié accommodantur.*" Why, indeed, should the "verba Scripturæ sacræ" be treated with more ceremony than the words of any received doctor in a Church under guidance as constant and unfailing as the Scriptures themselves could claim, and perpetually, as the new theory would maintain, growing in *fuller* and yet fuller knowledge? Why should the authentic book of the apostolic age be regarded as any more than the authentic book of any other equally inspired age? Why so *much*, since it was the earliest, and, therefore, the most unformed, and indecisive, and immature?

There is a further application of these considerations which perhaps my last remarks will have suggested to your readers. I may yet refer to it; though, I confess, I scarcely like drawing forth, even in argument, such inferences to the public view. Those who are at all acquainted with the views of modern neologism relative to our blessed Lord himself will understand what I mean; and will observe this new and instructive exemplification of the invariable law which (though she boasts to be our only preservative from such evils) evermore identifies the philosophy of Romanism and Rationalism as fundamentally one.

Habit, or a kind of instinct of preservation, does indeed induce Mr. Newman at times to bring together what proofs he can from the early ages, of practices that may countenance the Roman innovations. But

tiam et contemptum, ne de cætero quisquam quomodolibet verba Scripturæ sacræ ad hæc et similia audeat usurpare."—G.]

his *admissions* are nevertheless decisive. For example, 1st, of Image Worship, after telling us that the early Christians used the sign of the cross, that Constantine had a cross on his standard, and that Julian the Apostate<sup>b</sup> charged them with worshiping the cross (a conclusive authority, doubtless), he adds, with perfect simplicity, “IN A LATER AGE [he might have added, after violent struggles] the worship of *images* was INTRODUCED.”—p. 357. Again: “The introduction of images *was still later*, and met with more opposition in the West than in the East.” And he adds the hollow sophistry of Damascene<sup>c</sup>, who unfortunately became the defender of this lamentable corruption, that the worship of images was a sin *only* because the Gentiles made them gods; whereas to Christians images are a triumph, &c.—pp. 362, 363. This, it will be remembered, was far in the *eighth* century. Again, 2nd, of the Worship of Saints and Angels he tells us (p. 400): “The treatment of the Arian and Monophysite errors [in the fourth and fifth centuries] became *the natural* INTRODUCTION of the *cultus sanctorum*.” 3rd, Of the Worship of the Virgin Mary: “As is well known, the special prerogatives of St. Mary were not fully recognized in the Catholic ritual TILL A LATE DATE.”—p. 384. And again: “There was in the first ages no public and ecclesiastical [as if there *was* any other!] recognition of the place which St. Mary holds in the economy of grace.” 4th, Of Purgatory: “As time went on”—[my readers know that the “public and

<sup>b</sup> [Vid. S. Cyrill. Alex. *Cont. Julian*. Lib. vi. p. 194. ed. Spanhem. Lips. 1696.—G.]

<sup>c</sup> [*Apol. pro ven. sanct. Imagg.* L. ii. fol. 39. Paris. 1555.—G.]

ecclesiastical recognition" of Purgatory took place a full *thousand* years later than even St. Augustine's varying and contradictory speculations<sup>d</sup> about its possibility]—" *as time went on*, the doctrine of Purgatory was *opened upon the apprehension* of the Church ;" " the mind of the Church working out dogmatic truths from implicit *feelings*."—p. 417. But " Catholic principles" were even "*later* in development than Catholic doctrines ;" and "*to this day*," among other matters, " the seat of infallibility remains more or less undeveloped, or at least undefined by the Church."—p. 368. Why this last most important " Catholic principle" should still remain " undeveloped" we are not very satisfactorily informed : it certainly is *not* that the whole mind of the Roman Church has not been most anxiously, eagerly, and incessantly " working" on the subject ; for there is scarcely any other which has so completely busied her from the Council of Constance to the present day. I cannot derive much light from Mr. Newman's solution, that such a matter as this is rather her " assumption than her objective profession." Does he really mean to convey that the doctrine of infallibility and its accompaniments rank anywhere but among the most deliberate formal dogmas of the Roman Church ? Does he mean to say that the *seat* of infallibility is only tacit " assumption," when he cannot but know that it is the ground of constant disputation, and of a bitter though decorous schism between the two great divisions of the Roman Communion ?

<sup>d</sup> [For a full discussion of St. Austin's Purgatorial opinions, see Bp. Taylor's *Dissuasive*, Part ii. Book ii. sect. ii.]



To all these ample admissions that the primitive theology was destitute of the subsequent Romish elements—admissions which are ill compensated by apparently anxious, but certainly not very successful, efforts to detect traces sufficient to supply some germ for the “development” which is, at the distance of some centuries, faithfully to follow—Mr. Newman subjoins, near the close of his volume, a very valuable illustration. He cites a former paper of his own upon those most remarkable and important relics, the Epistles of St. Ignatius. The object of the paper is to exhibit the *maturity* of doctrine contained in these epistles of a disciple of St. John; to shew how much which Dissenters from the Church are in the habit of regarding as modern corruptions is there fully recognized. I need not recount the particulars, as I may take for granted your readers are acquainted with the Epistles themselves, and will readily admit the general assertion :—

“Let it be granted only so far as this,” argues Mr. Newman, “that the substance of them is what Ignatius wrote, and those who deny this may wrestle as they best can with the greater difficulties in which they will find themselves, and is any further witness wanting to prove that the Catholic system [I am quoting Mr. Newman of 1839, it will be remembered], not in an inchoate state, not in doubtful dawnings, not in *tendencies* or in *implicit teaching*, or in *temper*, or in *surmises*, but *in a definite, complete, and dogmatic, form* was the religion of St. Ignatius; and if so, where in the world did he come by it? How came he to lose, to blot out from his mind, the true Gospel, if this was

not it? How came he to possess this, except it be apostolic? One does not know which of the two most to be struck with, his precise, unhesitating tone, or the compass of doctrine he goes through," &c.—p. 395.

It was characteristic of Mr. Newman's fearless candour to quote this; for the application to the question before us is surely obvious. Here is a plain avowal of the *definiteness* of Christian doctrine from the very first; an admission that the future belief was even then no mere "temper" or "tendency;" yet *here*, with almost all the leading features of doctrinal and practical Catholicism, there is not even a trace of any one of the distinctive peculiarities of Romanism. Not a trace, through the whole seven epistles of this propounder of a distinct and complete dogmatic Christianity<sup>e</sup>. If, as Mr. Newman afterwards urges, two or three subjects are not specially mentioned ("original sin, &c."—p. 396), will this explain the fact that no allusion is made to topics that must (on supposition of their existence) have lain directly in the writer's way? Perpetually enforcing Church unity through cordial submission to the Church's governors, how does it happen that the blessed martyr makes not the remotest reference to that which the authentic champions of Romanism have constantly affirmed to have been from the first the admitted guarantee of unity? Even Mr. Newman endeavours to show that the Papacy was already in at least embryonic existence; and condescends to revive the long-exploded argument from the

<sup>e</sup> The Eucharistic passages, I need not say, are no where stronger in Ignatius than in our own Service and Catechism, and of course admit of exactly the same interpretation.

title of St. Clement's contemporary epistle<sup>f</sup>. If, then, Clement was really a seminal Hildebrand, and described his Church as "presiding in the Roman region," from some dim, half conscious, but real anticipations of future greatness, it is surely somewhat strange that the "definite, complete, and dogmatic" system of Ignatius' theology should have been absolutely without this important element. Truly Mr. Newman had best adhere steadily to his "development" theory; and not suffer himself to be thus at times betrayed into the fond dream of really verifying modern Romanism in the Catholicism of the Apostolic Fathers. Meanwhile, the Church of England is content with the theology which contented Ignatius.

It is scarcely possible to overstate the importance of this admission, that, after all the long and earnest efforts of her devoted advocates to demonstrate that the Roman Church has delivered to us the simple Christianity of antiquity, the attempt must honestly be given up as hopeless. There is, indeed, something very providential in the case. Scarcely any one but a person situated just as Mr. Newman has been, could have prosecuted such an argument, and brought it so satisfactorily to this result. A professed Anglican theologian denying the antiquity of Romanism, would have been regarded as a mere partisan controversialist,

<sup>f</sup> [Mr. Newman's argument is not derived from the *title* of St. Clement's epistle, but from the fact that "St. Clement, in the name of the Roman Church, writes a letter to the Corinthians, when they were without a bishop."—p. 22. The description of the Church of Rome as "*presiding* in the Roman region" occurs not in St. Clement, but in *St. Ignatius*.—Epist. ad Rom. ed. Jacobson, Tom. ii. p. 344.]



echoing what others had said, and speaking rather what he wished than what he knew. A professed Romanist, on the other hand, would scarcely have ventured to risk his Church's reputation upon the chances of a semi-philosophical theory of "development;" knowing that, though the theory might go the way of a thousand theories before it, the fatal admission it involved would not be readily forgotten. Mr. Newman being in a transitional state, neither Anglican nor formally and definitely Roman, was emancipated from both these restraints, and has accordingly opened his mind freely, fairly, and irrecoverably. His previous education in our great Anglican University had fortunately expanded to him the whole field of antiquity, without those perverting biasses by which Romish training would have prepossessed his judgment; accordingly he could not be deceived by the hollowness of the common pretences of the Roman theologians on behalf of their tenets; whatever merits mediæval Romanism might claim, he knew antiquity too well not to know it could not really claim *that*. It might be (as he seems to dream) something better than antiquity, but it was not antiquity. Still,—if I may without presumption go on and venture to sketch what I have little doubt is nearly the true history of this case, and of many others,—his imagination and feelings were irreparably engaged; and reason, as usual, was soon busily active in devising subtle argumentative grounds to justify his choice. He had before his fancy a bright ideal of Unity, Perpetuity, Holiness, Self-denial, Majesty,—in short, that "glorious Church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such

thing," which the Lord of the whole Church is *yet* to present to Himself "holy and without blemish;" in the impatience of desire he had come to identify his ideal with the actual Church of history; by constantly dwelling among the highly-wrought devotional works of holy men in the Roman communion—works which utterly spoil the taste for the calmer and more intellectualized piety of our divines (very much as romances debauch the taste for solid reading), his heart was seduced into forgetting the vices of thousands in the heroic virtues of comparatively few, and (what is much worse) the gross doctrinal errors of those few for the sake of the ardent piety their effusions seemed to embody; until at length the errors became tolerable, became acceptable, became welcome, were received as truths; and then the work was accomplished. But all was not yet secure. In this crisis arose the necessity of accounting for the undeniable absence of certain prominent peculiarities of the system from the records, not only of inspiration but of antiquity for centuries. Others might not feel the difficulty; *he* could not escape it. And so by degrees the thought grew into shape, fitting itself as it grew with goodly apparel from the "wardrobe" of one of the richest imaginations of our time, that the Church of Christ *might perhaps*, be meant to embody one living, growing, self-organizing scheme of belief; that it *might* have been intended spiritually to nourish itself by imbibing and assimilating materials from all around it; incorporating into itself all the truths of all mankind, permeating them with its own transforming spirit, and moulding them into new shapes, so that what was before gentile error and worthless superstition became merely, by virtue of



this regenerating adoption, high and holy truth ; nor this alone,—but that by brooding over its original store of doctrine, it might be endowed with a faculty of expanding it into totally new and unsuspected forms, even into collecting new Objects of Worship, legitimate sharers in divine adoration, from their relation to Him, whom it once seemed the first principle of all religion to maintain in sole and incommunicable supremacy. Such was the “theory of development,”—an hypothesis in many respects brilliant, attractive, imposing; having against it only such objections as these,—that it was utterly destitute of evidence beyond its utility for the explanation of the (unnecessary) difficulty that suggested it; and that in somewhat alleviating that difficulty, it introduced others of ten-fold magnitude peculiar to itself.

But the dimensions of your Journal are not calculated for lengthy disquisitions, and I must pause. I have endeavoured to show, that Mr. Newman’s theory is *profitless* to Romanism, for it is flatly contradictory to her own recorded and unalterable decisions ; that it is *dangerous* to Romanism, for it surrenders her long-cherished claim to evidence from antiquity, and gives her in return only a precarious hypothesis which she has herself in substance repeatedly disavowed. With all this, however, I have only now approached the main theory itself, and its merits. With your permission, I will humbly attempt to estimate its intrinsic claims in my next communication.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your’s faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.



## LETTER II.

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DEAR SIR,

IN the letter which appeared in your last Number I drew the attention of your readers to the very important fact, that the theory of Mr. Newman is absolutely inconsistent with the deliberate affirmation of the most authoritative of all Roman Councils ; that Council, whose definitions and Canons are, in the peculiar creed of the modern Romish Church, alone *specially and by name* commended to the undoubting reception of all her members<sup>a</sup>. Artfully ambiguous and elaborately qualified as are many of the declarations of Trent (for the prelates of that Council were

<sup>a</sup> [The following are the terms in which all ecclesiastics and converts are required to profess their assent to the Tridentine Canons : “ Cætera item omnia a sacris Canonibus, et Œcumenicis Conciliis, ac *præcipue* a Sacrosancta Tridentiuna Synodo tradita, definita, et declarata, indubitanter recipio, atque profiteor, simulque contraria omnia, atque hæreses quascunque ab Ecclesia damnatas, rejectas, et anathematizatas, ego pariter damno, rejicio, et anathematizo.”

“ Pius IV. not only enjoined all ecclesiastics to swear to his new creed, but he imposed it on all Christians as ‘ veram fidem Catholicam extra quam nemo salvus esse potest.’ ”—Vid. Abp. Bramhall, *Works*, Vol. ii. p. 201, in *Anglo-Cath. Lib.*]

themselves not uninfluenced<sup>b</sup> by the movement they met to resist), on *this* the deliverance is decided and unequivocal. Beyond all doubt, Mr. Newman's book is formally implicated in the anathema of Trent; the Council's prophetic condemnation, to which time can set no limits, has already made it, *ipso facto*, heretical. The "development" of this theorist is every where confronted by "*traditiones continuâ successione conservatæ*." Not only are such important matters as the *seven* Sacraments declared to be, every single one, "*a Jesu Christo Domino nostro institutum*," [Sess. vii.], but even such minute particulars of discipline as *secret* sacramental confession (as distinguished from public) are "*a sanctissimis et antiquissimis Patribus magno unanimique consensu semper commendata*," and such as "*ab initio Ecclesia sancta usa est*."—Sess. xiv. c. 5. [*De Pœnitentiâ*.] Interpretations of Scripture, in which an inventive genius, like our Author's, would find a peculiarly fertile source of subsequent development, are stringently forbidden,—"*contra unanimum consensum Patrum*" (Sess. iv. *De Canonic. SS.*); nay, the very *thought* of such, "*etiamsi hujusmodi interpretationes nullo unquam tempore in lucem edendæ forent*;" and

<sup>b</sup> [Cardinal Pole was one of the three legates commissioned by Paul III. to open the Council in 1542. Pole had been, along with the excellent Cardinal Contarini, engaged in preparing the "*Consilium delectorum Cardinalium et aliorum Prælatorum de emendandâ Ecclesiâ*," which in 1537 was presented to the Pontiff as a plan for the reformation of the Church. It was not until December, 1545, that the opening of the Council actually took place. "Contarini was now no more; but Pole was present; and there were in the assembly many others warmly attached to their opinions."—Ranke's *History of the Popes*.]

the expression of the decree is put yet more beyond the possibility of evasion in the Creed, where the divine, or the convert, solemnly promises “never to take and interpret the Scripture *otherwise than* according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.” The decision of the Council can, therefore, be made to square with the new theory only by the most palpable distortion of its express, repeated, and positive affirmations; and the illustrious convert will require to apply *to the creed of Pius IV.* the same ingenious process by which he contrived, some years since, to disembarass himself of the burden of the Thirty-nine Articles.

But though the authoritative doctrine of the Roman Church is thus unquestionable, Mr. Newman’s speculations, as might be expected, are not without what the technical phraseology of his theory would style some scattered “early anticipations.” Some of these will, I dare say, have already occurred to your readers, as our divines have frequently cited them with no unjustifiable triumph. Such is the well-known admission of Fisher: “*Aliquando Purgatorium incognitum fuit, sero cognitum universæ Ecclesiæ.*” “*Legat qui velit Græcorum veterum commentarios, et nullum, quantum opinor, aut quam rarissimum de Purgatorio sermonem inveniet. Sed neque Latini simul omnes, at sensim, hujus rei veritatem conceperunt.*”—*Contr. Luther. Art. 18.* But what avails the precipitate honesty of Fisher or Mr. Newman against the solemn verdict of Trent, revealing to us, with direct authority from Heaven, that “*Catholica Ecclesia ex antiquâ Patrum traditione docuit Purgatorium esse*” (Sess. xxv.); and that the Sacrifice of the Mass “*pro defunctis in Christo nondum ad ple-*



*num purgatis, rite, juxta APOSTOLORUM traditionem, offertur.*" (Sess. xxi. cap. 2).—Or again,—of Indulgences, the same candid Cardinal admits<sup>c</sup>, that "Earum usus in Ecclesia videtur fuisse *recentior, et admodum serò repertus*;" and that "cœperunt Indulgentiæ *postquam ad Purgatorii cruciatus aliquamdiu trepidatum est*" (*Assert. Luther. Confut.* 1523, p. 111); and Cajetan<sup>d</sup> confesses, "*nulla sacræ Scripturæ, nulla priscorum Doctorum, Græcorum aut Latinorum, auctoritas scripta hanc* [*"hunc" scil. ortum*] *ad nostram deduxit notitiam;*" (*Opusc.* Tom. i. Tractat. xv. c. 1.) and Durandus, that "*sancti etiam minimè loquuntur de Indulgentiis.*" (IV. Dist. xx. 2, 3.) But what profits all this ill-timed candour, except to excite strange heretical surmises, when the

<sup>c</sup> [Bishop Fisher is here stating the opinion of *others* rather than his own: "Multos fortasse movet Indulgentiis istis non usque adeo fidere, quòd earum usus in Ecclesiâ videatur recentior, et admodum serò apud Christianos repertus. Quibus *ego respondeo*, non certò constare à quo primùm tradi cœperint: fuit tamen nonnullus earum usus, ut aiunt, apud Romanos vetustissimus; quod ex Stationibus intelligi potest." This passage is transcribed from the work of Polydore Vergil, *De Rerum Inventoribus*, Lib. viii. Cap. i. p. 484. Basil. 1550. It is a remarkable fact that the entire citation from Bishop Fisher, and Vergil's words which accompany it, (in all thirty-six lines,) have been sentenced to expurgation by the Vatican Index in 1607, and by that of Cardinal Zapata, in 1632: an instance of the watchful jealousy of the Church of Rome respecting questions raised as to the date of the introduction of her novelties.—G.]

[The entire passage from Polydore Vergil, including the citation from Fisher, will be found in Bishop Taylor's *Dissuasive*, Part ii. B. ii. sect. ii. p. 391. Ed. Cardwell.]

<sup>d</sup> [It must be acknowledged that Cardinal Cajetan's expressions have reference to the difficulty of *tracing the rise* of Indulgences. He asserts in the same place that "*Indulgentiarum gratia antiqua est in Christi Ecclesia, et non nova adinventio.*"—G.]

infallible Council, “*Spiritu Sancto adjuvante*,” pronounces that the Church “*hujusmodi potestate divinitus sibi traditâ antiquissimis etiam temporibus, usa fuerit* ;” which, unless the Council be guilty of the grossest deception, we must, of course, understand of indulgences in the only sense in which they were at the time contested. Of even the characteristic Roman doctrine of the physical annihilation of the bread and wine in the Holy Eucharist, the able Franciscan, Alphonsus de Castro, admits that “*de transubstantione panis [in corpus Christi] rara est in antiquis scriptoribus mentio*.” (*Advers. Hæres. viii. [verb. Indulgentia]*) ; and the oracular Master of the Sentences, in a well-known passage (iv. 11), declares that he cannot venture to pronounce anything definite on the subject, and would advise all pious persons to avoid the inquiry<sup>e</sup>. While the very learned Jesuit, Sirmondus, informs us that Paschasius “*ita primum explicuit genuinum Ecclesiæ Catholicæ sensum ut viam cæteris aperuit*”<sup>f</sup>.—*Vit.*

<sup>e</sup> [Peter Lombard’s words, “*definire non sufficio*,” are not to be understood as intimating a doubt of the truth of the doctrine of Transubstantiation ; for in the preceding sentence he had explicitly declared, “*substantiam panis in corpus, vinique substantiam in sanguinem converti*.” The question discussed in this Distinction is “*De modis conversionis* :” and the advice about avoiding an inquiry into a mysterious subject is simply this ; “*Mysterium fidei credi salubriter potest, investigari salubriter non potest* ;” an observation which is made in the following page, relative to the assertion that the body and blood of Christ are not *increased* by the continued exercise of the sacerdotal office.—G.]

<sup>f</sup> [In this extract we must read “*primus*,” and “*aperuerit*.” The passage is : “*in eoque*” (scil. Libro) “*genuinum Ecclesiæ Catholicæ sensum ita primus explicuit, ut viam cæteris aperuerit, qui de eodem*



*Paschas.* But, once more, how can the pacific counsels of Lombard, or the plain admissions of many other Roman divines (to whose opinions, concerning the obscurity of early testimonies on the whole subject, Mr. Newman appears in no small degree inclined, pp. 19, 20), as to the absence from antiquity of any unequivocal evidence to a belief in the physical change of substance, avail against the distinct assertion of the Council, that the very special and particular mode of change, and no other, which is now styled “transubstantiation,” was that which “persuasum SEMPER in Ecclesia Dei fuit” (sess. xiii. cap. 4). Nay, some of the

argumento multi postea scripsere.” (Sirmondi *Opp.* iv. 448. Venet. 1728.) It is scarcely fair to interpret this description of S. Radbert’s work otherwise than with relation to the *manner* in which he treated of the Sacramental question, in consequence of it having been “à nonnullis temerè jactata” in the reign of Ludovicus Pius. Bellarmin’s language, (*De Scriptt. Eccl.* ad an. 820.) which is frequently misquoted, is to the same effect: “Hic auctor primus fuit, qui seriò et copiosè scripsit de veritate corporis et sanguinis Domini in Eucharistia, contra Bertramum Presbyterum, qui fuit ex primis qui eam in dubium revocarunt.”—G.]

[Sirmondus and Bellarmine seem to intimate that Paschasius first reduced to *dogmatic form* what had always been implicitly believed. Mabillon suggests a very different explanation of the *strangeness* of his statements in the eyes of his contemporaries; namely, that they had lost the true doctrine once held by the Fathers, and now restored by him, “Ante Paschasii librum confitebantur Catholici omnes Christi Domini verum corpus, verumque sanguinem reverâ existere in Eucharistiâ, itemque panem et vinum in illâ converti; at *nemo Paschasii tempore* illud corpus esse idem quod ex Mariâ Virgine natum est, tam directè asserere auditus fuerat. Id quidem antea ex Patribus tradiderant non pauci, sed ignota erant illo ævo, aut certè non observata, eorum hâc de re testimonia.”—Vid. Du Pin, Vol. ii. p. 80, English Trans.]



contemporary and post-Tridentine schoolmen (of course without the slightest authority, after the conciliar decision),—members of “those modern schools in and through which,” as Mr. Newman, with incomparable coolness, observes, “the subsequent developments of Catholic doctrines have proceeded” (p. 333),—have at times, in the stress of argument, ventured to approach the views of our author. “This,” says Bishop Patrick (*Discourse about Tradition*, Part ii.), “is the doctrine of Salmeron, and others of his fellows<sup>g</sup>, that ‘the doctrine of faith admits of additions *in essential things*; for all things were not taught by the Apostles, but such as were *then* necessary and fit for the salvation of believers;’ by which means,” as he adds, “we can never know when the Christian religion will be perfected.” Indeed, Mr. Newman might possibly find some traces of his doctrine in an authority which he, I doubt not, ranks among the very highest in the calendar of Roman hagiology, the meek, unworldly “Saint Gregory VII.” “Primitiva Ecclesia,” observes that Pope, “multa *dis-simulaverat*, quæ a sanctis Patribus, postmodum firmata Christianitate et religione crescente, subtili examinatione *correcta sunt*.” (In his Answer to the Duke of

<sup>g</sup> Bishop Patrick’s assertion is no exaggeration; e.g. “Non omnibus omnia dedit Deus, ut *quælibet ætas suis gaudeat revelationibus*.” *Salmer. In Epist. ad Roman.* Diss. lvii. “*Unius Augustini doctrina assumptionis B. Deiparæ cultum in Ecclesiam introduxit*.”—*Ibid.* [The “*Liber de Assumptione beatæ Virginis Mariæ*,” here alluded to, is unquestionably spurious.—G.] [It is a sermon of some author of the twelfth century or thereabouts.—Vid. Du Pin, Vol. i. p. 404, English Trans.] Mr. Newman may compare this with his citation from this Jesuit, in p. 321, in proof of his having held an opinion of the supremacy of Holy Scripture.

Bohemia, *inter Epp.*) Though, on the other hand, it must be confessed, his great namesake Gregory I., traced *his* developments to a different and more direct source. To an inquirer who bluntly asks how it happens that, at the opening of the seventh century, "*tam multa de animabus clarescunt quæ ante latuerunt*," or, in Mr. Newman's phraseology, how "Purgatory was opened upon the mind of the Church," the worthy Pope replies by referring the fact to the approaching end of the world: "*quantum præsens sæculum propinquat ad finem, tantum futurum sæculum signis manifestioribus aperitur*" (Dial.<sup>h</sup> iv. 40, 41); a view of the case which, possibly, by some profound mystical interpretation (such as Mr. Newman in this volume advocates so strenuously), may be made to square with the theory of development; but the very allegation of which (with the numerous visions and supernatural revelations likewise affirmed) would, at first sight, and to superficial reasoners, appear to demonstrate how very little the *patrons themselves* of the innovations on Christian doctrine, knew of the process by which our deeper theorist would account for their proceedings.

The history, indeed, of the successive "expedients" (to employ Mr. Newman's term) for reconciling the Roman faith with primitive doctrine would be, had I time or space here to pursue it, exceedingly curious and instructive. It is not generally observed (what Bishop Stillingfleet has very clearly established), that the distinct and formal assertion of Unbroken Apostolic Tradition, *as a separate source of articles of belief*,

<sup>h</sup> [The genuineness of these Dialogues cannot be safely assumed.—G.]



is itself, even in the Roman Church, comparatively modern. The great divine whom I have named has demonstrated this point convincingly, from the history of the discussions in the Council of Trent itself, as reported by Pallavicini; from the assertions of the divines of the Roman Church previous to the Council for many centuries; from the express statements of the Roman Canon Law, and from ancient offices of the Roman Church, and the glossers who have commented on them. Exactly in proportion as innovations grew more and more irreconcilable with Holy Scripture, we can trace the slow, gradual elevation of a vague, undefined tradition to a sort of co-ordinate authority with the written Word of God<sup>i</sup>, until at length, in the

<sup>i</sup> Perhaps the first complete authoritative appeal to Tradition, in tacit preference to the written Word (though even then not distinctly alleged as an absolutely separate ground for faith), may be considered to have occurred in support of the peculiarly unscriptural innovation of Image-Worship. “We,” say the Bishops of the Second Nicene Council, “following the divine instructions of the holy Fathers, and the traditions of the Catholic Church, decree, with all accuracy, &c., that the venerable and holy images shall be placed in the holy churches of God. Thus, the instruction of our holy Fathers is established, to wit, the tradition of the Catholic Church, &c.”—Art. vii. [*Act. vii.*—The sentences here cited are not consecutive. It was an express declaration of this Council, while it boasted of its not adding to, or taking from, the truth of the Gospel, “omnes Ecclesiasticas, *sive scripto, sive sine scripto*, sancitas nobis Traditiones, illibatè servamus.” (*Concill. Gen. iii. 661. Romæ, 1612.*)—G.] Yet at that time, and long after, the doctrine appears very undecided. For instance, at the Fourth Council [The eighth General Council, probably the thirty-sixth Synod of Constantinople, was the fourth there held, to which the name of Œcumenical is commonly attached.—G.] of Constantinople (A. D. 869), a tradition is claimed to be obligatory, delivered “etiam a quolibet Deiloquo



Council of Trent, which had been preceded by fierce Protestant discussions of the Rule of Faith, this convenient voucher was deliberately exalted to share the same throne<sup>j</sup>; and an expedient which itself grew out of innovation was made to authenticate the innovations that originated it. These imaginary Apostolic Traditions for modern Romanism, were supposed to be partly oral, partly preserved in the written records of the Church; the latter having been long before (a fact now notorious, and admitted by *all* parties) flagrantly interpolated and corrupted in such instances as the forged Decretals<sup>k</sup>, and the numerous mediæval treatises attributed to the early writers. In either sense of it, the plea of Apostolic Tradition in behalf of the mediæval dogmas could only pass current with the uninformed classes, and could never be expected to last very long. The shrewd and daring Jesuits, men fitted to grapple with the intellect and learning of the age, while making desperate efforts (Turrianus<sup>l</sup>, &c.) to vindicate the genuineness of the forgeries, plainly manifest, by glimpses of the very views now given to the public, how little they really relied for permanent suc-

patre ac magistro" (Can. i.)—an extension inadmissible on almost any conceivable theory.

<sup>j</sup> "Traditiones ipsas, &c., *pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ* suscipit et veneratur."—Sess. iv.

<sup>k</sup> [For an account of these *Decretals*, vid. *infra*, p. 47.]

<sup>l</sup> [*Turrianus*, or Francis *de la Torre*, a Jesuit of Herrera, in the diocese of Valentia, in Spain, published a work in defence of the forged Decretals, entitled, "*Adversus Magdeburgenses Centuriatores pro Canonibus Apostolorum, et Epistolis decretalibus Pontificum Apostolicorum, Libri quinque.*" Florent. 1572. Gieseler. ii. 335, in Clark's *For. Theol. Lib.*]

cess on these spurious testimonies; though, fettered as they were by the unmanageable decisions of Trent, they were forced to tender a simulated allegiance to the doctrine of continuous primitive Tradition. But now, when, before the light of a just and honest criticism, the gloomy spectres of Decretal and Canon, that so long stalked through the twilight of the middle ages, have for ever vanished, and even the most reckless controversialist is ashamed to recall them,—when, as Mr. Newman deplores, “infidelity is in a more hopeful position as regards Christianity” (he means, more hopeful of gaining its object), because “the facts of revealed religion present a less compact and orderly front to the attacks of its enemies,” and this again, because “the state of things *is not as it was* when an appeal lay to the supposed works of the Areopagite<sup>m</sup>, or to the primitive Decretals<sup>n</sup>, or to St. Dionysius’s

<sup>m</sup> [These writings, ascribed to S. Dionysius of Athens, are now universally admitted to be spurious. Thorndike supposes them to have been composed in the fourth century (*Works, in Lib. Anglo-Cath. Theology*, Vol. i. Part i. p. 321). Le Quien regards them as the work of a monophysite heretic. Du Pin considers that they must be subsequent to the fourth century, from various internal evidences. They were unknown in the west until much later. “The Grecian Emperor, Michael Balbus, sent to Lewis the Meek, in the year 824, a copy of the pretended works of Dionysius the Areopagite, which fatal present kindled immediately the holy flame of mysticism in the western provinces.”—*Mosheim, Eccles. Hist.*, Cent. ix. The work was translated into Latin by the order of Lewis. A new translation was made by John Scot Erigena, at the request of Charles the Bald, a very interesting account of which is given by him in a letter to the emperor, which is preserved in Ussher’s *Sylloge Veterum Epistolarum Hibernicarum*. Works, Vol. iv. p. 476. Edit. Elrington.]

<sup>n</sup> [For an able sketch of the vast and permanent effect of these



answers to St. Paul<sup>o</sup>, or to the Cœna Domini<sup>p</sup> of St. Cyprian"<sup>q</sup> (p. 28); in other words, when, according

Decretals in supporting the encroachments of the Papacy, see *Allies' Church of England cleared from the Charge of Schism*, Ch. vii. sect. 2; and Gieseler., *Eccles. Hist.*, ii. 330, et seqq., in *Clark's Foreign Theol. Lib.* "A new canonical jurisprudence began to be introduced into the Gallican Church, as well as into the other provinces of the west (from the year 836) by the invention for that purpose of the supposititious Letters of the ancient Roman Pontiffs, in which there are a great number of regulations altogether opposed to the statutes of the ancient Canons. These were edited in a collection of Canons which is commonly attributed to Isidore Mercator, which Riculph, Bishop of Mayence, brought from Spain into Gaul. . . . It is indeed certain, and beyond all doubt, according to the judgment of all learned men, and also the Cardinals Baronius and Bellarmine, that those letters of the ancient Pontiffs, namely, Clement, Anterus, Euaristus, Telesphorus, Callistus, Julius, Damasus, and generally all those which precede the times of Siricius (384–398), and Innocent, were fabricated by this Isidore."—De Marca, *De Concord.* quoted by Allies. Pope Nicholas I. warmly maintained the authority of these Decretals, because they sanctioned his assumption in the celebrated dispute between the French Bishops and Rothadus, Bishop of Soissons, who appealed to the Pope against the sentence of his brethren. "He wrote a large letter to all the Bishops to oblige them to receive Rothadus; and taking this occasion to greaten his authority, he claims as his due that all causes of the bishops should be brought to the Holy See. He upholds this pretence by the false Decretals, which he vouches to be genuine, ancient, and very authentic. This letter is dated January. Indict. 13. A. D. 866."—Du Pin, Vol. ii. p. 62. The Magdeburgh Centuriators first gave copious proof of their spuriousness, which was admitted by Bellarmine and Baronius. They were defended by Turrianus; but "the question was decided by Dav. Blondelli Pseudo-Isidorus et Turrianus vapulantes. Genev. 1628."—Vid. Gieseler., *Ecc. Hist.*, ii. p. 341, in *Clark's Foreign Theolog. Lib.*]

<sup>o</sup>[Not "S. Paul," but "Paul;" for the allusion evidently is to the disputable Answers of S. Dionysius of Alexandria to ten propo-



to Mr. Newman, Christianity is in great danger, because she can no longer employ in her defence the most execrable weapons that hypocrisy and falsehood ever invented; in this alarming state of things for "Christianity," new measures must be adopted; Apostolic Tradition has had its day, and the Roman Proteus exhibits himself in a form not only different from, but absolutely incompatible with, the argumentative grounds on which, *by infallible authority*, the belief of centuries has been built. Apostolic Tradition, itself a comparatively modern pretext, slowly retires, and makes way for Mediæval Development.

To the brief consideration of this latest "variation of Romanism" I now proceed.

I am, however, well aware how arid and uninviting the cold process of argumentative dissection must appear, when contrasted with the commanding preten-

sions of the heretic *Paul of Samosata*. Vid. Tillemont, iv. Notes, pp. 42-3. ed. Brux. Valesii *Annot.* in Lib. vii. Euseb. Cap. xxx.—G.]

<sup>p</sup> [It is very well known that the tract *De Cæna Domini* is the sixth of twelve treatises *De cardinalibus Operibus Christi*, written by Arnoldus Carnotensis, Abbas Bonæ-vallis, about the year 1160.—G.]

<sup>a</sup> On reperusing the entire of this extraordinary passage, I think I can plainly perceive that it was meant (though somewhat covertly), in anticipation of objections from the *Romanist divines* themselves. This is instructive, in relation to what has already been observed of the absence of all ecclesiastical authority for the new system. Meanwhile, it must be remembered, that Mr. Newman has solemnly committed his hazardous theory to the "judgment of the Church" (Pref. p. 11), and, utterly subversive as it is of all her theological bulwarks for centuries, "the Church" has not ventured to discountenance it.

sions and engaging brilliancies of a speculation like Mr. Newman's. Probably nothing would wholly destroy the effect of such a work but some equally clever *rival theory*. An intellectual romance of this kind is, in this respect, like a religious or political novel; you cannot meet it effectively by mere argument; to put it down at all you must win the public ear and fancy by a *counter* novel. Whether it would be very difficult to string together an equally plausible series of opposing hypotheses, I shall not undertake to pronounce; I am certainly not about, for my own humble part, to attempt the unequal contest. I do not undertake to present Mr. Newman with a lofty and attractive system like his own; unfolded with all the pomp of scientific method, and branching into its infinity of applications and illustrations. *Hypotheses non fingo*. I do not pretend to have penetrated all the minutiae of the providential government of the Church; nor can I dare to approach a subject so awful, except in the cautious and careful guise either (so far as it is at all practicable) of demonstrated theory—laws patiently educed from distinct and ascertained facts, or of humble and confessed conjecture. Indeed, Mr. Newman himself furnishes me with a warning on this head, which it may not be the less prudent to adopt, that its author has himself rested the main pillar of his theory on neglecting it. "Sometimes," he tells us, with evident disapprobation, "an attempt has been made to ascertain 'the leading idea,' as it has been called, of Christianity: a remarkable essay, as directed towards a divine religion, when, even in the existence of the works of man, the task is beyond us."—p. 34.

In which point of view unquestionably the author's own is an exceedingly "remarkable Essay," inasmuch as its principal test of genuine development, and that on whose application the greatest amount of labour is bestowed, consists in the "preservation of *the idea*" of Christianity, which it is here previously pronounced chimerical to profess to determine at all.

Let me first attempt to communicate some conception (of course a very faint and ineffective one, within so limited a compass) of the course of the author's argument.

"The Development of an Idea," according to Mr. Newman, is "the germination, growth, and perfection of some living, that is, influential, truth, or apparent truth, in the mind of men, during a sufficient period."—p. 37. And as this period closes, or advances to its close, "the system or body of thought thus laboriously gained will, after all, be only the adequate representation of the original idea."—p. 36. The necessary characteristic of this process is, that "an idea cannot develop at all except either by destroying or modifying and incorporating with itself, existing modes of acting and thinking." And as it modifies, so also "it is modified or at least influenced by the state of things in which it is carried out, and depends in various ways on the circumstances around it."—p. 38. From this (which seems intelligible enough) Mr. Newman next proceeds to specify the *kinds* of development, and, after rejecting certain literal or physical significations, he insists chiefly on what he styles political, p. 45; logical, p. 48; historical, p. 49; moral, p. 50; and metaphysical, p. 54, developments. I cannot say much for the *perspicuity* of his eloquent exposition of these classes,



which principally consists in a rapid aggregate of illustrations, the precise point of which is not in all instances very obvious to readers of a fancy less excursive than the gifted author's. It is not, difficult, however, for such readers to perceive that the class of developments with which the work is likely to make them most familiar are those which it styles "moral."

"Moral developments are *not properly matters of controversy* [a convenient maxim, as the reader will perceive, when admitted to the intended *applications* of this law or class of developments], but are natural and personal, substituting what is congruous, *desirable*, pious, decorous, *generous*, for strictly logical inference."—p. 50. And after quoting a passage of Bishop Butler, which he considers applicable to his argument, and stating from the "Analogy," as an *instance* of a "moral development," the obligation of worship which at once, even without express revelation, arises from the knowledge of the deity of the Second and Third Persons of the Trinity<sup>r</sup>, he adds (an analogical corollary which would have somewhat astonished the great

<sup>r</sup> It is observable, that the very passage which Mr. Newman cites from the "Analogy" contains (in his own quotation) a qualification which is all but a direct contradiction of the unbridled license of "moral development" he contends for in religious worship. Even of such unquestioned duties as the worship of beings who are themselves the very and eternal God, Bishop Butler adds: "*In what external manner* this inward worship is to be expressed is a matter of *pure revealed command*." Whereas, if the worship of holy men and women deceased be but a mere development of the Church's *feelings*, the "external manner in which this inward worship is to be expressed" must, it is pretty plain, be still more utterly resolvable into the same shadowy original.

philosophic theologian): "Here is a development of doctrine into worship. *In like manner* the doctrine of the Beatification of the Saints has been developed into their *cultus*; of the *θεοτόκος*, or Mother of God, into *hyperdulia*; and of the Real Presence into adoration of the Host." Not content with this satisfactory deduction, Mr. Newman proceeds to observe, that there is a "converse development" that still more completely overleaps the bounds of "strict logical inference;" a development of feelings into the assumption of Objects; and (for I have no room here to analyse his other examples, and hasten at once to the main scope of his work) of this we have manifest and irresistible theological instances in "the doctrine of post-baptismal sin, and the usage of prayers for the faithful departed, developing into the doctrine of Purgatory."

Accordingly, at the close of a section in which he carefully and scrupulously separates faith and reason, he observes that to those who hold this safe and dignified view of a Christian's faith (p. 337) "*arguments* will come to be considered rather as representations and persuasives *than as logical proofs*; and developments as the spontaneous, gradual, and *ethical* growth, not as intentional and arbitrary deductions, of existing opinions." On a basis so wide as this, it obviously needs not an architect of Mr. Newman's powers to raise any superstructure he pleases.

After thus explaining the varieties of development, our author proceeds to investigate the tests by which a genuine development may be distinguished from a corruption. A multitude of illustrations, more or less applicable, make up the bulk of this discussion; the

general result of which, upon any candid reader, will, I am quite satisfied, be a conviction of the utter uncertainty of rules and applications so vague, shifting, and flexible; and the absolute unfitness of such a method of inquiry for any man honestly desirous to know and adhere to the truth in the most momentous of all human concerns. Indeed, of the first and most important of them all, the author admits that it is “not of easy application in particular cases,” and that it implies what “often will lead to mere theorizing”—p. 66; requiring, in truth, nothing less than (I have alluded to the point already) an accurate and complete knowledge of “the essential idea of Christianity;” in other words, requiring what the loftiest faculties, and (what is better) the deepest habitual spirituality, will be the first to confess themselves poorly competent to grasp: and what, if grasped, would surely presuppose the point already settled, to which it is here made subordinate; for, what further has *he* to seek in the way of religious belief and knowledge who has already mastered, in the clear and perfect *degree* required for a secure application of this theory, “the essential Idea of Christianity?”

With regard to these tests, in general, they are better considered in their application in a subsequent part of the volume. It is *there* the lofty, various, and discursive style of the author can best be fixed and interpreted. Mr. Newman’s composition has great *rhetorical* merits, and among them that of often producing a strong general impression, without leaving anything very definite, in either fact or reasoning, to which the impression can be distinctly traced. With such



an adversary it is always of importance to come as speedily as possible to the specific case, or cases, to which all these imposing abstractions are skilfully meant to be subservient. Moreover, I presume, it is not the abstract theorist, but the Romanist polemic, that chiefly interests the public at present in Mr. Newman. Well had it been, if his soaring speculations *had* for ever remained unembodied in their native regions of air; nor thus descended to earth and taken tangible form, in the vain attempt to give soul and spirit to the dull and lifeless dogmas in which the second half of his volume endeavours to realize them!

Having enlarged on the tests which he considers adequate to distinguish between genuine development and corruption, Mr. Newman next argues for the antecedent probability of developments in *Christianity*. This he considers he has established from the necessity of the case; from the history of sects and parties in religion; and from the analogy and example of Scripture. Such is his own summary of his antecedent argument (p. 113), which I purposely adopt, in order to avoid misapprehension of a style of disquisition which is certainly somewhat liable to it. He adds the general analogy of developments in the natural and moral world. Your limited space will not allow me to extract the whole of this argument, which extends to twenty pages; and I should unfairly risk an effect, which so largely depends on power of style, by any awkward abridgments of mine. Your more thoughtful readers will, however, be probably at no loss to conjecture the general purport of the argument, when they remember the exceedingly vague and indefinite

sense in which Mr. Newman employs the leading term of his theory, and that he finds himself at liberty to cite nearly every variety of successive change to which the word *development* can be, with any plausibility, applied, as witnessing to the validity of his hypothesis of doctrinal development in the Christian faith.

From this he proceeds to contend for the probability of a developing *authority* in Christianity, a supposition which I trust hereafter to show you is, by a singular combination of logical embarrassments, at once absolutely necessary to, and absolutely inconsistent with, his entire theory. And he then endeavours to establish a *presumption* in favour of the existing (Roman) developments of Christianity, as being its genuine products. And with this the abstract or theoretical part of his work concludes.

I have just observed that it is, in a great measure, by the indefinite use of language, especially of the term Development itself (notwithstanding much apparent accuracy of distinction), that Mr. Newman gives colour and plausibility to his hypothesis. Let me, in all humility, endeavour to remedy this; and without professing to state anything very new, very profound, or very complete, on the subject, let me, as the simplest way of opening the question, try to offer some brief answer to the problem—Are there *admissible developments* of doctrine in Christianity?

Unquestionably there are. But let the term be understood in its legitimate sense or senses to warrant that answer; and let it be carefully observed how much, and how little, the admission really involves.

All varieties of real development, so far as this argument is concerned, may probably be reduced to two general heads, *intellectual* developments, and *practical* developments, of Christian doctrine. By “intellectual developments” I understand *logical inferences* (and that whether for belief or practical discipline) from doctrines, or from the comparison of doctrines; which, in virtue of the great dialectical maxim, must be true, if legitimately deduced from what is true. “Practical developments” are the *living, actual, historical results* of those true doctrines (original or inferential), when considered as influential on all the infinite varieties of human kind; the doctrines embodied in action; the doctrines modifying human nature in ways infinitely various, correspondently to the infinite variety of subjects on whom they operate, though ever strictly preserving, amid all their operations for effectually transforming and renewing mankind, their own unchanged identity. Intellectual Developments, it is thus obvious, are in the same sphere with the principles out of which they spring: they are (even when regarded with a view to rite and practice) unmingled doctrine still: they are *propositions*. Practical Developments, on the other hand, essentially consist of two very different, though connected, elements; divine doctrine, and human nature as affected by it; they are *historical events*. I am not aware of any thing reasonably to be called a development of Christian doctrine which is not reducible to either of these classes, the Logical or the Historical. Let me exemplify.

1. In the former case, revealed doctrines may be compared with one another, or with the doctrines of



“natural religion ;” or the consequences of revealed doctrines may be compared with other doctrines, or with their consequences, and so on in great variety : the combined ultimate result being what is called a System of Theology. What the first principles of Christian truth really are, or how obtained, is not now the question. But in all cases equally, no doctrine has any claim whatever to be received as obligatory on belief, unless it be either itself some duly authorized principle, or a logical deduction, through whatever number of stages, from some such principle of religion. Such only are legitimate developments of doctrine for the *belief* of man ; and such alone can the Church of Christ—the Witness and Conservator of His Truth—justly commend to the consciences of her members.

To take one or two examples that present themselves at the first moment :—it is thus, that, when we have learned, on the infallible authority of inspiration, that the Lord Jesus Christ is himself Very God, and when we have learned from the same authority, the tremendous fact of His Atoning Sacrifice, we could collect (even were Scripture silent) the priceless *value* of the Atonement thus made ; the wondrous *humiliation* therein involved ; the unspeakable *love* it exhibited ; the mysteriously awful *guilt* of sin ; which would again reflect a gloomy light upon the equally mysterious eternity of *punishment* :—and similar deductions of immense practical importance. These would be just and legitimate developments of Christian doctrine. But in truth, as our own liability to error is extreme, especially when immersed in the holy obscurity (“the *cloud* on the mercy-seat”) of such mysteries as these, we have

reason to thank God that there appear to be few doctrinal developments of any importance which are not from the first drawn out and delivered on divine authority to our acceptance.

Or again—to take another instance, the evidence of which the Author of the work before me has most lamentably laboured to involve in doubt and perplexity :—When Three Beings are, on divine authority, represented to us as acting with mysterious, but real, distinctness of operation, yet each possessing the attributes of supreme Godhead—that Godhead which is, and can be, but one—we can scarcely be said to “develop,” we do little more than express these combined truths, when we acknowledge, and bend in adoration before, the Ever-Blessed Trinity. And we can easily perceive, that wherever or whenever there may have been, or is, any difficulty in arriving at this truth, it is *not* as if in the nature of things this truth could be had only by long processes of conjecture and slow successive contemplation,—it is not as if after it had been revealed in Holy Writ, men *must* err and stumble on the road to receive it, and pass through a discipline of centuries before they can arrive at admitting that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are One God ; but simply from the fact (granting for a moment any such supposed or imputed charge of error), that the numerous and melancholy causes that impede the perception of valuable truth in so many other departments of human knowledge, may be conceived more or less to have operated in this, incomparably the most precious of all.

Or again—to come somewhat nearer the favourite region of false and spurious “development”—when we

remember the Divinity of Christ, combined in one personality with His manhood, at His Incarnation through the Holy Virgin, we can readily deduce (with the Angel) that she was indeed eminently “blessed among women,” or (with herself) that she ought fitly to be “called blessed” by “all generations.” We *cannot* deduce by exactly the same process, that that blessed Person has been for eighteen centuries the “Queen of Heaven,” exalted above every created thing, and to be worshiped with the veneration due to a being possessing all of Godhead, except its absolute infinity, as Mr. Newman proclaims (p. 406), that she is (as the present Bishop of Rome not long since declared, from the inmost sanctuary of infallible truth), “Our greatest hope, yea, *the entire ground* of our hope !”<sup>s</sup>

I have thus instanced what may exemplify legitimate “intellectual developments.” Such justly carry authority, for such bring with them their own credentials. To make such comparisons and conclusions with accuracy, is, doubtless, a fruit of divine favour, blessing the just researches of faith (Prov. ii. 4, &c.); to perceive some of them more prominently than others, may be the characteristic of different ages or crises in the history of theology, and unquestionably has ever been the object of a very special providence in the divine government of the Church<sup>t</sup>; to receive such conclusions with practical effect on heart, spirit, and life, is above all, the peculiar and supernatural gift of God ; but as

<sup>s</sup> Encyclical Letter, 1832.

<sup>t</sup> I presume I need scarcely remind any reader of the numberless fine and profound suggestions on this interesting topic, that abound in the Remains of the late Mr. Knox.



truths of theology, evolved from its revealed principles, such *developments* are, in all cases, since the close of the Canon of Scripture, commended to us, through the ministry of enlightened and sanctified *reason*.

2. The other class I have called "Practical Developments" of Christianity; the innumerable instances which are furnished in the history of the Church, of the *effects* of revealed truth upon individuals, nations, manners, laws, institutions, and the like. These form a profoundly interesting subject of meditation; beyond all doubt their course, whether in purity or corruption, is (like the former) under the special and over-ruling government of providence; doubtless too, they frequently suggest valuable rules of Christian discipline, valuable results of Christian experience, noble examples of Christian fortitude; nay, sometimes tend, to a cautious, careful, and reverential inquirer, to throw some light upon God's own purposes, and correct fallacious anticipations as to his designs<sup>u</sup>; but they can have, simply as historical events, no authority in matter of faith, and they are utterly inadequate to warrant new articles of belief. The reason is abundantly obvious from what I have already observed in introducing them. In the production of every such "practical development," there are two elements conjointly at work, the

<sup>u</sup> I would venture to refer to a Letter in this Journal (occasioned by some acute objections to a Visitation Sermon), in, I think, the latter part of 1842, or beginning of the following year, merely as helping to illustrate what I *mean* by this clause, which I have now no space to expand.

[This Letter is reprinted in the volume of Sermons of Professor Butler, published some months ago.]

truth, which is divine, and the recipient, who is human : the conclusion cannot be stronger than the weaker premiss ; the result (which is the development itself) cannot be trusted. That men in high authority in the Church have felt, after the lapse of centuries, ever and anon, a tacit, growing tendency (such as Mr. Newman so seductively portrays) to incorporate some new tenet into the primitive system of belief, can persuade us to credit their “tendencies,” only when we believe these men to have possessed the purity and the intelligence of angels. And if we *are* to argue from the analogy of providential dispensations in general, it is certain God never yet sent a gift into the world which man did not deteriorate in the using it. The treatment of HIM who was to us the Gift of all perfections embodied in one, is but the master instance of an universal principle ; the primeval revelation of Paradise was corrupted ; the patriarchal truth was corrupted ; the Jewish religion was corrupted (and what apparently absolute promises of infallible guidance had Israel !); human reason and conscience, a sort of interior revelation, are perpetually corrupted. To deny the analogy in the *one* case now before us, is to assume the Roman infallibility, which cannot, of course, be admitted without distinct and separate proof ; and which, in point of fact, is absolutely inconsistent with the long course of previous weakness, uncertainty, and error, which the theory of development supposes.

But some one of these admitted innovations on the primitive belief and practice is, we will suppose, “a practical development” of comparatively *early* growth, is of very *general* prevalence, is of very *long* continu-

ance ; have we not, in these characteristics of an innovation, some proof of its claims to being a genuine product of Christian principles and doctrines ? The observations just made at once answer the question. It is manifest that if there are principles capable of development in Christianity, there are parallel principles, *equally capable of development*, in frail and erring human nature. Both elements are busy in the history of the Church of Christ ; and we have, first, and before we can concede one tittle to the demand, sternly and rigorously to determine, by appeal to some extrinsic standard, of *which* is the innovation a product ? When the advocate of certain admitted innovations found in the Roman theology, pleads the universality or long continuance of these errors as establishing their claim to the dignity and authority of truth, he commits the astonishing oversight of forgetting that the identity of human nature, and hence the similarity of human weaknesses, already furnish an abundant ground for anticipating the very result he pleads. “Christianity,” he cries, “must itself tend to this result, for it has done so, soon, and generally, and for a long period.” “Human nature,” I reply, “is inherently apt to lead to this result, and therefore we need not marvel that it *has* done so, soon, and generally, and for a long period.” “I undertake,” proclaims Mr. Newman, “to account for these novelties (for I fully admit them to be such) out of the original fact of Christianity.” “I undertake” (his critic will be permitted humbly to reply) “to account for them with infinitely more probability, illustrated by the very history of the innovations themselves, and supported by a host of analogies in every other



department of religious history since the Fall, out of the inherent tendencies of human nature." "I will vindicate them," declares the new theorist, "out of Christianity, a fact absolutely unique in the world's history, and from its leading Idea (which I confess it is presumptuous for any man to profess to master)." — "And I," is the reply, "will show them to be the manifest growth of that human nature with which every man is familiar every hour of his life, and of which all the volumes of all history are but repositories of the true and unquestionable developments." This is the first stage of the pleadings ; no equitable judge will deny that the rejoinder is full, fair, and to the point : issue, therefore, must *now* be joined, and the question as to the real source of the innovation determined by appealing at once to some standard of truth *distinct from either party's allegation*, separate, and incorruptible. Nor could the pleader deserve for one moment the attention of the tribunal to which he addresses his argument, should he refuse to advance beyond his first position, and, in the fancied security of his own private and arbitrary hypothesis, call aloud and at once for the judgment of the court in his favour.

For example,—Man—and, above all, southern Man—has a strong tendency to a *sensuous* religion ; no fact is, on the whole, authenticated by a more universal experience. The need is provided for in exactly the right *degree* by Him Who "knew what was in man," in the original draft of Christianity. But it is *antecedently* most improbable that, without direct divine interposition (of course not to be assumed at this stage of the argument), the mass of men will limit themselves ac-

curately within the appointed boundaries. If, then, this tendency begin, in some form or other, *early* to shew itself, it is precisely what we might anticipate ; for the tendency was latently present, even when most restrained. If it begin *generally* to show itself, unhappily it is equally what we might expect ; for the tendency was not that of one man or two men, but of Human Nature itself ; and, as before observed (for it is most important), specially and peculiarly of the section of human nature—the countries, clime, and people in which the holy religion was first propagated, and which thence exercised so remarkable and almost necessary an influence upon all its subsequent history among other races—the imaginative, symbolizing, pomp-loving children of the South. If the tendency continue *long* to operate, we can surely be just as little surprised, for it has a ground in man as permanent as his imagination and feelings. Not to insist at present upon the obvious solution for the *duration* of all such unhappy phenomena in the fact, that the great Catholic principle of *adhering to what has once been fixed and transmitted*, which, in the fundamentals of faith, has ever been so invaluable a protection to every branch of the Church, must work to perpetuate circumstantial error, when such has unfortunately gained currency, and has secured the authority of commanding names.

No *universality*, no *permanence* of admitted innovation, therefore, can simply, and of itself, authorize it. It may give a claim to respectful inquiry—no more. Whatever is not originally contained in the standard of truth, whatever *was confessedly unnecessary to man's salvation or spiritual well-being from the first*, must make

good its claim upon other grounds than its existence ; and it is as justly liable to that demand at its twentieth century as at its first. Examples of the utter feebleness of a claim to absolute authority on such a basis, are innumerable ; the only difficulty is in selection. Take one—prominent and universal. What is all Idolatry but a corruption of primitive revelation ; a “development” that, doubtless, began (for in religious belief, as in practical morality, *nemo repente fit turpissimus*) exactly as the melancholy parallel “development” began in Christianity,—and was, we know, defended by the wiser heathens on precisely the same plea ;—a corruption *early, general, permanent* ;—for it began in the infancy of the world ; it has, at one time or other, covered its whole surface, and to this day retains most of it ; and it has in its favour a prescription of near six thousand years. What can the worship of Januarius or Dominic, the half-adoring invocation of men whose very salvation is too often doubtful, the prostration before the theatrical Virgins and imaginary relics of the religion of Italy and Spain, offer to our acceptance in comparison with the venerable antiquity—the “chronic continuance,” as Mr. Newman would style it—of *idolatry itself* ? Nor let men attempt to evade this by urging (comp. pp. 62, 63, &c.), that in this instance the “development” proved itself a corruption by *destroying* the original ; it did not, and in the case of cultivated heathens very seldom does, destroy the original belief of a single Supreme God. In all the long succession of heathen wisdom, from its earliest dawn in the twilight of profane history up to the present hour,—up to the living sages of India and China, and the wild men



of the western forests,—the recognition has ever, more or less directly, been preserved of a Great Spiritual Being who has graciously manifested Himself in these delegates of His omnipotence, and in their “sacred images.” Even mere unassisted oral tradition, backed by the unconquerable affirmations of natural reason, has effected this ; can we in the least degree wonder that the corrupt element should exist side by side with the revealed truth without destroying or absorbing it, in a case where that original truth is everywhere affirmed in the primary documents of the Religion, and in fact, from the very nature of the Religion, *must* continue to be involved and assumed in its very existence—an existence guaranteed by the express promise of its Founder ? At the same time,—how far in Roman Christianity the corruption *has* eventuated in practically superseding the rights of the supreme God, by intercepting the tribute of trusting and dependent affection due to Him from His children, wasting those precious impulses upon imaginary human mediators of intercession and even of grace, and thus reserving for the Heavenly Father only that residue of distant awe and terror that can reach Him after all the tenderness and confidence of the heart have been lavished away upon the intermediate agents between Him and His,—how far, especially among the mass of the people (learned divines have securities of their own in the very nature of their studies), in purely Romish countries, this is the case, it would indeed be very painful to dwell on, but, I fear, far too easy to determine.

And now let me come closer to the exposition and the defences of the new theory.

Though Mr. Newman takes judicious care to emancipate himself from the bonds of the received logic of philosophical theory (pp. 179, 180), he must not be surprised if in a matter which involves the faith and peace of millions, his critics refuse to accompany him into those licenses of conjecture which his rhetorical skill would artfully substitute for the old-fashioned process of proving facts, and thence deriving principles. I shall, therefore, in despite of his very natural disclaimer of the severity of the Baconian method, take the liberty of observing that his system violates every one of its rules of genuine philosophical proof, without a single exception. To bring the whole series of his logical offences to a head; his Principle is an invention, and—his Facts cannot be reduced under even that invented principle.

What is his Principle? It is the hypothesis, that God intended to reveal dogmas of overwhelming importance, only by degrees to His Church; in such a sense as that later centuries, by the mere process of dwelling on the primitive creed, and the insensible operation of moral feeling, were to find their way to a large body of most momentous speculative and practical doctrine, of which the bishops, martyrs, and whole body of the faithful of the first ages, were wholly, or almost wholly, ignorant.

What are his Facts to be explained by this principle? The special doctrines and practices of Romanism; its worship of the Blessed Virgin, Saints, and Angels—its religious prostration before images of wood and stone—its purgatorial fire—its gradual formation of a



despotic spiritual monarchy—and the rest ; all of which, he informs us, can be easily developed by patient reflection and moral sensibility, out of the religion of the New Testament and the first Churches.

The *former* of these assertions,—for this must first occupy our attention,—is not only a mere creation of the fancy, but is encompassed with manifold and manifest difficulties. Mr. Newman, indeed, endeavours (of course) to prepare his way, by arguing the antecedent probability of such developments in Christianity, in a chapter (pp. 94–114) to which I have already alluded. But not one of his arguments really reaches the *required* mark. For instance—“Christianity is a fact, and can be made subject-matter of the reason.”—It is seen in “aspects” that must vary to different persons ; and must, as a living, influential thing, “expand” in the mind.—Again, we are told that it is an universal religion, and must have great varieties of local application.—Again, its peculiar phrases, such as “the Word of God,” require much thought ; and many deduced and connected considerations will gather round mysterious expressions like these.—Again, there are very interesting questions not solved in Scripture—the Canon of Scripture, Sin after Baptism, the Intermediate State, and the like.—Again, Prophecy was a progressive thing, the Mosaic history was so, and our Lord’s sayings are remarkably brief and pregnant.—Again, the style of Holy Scripture is such that “*of no doctrine whatever*, which does not actually contradict what has been delivered, can it be peremptorily asserted, that it is *not* in Scripture !” (p. 110). Once more : Scripture itself proclaims Mr. Newman’s theory



in the parable of the Mustard Seed, and the Seed sown, and the Leaven.

Now, I request the reader to recall the observations made above on the two classes, or senses, of real development; and I ask him, is there a single one of these considerations, giving them all the weight they can possibly claim, which establishes more than I have already abundantly conceded? Indeed, the accomplished Author himself at times admits it. When he would, in this very chapter, describe how theological questions have arisen and been settled, he observes that in such cases “the decision has been left to time, to the slow process of thought, the influence of mind upon mind, the issues of controversy, and the growth of opinion”—p. 99<sup>w</sup>. Does Mr. Newman really suppose that any one *denies* the existence of *such* processes in the history of the Church, and of the heresies that have assailed or infested it? Were this the only question at issue, between what two individuals who had ever read a volume of any elementary Church history could there be a difference about it? Or, if this were a fair account of his real theory, how could the very arguments that are used to refute it escape being its verification? Truly, Mr. Newman must effect something more for his adopted cause than thus elaborately prove what nobody denies, and then pass off this weighty conclusion for the proof of his real but unmanageable thesis. If his object be to demonstrate

<sup>w</sup> “Argument implies *deduction*, that is, *development*”—p. 97. Mr. Newman will, unquestionably, number a large sect of disciples, if every man who holds that a theological *deduction* can be made, is to be regarded as a votary of “the theory of development.”

that various theological questions have been raised and settled by discussion, and often by laborious, and animated, and protracted discussion, he is not likely to meet many adversaries. It has assuredly been the will of God that reasonable creatures should duly employ their reason on His Divine Religion ; nor is any legitimate conclusion of the reason unacceptable to Him who gave the faculty that made it. No conclusion, that, by any reach or grasp of thought, *can be logically deduced* from the matter of faith as originally revealed, do we refuse. What we *do* refuse,—and refuse as the very principle of all the extravagances of fanatical heresy, as (so to speak) the very logic of enthusiasm,—is the position, that doctrines unknown to the primitive creed of the Church, nay the knowledge of actual facts in the realm of Spirits (as Purgatory or the Saints' power of hearing prayer), were to be gained by processes, *avowedly not ratiocinative, but emotional, impulsive, spontaneous* ; that men charged with the awful responsibility of guarding and expounding God's Truth were not logically to infer, but infallibly to *feel* ; and to "feel" not merely moral convictions, but downright physical facts, actual phenomena of the invisible world !—What we *do* yet further assert—we, "insulated" and heretical Anglicans—on behalf of the insulted Catholicity of primitive saints and martyrs, is, that *no truth of the importance which the special Roman Dogmas, if true, must possess*, was unknown from the beginning ; that no doctrine granted to be thus unknown for ages, can now, on pretence of subsequent discovery, be pressed on the belief of all Christians on pain of everlasting damnation.



Any appeal to Holy Scripture, however vague, transitory, and fanciful, has a claim to respectful attention. Mr. Newman alleges the analogy of the *prophetic* revelations. In every possible point of view the analogy fails. Prophecy was essentially mysterious and enigmatical ; doctrinal teaching was meant to be plain and intelligible. Prophecy was usually to grow in clearness as it advanced to the event, and there alone to find its full explanation ; but what imaginable ground is there for assuming that doctrinal exposition was thus to postpone its purport to the distant future ? The excellence, the adaptation of the doctrine would, indeed, perpetually receive new illustration as it extended through peoples and ages ; but the very marvel of its perfection, the growing authentication of its high celestial birth, would consist in the wondrous fitness by which, itself substantially unchanged, it matched itself to every race and people, transmuting *them* into its own likeness, not moulding itself after their carnal wants and wishes. Alas ! had the wilfulness of man always recognised this great office and high supremacy of Divine truth, should we have had such instances of the “development” of God’s awful Word, as are cited with approbation in the chapter before me,—“developments” which, by whatever weight of individual authority they be recommended, God grant the conservators of His Truth grace ever to denounce with indignation and scorn,—“Praise the Lord in His saints,” as a command to worship men ; “Adore his footstool”<sup>x</sup>, as a

<sup>x</sup> “Adorate scabellum Ejus,” Ps. xcix. 5. Better “at—towards—His footstool.” It is thought to refer to the divine manifestation in the Jewish sanctuary.



command to fall down and literally worship in His honour the lifeless matter He has made! As to the parables which Mr. Newman cites, I hope it can hardly be necessary to observe how utterly they are perverted from their true signification to the profit of his theory of doctrinal innovation; parables which manifestly shadow forth the spread of the Gospel among the nations of the earth, or in their internal application symbolize its gradually pervading and transforming power upon the souls of those who embrace it.

But as the topic of scriptural proof *has* come before us, I can scarcely avoid, though I ought perhaps to apologise for, recommending to Mr. Newman's meditation, in contrast to the convincing instances just quoted of what he styles "the Church's *subtler and more powerful* method of proof (p. 323) by mystical interpretation, such unfortunately clear (and therefore, of course, miserably feeble and inconclusive) testimonies concerning his system as St. Paul's memorable affirmations: "I kept back *nothing that was profitable*;" "I have not shunned to declare unto you *all the counsel of God*;" "I have showed you *all things*;" "We use *great plainness of speech*, and not as Moses, which put a veil over his face;" being "not rude in *knowledge*, we have been thoroughly *made manifest among you in all things*;" "Though we or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel unto you than that *which we have preached—than that ye have received*—let him be accursed." "Keep that which is *committed to thy trust*." "Hold fast *the form of sound words—that good thing which was committed unto thee* keep by the Holy Ghost;" "The things which *thou hast heard of me the same*

commit unto faithful men ;” “ Continue thou in the things *which thou hast learned* ;” “ Be not carried about with divers and strange (*ξένας*) doctrines.” Or St. John’s, “ Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know *all* things :” or the Lord’s own solemn promise, “ the Comforter shall teach you *ALL* things ;” “ the spirit of truth will guide you into *ALL* truth :” expressions which, to plain people, may possibly appear somewhat inconsistent with the doctrine, that they who were thus “ taught all things,” and who “ kept back nothing” of what they were taught, left it to future centuries, to the prelates and monasteries of the middle ages, to *discover* and declare articles of transcendent importance to the very substance, and the whole practical operation of Christianity.

Upon the obvious question which here arises, and which, indeed, must be one of the earliest to occur to every reader,—how far the *Apostles themselves* are held in this system to have known the developments of modern Romanism?—Mr. Newman delivers himself as follows, which is the only distinct reference I can remember to the subject in his entire volume: “ The holy Apostles *would know*, without words, all the truths concerning the high doctrines of theology, which controversialists after them have piously and charitably reduced to formulæ, and developed through argument.”—p. 83.

And he then proceeds, as if somewhat afraid of so delicate an inquiry, to talk about the knowledge St. *Justin* and St. *Irenæus* “ *might*” have of (it is one of the usual artifices of his rhetoric to class such things together) Purgatory *or* Original Sin. Meanwhile the above



sentence affords all the light Mr. Newman is pleased to furnish us as to his views of St. Paul's knowledge of the propriety of invoking, in religious worship, St. James after his martyrdom ; or St. John's conceptions of the duty of depending for his "entire hope," with Pope Gregory XVI., upon the boundless influence in Heaven of her whom he "took unto his own home ;" or St. Peter's notions of the absolute supremacy of himself, and of a line of prelates professing to occupy his place ; or St. Matthew's thoughts about the utility of bowing in "relative adoration" before wooden images of deceased men and women. The Apostles *would* know all these things "without words."

But now, if the Apostles not only "*would* know"—a form of expression which I do not pretend precisely to understand—but really *did* know these things, it may be permitted me, without presumption, to ask, on what conceivable ground is their silence regarding them to be explained ? Their love of souls was unquestionable ; the practical importance of the doctrines in question, if true, was equally so. If souls elect, saved, forgiven, are, after death, to be tortured for thousands of years in Purgatorial flames, and depend for their sole chance of alleviation or release upon masses on earth, how incomprehensible was the abstinence of earnest, loving Paul (knowing all this thoroughly) from any allusion to the necessity of such helps for these wretched spirits ! If the invocation of the Blessed Virgin be one of the chief instruments of grace in the Gospel, how inexplicable that, in all the many injunctions of prayer and supplication, no syllable should ever be breathed of *this* great object of prayer ; on the contrary, that



numerous apparent implications should occur of the sole and exclusive right of the Deity to such addresses! If the Bishop and Church located at the city of Rome were, by Divine appointment, ever to carry with them a gift of infallible guidance to itself and all Churches in their communion,—how utterly inconceivable that the Apostles, knowing this, above all that St. Peter himself, the conscious fountain of all this mighty stream of living waters ordained to flow to the end of time should, while constantly predicting the growth of heresies, the prevalence of false knowledge, the glory of steadfastness in the faith, never, even by incidental allusion, refer to this obvious, safe, immediate security against error! And so of the rest.

Nor let Mr. Newman here interpose with the dictum of that great divine, whom, I fear, he rather affects to quote than loyally follows<sup>v</sup>, “We are in no sort judges

<sup>v</sup> There is something, to me, unspeakably melancholy in the repeated and respectful mention that occurs in this volume of Bishop Butler. Bishop Butler! between whom and his still lingering disciple there is now, in that disciple’s estimation, a barrier fixed everlasting as eternity; whom, with all his early associations of veneration for one to whose deep sayings no thoughtful mind was ever yet introduced, for the first time, without acknowledging the period an epoch in its intellectual history, *he* must now regard as, after all, a poor benighted dreamer, falling ever and anon upon fragments of truth, and binding them together into the illusory harmony to which alone heresy can ever attain; in reality inferior for spiritual vision to the paltriest inditer of “Devotions to the Heart of Mary,” or the most verbose schoolman that ever compiled his page of indistinguishable distinctions! Thoughts like these would lead me far. What a horrible confusion of all the standards of true and false, valuable and worthless, yea, even right and wrong, must be produced in any consistent mind by the unfortunate step

of how a revelation would be made." Mr. Newman cannot, with any argumentative justice, first violate that just and profound maxim by *assuming* the way in which the revelation *was* made (namely, in his own way of so-called development), and then retreat behind the principle he has disregarded, in order to shelter himself from the manifest improbabilities of his own arbitrary scheme.

No; let the truth be plainly spoken. Mr. Newman knows well the Apostles knew none of these things. And yet, by no human ingenuity can it be proved that these things were not as *needful* to be known at first as they could ever be. By no art can it be shown that, if *real*, they must not ever have been among those "things profitable" of which St. Paul declares he kept back *none*. By no subtlety can the ignorance of such things be reconciled with the express promise of Him who was Himself substantial truth, that the Spirit should lead His Apostles into *all* truth.

And now see, on *this* supposition that the Apostles had no real knowledge of these doctrines, how the case stands between Anglican antiquity and Roman development. The English Church, it appears, is content to believe as Paul and John believed; as those believed who heard and transmitted their teaching; as those who followed them for centuries (equitable allowance made for necessary change of circumstances, for mere private opinions, for incidental fashions, and even *that* allowance requisite, in a very trifling degree, for at least a period more than equal to our own distance

this gifted but mistaken man has taken, and would seduce others to take!

from the Reformation), expounded and delivered the original belief. Rome, on the other hand, *must*, on the new theory, maintain that the Gospel, imperfect in the hands and hearts of Paul, and Peter, and John, has since their day advanced in purity, perfection, completeness; that men in the mediæval monasteries, literally and in all the fulness of the phrase, understood and unfolded it better than the disciples of inspired Apostles, better than inspired Apostles, better than—I pause.

There is a great future event, of which it is written, that neither the angels know it nor *the Son of Man*. There was a sense in which the knowledge of the Son of Man was progressive. He grew in wisdom and stature<sup>z</sup>; He “learned obedience;” He was “perfected through sufferings;” and, having suffered, was *thence* qualified to help them that suffer. There was a sense in which the believers on Him were to do even “greater works” than He. The blasphemy against the Holy Ghost (the Church’s inspirer) was to be a more fearful crime than that against the Son of Man. There is a Christian communion in which it has been gravely maintained, and formally decreed<sup>a</sup>, that a man, in the

<sup>z</sup> “The Church,” says Mr. Newman, to illustrate its development, “grows in wisdom and stature”—p. 96. Is my application unwarrantable after this suggestion?

<sup>a</sup> The *Liber Conformitatum* (between S. Francis and the Lord), in which this was done, was solemnly approved by the Chapter of Assisi, in 1390,\* and was for a long period a performance of un-

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\* [Aug. 2, 1399. The author was Barth. Albizi, or De Albizis, (Lat. Albicius,) who was surnamed De Pisa. The words of the Approbation of this work by the general Chapter of the Franciscan Order may be seen in *L'Alcoran des Cordeliers*, Tome i.



thirteenth century, surpassed the Lord himself ; a fact which may at least be admitted to indicate a tendency. Considering the mysterious but manifest distinction which the Incarnation, as unfolded in the Gospel history, involves, between that Godhead in which Christ was equal to the Father, and that manhood in which He was to the Father inferior, men of less ingenuity than the author before me might extend his theory somewhat further than he has yet ventured to carry it. Apostolic inspiration and knowledge once undervalued, who shall protect from dishonour unspeakable the attainments of the Son of Man Himself—the Teacher of those half-illuminated Apostles, the Inspirer of that imperfect inspiration ? If the development of Gospel in Epistles (p. 102) be the adequate justification of the development of the middle centuries from the primitive, who shall say that the *reason, mode, and process* of improvement were not the same ; or, rather, is it not strongly insinuated that they *were* ? The Germany where Mr. Newman found the seeds of his theory will also supply him with its fruits.

But here I must, for the present, cease. Let me recapitulate. Mr. Newman's system, we have seen, to

restricted circulation and popularity. This is the Church whose advocate, in the volume before me, charges *us* with being called by the names of men !

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p. 344. A Amst. 1734. It may be added, that this last-named book is the French version, with additions, by the Genevan printer Conrad Badius, (the volumes were afterwards illustrated with Picart's plates,) of the original, *Der Barfüsser Münch Eulenspiegel und Alcoran*, 1531, which was composed by Erasmus Alberus of Brandenburg ; not *Albertus*, as he is styled by Gesner, Simler, Oudin, Bayle, Du Pin, and others.—G.]

be even nominally a theory, must consist of two elements; the supposition of real and important doctrinal innovation in the Christian Creed to be attained in the way of development; and the attempt to reduce the peculiarities of Romanism under a developing process. The latter of these points I have, as yet, scarcely touched at all; on the former I have offered you some observations in this paper, and more remain. But we must remember that that supposition of development (as I have already intimated) does not stand alone; it is conjoined with another supposition—*infallible guidance* for the Roman Church in the developing process. Nor can Mr. Newman's hypothesis, in its full integrity, be understood without combining them both. I shall do so, and it will then remain for me to show you (as concerns this first division of his general argument) that not only is the supposition of development (in Mr. Newman's sense of it) itself gratuitous, unsupported, improbable—as, I think, we may have already in some degree collected—but that, when united to the notion of constant infallibility, the theory adds to these characteristics the further attributes, partly, of assuming, in the most important stage of the whole argument, the very point to be established—partly, of involving, even after the assumption has been made, direct and manifest self-contradiction. Such, unless I have strangely misconceived the purport of Mr. Newman's own exposition, may *that* theory be shown to be before which the theology of England is to crumble into dust; and which has certainly been attractive enough to replace that theology in the convictions of one of the

most accomplished, if not always the most judicious, of its expounders.

Certainly such a case as this is not without its lesson to us all. With what renewed caution, with what reverent dread of substituting in matters of religion our imaginations for divine ideas, our wishes for God's will, ought *we* to walk—we ordinary men—when the spectacle is here presented to us of a man such as this, of genius the most brilliant, subtle in reason, affluent in fancy, prompt, various, and versatile in the use of all the mental powers, diligent too, and eager in the pursuit of knowledge, industrious in moulding and reproducing it in all the forms of literary labour ; thus, in the very restlessness of his own high gifts, abandoning a faith which even he himself can hardly avoid implying to be a closer copy than his adopted creed of the belief with which Paul and Peter went to martyrdom,—and abandoning it to risk his own salvation, and that of the numbers his personal influence and authority can sway, upon the solidity of a phantom like the theory I have been exposing—it being a most awful but inevitable fact, that if this daring theory be *not* true, he has, in the very conditions and construction of it, completely cut off his own retreat upon any other !

I remain, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.



## LETTER III.

DEAR SIR,

THE hypothesis of Mr. Newman in reality consisting in the assumption that the *mere historical eventuation* of dogmas in a certain particular division of the Christian Church, is a sufficient evidence of dogmatic *truth*, and a sufficient ground for the absolute *authority* of these dogmas over the belief and conscience of all mankind ; and its power of persuasion consisting almost wholly in a dexterous substitution of this mere historical eventuation—or, at best, of some imaginary connecting process of moral and emotional impulse—for plain logical deduction ; he himself soon saw that his hypothesis must ever be feeble and inadequate (indeed must differ in nothing, except its imposing garb of learning and research, from the most pitiful enthusiasm that ever bewildered ignorance)<sup>a</sup>, unless combined with the further supposition

<sup>a</sup> The complete coincidence between Mr. Newman's "*moral development*," and the ordinary ground on which enthusiastic separatists have ever vindicated their fantasies, it would not be very edifying, and, I presume, must be nearly unnecessary to evince by examples. No reader who has ever studied (surely one of the sad-

of an *infallible directive authority* to govern the course of these vague spontaneous evolutions of doctrine.—

dest chapters in the story of our race) the melancholy history of such leaders and their disciples, can require to be told that the substitution of vague impulse (under claim of divine direction too) for intelligible deduction, is the very basis of all fanaticism. But Mr. Newman's sovereign alchemy of the "sacramental principle" (by which, according to his exposition, p. 359—for so sacred an expression requires explanation in its new significance—heathen and heretical extravagancies are suddenly transmuted into Church truths) will, of course, stand him in good stead in this strait.

The doctrine itself of progressive development (we shall presently see it in its infidel aspect) is also no novel form of Christian heresy. Mr. Newman admits it is to be found in all its perfection, in the Montanism of Tertullian; whom he censures solely, it would seem, for having arrived at perfection too soon (p. 351); for having ambitiously presumed to be a mediæval saint before his time: perfect excellence in the tenth century being palpable heresy in the second. Few of our author's positions are more characteristically courageous than this. "*Equally Catholic* in their principle, whether in fact or anticipation, were most of the other peculiarities of Montanism. The *doctrinal determinations*, and the ecclesiastical usages of the middle ages, are *the true fulfilment* of its self-willed and abortive attempts at precipitating the growth of the Church," &c. &c. There is, by-the-by, a happy prophetic ambiguity in one of Tertullian's expositions of development,\* which suits it perfectly to Mr. Newman's *Papal* Montanism, and would form a good theme for his ingenuity of mystical interpretation. (*De Virgin. Veland.* c. i.) "Quoniam humana mediocritas omnia semel capere non poterat, paulatim dirige-

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\* [Though Tertullian believed that Montanus was commissioned to perfect the Christian dispensation, it is evident that in the passage referred to he is not speaking of him, but of the Holy Spirit, who, after the ascension of our Lord, was substituted in His place. The words in the original are not "Vicario Dei," but "Vicario Domini, Spiritu Sancto;" and they relate only to the Saviour's declaration, (S. John xvi. 12, 13.) "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now. Howbeit when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth."—G.]

(See p. 117, &c.) Had the “developments” for whose defence the theory was constructed, been logical de-

retur, et ordinaretur, et ad perfectum perduceretur disciplina ab illo VICARIO DEI” [the *Paraclete*]. “*Summus Pontifex*,” proclaims Innocent III., “non hominis puri sed veri DEI VICARIUS appellatur.” (Lib. i. Epist. 326, *ad Faventin.*)\* [The original title having been “*Vicarius Petri*,” which was gradually thus “developed,” and the former indignantly rejected.]† Mr. Newman will also find some instructive exemplifications of his principle in the remains of the teaching of the spiritualist followers of the Abbot Joachim, and of Peter J. Olivi; whose highly philosophical developments enlightened the thirteenth century. It must be confessed, however, these resolute Franciscans‡ were not content with the more decorous process of making Scripture speak their mind by “mystical inter-

\* [Faventinus was not a man’s name, but signifies the Bishop of Faenza. Another Epistle of this same Pope, which is found in the Canon Law, (*Decret. Greg.* IX. Lib. i. Tit. vii. Cap. Quanto personam.) contains the following similar decision: “Non enim homo, sed Deus separat, quos Rom. Pontifex (qui non puri hominis, sed veri Dei vicem gerit in terris,)” &c.—G.]

† [This observation has been taken from Gieseler: (ii. 254.) but though “Christi Vicarius” is, as might be expected, among the fifty titles of honour assigned to the Pope by Bzovius, (*Pont. Rom.* Colon. Agripp. 1619.) yet Bishop Barlow (*Brutum Fulmen*, pp. 54–61.) has abundantly shown that there is no extraordinary peculiarity nor “Development” connected with this name. “We pray you *in Christ’s stead*” is the earnest language of S. Paul. (2 Cor. v. 20.) A Bishop, says S. Cyprian, (*Ep.* lix.) is “*Judex vice Christi*,” and Firmilian (lxxv.) dwells upon the fact of episcopal succession from the Apostles “*ordinatione vicariâ*.” The Council of Trent itself assures us, that “*Dominus noster Jesus Christus, è terris ascensurus ad cœlos, Sacerdotes Sui Ipsius Vicarios reliquit.*” (Sess. xiv. De Pœn. Cap. v.)—G.]

[For the distinction of *Petri et Christi Vicarius*, see Allies, p. 231. “The power of the Roman Pontiff in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, stood on a different basis from his power in the middle ages. The difference, perhaps, may be summed up by saying that in the former he was Vicarius Petri, in the latter Vicarius Christi; in the former he had a more or less defined Primacy, in the latter he laid claim to a complete Supremacy; he was exalted as a Monarch above his Councillors. A Primate is one idea, a Monarch is another. It seems to be the great *tour de force* of Roman writers to prove the second by the first.”]

‡ [Joachim, Abbot of Flora in Calabria, was not a Franciscan, but of the Cistercian Order.—G.]



ductions from revealed principles, and so, capable of approving themselves to candid reason, this, of course, could scarcely have been required ; they would, in that case, have vindicated themselves. But the actual Roman developments being too manifestly such as can claim little or no *internal* validity in preference to a hundred other conceivable forms of doctrine, it became absolutely necessary to warrant them by some constant external authority; an authority which, at the same time, if it exist, renders the whole elaborate theory of development superfluous, except as a matter of speculative curiosity. A Church absolutely infallible can need to vindicate its decisions out of a theory of development no more than St. Paul would have *needed* to prove the resurrection of the body out of the books of Moses. Such theories as these, indeed, with whatever air of submissiveness propounded, are almost always in reality the work of half-believing disciples of the systems

pretation :” “adveniente Evangelio Spiritus Sancti, *evacuabitur* Evangelium Christi,” is their decisive maxim.\* (Eccardi Corp. Hist. Medii Ævi, ii. 850). It is certainly plainer speaking.

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\* [Eymericus the Inquisitor has thus set down the entire sentence : “Undecimus error, quòd adveniente Evangelio Spiritus Sancti, sive clarescente opere Joachim, (quod ibidem dicitur Evangelium Æternum, sive Spiritus Sancti,) *evacuabitur* Evangelium Christi.” (*Director. Inquis.* Par. ii. p. 189. Romæ, 1578.) This writer and his annotator Pegna (p. 57.) concur in the ascription of the *Evangelium Æternum*, commonly attributed to the Abbot Joachim, (for whose Life, Acts, and Prophecies see Wolfius, *Lectiones Memorabiles*, i. 361–409. Francof. 1671.) to Joannes de Parma, an Italian Monk. It would appear certain, however, that the language above quoted belongs not to the original fantastic book, but to the *Introduction* to, or *Exposition* of, it, which was condemned by Pope Alexander IV. in the year 1255, and has been since prohibited. Consequently the person upon whom censure must fall is the Franciscan Friar Gerhard. Vid. Quetif et Echard *Scriptt. Ord. Præd.* i. 202. Lut. Par. 1719. Moshemii *Instt. Hist. Eccl.* Sæc. xiii. ii. ii. xxxiv.—G.]

they are brought to support ; they are the last hesitating parley of "faith" with still remonstrant Reason.

We are, as yet, however,—postponing the element of infallibility,—to be engaged for a while longer with the internal claims of the Development-Hypothesis itself.

I. I have said that the chief art of this performance consists in substituting high-toned and elaborate descriptions of the course of mere *historical eventuation*, or little more than this, for the legitimate *logical connexion* of the disputed with admitted doctrines. Now it must be quite plain, that, antecedently to all inquiry, such a management of the subject, indeed of *any* historico-dogmatical subject (especially where the materials are very extensive), must be easily practicable. Historically, nothing is without a cause, whether change of action or change of belief, whether deed or dogma. And where a system begins in perfect truth, and perpetually professes a respect for its origin, a pleader of very moderate skill will almost always be able to show that its variations have *some* point or other whereby they grapple with real truth ; corruptions, especially the earlier corruptions of such a system, are seldom so utterly monstrous as to have no corner where they are in contact with truth, no small link by which they hook themselves on to genuine religion. The art of the advocate is, of course, to magnify to the utmost this little link, to gild and burish it by all the devices of eloquence. The human hypotheses and imaginations by the *aid* of which alone it can really make good its position as a member of the true theological system, it is easy to leave in com-



parative obscurity. And then the work is considerably advanced, and the effect skilfully heightened, by invariably stating, in the most exaggerated terms, the adversary's view (that, for example, "a counterfeit Christianity" was early substituted for the Gospel, p. 2), so as to contrast his stern, intemperate condemnation with the meekness and innocence of the little stranger-dogma (whatever it be); or else by the equally ingenious method of vividly describing infidelity<sup>c</sup>, and calling it Protestantism, and under the "Protestantism" so described, covertly leaving to be included the Catholic Church of England.

And, as the link of connexion between the development and the original, is usually of the most attenuated dimensions, and yet the connexion affirmed to be irresistibly proven, the tendency of the whole theory must, of course, be to involve all the evidences of all religion in perplexity, to sink the proofs of the whole to the level of these miserable demonstrations. An organ of investigation being introduced, which may be employed for any purpose indifferently, the tendency of such a theory of religious inquiry will just tell according to the spirit on which it acts. A sceptic will develope the principle into infidelity, a believer into superstition; but the principle *itself* remains accurately the same in both. The *very same* developing process that led Kant, and his innumerable followers, to find at last Christianity complete "within the limits of the Pure Reason<sup>d</sup>," has led Mr. Newman to find it

<sup>c</sup> See pp. 368, 406, 438, &c.

<sup>d</sup> The reader who doubts this, I refer to Kant's own famous (and undeniably very able) work on "Religion within the Boundaries of



complete only in Popery. If Mr. Newman has not ended where the fashionable German school has ended,

Pure Reason.” Mr. Newman considers Christianity intended to develope, so as to adopt new dogmas ; Kant, so as to set itself free of the old. The one would encumber the spirit with an unwieldy body, the other would disembody it altogether ; but *both equally* affect to preserve the spirit itself of the religion. In the Kantean “development,” mysteries “*must eventually* pass into the form of moral notions, by a metempsychosis, if they are ever to become generally intelligible”—(Pref.) ; or, as again : “The Church creed contains within, *the germ of a principle* whereby it is urged to a *continual and more close approximation* towards pure ethics and religion, until, at length, these last being attained, the other be superseded and dispensed with”—Book III. Apot. i. § 7. Religion *gradually disengages* itself “ . . . . The swaddling-bands beneath which the embryo shot up to manhood must be laid aside when the season of maturity is come. The leading-strings of *sacred traditions* [here we have a really edifying coincidence], &c., which, in their time may have been of service, grow, by degrees, superfluous, &c.”—Ibid. The general object of the work is to unfold this in detail.

So too Mr. Newman and the great Patriarch of Rationalism agree perfectly on the necessity of “mystical interpretations” (Newman, 319–327), to reconcile their respective “developments” with Scripture ; with Kant, much “depends on the mode in which the revealed text is expounded, *so as to receive* a perpetual interpretation parallel (to modern Romanism, in Mr. Newman’s view) to the religion of Pure Reason.” “An interpretation of this sort,” continues Kant, “may often be strained, but the text *must then be forced in preference* to the literal meaning, &c.”—Ibid. § 6. So Mr. Newman too, after similar pleadings, formally lays it down, “that the mystical interpretation and *orthodoxy* will stand or fall together,” p. 324. How instructive, yet how awful, this coincident anxiety to provide for the felt hostility of the solemn Word of the Most High to the results of both schemes alike !

Meanwhile I cannot venture to compliment Mr. Newman, ingenious as his book often is, and always eloquent, with having made his scheme of the development of the Gospel into mediæval belief,

most assuredly it is not his theory or his method which has saved him. The instant that the plain principle is rejected, of man's obligation to bend his faith in humble submission (however taste, fashion, associations, peculiar habits of reading, or personal inclinations, may urge him) to the original Message of God (in whatever way, once for all, communicated), and the truths therein involved ; the instant that for *this*—the old and recognised maxim of the Catholic Church through all its divisions, up to the fatal period when vain and ill-conceived additions to belief and worship forced the theologians committed to them to cast about for some new principle to defend new practices,—he substitutes his own calculations of what may be (in Mr. Newman's phrase) “congruous, desirable, decorous, &c.”—from that instant he has adopted a maxim which may lead to *any* results, and is equally illegitimate, to whatever result it lead.

It is, therefore, quite vainly that Mr. Newman would vindicate his system from being a defence of Romanism on the principles of Rationalism, by alleging that the tendency of the Development Theory is positive, and to extend belief ; of Rationalism negative, and to contract it (p. 83). The formal nature of Rationalism is—the undue employment of mere human reason in the things of religion, with a view to evade in some way the simplicity of the obedience of faith. Now this may manifest itself either in the *result* arrived at, or in the *method* employed ; even supposing that Mr. Newman

anything like so plausible as Kant's development of the same Gospel, by the same method, into ultra-rationalism.



were to be acquitted on the former ground, he cannot on the latter. A man who should affect to discard all revealed testimonies, and to prove the Divinity of Christ or the Doctrine of the Trinity exclusively by internal reason, would be a rationalist, though his conclusion be not a negative, but a most positive dogmatic truth. It is, moreover, a great mistake to assume that superstition (i. e. the unwarrantable superaddition of beliefs or practices) has not its own rationalism ; in point of fact, the various practical corruptions that have been superadded to Christianity have all been *first* justified less by an appeal to authority (for they could have little at *that* stage of their history) than on plausibilities of reasoning, imaginary analogies, alleged expediency—that is, by essentially rationalistic processes. When Mr. Newman lays it down as a great practical axiom preliminary to his theory, that “to be perfect is *to have changed often*” (p. 39), of what school does he echo the principles ? in what Catholic Doctor will he find his model ? In truth, this slippery theory can avoid the title of rationalist only by not being even worthy of the name ; this scheme for evacuating the Catholic Rule of Faith does not even profess to rest on distinctly *rational* grounds ; capricious and unlicensed as are the ventures of rationalism, even they are not so precarious as the *emotionalism* of Mr. Newman.

II. However the theory may be modified by the subsequent additional supposition of infallible guidance, it is quite evident that, considered in itself, its internal spirit and scope (especially as illustrated by its alleged Romish instances) are nothing short of this, that *everything* which *certain* good men in the Church,



or men assumed to be such, can, by reasoning or feeling, collect from a revealed truth, is, by the mere fact of its recognition, admissible and authoritative. Now, against this (and I repeat that nothing short of this can cover the instances in question), I venture to affirm the broad principle,—that the very perfection of the Church's discharge of her office of instruction and exposition lies not in unlimited development," but in cautious *moderation* ; in being not "wise beyond ;" that the great problem in theological deductions and applications consists in exactly the very thing this speculation overlooks, the *admitting a certain tone of thought, and guarding against its extravagancies*. What this theorist would call timidity and incompleteness is just the perfection of practical wisdom. The Aristotelian "mediocrity," imperfect as an ultimate criterion of right and wrong, is yet a great and almost universal practical truth ; man himself is a sort of mean term between the extremes of being ; and the very essence of practical wisdom in almost every department of human life seems to consist in carrying out this condition of his nature, in the sagacity that accurately determines *where to stop*. Rare and inestimable as is this gift, it is of all high qualities the easiest to ridicule and depreciate. The Socinian regards the Anglican Catholic as a superstitious bigot ; the Romanist regards him as a frigid rationalizer, whose religion is one universal negative. The Puritan enters an English Cathedral (that almost miraculously felicitous realization of the precise degree in which religion may rightly invoke the aid of sense and imagination !) to smile or scowl on the "ill-said mass ;" the Italian churchman, to deplore the lin-

gering infidelity that will not go farther, and dissolve in tears before the Madonna's pictured purity. In this, as in so many other respects, English theology recalls the theology of Antiquity. The object of all the first controversies and councils was to fix that middle truth of which rival heresies were the opposite distortions ; in Mr. Newman's forcible and happy figure (p. 448), "The series of ecclesiastical divisions alternate between the one and the other side of the theological dogma especially in question, as if *fashioning it into shape by opposite strokes*." It is not, then, to such an antiquity of careful conscientious limitation that we must look for the model of unchecked and unqualified "development."

III. This consideration becomes the more momentous, when we remember how it may have been—in some respects, certainly *was*—the intention of the Author of the Christian Revelation to *withhold information* upon subjects on which His high wisdom saw it as well or better that we should not possess distinct knowledge. In such a case we can scarcely imagine a more unwarrantable contravention of His will than presumptuously to intrude into such "hidings of His power," and authoritatively to propound in relation to them obligatory articles of belief. Such subjects are, among others—the state of departed souls in general, and all its connected topics ; the exact estimate the Supreme God may make of the works of His saints, or of the spiritual condition of special individuals before Him ; the beatification of particular deceased Christians (and that with the *certainty* required to make them secure objects of religious devotion !); the precise and (so to



speak) metaphysical nature of that ineffable Communion of the Body of Christ, which He Himself describes in those profound sentences in John vi., and which St. Paul peculiarly connects with “the bread which we break ;”—and numbers of similar subjects of speculation. That there *are real* limits to all attainable knowledge on such matters in our present state, is internally evident from the very nature of the case, and abundantly confirmed by such solemn warnings as that of St. Paul, Col. ii. 18 ; nor even if inspired men actually possessed such knowledge, does it follow that they would be permitted to publish it ; increased knowledge, merely as such, being by no means necessarily a blessing ; especially where no new *duty* arises in consequence, or no new light is thrown upon the old. But it is one of the practical evils of a claim such as the Church of Rome makes to infallible authority (and no small presumption against its legitimacy), that she is inevitably driven to this profane and irreverent scrutiny and determination of things mysterious ; for when controversies arise, she often cannot in very shame but profess to decide them ; and is thus forced to *follow* all the abstruse distinctions and difficulties that any subtle teacher may propose for public disputation. We know indeed how often (especially in more inquiring times) Rome has felt the burden of this inconvenient accompaniment to the claim of theological omniscience, and endeavoured to escape it ; for example, in the controversies about Grace and Free Will in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, which she so long strove to evade, partly by adjourning the decision, partly by enforcing silence on the contending factions. While, on



the other hand (I cannot help observing, as the subject is before me), it is certainly surprising that her votaries are not struck by the presumption against her *preternatural* wisdom involved in the lameness and feebleness of these decisions. If she declined deciding at all, we could ascribe it to a Divine impulse to *reserve*, and see in it perhaps some resemblance to God's own ways of partial disclosure in Revelation; but to decide, and decide poorly, and ambiguously (so as to "more embroil the fray"), and in the technical terms, and (apparently) borrowed inferences of mere human wisdom, without throwing a ray of light upon the real question beyond what all the world possessed before,—this surely reveals little of a power beyond human, little of the voice of the Holy Spirit Himself condescending to enlighten men. There is a very important distinction to be preserved here. In things where there *can* be no human test of consciousness or observation, *any* arbiter who assumes infallibility can carry off his pretensions easily; he can map out the invisible world with as confident a security against all opposing claimants, as astronomers have divided among themselves the titles of districts in the lunar globe. Such are the dogmatical affirmations of a Purgatorial region, of a secret physical Transubstantiation, of the beatification of eminent defenders of the Roman claims and belief, of the omnipresent attention of such to their innumerable votaries at the same moment; and the like;—things of which the scene is carefully placed so as to remove them from the reach of direct counterproof. It is otherwise where (as in the controversy referred to above), the whole question and all its grounds are

within the grasp of the ordinary student ; and accordingly, we may observe (though it would take too long to establish it in detail), that *exactly in proportion* as questions are of *that* description, is there real and energetic disunion about them, under the imposing external uniformity of the Roman Church.

Restraint within appointed limits, then, not unchecked development of the kind here contemplated, is the true characteristic both of the Church's *wisdom* and of her *humility* ; not the accumulation of new doctrines, but the deep and earnest practical realization of the all-sufficing doctrine she already and from the beginning possesses. She believes that the *more* "living" and influential that doctrine, the more will it transform others to its likeness, the less will it yield itself to their's. The Truth of God stoops to men from on high ; though it be among them, it is among them as a superior ; it is but to confound earth and heaven to compare (p. 45) its intended course to the wavering miscellaneous fortunes of a political principle or a political party. The true Catholic reveres too deeply the mysteries of divine truth to take them from their own appropriate region, and, casting them into the heated alembic of human feeling, to try how, by this subtle theological chemistry, he may be able to distil the pure essence into new forms of belief and worship. The man violates the first principle of ecclesiastical wisdom and duty, who would thus counsel the Church of Christ to idolize itself as the source and centre of truth ; to take its own half-disciplined tendencies for principles of divine knowledge ; and, insincerely using the oracles of God as the convenient occasion of new doctrines, not



as the warrant of the old, to advance rashly into the very heart of God's own secrets, and whatever its feeble eye could catch, or seem to catch, amid those awful depths, to stamp as portions of eternal truth, authentic revelations, supplementary scriptures. These are not the enterprises for which the Catholic Church was chartered : "Teach them" was His word, "whatsoever I *have* commanded you," it was never,—"*Modify the simplicity of truth to suit accidental circumstances as they rise ; or expand hints *designedly* faint ; or make all clear where God would have mystery, or recommend doctrines to gross minds, by adopting and consecrating their grossnesses (see p. 359, &c.) ; and thus, out of these few primary elements, develope according to your wisdom a system that may awe, attract, and govern mankind.*" No provision whatever is made in the original documents of the religion, for such subsequent incorporations ; the warnings are careful and reiterated against it. With what scrupulous caution did the model of teachers himself, and on an inspired page, distinguish between what he spoke of command from God, and what he offered as a private suggestion ! How earnestly did "the wise master-builder," who had "laid the foundation," bid "every man take heed how he should build thereupon ;" adding the solemn warning, that "the wisdom of this world was foolishness with God," as if to urge men to distrust the most plausible suggestion, when not marked with the signet of God's declared approbation. Mysteries abound in God's dispensations, both of Nature and of Grace. "Sin after Baptism," on which the present author enlarges, as if it was a problem on which the Gospel can throw no



light, without help from the Council of Florence, is surely, at worst, no greater mystery than numberless others that we must contentedly endure; all are equally trials of faith, humility, patience; and many might, for aught we can tell, require for their satisfactory disclosure, a degree and kind of knowledge impossible to our present faculties, or a change of faculties unsuited to our present state.

But though limitation and mystery are thus manifestly the will of God, and subserve ends most important in the discipline of Man, it is seldom that human pride and curiosity are satisfied with such a dispensation. This restlessness manifests itself in a two-fold result. Man's impatient spirit will *either* tolerate no mystery at all with the Socinian, *or*, if he must have it, will take care to handle, shape, and vulgarize it after his own coarse fashion, with the monk and schoolman of the middle ages. It is thus that, in melancholy truth, Romish "development," in every point, debases the true sublimity of Christianity; as, indeed, might be expected, when we remember the period when, and the artists by whom, the attempt was undertaken, of completing the divine outline. The reformer of Christianity (for really that title, so unpopular with Mr. Newman's friends, must, by his own confession, be henceforth allowed to belong most appropriately to the devisers of his own creed)—the reformer, or developer, of primitive Christianity will suffer no mystery to be safe from his degrading explanations. He will not have the blessed mystery of the "Communion of the body of Christ;" it must be squared and fashioned into a precise and definite Transubstantiation of sacramen-

tal bread and wine. He will not leave in all its grand and pathetic mystery the state of the disembodied ; it must be a Limbo or a Purgatory, the exact temperature of whose penal fires<sup>d</sup>, and number of whose years of woe he will undertake to demonstrate. He will not tolerate the profound mystery of the Communion of Saints, that fearful and glorious spiritual advent of the Christian to “the heavenly Jerusalem, and the general assembly and Church of the first-born ;” it must be a semi-idolatrous Invocation, for that every body can understand. He will not receive the parallel mystery of earthly Christian unity, unless it be substantiated in a visible monarchy, which effectually relieves it of any mystery at all. He cannot accept the admirable mystery (so abundantly sufficient and consoling for genuine faith), of God’s secret Providence governing the Church Catholic from age to age ; securing its promised permanence, and bestowing His Spirit according to His own all-wise distribution ; it must be a downright infallibility of a kind all can comprehend, and even attached to a place and a person, to make the conception more utterly on a level with the vulgar capacity. It is thus that all the dim and shadowy features of mystery are sharpened into cold and hard details ; its majestic distance brought near, its sublime immensity contracted, its grandeur made mean and paltry ; and *this*, this condensation of awful mystery into frigid fact, is what we are to venerate as the “development of Christian doctrine.”

<sup>d</sup> *Thom.* in 4 *Sentent. Dist.* 21. *Q.* 1. [*Super quart. lib. Mag. Sent. Dist.* xxi. *Qu.* i. foll. 123–6. Venet. 1497.—G.] *Bellarmin. De Purgat.* ii. 6. § *Deinde.* &c. &c. [*Opp.* Tom. ii. col. 790. Ingolst. 1601.—G.]



IV. For it might, surely, be reasonably expected that were this progression of revelations designed to be the real law of the promulgation of Christian truth, the growth would be, as in parallel cases, from things simple, easy, obvious, to matters of a character *sublimar* and yet sublimer; such as would exalt the human spirit to a loftier elevation, and open a vaster horizon to its gaze. Even in the great historical instance of the simple logical fixation of a disputed truth by appeal to the written testimony of God and the transmitted belief of the Churches, the discussion and settlement of the doctrine of the Trinity, we find it perfectly so. The doctrine of the Trinity, which simply designates by one name, and thus brings together into one luminous focus, the distinct and numerous intimations of the original revelation, is a grander thing than any single portion or detached ground of itself; in combining the separate elements into one, it heightens by mutually reflected splendour the glory of each, and magnifies the awful mystery of the whole. But how incomparably different is the character of the Roman peculiarities! Scarcely any man will venture to deny—indeed Mr. Newman's "sacramental principle" involves a plain admission—that they are, for the most part, of a lower character than the truths out of which they are held to grow. Invest it with all the brilliancy of imaginative colouring, philosophize it into all the dignity of metaphysical abstraction, and, after all, who, not irrevocably committed to the system, will have the face to say that *Image Worship* was not a descent and a retro-gradation? Who that remembers the laborious foundation laid for securing the unity of the Object of worship in the Old



Testament,—the supply specially made (in this connexion) for the just satisfaction of man's human longings and sympathies by the Incarnation in the New,—the miserable and universal tendency of men to interpose men between themselves and the awful purity of God,—but will see that *saint-worship* was below, not above, or upon, the level of the religion of John and Paul ?

Not such are faithful “developments,”—if we must employ a term, whose ambiguity—the word being equally employed (in its common application to the growth of organic structures) for the unfolding of *original elements* and the further incorporation of *foreign materials*—perpetually darkens the whole subject. Such combinations and comparisons of doctrine—humbly, reverentially, patiently prosecuted—attest the glory of the divine religion, and maintain it perpetually in its own celestial sphere. It will be found so in *all* that is really of God, and uncorrupted by weak human qualifications, whether in the departments of Nature or of Grace ; truth steadily adhered to, the more admirable will it grow with every new combination ! But all depends on that scrupulous adherence. It is hard to persuade men of this, hard to convince them that God's Reality is everywhere essentially sublimer than Man's Imagination. Yet every step in the march of human knowledge has shown it. The real law of the physical universe is a nobler conception, even in its imaginative aspect, than all the brightest philosophical visions that went before it ; patient science, which deals with the creations of God, is continually arriving at conclusions not merely more valuable, but even poetically more

brilliant and beautiful, than man ever attained when giving loose to all the capricious evolutions of fancy or conjecture. Let any man in *this* point of view compare the *Timæus* and the *Principia* ! Just so is it in the *revealed* system too. Christianity itself is infinitely beyond the best human and philosophical conceptions of a religion ; and such likewise will invariably be the superiority of the theology that originally grew out of the strict and scrupulous meditation of the revelation itself, over any which ever has been, or will be, generated by the unlicensed aid of human feelings, sensibilities, adaptations, expediencies. Amply does experience prove it in the great example before us ! The pretended “development” of the mediæval centuries is, in truth, no advance, but a confused *retreat* upon the old Pagan associations, so dear, so natural to man ; human nature has pretty extensive experience of its own tendencies in the construction or corruption of religions, and it can very safely depose to its own manufacture in the religion of images and “deified saints.” This was no “shining *more and more* unto the perfect day.” The Christianity of the Apostles was profound, pure, lofty ; the spirit of man feels that, deep as it may plunge, it can never touch ground in that unfathomed ocean, nor in its strongest soarings reach the heights of that unbounded sky. The public and authorized Christianity of the middle ages (save for the corrective virtue of the precious body of fundamental truths it preserved) was the religion—unless all the analogies of history and travel are a delusion—of the decrepitude or the infancy of the human spirit. It bears not one token of true growth, or expansion, or vigour ; save



what inseparably belonged to its original inheritance of truth. It enlarged indeed its multitude of subject minds ; but, for the most part, *what* minds ! and how utterly has it ever since, on any large scale, failed where true Christianity has so often among us achieved its noblest victories, in proving its innate vigour, by commanding the allegiance of perfectly free and deeply thoughtful spirits ; the educated classes, through almost its entire dominion, being at this moment (oh, shame and disgrace !) notoriously and avowedly infidel ; and the Romanism which would now storm or seduce the intellect of England, having become, on its own ground—God forbid I should say it otherwise than in sorrow for the suffering cause of Christianity !—the scoff and scorn of the leading intelligences within its nominal communion. To resume. In the profound providence of God, such a modification of the primitive revelation as the mediæval may have been suited in some respects,—not in the *chief* respects, for the glory of the pure religion is its universal applicability and power,—but yet in some respects, for the semi-barbarous races it addressed, it might have bridged the passage from their national superstitions, by (as sainted Popes were not ashamed even then to recommend, and modern Jesuits long after exemplified) adopting and imitating their weaknesses. I do not deny such overruling mercies possible to Him who can extort good out of the worst of evil ; but I do reclaim against the monstrous pretence that this clumsy and uncouth scaffolding (whatever its temporary uses), is to be regarded as a genuine member of the majestic architecture it disfigures : that this *hypertrophy* is to be taken as a healthy and natural



growth of the divinely organized frame it encumbers and corrupts.

Let us not be deceived by the literary fashion of an hour. The "dark ages" have, no doubt, been unreasonably darkened; keen and learned explorers<sup>e</sup> have shown us how unfair it is to make a starless midnight of that twilight of the mind; but, in the name of common sense and reason, let us beware of the most absurd and irrational of all reactions; and amid all the learned revolutions that in so many departments are reversing around us the old judgments of history, let us yet a while pause, before we consent to call the age of the monastic miracles and the Lateran Councils the *beau idéal* of Christian sincerity, humility, and wisdom!

For, in truth, this important consideration must not be overlooked in dealing with this daring hypothesis. I have already in this paper argued that this system is but a Romish application of the method by which all the peculiarities of Christianity may be, and have been subverted; I have argued that the theory rests upon ideally substituting the extravagant straining of doctrine for that moderation which is the true perfection of the Church's wisdom, in the discharge of her prophetic function. I have argued that such a system essentially contravenes the purpose of God to withhold superfluous knowledge, and to discourage vain curiosity on the "secret things" that "belong" to Him alone.

<sup>e</sup> I need scarcely mention Mr. Maitland's acute and agreeable essays. [For a discussion of the literary attainments of the "Dark Ages" see also Hallam's *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, Chap. ix. note 203, and M. Ampere, *Histoire Littéraire de la France avant le douzième Siècle*. Paris, 1840.]

I have argued that (as might be expected) the unblest attempts of divines (who often foresaw not the peril of the example they set), to intrude into the Unrevealed, have only terminated in degrading the Revealed ; and thus that, in point of fact, the pretended “developments” of the Roman theology, are themselves a palpable *descent* from the level of Christianity, instead of being, as all true growths of primitive doctrine would assuredly be, undiminished manifestations of its principles and power—advanced apprehensions of the one unchangeable truth, in proportion to the advanced experience of the Church,—“wisdom” for them that were become more and more “perfect,” and whose “senses” were “exercised to discern” with a yet more exquisite and instantaneous tact : but this argument becomes still more convincing when we recall the PERIOD at which these improvements of the Gospel were invented or methodized, the sort of guides at whose feet, as being the only safe developers of Christianity, we primitive Catholics are now summoned to surrender our faith. This topic I cannot wholly omit, although I can do it but little justice here.

V. That traces of some of these notions are to be found as early as the fourth and fifth centuries, is well known ; though the lowest degree of competent criticism can separate between them and authoritative dogmas at that period ; and every one interested in this controversy must take special care to remember, that the Roman hierarchy is not censured *merely for retaining* (in despite of all the opportunities of inquiry, and all the merciful teachings of Providence) these follies and weaknesses, but for *enforcing* them as *essential*



to the right conception of Christianity ; essential to the salvation of every human soul ; essential in such a degree, as to justify convulsing the whole Church of Christ to its centre, and sundering its visible communion, rather than recognise their omission in any national Church. But it is not in the fourth and fifth centuries Mr. Newman delights to find his model ; he knows well how the great names of those days, even when betrayed into countenancing (or, like St. Jerome, too angrily championing), some of these weaknesses, yet, in their more reflective hours, expressly speak of them as things uncertain, optional, circumstantial, at best. The *medicæval* Christianity is Mr. Newman's true Ideal of absolute perfection ; is it not fair then to ask my readers to reflect what was the real pitch of learning and morals in the period to which we are no longer called to do even-handed justice (it is delightful to be shown how to render *that*), but which is boldly set before us as the culminating point—at least till the next “development”—of Christian knowledge and Christian holiness ?

The devotional habits attributed in the monastic histories and legends to that period, recommend it to men who have to lament (what, however, the better prelates themselves of that day lamented with at least equal energy) the prevalence of indifference and scepticism ; and numerous individual instances of excellence, no doubt, there were, though it requires some ingenuity and perseverance to detect them through the mist of extravagance with which the middle-age mythology has invested its heroes. But it is not individual instances that determine the tone and character



of the times. The mediæval treatises that make up so large a portion of the huge *Bibliothecæ Patrum* (even supposing them to be of far higher quality than most of them can pretend to), were the attempts of pious men not so much to elevate and reform a declining Church, as to adorn and recommend what they found to be its general belief. The doctrine of an age cannot well rise above the level of its *average* instructors. What was the condition of the clergy at large, when the “developments of Christian doctrine” became fixed integral portions of the Gospel? Was it such as to form a *legitimate presumption in favour* of these innovations? Of what class and character were the men to whom it was given to see mysteries of faith, on which he who was “caught up to the third heaven” was silent, to which, hundreds of years after him, Chrysostom and Augustine were blind, or but feebly and indistinctly alive<sup>f</sup>.

I open an ordinary authority<sup>g</sup> almost at hazard; and I transcribe nearly the first sentences I meet. I have no room for (what would be very easy) lengthened

<sup>f</sup> “Nunquid Patribus,” asks St. Bernard, who, if unfortunately he did not always follow his own maxim, always, we may presume, imagined he was strictly doing so,—“doctiores aut devotiores sumus? Periculose præsumimus *quicquid ipsorum in talibus prudentia præterivit.*”—Epist. clxxiv.

<sup>g</sup> [Viz. Gieseler, ii. 33, where the first three quotations are more fully given. This *Text-Book of Ecclesiastical History*, translated by Cunningham, Philadelphia, 1836, is almost exclusively the source of Mr. Butler’s references, and is the work intended when the writer’s name occurs in any of the notes signed G. The editor occasionally cites another performance by the same author, published ten years later.—G.]

citations ; but the candid student will understand what such as these *imply*, and “develope” for himself. The following, for example, is a decree of a very important and influential Council of Aix la Chapelle, A. D. 789, intended apparently for the prelates at large of the Western Churches<sup>h</sup>. “Videant Episcopi ut *presbyteri missarum preces bene intelligant . . . ut Dominicam orationem ipsi intelligant*, et omnibus prædicent intelligendam.” In an episcopal *mandement*<sup>i</sup>, some time later, it is earnestly pressed, that “Sermonem Athanasii de Fide, cujus

<sup>h</sup> [The Capitulary of Aix-la-Chapelle, addressed by Charlemagne to Ecclesiastics, may be seen among the Laws collected by Ansegisus Abbas, and Benedictus Levita. On account of the omission of a clause after the word “intelligent,” where it first occurs, it may be well to set down the entire passage :—“Ut Episcopi diligenter discutiant per suas parochias Presbyterorum fidem, Baptisma Catholicum, et Missarum celebrationes, ut fidem rectam teneant, et Baptisma Catholicum observent, et Missarum preces bene intelligant, et ut *Psalmi dignè secundum divisiones versuum modulentur*, et Dominicam orationem ipsi intelligant, et omnibus prædicent intelligendam, ut quisque sciat quid petat à Deo, et ut Gloria Patri cum omni honore apud omnes cantetur.” (Cap. lxx. fol. 14. Paris. 1603.)—G.]

<sup>i</sup> [Of Archbishop Hincmar (*Capitula Presbyteris data*, ann. 852, c. i.) See Mansi, xv. 475, in Gieseler, *Ecc. Hist.* ii. 263. Ed. Clark. The injunction of Hincmar, from which the citation in the text is made, does not imply that his clergy were remarkably low in their attainments: “Ut unusquisque Presbyterorum expositionem Symboli, atque orationis Dominicæ juxta traditionem orthodoxorum Patrum *plenius* discat, exinde prædicando populum sibi commissum sedulo instruat. Prefationem quoque Canonis, et eundem Canonem intelligat, et memoriter ac distincte proferre valeat, et orationes missarum, Apostolum quoque et Evangelium *bene* legere possit ; psalmorum etiam verba et distinctiones regulariter et ex corde cum canticis consuetudinariis pronuntiare sciat. Necnon et Sermonem Athanasii,” &c.]



initium est Quicumque vult salvus esse, memoriæ commendet [unusquisque presbyterorum], et *sensum illius intelligat*, et verbis communibus enuntiare queat”—*Mansi*, xv. 475. And there is no reason for supposing that the clergy of Hincmar, the bishop who issued these instructions, were not up to the level of their day.

A little farther on, and some sixty years after<sup>k</sup>—“Qui Scripturas scit, prædicet Scripturas; *qui vero nescit*, saltem *hoc quod notissimum est* plebibus dicat [ut declinent a malo, et faciant bonum, inquirant pacem et sequantur eam]”.—*Theodulph.*<sup>1</sup> *ad Paroch.* [*Capit. ad Presbyteros parochiæ suæ*,—G.] c. 28. Sometime after, RATHERIUS<sup>m</sup>, in an age of still further development, enforces sternly upon the clergy of one of the most important dioceses in the Western Church the absolute necessity of knowing the three Creeds<sup>n</sup>; and seems to add his earnest admonition, that they would try to learn the meaning

<sup>k</sup> [Rather, fifty-five years before. Archbishop Hincmar's *Capitula* were issued in 852, and those of Theodulphus, Bishop of Orleans, (first published by Baronius,) about A. D. 797.—G.]

<sup>1</sup> [It must be admitted, in fairness to the *middle ages*, that the Capitular of Theodulphus does not involve such ignorance as is implied in the text. One of his directions is as follows (Ch. 20); “Presbyteri per villas et vicos scholas habeant, et si quilibet fidelium suos parvulos ad discendas literas eis commendare vult, eos suscipere et docere non renuant, sed cum summâ caritate eos doceant. Cum ergo eos docent nihil ab eis pretii pro hâc re exigant, nec aliquid ab eis accipiant, excepto quod eis parentes caritatis studio suâ voluntate obtulerunt.”—Vid. *Mansi*, xiii. 993, quoted by Gieseler, ii. 265, Ed. Clark.]

<sup>m</sup> [Ratherius became Bishop of Verona in the year 931.—See Du Pin.]

<sup>n</sup> [“*Memoriter*” should have been added. In fact, notwithstanding the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, if a Bishop in the



of the Sunday°. “Moneo etiam vos de Die Dominico ut cogitetis, *aut si cogitare nescitis, interrogetis, quare ita vocetur*, . . . . ut unusquisque vestrum, si fieri potest, expositionem Symboli et Orationis Dominicæ juxta traditionem orthodoxorum penes se scriptam habeat, et *eam pleniter intelligat*; et inde, *si novit*, prædicando populum sibi commissum sedulo instruat; *si non, saltem teneat vel credat*:” and he similarly recommends to those who do not understand<sup>p</sup> the prayers they utter at Mass, that “saltem memoriter et distincte proferre valeant.”

Listen again to the testimony of one who was himself one of the great instruments of ecclesiastical “developments:” “Populus,” he writes<sup>q</sup>, “nullo *prælatorum* mo-

present day were to require his Clergy, at a Visitation, to repeat from memory the three Creeds, with the alternative of leaving his diocese in disgrace, it may be apprehended that many a heart would tremble.—G.]

° [By looking at the original in the *Spicilegium* of D'Achery, (i. 376. nov. ed.) it will become quite manifest, that this statement, hastily copied from Gieseler, (ii. 98.) does not rightly represent the Bishop of Verona's meaning. His object was to prevent irreverence and profaneness with regard to Sunday; and he therefore directs that it may be borne in mind *Whose* day it is: “si enim Dominica est Domini, utique non nostra dies est: si Domini est, reverentiâ Domini est honoranda.”—G.]

<sup>p</sup> [Dr. Maitland, if speaking of this passage, would doubtless ask for attention to the circumstance that the not unimportant word “*bene*” has been here omitted. On a similar occasion he observes, that “surely there was no proof of brutal ignorance in inquiring whether a candidate for holy orders could read Latin *well* in public—could repeat, understand, and explain the Athanasian Creed, and preach the doctrine contained in it in the vernacular tongue.” (*Dark Ages*, p. 18. Lond. 1844.)—G.]

<sup>q</sup> [See Gieseler, ii. 159. Pope Gregory is lamenting the worldliness and ambition prevalent among the Clergy: but the depressed

deramine, nullisque mandatorum frænis in viam justitiæ directus, immo *eorum qui præsunt*<sup>r</sup> *exemplo* quæcunque noxia et quæ Christianæ religioni sunt contraria edoc-tus, ad omnia pene quæ nefaria sunt proni et studio currentes, [corruentes,—G.] Christianum nomen, non

condition and imperfections of the Church he attributes to a most efficient cause, the insubjection and hostility of the State. “Rectores et principes hujus mundi singuli quærentes quæ sua sunt, non quæ Jesu Christi.”—G.]

<sup>r</sup> It is to be observed that (with, of course, brilliant exceptions, as no doubt there were many brilliant exceptions for ever lost to human fame, but known and dear to God, in *all* classes), there is very little reason to exclude the *prelacy* of the mediæval Church from this general character of its clergy. Whether we regard the warrior bishops of the empire, or the more luxurious and magnificent courtiers of Rome and Avignon, it would certainly appear that “the development of Christian doctrine” was not likely to be a whit safer in their hands than in those of the inferior clergy. As for the Scholastic Doctors, their office (not to insist on their incessant mutual disputes), was, for the most part, to methodize, and to defend at all hazards, what had already, in spirit and substance, grown up before them amid such a clergy and such a laity as the previous centuries afforded. The monastic bodies in the mass, remain; but the perpetual story of their *reforms*, and of the difficulty and rapid decay of these reforms, too clearly indicates *their* average state. Not to add, that mere monastics must ever be essentially unqualified to understand Christianity in all *the fulness of its practical* application, from inevitable lack of experience; and must, therefore, be, of all Christian men, the most incompetent to legislate for universal Christian belief.

And yet the Church was, in its saddest obscuration, a light and blessing to the world,—a priceless blessing! With all the infirmities and errors of its hierarchy, it retained the great lines of Catholic truth, and the blessing that truth inherits. It is only melancholy that the preposterous and extravagant claims of the advocates of its corruptions, should force men to seem to throw any doubt upon that consoling belief.



dico absque operum observantia, sed pene *absque fidei religione* gerunt.”—*Gregor. VII. Epp.* i. 42. But such passages as this bring one to the further ground of the *moral* condition of the clergy; a matter obviously as important in relation to the present theory, but on which to accumulate citations applicable to every successive century, would be a work literally endless. They shall be forthcoming in shoals, if they are asked for. One remark may be made on them all. In every case, the evil seems to grow directly as we approach the very focus of “development,” Rome itself. “*Præ cæteris gentibus baptismo renatis*,” is the declaration of Ratherius, echoed on every side—“*contemptores canonicæ legis et vilipensores clericorum sunt magis Italici*”<sup>t</sup>. Though certainly the latter article of the charge can scarcely move much surprise, when we remember of what description the vilipended *clerici* truly were, on the testimony of the Veronese bishop himself. From Hincmar’s exhortations to Bernard’s<sup>u</sup> more awful

<sup>s</sup> [“*Quærat et aliquis, cur præ cæteris . . . . sint . . .*”—G.]

<sup>t</sup> [D’Achery, i. 354. Pope Pius IX. might perhaps be disposed to ask the same question as that which Ratherius undertook to answer respecting the Italian laity. Possibly he might consider these words also not to be inappropriate: “*sine formidine suis voluptatibus, et mortiferis voluntatibus passim deserviunt omnes.*”—G.]

<sup>u</sup> [Bernard *in Cantic. Serm.* 33. *Opp.* Tom. i. p. 1397. item *Serm. ad Clerum in Concilio Rhemensi*, cited by Ussher, *Works*, vol. ii. p. 68. Ed. Elrington. The following words are a specimen: “*Olim prædictum est, et nunc tempus impletionis advenit, Ecce in pace amaritudo mea amarissima.* (Esai. Cap. 38, Ver. 17.) *Amara prius in nece martyrum; amarior post in conflictu hereticorum; amarissima nunc in moribus domesticorum. Non fugare, non fugere eos potest, ita invaluerunt et multiplicati sunt super numerum. Intestina et insanabilis est plaga Ecclesiæ, et ideo in pace amaritudo ejus ama-*



denunciations, from Bernard to the dreadful revelations of the Council of Constance, the report is miserably uniform ; till the very expression, *ut populus sic sacerdos*, seems to have become a sort of mediæval proverb<sup>w</sup>.

This is a subject on which there is little pleasure in enlarging, and our common historians certainly speak too unsympathizingly of even the harmless peculiarities of the mediæval Church, for me to desire to carry such descriptions beyond their legitimate application. But in relation to the present question, that application is obvious, and it is indispensable. In lieu of the ancient Catholic Rule of Faith, given up as unmanageable, an author stands forward, avowedly substituting “the mind of the Church working out dogmas from feelings.” Surely, we have a right to inquire in what state was the “mind” that took upon itself this tremendous function ? Surely, we may fairly ask, what was the previous discipline, and what the existing cultivation of this ecclesiastical “mind,” that thus undertook to improve on the religion of the Apostles, that saw the true answer to problems they preferred to leave unsolved, and was favoured with revelations the Paraclete of “all truth” forgot to impart to them !

rissima. Sed in quâ pace ? Et pax est, et non est pax ; pax a paganis, pax ab hæreticis, sed non profecto a filiis.”]

<sup>w</sup> [See Glaber Rodulphus ap. Ussher, *Works*, ii. 107. ed. Elrington. The monk thus speaks of the pontificate of Benedict IX. commencing A. D. 1033 : “Quis enim unquam antea tantos incestus, tanta adulteria, tantas consanguinitatis illicitas permixtiones, tot concubinarum ludibria, tot malorum æmulationes audiverat ? . . . . Insuper ad cumulum tanti mali, cum non essent in populo, vel rari, qui cæteros corrigentes talia redarguerent, impletum est Prophetæ vaticinium, quod ait, *et erit sicut populus sic sacerdos*.”]

VI. But untenable as is this claim of authoritative development when confronted with history, distorted and discoloured as we may expect the beams of celestial light to issue from this medium of impure, uncertain refraction, it is really, I must say, doing the whole hypothesis too much honour to refer it gravely *to historical tests at all*. Every one who is in the least competent to judge, and who knows the legerdemain that learned ingenuity can perform in such uncertainty of light, and with such an infinity of pliable materials, must be at once satisfied that the theory of this volume could be made with equal facility *to prove any thing whatever*. Mr. Newman himself seems at times pretty well aware of this ; and while in one page proclaiming his “developments” as little short of demonstration, and “Protestants” blinded and undevout and unbelieving, who cannot at once recognise their force, in others he depresses the demands of his argument, and speaks of it as merely evincing it not impossible that the mediæval divinity *might* possibly have issued legitimately out of earlier doctrine. “The drift of this argument,” he tells us, p. 388, “is merely to determine whether certain developments [in that term simply assuming the question] which did afterwards and do exist, have not *sufficient countenance* in early times, that we may pronounce them to be true developments :” . . . . . and he proceeds to urge that, even if very *little* countenance could be found for them, nay, if the anticipations of them “were *much fewer* than those of a contrary character, they would be the rule, and *the majority would be the exception* ;” the entire reason for this portentous affirmation (which really renders his whole



inquiry nearly superfluous) being, that “they have a principle of *consistence* and *tend to something*,” whereas the others “have no meaning, and come to nothing;” it being perfectly manifest that *any* permanent corruption (and I have already shown that the continuity of human nature lays an adequate foundation for the permanence of religious corruptions), may be similarly vindicated by the fact of its *existence*; and that all corruptions are likely to be more or less *connected*, and thus to have a sort of internal “consistency,” if they be the common growth of tendencies in themselves so connected as are the various superstitious impulses commonly observable in our imperfect nature. But it is not on this I now insist. My present object is simply to lead Mr. Newman’s disciples to do justice to their master, by observing and admiring the universality and flexibility of this new instrument of theological investigation, which can be applied, for the common benefit of all sects and parties in religion, to the proof of anything they please.

In order to clear the way for this modern Rule of Faith, of course (as I have before observed), it becomes necessary to cloud the luminous simplicity of all the evidences of religion. The “Catholic Fathers and ancient bishops” were accustomed to speak somewhat triumphantly in their contests with heretics of the plainness and certainty of the rule of belief. Not so the school of which Mr. Newman aspires to be the founder. He admits that the tests he had himself so laboriously fixed for the ascertainment of correct developments are (p. 117) “insufficient for the guidance of individuals in the case of so long and complicated a problem as Christianity,” and he hesitates not to *gene-*



*ralize* this unhappy principle of scepticism in that usual fearful way in which Romish controversialists prefer sinking the vessel itself of Christianity, to lightening it of their own superfluous burden, and had rather men were utter Deists than rebels to *their* authority. “We must,” he mournfully declares (p. 180), in order to discover (what he calls) “the formal basis on which God has rested His Revelations”—“we must do our best with what is given us, and look about for aid from any quarter ;” and the aid we are to expect, after this long and dubious search, is to consist of “the opinions of others, the traditions of ages, the prescriptions of authority, *antecedent auguries*, analogies, parallel cases, and the like ;” for the basis of belief, for which we are thus groping through the twilight, is of “an historical and *philosophical* character.” This gloomy picture of the difficulties of knowing what to believe (which will answer excellently for our next exportation to Germany, in order duly to maintain the literary balance of trade between us and the philosophers of Bonn and Berlin), and the convenient facility it at the same time presents for believing whatever we choose, is admirably applied in other parts of the work in the establishment of particular doctrines. The following struck me especially, in perusing the volume, as perhaps the happiest specimen of the art of proving by waiving all proof, that the annals of even Roman divinity can furnish. “If it be true,” observes Mr. Newman, in laying down the canons of his theological *Novum Organum* (p. 366), “that the *principles* [the reader must recur to the author for the distinctive meaning of this term<sup>x</sup>; the explanation takes

<sup>x</sup> “Principles are abstract and general; doctrines relate to facts ;

up four pages, 70–73], of the later Church are the same as those of the earlier, then, *whatever are the variations of belief between the two periods*, the earlier, in reality, agrees more than it differs with the later ; for *principles are responsible for doctrines.*”

It being thus settled (for this is the real import of the maxim, as applied in the book) that whatever can be shown to be (in whatever exaggerated degree) an instance of a principle recognised (in whatever limited degree) in the early Church, has a claim to be received, unless we are prepared *wholly* to disavow that principle ; and it being, moreover, no very difficult matter for a writer conversant with the voluminous remains of Christian antiquity, and reading them by a light reflected from subsequent ages, to discover those vague entities which he designates “principles,” pretty much at his pleasure ; the proof of any doctrine at all by clear evidence of antiquity (should persons be so scrupulous as to require that warrant) becomes, in newspaper phrase, “level to the meanest capacity.” Let me venture a trial.

Bishop Stillingfleet, as I remember, quotes in one of his treatises<sup>v</sup> the case of certain sectaries, mentioned

doctrines develope, and principles do not ; [compare p. 368, where we are told that “the principles of Catholic Development *admit of development* themselves,” &c., so maturely has this author digested his own system ;] doctrines grow and are enlarged, principles are illustrated ; doctrines are intellectual, and principles are more immediately ethical and practical. Systems live in principles, and represent doctrines, &c. &c.”—p. 70.

<sup>v</sup> [*Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome*, p. 118. Lond. 1672.—G.]



by St. Augustine<sup>z</sup>, who identified our Lord with the Sun; the Bishop arguing (against the common Romish evasion), that sun-worship, even under that supposition, could ill be excused from the imputation of idolatry. A modern growth of these Christian Guebres might, however, on the new system, make out no feeble case; the public religious recognition of this great visible type of the True Light is but a fair “development” of “the typical principle;” the justifiable imitation of the guilt of heathens, in its adoration, is but an instance of the transforming powers of “the sacramental principle;” while it requires but the most obvious use of the great instrument of orthodoxy, “mystical interpretation,” to find the duty hinted (clearly enough for watchful “faith,” though obscurely to the blinded and undevout), in those passages that speak of a “tabernacle for the Sun,” and we know the Jews *adored* towards the “tabernacle,” or Deity itself being “a Sun”—or the “rising of the *Sol Justitiæ*” (for these things sound more solemnly in the ecclesiastical language)—or “a woman clothed with the Sun,” which woman herself we know to be the object of just adoration, and whose “clothing” may fairly be included in the worship, by the well-known “principle” of material contact, on which so much of the supernatural virtue of relics is founded. Indeed the whole body of the righteous are promised to “shine as the Sun” in the heavenly kingdom; an expression which, though it appear superficially to refer to a period not yet arrived, the Church has correctively developed into an assurance of their present beatification, and consequent right to worship;

<sup>z</sup> He quotes St. August. Præf. in Psal. xciii. [fol. 97, b. Lugd. 1519.—G.]



while it must be at once manifest, that if any representative emblem of the *Deity* may demand religious prostration in our Churches, the analogous emblem of the “deified,” in the great temple of the material universe, may fairly expect a participation in that honour<sup>a</sup>. It is true, there is an express command (Deut. iv. 15), “Take heed lest when thou seest *the sun*, &c., thou shouldest be driven to worship them,” &c., but so there is a command, at least as distinct and imperative, against the worship of *images*, which Mr. Newman instructs us has been repealed under the Gospel, and was never more than a mere Judaic prohibition (“intended for mere temporary observance in the letter,” p. 434), his chief reason being, that the Jews kept it and yet were punished, which, it is obvious, is equally applicable to the glorious development and high privilege of sun-worship which we are humbly vindicating. As to “early anticipations,” there is that plain and irresistible one, the custom of turning to the east in portions of the public service, which can, in no wise, be better explained than by supposing a primitive sun-worship, or, at the very least, an instinctive undeveloped “tendency” thereto (which will answer as well), of which the Fathers indeed take little notice, because this entire

<sup>a</sup> He who holds “*Laudate Dominum in Sanctis Ejus*,” to justify saint-worship, according to the “subtle and powerful” method of mystical interpretation, can scarcely deny the validity of these cogent scriptural proofs. I do not mention the other passage quoted (to justify the worship of matter) in the same place, “*adorate scabellum Ejus*,” because its force and application are too obvious to require insisting on; all arguments to evince the propriety of worshipping *any* portion of the visible creation must, of course, apply with an *a fortiori* power to a portion so glorious in itself, and so suitably emblematical, as the great Orb in question.

mystery was part of the *disciplina arcani*. But, you will say,—for what will not the frigid and sceptical spirit of “Protestantism” allege, to escape the unwelcome control of legitimate development?—that this very custom appears to be condemned by the high authority of St. Augustine, and something very like it attributed to the Manichees<sup>b</sup>. Undoubtedly; but our new instructor has shown us (p. 351) how to discover, in the utmost extravagancies of heresy, only the impatient strugglings of premature truth,—embryo Catholicism, born before its time; as *he* treats Tertullian’s Montanism, we treat the brilliant, but too eager anticipations of Manes. While, again, Augustine lived, after all, in but the childhood of the Church; he who certainly knew nothing of transubstantiation, and has given (doubtless corrupted by the Syrian school<sup>c</sup> that misled Chrysostom and Theodoret) such sad triumphs to heresy on that head, may well be regarded as not absolutely infallible upon this. Still, you may murmur, at how *late* a period does this novel graft upon the Christian stock appear! Vain surmises of a mind that cannot rise to a due conception of the generative energy of that prolific faith (comp. Newman, p. 71), that even in old age can multiply its family of legitimate developments! For more than a thousand years the Church had to wait for the full manifestation of the Gregorian development of absolute spiritual and temporal supremacy, plainly as it is revealed in the very first chapter of Genesis<sup>d</sup>; for nearly fourteen hundred she had to

<sup>b</sup> Aug. contra Manich. xx. 1. [*Contra Faustum*, xx. i. Opp. Tom. viii. 237. ed. Ben. Amst.—G.]

<sup>c</sup> [Vid. sup. p. 19.]

<sup>d</sup> I need scarcely recall to the reader’s notice the exquisite appli-



wander in the darkness of a vain belief that the commands of the Last Supper were to be strictly observed, nor knew how (“for *some* wise purpose, doubtless,” p. 366) it would add infinitely to her happiness and her

cability of *this* mystical interpretation, (which was the great scriptural proof for centuries of the absolute papal supremacy,) to the peculiar subject immediately before us. “Fecit Deus duo luminaria magna; (Gen. i. 16.) scil. Solem, h. e. ecclesiasticam potestatem, et Lunam, h. e. temporalem et imperialem, ut regeret universum. Et sicut Luna nullum lumen habet, nisi quod recipit a Sole, sic nec aliqua potestas aliquid habet, nisi quod recipit ab ecclesiastica potestate,” &c.—*Bonif. VIII. in Confirmat. Alberti I.\** The same impressive argument had been used long before by Greg. VII. and Innoc. III. *passim.*† I appeal to it in preference to the other (though equally overwhelming) evidence for the twofold papal supremacy from Scripture, “*Ecce duo gladii . . . . Satis est,*” because, though the latter mystical interpretation was unquestionably employed as a “medium in which the mind of the Church was exercised and developed in the structure of the Canon Law, and the Bulls and Letters of the Popes,” (Newman, pp. 320, 321.) yet the former is more immediately interesting in relation to my present purpose, as helping to give the Sun and Moon a recognised place in theology.

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\* [Gieseler, ii. 247.—G.]

† [Pope Innocent's decision is perfectly authenticated by its insertion in the Canon Law. (*Decret. Greg.* Lib. i. De Major. et obed. Tit. xxxiii. Cap. vi.) This Pontiff having informed the Emperor of Constantinople, that the Pope is as much superior to a King as the Sun is larger than the Moon, it became a matter of considerable moment to estimate accurately the comparative magnitude of these luminaries. Accordingly Bernardus de Bottono, in his “most erudite” Gloss, affirms that the Sun is *forty-seven* times greater than the Moon; and this determines the degree to which he supposes that regal dignity ought to be lowered. A more correct edition of the *Corpus Juris Canonici* elevates pontifical above imperial power in the ratio of *fifty-seven* to one. Laurentius, a Canonist, endeavours to annihilate all hope of future competition by declaring, in his comment on the same place, that “it is evident” that the Sun is *seven thousand, seven hundred, and forty-four times and a half* greater than the Moon; and this computation having been made by one profoundly acquainted with Astronomy, the relative rank of Emperor and Pope is for ever adjusted, and infallibly fixed upon even to a fraction.—G.]



orthodoxy to break them ! But has—you persist to urge—*has* the Church pronounced in favour of this, so as to warrant me to consider the Worship of the Sun a just and correct development of her admitted principle of relatively worshiping matter as an emblem of God ? Perhaps not ; but *how could a development ever take place if you were to wait first for her authoritative command ?* All the developments by which the mediæval theology is distinguished from that of Ignatius or Cyprian, grew up through the gradual expansion of tendencies in individual minds, and were only at length stamped by the seal of ecclesiastical authority. The verdict of Rome is the consummation, not the outset, of development. The chosen instrument of a new development must prepare for struggle and conflict ; storms and tempests must precede the sacred calm ; the protracted warfare of intellects is indispensable to win for the Church these new territories in theology. The most characteristic, perhaps, of all developments of the Gospel—the assertion of the indefeasible right of Christian men to bow down before wood and stone—was the result of a century and a half of conflict in East and West ; and so little are you to be discouraged by the opposition of modern enlightenment in forcing a way for any doctrine (however apparently monstrous) you espouse, that it is notorious that, in *that* struggle, nearly every divine of character in the Church of the West, including the royal saint, Charlemagne, himself, was opposed to the innovation. Since “development” is the law of the Christian Revelation, it is clearly the duty of every man, in the first instance, to push to the utmost, by every art of ecclesiastical influence and agi-

tation, whatever he may conceive to be a *just* development ; he cannot know it to be *not* so, until Rome—not of late very forward to decide—has spoken ; till then it is plainly his positive duty to press his point ; the conviction he feels is evidence *for*—and he has no evidence as yet against—his being the elected instrument of Heaven to herald into the world a new “development of Christian doctrine.” On what conceivable ground, consistently with this theory, should the *heliolator* delay to propagate his views, or hesitate at once to offer his humble contribution to the ever-growing accumulation of Christian theology ? Rome is not the moving power, but the criterion, of development ; the candidate must strive *before* the judge can decide. The theory of development itself, has *it* waited for the sanction of the Vatican ?

How the slight and humble instance of development which I have ventured to suggest may be carried further, and the heavenly bodies *at large* made the basis of a new exhibition of the principle of relative and typical worship, such passages as Job, xxxviii. 7, Ps. cxlviii. 3, 1 Cor. xv. 41, &c. &c., will readily suggest to the thoughtful reader, practised in exploring the depths of Scripture with the sounding-line of mystical interpretation. Indeed it may be questioned whether, on the same invaluable principles, we may not reconquer to the standard of the Gospel (under some slight decorous changes of name and circumstance), the whole long-lost territory of Pagan dogma and worship ; a scheme said to have been partly contemplated by some of the literary cardinals at the court of Leo X. But this is matter too extensive for my present limits ; nor

will I anticipate the conclusions of the reflective, but leave the subject as a matter of instructive and profitable speculation to those students of the theory, who would like to make some little ventures of their own in the *art* of developing Christian doctrine. It would surely be quite inexplicable, not to talk of its suggesting to the irreverent a somewhat suspicious degree of mere human caution in an inspired hierarchy, if from the date of a Council of three centuries ago, the inherent developing energies of the Church were to be mysteriously and for ever frozen at their source !

Still possibly there may be those who think this instance somewhat exaggerated—though if such there be, I do beseech them, in perfect seriousness, to reflect whether Sun-Worship, at least an innocent *dulia* of that magnificent object—is at a *greater* distance from the worship of images, than the worship of Images from the general spirit of the Pauline theology, or the “keep yourselves from idols” of St. John ? Such more timid spirits, therefore, may please themselves with demonstrating from the new theory the propriety of such minor modifications of the *existing* ritual as, for example,—the duty of worshiping the water of baptism, which no one who remembers the constant analogy enforced in antiquity will say, is not, as regards the Third Person, nearly as natural a development as the *latria* of the other sacrament, first universally established in the thirteenth century, was, regarding the Second ; or the high privilege of adoring the priesthood<sup>c</sup>, which is but an obvious exhibition of the “prin-

<sup>c</sup> The difficulty is really to imagine any extravagance that has *not* been patronised. Augustinus Triumphus gravely argues whe-



ciple" of Reverence, and fully warranted by that "deification" of all who possess an inward gift which Mr. Newman has taught us is a full justification of the *cultus* of men ; or the practice of Communicating the Dead, which is plainly in harmony with the peculiar sacredness of bodies yet to be raised from the grave, in short, a manifest "development of the doctrine of the Resurrection,—" according to the same author's convincing vindication of relic-worship ; or—but I really must not enter upon the boundless enumeration of that infinity of rites, customs, and beliefs, which may, for the consolation and encouragement of theological discoverers, be, every one of them, defended with exactly the same force, and on exactly the same principles, as Mr. Newman's Roman developments of Christian doctrine.

VII. Yet it may still be urged that these are but possibilities (as if *all* developments were not possibilities before they became realities) ; "we do not like to

ther the Pope ought to be honoured as God is, (*Summa de Potest. Eccles. Qu. ix. 1.*) and with a little qualification decides for the affirmative;\* and the "Dominus *Deus noster* Papa" of the Gloss on Extrav. xiv. 4, is not the less certain and memorable, that in the *later* editions the important word is omitted.†

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\* [It may be right to acknowledge that the principle of this Ancona Monk was, that power, and consequent honour, belong "essentialiter" to God ; but to the Pope, or any other creature, they appertain "*participativè, et ministerialiter, vel instrumentaliter.*"—G.]

† [The two references in this note have been taken from Gieseler, iii. 46–7. As to the omission of "Deum" in the famous Gloss of Zenzelinus, it is true that some copies were without the word ; but it was restored, and rendered permanent, in the edition of the Canon Law sanctioned by Pope Gregory XIII. Ten impressions in which the title occurs are enumerated in a note to Calhill's *Answer to Martial's Treatise of the Cross*, p. 6. ed. Parker Soc.—G.]

dwelt upon such unlicensed speculations, or indeed to hear religious questions treated in this tone of apparent irony." On this last criticism—which I readily anticipate—I have but to observe, that whatever of this kind may seem censurable in this paper belongs, unquestionably, not to the applier, but to the *originator* of the argument under discussion ; unless, indeed, the inventor of a new method in theology, no less than in mechanism, has a right to protect his invention by a patent, so as to restrict its application within the arbitrary limitations of his own particular purpose. But if it be preferred, I am willing to shut out the long perspective of future possible developments, to " spare the aching sight" these " visions of glory," which may yet make the descendants of the present generation of Romanists blush for the contracted theology of their fathers ; and to confine myself to a simple retrospect of what *has* actually taken place in the story of the Church. In illustration, then, of the powers of this new instrument of proof, I shall take leave to apply it to a very important instance, which, among some others, its author has quite too much neglected, and which I beg to offer as, in the old critical phraseology, a *mantissa* to his treatise.

There is a Doctrine of enormous practical moment, affecting every individual Christian vitally, and modifying the entire character of the Gospel revelation, which, it can scarcely be denied, has somehow gradually fallen into indistinctness in many parts of Christendom since the period of the Reformation, but which has certainly never been by the Roman Church formally denied ; which seems still very remarkably to

manifest itself everywhere in exact proportion as that communion attains unrestricted power; and which was in the middle-age period its known, admitted, and energetic belief. It may be right that the world should at once be made aware, that in Mr. Newman's theory the way is prepared for its reassertion on distinct *scientific* grounds. Briefly—I affirm, without the slightest fear of contradiction from any one who has mastered the spirit and bearing of his system, that there is no one argument which that system can supply for any *other* prominent Roman peculiarity, which is not with as great or greater force applicable to demonstrate the Antiquity, Catholicity, and Perpetual Obligation under infallible authority, of the doctrine and practice of IMPRISONING, MUTILATING, AND BURNING HERETICS.

There are those—still, God be thanked! the infinite majority of Englishmen,—who will regard such a proof as approaching as nearly as possible to an argument *ad absurdum* in refutation of any theory that involves it. I fear—and it is with real pain and horror I express the fear—that Mr. Newman has long made up his mind not to regard it as such. In the present volume he does not venture formally upon this delicate ground, though the topic must have often crossed his thoughts; but terrible though momentary glimpses are now and then revealed of the dismal depths within. For instance, in his alleged examples of the gradual formation of definite doctrine, in p. 354, we are suddenly startled with the following ominous words:—“ St. Augustine might first be opposed to the employment of *force in religion*, and then *acquiesce in it*; and the spirit which, with high encomium, he assigns to the



Church of the Fourth century (p. 269), as “*intolerant* towards what it considers error, and engaged in *ceaseless war* with all other bodies called Christian,” and the like (though such words, abounding in this book, are capable—for this is common to his style—of different *degrees* of meaning), unhappily, as referred to the intended application to after ages, when we know pretty well of what sort was this intolerance and this “warfare”—too fearfully supports the same view of his real opinions.

This is a gloomy theme. But it is an awful warning to those—especially to the young, at present exposed to such lamentable danger—who, trifling with their own undeserved privileges, and seduced by a temporary and local fashion in religion, shall venture to connect themselves with a system *which can do this*; which can make a man gifted, pious, self-denying, amiable, not blush to countenance—certainly to not discountenance—as a genuine growth of the Gospel interpreted by the same Spirit of truth and love, Who gave it, the darkest perversion in its whole annals; nay, the most terrific and palpable intrusion of the Spirit of Evil into the paradise of God, that any period of human history can instance, since its tremendous type and image in the first Fall of man, and the shedding of innocent blood that followed and attested that Fall.

Meanwhile, it is quite certain, that, if Mr. Newman has indeed adopted such views, he has only accepted the legitimate consequences of his own theory of the rule which is to determine Christian belief and practice. He knows well that the suppression of imputed

heresy by torture and death is a “development” *formed in the very same manner, supported by the very same kind of evidence, warranted by the very same supreme authority* as the rest of those peculiar tenets without which he now believes no man can be saved. It would not be very difficult (according to his own suggestion, p. 29) to take up his unfinished task where he has left it, and carry his argument in triumphant identity through this territory of fire and blood. Will you accept in the meantime a very inferior artist? Some such supplementary section as the following, in which, however, I am forced to be very brief, might enhance the value of the next edition of the *Essay on Development*:

“§—*Torture and Massacre of Heretics.*”

“I have reserved to the last another important practical doctrine of Christianity, because I consider it not so much an instance of the application of one or two of the distinguishing tests of true development already laid down, as a memorable example of *them all*; being amply recommended to our undoubting belief by every one of those infallible criteria of truth; and thus, perhaps, surpassing in force of evidence even those fundamental doctrines of Christianity—as the Trinity—which I have already shown were very doubtfully and indistinctly apprehended by Christians for several hundred years. The doctrine to which I allude is the duty of employing force, in all its varieties of imprisonment, torture, and death, for the conversion of heretics and the suppression of heresy. This great characteristic of the Catholic Church, in which it so

perfectly reflects the character, and thus attests the guidance, of its Founder, has been of late lamentably obscured by the influence of Protestant infidelity; no Church out of communion with that of Rome having the least respect for the dogmatic principle, but all of them, without an exception, believing that whatever any man thinks true is absolutely such; and all being therefore inevitably blind to the beauty of the compulsory principle of conversion. It must be plain, however, that the theory of these pages secures to all true Catholics this delightful Christian privilege, which the wretched unbelief of our times would surrender without a murmur to the Vandal Arians of old and the followers of Mohammed in later times.

“ The Catholicity of this development will at once appear, if we briefly measure it by the tests aforesaid.

“ 1. It exhibits ‘ Preservation of the Type and Idea’ (p. 64), the first criterion of a true development. For I have abundantly shown (p. 240, 241), that the real and true ‘ idea’ of Christianity is that of a society considered by those who contemplate it, ‘ to borrow its customs *from the Heathen* (in this case so often alleged), to burden the mind by requisitions,’ ‘ to be supported by imposture;’ commonly considered (to come nearer the point), ‘ as proselytizing, anti-social, revolutionary, as dividing families, separating chief friends, corrupting the maxims of government, making a mock of law,’ &c. &c.; ‘ a religion which men associate with intrigue and conspiracy, and which, from *the impulse of self-preservation*, they would proscribe if they could.’ I have further shown that in the Fourth Century this ‘ Idea’ manifests itself by ‘ intolerance and ceaseless



war' (p. 269) ; in the Fifth and Sixth, that these characteristics specially collected round Rome and its bishop (p. 317). Now, if the central 'Idea' of the Gospel, out of which all others originate, be this sort of fierce and savage exclusiveness, as men deem it, need I add one word to shew that the stern use of *force*, and the subjugation of civil governments into the mere instruments of ecclesiastical vengeance, must tend to 'preserve,' in all its purity, 'the idea of Christianity?'

"2. The second test of a true 'development' is, 'Continuity of Principles.' I may, indeed, have interposed some difficulty in my own way when in expounding this 'test' abstractedly (p. 58), I have said that 'Christians conquer by yielding, gain influence by hating it, and possess the earth by renouncing it ;' but, in truth, this touching maxim is certainly not more irreconcilable with my present scope than it is—explain it how I may—with the whole history of the papacy ; it being, after all, a somewhat perplexing problem to demonstrate, that St. Gregory VII. and Innocent III. 'conquered by *yielding*, and gained influence by *hating it*.' But when, from this perhaps precipitate sally, you turn to my own *applications* of the second test of fidelity in development, you will easily perceive that in my account of the 'dogmatic principle' (p. 337), I have not forgotten to secure a faithful auxiliary for our present purpose, and in 'the supremacy of faith' (p. 327), according to *my* sense of it, a convenient answer to all the idle reclamations of reason ; while in my *other* application of the same test

—the ‘mystical sense of Scripture’—I have provided the doctrine of persecution with an inexhaustible treasury of scriptural warrants at demand, and need not (if I but copy some of my own examples in that section) despair of converting the Samaritan ‘fire from heaven,’ into a direct command to patronize the Crusades with Urban, and burn alive with Pius.

“ 3. ‘Power of Assimilation’ stands as my third test. This enables the Church to incorporate from foreign sources ; chiefly by the operation of what I have boldly styled the Sacramental principle. The application is obvious. It is thus, that the Church, rocked in the bloody cradle of its ten persecutions, rightly and justly, in its mature age, adopted the persecuting principles its infancy had escaped ; and converted the philosophic butchery of Antonine, and the stern vindictiveness of merciless Diocletian, into a righteous and affectionate concern for souls, by the mere act of *assuming* these cast clothes of Paganism, with all their envenomed infection. For, as I have fully demonstrated (p. 365), ‘The Church can convert heathen appointments into scriptural rites and usages,’ ‘exercising a discretionary power’ therein ; and (p. 354), ‘there is a certain virtue or grace in the Gospel, which *changes the quality* of usages, actions, and personal characters, and makes them right and acceptable to its Divine Author, *when before they were contrary to truth.*’

“ 4. The fourth test is, ‘Early Anticipation.’ I am not without at least as much support *here*, as I have for most of the four instances I have already produced

under this head in my volume (pp. 369–388)<sup>f</sup>; for it must be remembered that the profound excellence and merit of persecution could not well be revealed until the Church had power to persecute ; as the blessed St. Thomas has profoundly replied (*‘Ecclesia in sui novitate nondum habebat potestatem’*), in the course of his arguments in proof that heretical princes are justly deposed by sentence of the Church, (2<sup>nda</sup> 2<sup>ndæ</sup>, Qu. xii. Art. 2.<sup>g</sup>) and that heretics may well and fitly be murdered (*‘Eradicentur per mortem’*) wherever the work can wholly (*‘totaliter’*) be done. [Qu. xi. Art. 3.]<sup>h</sup> A doctrine which the Church has (I need not say) confirmed, alike by the voice of Œcumenical Councils, and by the canonization of the author just named, as the greatest and soundest of all her developers of religious truth. But, even in earlier times, it is manifest that ‘the horror of heresy, the law of implicit obedience to ecclesiastical authority, and the doctrine of the mystical virtue of unity, as active then as in the Church of St. Carlo and St. Pius V.’<sup>i</sup> (see p. 367), involved the germ

<sup>f</sup> Namely, Relic-devotion, worship (or, as Mr. Newman, with judicious ambiguity, styles it), *Cultus* of Saints and Angels, Merit of Virginity, and the “Office of St. Mary.”

<sup>g</sup> [fol. 23, b. Lugd. 1540.—G.]

<sup>h</sup> [fol. 22, b. “Si tamen totaliter eradicentur per mortem hæretici, non est etiam contra mandatum Domini; quod est in eo casu intelligendum, quando non possunt extirpari zizania sine extirpatione tritici.”—G.]

<sup>i</sup> The citation of this personage, as an illustration of the just “horror of heresy” and the “law of obedience to ecclesiastical authority,” is another of those many passages which throw an unhappy light upon Mr. Newman’s notions of both. St. Pius V. was conspicuous, not only for a peculiar measure of the papal talent for



of the doctrine before us ; it being plain, whatever romantic maxims may have got currency in modern days about the power of truth, rational persuasion, and the like, that constraints more intelligibly efficacious are necessary, if the uniform testimony of the Catholic Church (fairly interpreted by that illustrious Saint, whom I have just mentioned) is to be received as the voice of heaven.

“ But it is when we advance somewhat further, that we begin to find this principle effectively manifest itself,—enough, at least, which is all my argument contemplates, to *countenance* its subsequent recognition by willing disciples. I have already hinted at the opinion of St. Augustine ; though I grieve to reflect how wavering and unsettled was that great prelate on this question<sup>k</sup>. When Priscillian was executed, the

stirring up nation against nation to mutual slaughter, for the good of the Church, but as being nearly the most persevering—perhaps, in heart and temper the very *most* cordial—burner of heretics in the annals of the papacy. This—added to those sterner ascetic virtues, which were a novelty on the papal throne in an age, when one of the commonest causes of political disturbance in Europe was the arrangement of principalities for the sons, and alliances for the daughters of the successors of St. Peter—secured the canonization of St. Pius V.; and Mr. Newman has now the privilege of offering up his daily devotions to this gentle Pastor, one of whose dearest designs was to head, in person, an armed invasion against England. (*Ranke*, Book iii. § 8.)\*

<sup>k</sup> See S. Aug. *ad Dulcit.* (Ep. 61, al. 204.) *ad Vincent.* (48, al. 113.) [xciii.—G.] and *De correct. Donatist.* Also, *Ad Marcellin. Ad Donat. Proconsul.* &c. Slowly and unwillingly he seems, by the difficulties

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\* [The Rev. Joseph Mendham is the author of the best account of the *Life and Pontificate of Saint Pius the Fifth.* Lond. 1832.—G.]

first heretical blood judicially shed, I confess that St. Martin of Tours, and St. Ambrose of Milan<sup>1</sup>, loudly protested against the innovation; for even strong spiritual vision cannot be expected to bear unwinking the first blaze of such light as this. But if Chrysostom and Hilary object<sup>m</sup>, I can cite strong sayings from Jerome<sup>n</sup> and Leo<sup>o</sup>, that ‘Leo, Bishop of Rome,’ whom

of the time and the incorrigible insubordination of the Donatists, to have been led to this; “Corrigi eos cupimus non necari,” . . . . . “pœna illorum rogo te ut præter supplicium mortis sit . . . propter Catholicam mansuetudinem commendandam,” . . . . . “pro lenitatis Christianæ consideratione, &c.” He admits that it was a change in his former views to countenance force at all; but that he was shaken by observing the advantageous *results* of severity in producing peace, “timore legum imperialium.” The *full* results of the principle this most holy man thus unwarily, and in its milder application, countenanced, it would, perhaps, have required little short of inspiration to have foreseen.

<sup>1</sup> Sulpic. Severus, III. 11 et seqq. [*Dial.* iii. §. xv. Amstel. 1665.—G.] S. Ambros. Epp. 24, 26.

<sup>m</sup> “Terret exiliis et carceribus Ecclesia; credique sibi cogit, quæ exiliis et carceribus est credita,” &c., a very eloquent remonstrance which I wish I had room to quote. (Contr. Auxent. Mediol.) [*Opp.* col. 1265. ed. Ben.—G.]

<sup>n</sup> “Non est crudelitas pro Deo pietas,” &c.\* He goes on to quote the *Old Testament* injunctions, something too much, I fear, in the spirit of the Balfour of Burley theology. (Ep. ad Ripar.)

<sup>o</sup> “Profuit diu ista districtio” (The severities to the Priscillianists,) “Ecclesiasticæ lenitati, quæ etsi . . . . cruentas refugit ultiones, se-  
veris tamen Christianorum principum constitutionibus adjuvatur,” &c. (*Leo, Ep. ad Turrib.*) [*S. Leonis Opp.* i. 227. Lugd. 1700.—G.]

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\* [The words are, “Non est crudelitas pro Deo, *sed* pietas,” and are used to justify his own severity of *language*, while they refer especially to some instances of zeal in God’s service recorded in Scripture; such as the conduct of S. Peter with regard to Ananias and Sapphira, and the sentence passed upon the sorcerer Elymas by S. Paul. (S. Hieron. *Advers. Vigilant.* ad Ripar. *Opp.* Tom. ii. p. 119. Basil. 1565.)—G.]

I have already celebrated (p. 302), as the bulwark of orthodoxy when every other had failed. These fore-shadowings of mediæval truth, combined with the unresisting admission by the Church of the imperial severities against heresy, supply an array of 'early anticipations' quite sufficient to save the blushes of the most timidly sensitive inquisitor of more enlightened times.

"5. For my fifth test ('Logical Sequence'), no difficulty at all remains. The body is inferior in importance to the soul; any pain of body which brings even the remotest chance of securing the welfare of the soul (or even of *other* souls, by terror of example), is, therefore, only an indication of the tenderest affection on the part of the torturer. And this instance of logical connexion has the advantage, that, whereas, in other cases, I confess (p. 388), I have been reduced to imagining a connexion of my own, without any proof that it ever existed in the minds of the original developers themselves, in *this* the course of thought, in those who first ventured to countenance civil penalties for heresy, seems actually to have been very much what I have here suggested. I need not add how this is confirmed by the expression of St. Paul himself about 'delivering' an offender 'unto *Satan* for the destruction of the flesh, &c.' (1 Cor. v. 5); a maxim which the Catholic Church

See it turned to good account in 3 Later. Canon 27; [*Cap.* 27. Concill. Gen. Tom. iv. p. 33. Romæ, 1612.—G.] *Sicut ait beatus Leo, &c.*, where it is *developed* into "fidelibus, qui contra eos (hæreticos) *arma susceperint*, biennium de pœnitentiâ injunctâ relaxamus,"—as well as a "relaxatio" from all bond of fealty or obedience.



has very properly verified, by making its inquisitorial punishments and dungeons bear the most striking resemblance (according to the universal testimony of historians, travellers, and the records themselves of the Holy Office), to those which are attributed to the agency and the abode of the Spirit of Evil himself.

“6. That racking and burning dissenters from the Roman orthodoxy is a ‘Preservative Addition,’ (my sixth test), no man can well deny, who is not prepared to affirm that the rack and the stake have no natural tendency to inculcate the expediency of obedience to ecclesiastical authority<sup>p</sup>.

“7. Lastly, that ‘Chronic Continuance’ attests the doctrine of torturing or destroying the heretic and infidel, there can surely be no reasonable doubt. A catena of centuries establishes this to be at least *as real* a ‘development’ as any single peculiarity of the Roman practical theology<sup>q</sup>. Indeed it had arrived *at its fullest height before* some of them were definitively settled. From the persecutions of Jews in the sixth century to the crusades against Saracens in the twelfth, from the

<sup>p</sup> It was left to M. de Maistre, of whose hardihood Mr. Newman, is, or seems, a disciple, to discover the value of the Inquisition as a “preservative” of *national* character and spirit; “Si la nation Espagnole,” declares this preacher of paradoxes, “a conservé ses maximes, son unité, et cet esprit public qui l’a sauvée, elle le doit uniquement à l’Inquisition.”—*Lettres a un Gentilhomme Russe*, &c. Lett. 4ième. Strangely enough, M. Quinet has adopted this notion in a passage in his eloquent, inaccurate, Lectures on “Ultramontanism.” Lec. viii.

<sup>q</sup> “A *corruption* is of brief duration, runs itself out quickly, and ends in death. This general law gives us additional assurance in determining” true developments.—p. 446.

slaughter of Albigeois in the thirteenth, and the establishment of the Holy Office, and the infallible Canons of the Œcumenical Council of Lateran, commanding the purgation of heretical filth, to the crowning achievement of St. Bartholomew's Day (applauded and confirmed by a blessed Pope), in the sixteenth, it may be confidently affirmed, that *continuous attestation, accredited by the supreme authority of Rome, can prove no doctrine whatsoever to be a genuine development of Christianity if it fail to demonstrate that the dungeon, rack, and stake, are the true and legitimate growth of the religion of Him Who said, 'Ye know not what spirit ye are of; for the Son of Man is NOT COME TO DESTROY MEN'S LIVES, but to save them !'*"

Such is the contribution, brief and unpolished (I have no space here for decoration) as to style, but, as I believe, perfectly unimpeachable as regards argumentative application, which I beg leave to tender to the Theory of Development. I have some apology to make for presuming to adopt the Author's personality ; and I am sufficiently aware that, in assuming the tripod, I have not inherited the energy and inspiration of the oracle. The designed inference, however, I suppose, is tolerably plain. Let any man compare the case (of which the above is the most meagre of outlines), that can be made for the Holy Inquisition and its agonies, with developments *argued in this volume to be, as such, of the essence of Christianity* ; let him remember the words of the Author himself (p. 154), "you must accept *the whole*, or reject the whole ;" "it is trifling to receive all but something which is *as integral as any other portion* ;" and let him then estimate to what *they*

are committed, who, abandoning the old immutable rule of faith, shall adopt as obligatory matter of belief, under the delusive pretext of development, whatsoever any cause, or combination of causes, shall have made permanent in the Roman Communion; who shall suffer themselves to be entrapped by this fallacious artifice, into accepting as the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, whatsoever inexperience, or precipitancy, or ambition, or resentment, or faithless mistrust of God's sufficient protection, or false logic, or a dominant philosophy, or evil example, or condescension to Heathen prejudices, or narrow views of expediency, or the misdirected energy of individual minds, may have *introduced*; and the haughtiness of power, or the indolence of rulers and mere *vis inertiae* of all that is once established, or the misapplication of true Catholic firmness to vain un-Catholic novelties, or growing ignorance of the original standards, may have *confirmed*; until, with the claim of absolute infallibility in all possible controversies of religion, it became impracticable to reject, and almost a deadly sin even to question, the innovation.

There are some other applications of this hypothesis to the general history of Christianity, which may justly make its Romanist vindicators pause, and of which I hope to say something in my next communication.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.



## LETTER IV.

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DEAR SIR,

In the close of my last Letter I endeavoured to illustrate, in one remarkable point of view, the perilous tendency of a theory whose object is to substitute for the primitive Rule of Faith “once delivered to the Saints,” “*sola immobilis et irreformabilis*”<sup>a</sup>, the historical succession of doctrines, practices, feelings, fashions, in the Latin Church. I have observed that such a theory cannot be maintained without stamping with the signet of Inspiration *everything equally* which that Church has unequivocally patronized; that it is preposterous to affirm us bound, on pain of eternal perdition, to admit the definition of Lateran<sup>b</sup> (merely as such) on Transubstantiation<sup>c</sup>, and deny that the

<sup>a</sup> [“Regula quidem fidei una omnino est, sola immobilis et irreformabilis.” Tert. De Veland. Virg. c. i.]

<sup>b</sup> [Fourth Lateran, in 1215, under Innocent III.]

<sup>c</sup> [It seems almost certain that Transubstantiation, as it is understood by later Romanists, was not intended by the decree of the Fourth Lateran Synod. The word *Transubstantiatio*, indeed, was used to express the μεταστοιχείωσις, by which the sacramental elements become the body and blood of Christ; but nothing is determined as to the nature of the mystery, whether the change be phy-

Holy Ghost spoke in the contemporary exhortations of the same Council to fire and blood ; the difference, if any, being only that the essential spirit—the true “ethical development”—of this Roman Catholicity, must have been even more intensely manifested in a *practical* matter, such as the torture and slaughter of dissentients, than in any enunciation of a purely dogmatic decision. The subtle distinctions which Roman divines endeavour to establish with regard to the comparative authority of the various classes of Church decrees (even if they did not abundantly contradict and confute each other, and even if they were here, in point of *fact*, applicable), are altogether irrelevant to *this* argument. Mr. Newman himself is eager to urge that the *general spirit* of the Church’s teaching and practice is that which, after all, bespeaks its heavenly origin, and its uninterrupted inspiration. It is in this—unfolding, adorning, enthusiastically celebrating *this*—that the power and seductiveness of his volume consists ; this

sical, or spiritual and sacramental. It is “very probable,” says Mr. Palmer, in his invaluable Essay, “that the Synod of Lateran did not intend to establish anything except the doctrine of the *Real Presence*. In fact the question was not then with those who denied the modern doctrine of Transubstantiation ; it was with the Manicheans, who denied the real presence of Christ’s body in the Eucharist.”—Vol. ii. p. 224. Pope Innocent himself asserts (*De Myster. Missæ*, lib. iv.) that the *total change* of the substance is not *de fide* ; and it is notorious that many opinions irreconcilable with Tridentine Transubstantiation were openly and without censure taught by Romish theologians, subsequent to the fourth Lateran Synod, as, for example, Durandus a S. Porciano, and Cardinal D’Ailly, who presided at the Council of Constance in 1415.—Vid. Palmer, *ubi sup.* See also Hagenbach’s *History of Doctrines*, vol. ii. p. 96, *et seqq.*]

—the Catholic spirit and Catholic principles—is just what he tells us Rome possesses, and we have lost ; and this, unquestionably, is not more vividly manifested in the formal decrees of Councils (which Councils, however, *are* abundantly committed to the maxims I speak of) than in the whole ecclesiastical tone and practices of an age. Let, then, the test be impartially applied ; let there be no shirking from the *full* acceptance of these infallible Roman developments, no eloquent celebration of some, and modest suppression of others ! The same authority authorizes all. If it must be so, that the mediæval Church surpassed us in the principle of religious reverence, I beg it may not be altogether forgotten that she surpassed us also in the principle of religious massacre ; and that it is really quite impossible to accept the former development *on the simple basis of her authority*, without accepting the latter development *on precisely the same plea*. “No one,” declares Mr. Newman, very justly—p. 29—“has power over the issues of his principles. We cannot manage our argument, and have as much of it as we please, and no more.” “That the hypothesis here to be adopted,” he had said just before, apparently distressed at the overwhelming force of his own arguments, “accounts not only for the Athanasian Creed, but for the Creed of Pope Pius, is no fault of those who adopt it.” I may be permitted to continue the series of its achievements, and add,—that if it accounts not only “for the Creed of Pope Pius,” but for the *policy, practices, and spirit* of that prelate, his successors, and his predecessors for centuries, it *may* possibly become “the fault” of those who, with conclusions so fearful palpably involved in



the hypothesis, still wilfully persist “to adopt it.” In a system such as Mr. Newman’s, in Romanism itself, there is no eclecticism possible ; let our unfortunate brethren in peril of this temptation remember it betimes ! They who sigh for Catholic unity may, perhaps, pause when they see in the papal history of the middle centuries—in the merciless tyranny of the Roman, in the voluptuous infamies of the Avignon papacy—that there *can* be worse evils for the Church of Christ than the independence of national churches ; they who long to grovel in the dust before the successor of St. Peter, may, perhaps, start and reflect when they find their idol besmeared with blood.

The Rule of Faith which Mr. Newman would establish, then, *applies to all the characteristics of Roman Christianity, or it can apply to none* ; no middle course is, on his theory, possible. His code of belief is a deduction from a vast series of historical facts ; and all *facts*, as such, are on a level ; all equally claim to be weighed in the theological balances ; all equally claim to be ingredients in the immense and diversified combination, out of which, in the last result, the genuine doctrines and principles of Christianity are to be extracted. With such a theory as his, he cannot select at his own will what he shall be pleased to style Catholic development, and what he shall prefer to slur over as temporary discipline. There is no discipline—least of all, a discipline explicitly deduced from principles, embodied under anathema in Canons, permanent and energetic for centuries—which does not involve and express *a real corresponding doctrine*. If the Roman Church was indeed *mistaken*, when that fearful war-cry

was heard for centuries from the vicars of the Prince of Peace—each taking up, with terrible continuity, the maxims of his predecessor, and transmitting them undecayed to the aged, pitiless priest that succeeded to the throne,—if it was *wrong* thus to halloo the ruthless baron and his wild soldiery to massacre the poor Waldensian, and the half-crazed Beghard, and promise the murderers heaven for their labours,—if the Roman Church, which did this as a body, and under the authority of her appointed head, and the instruction of her canonized saints, with all the fulness of united decision and corporate will, was in error so to do—intoxicated, not informed, possessed, not inspired—who shall demonstrate that this utterly mistaken “development,” this perversion, doctrinal, practical, intimate, pervading, permanent, stands *alone* in her history ?

This way of arguing (and how many similar misconceptions of duty, and the doctrines involved in duty, may be easily adduced !) is, I repeat, perfectly applicable as a test of the validity of Mr. Newman’s theory. It is essential to this theory to abide *all* true historical conclusions ; the theorist of “development” is bound as stringently to the history of the Church as he is to the Four Gospels. History with him is not merely the narrative of facts, but the law of doctrine ; *his* theology can as little neglect a fact in History, as the Anglican can a verse in the New Testament.

The fundamental error of the whole system indeed may probably be stated to consist in this very thing, that it conceives Christianity is to be investigated *as a mere succession of historical events* in order to determine Faith. He commences with it in the very first page

and sentence of his Essay. "Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in dealing with it *as a fact in the world's history*."—p. 1. "To know *what it is*, we must *seek it in the world*, and hear the world's witness of it."—p. 2. We must study it in this way, as we would "the Spartan institutions, or the religion of Mahomet." This is indeed a great error. It is wantonly to confound the functions of the historian and of the divine ; and in the confusion, inevitably to generate a history that is unfaithful, to harmonize with the divinity, and a divinity corrupted, to harmonize with the history. It is to confound the knowledge of Church History as a succession of historical facts, with the knowledge of Christianity as a Rule of Duty ; to confound Christianity as a mixed earthly Reality, with Christianity as a pure heavenly Ideal. The former, doubtless, is a profoundly interesting inquiry, but the latter alone is essentially theological. A conception so fundamentally erroneous is enough to vitiate all subsequent processes, and in point of fact (for it must in *spirit* be the maxim of every Church claiming infallibility) its practical results have been pernicious beyond description. It is not difficult to analyse them. When, instead of the original divine Ideal, ever to be indefinitely approached, perhaps never absolutely, in this world, attainable, we substitute the actual past Church History of eighteen centuries as our model of Christian perfection, we irreparably degrade, in its very essence, our own high aim and vocation ; we are almost inevitably tempted to play false with the records themselves of history (as in the miserable inventions of the legendary biographies of saints), in order to give some ele-



vation to our substituted model of excellence ; and we condemn the Church herself to retrogression or sterility,—forcing her and ourselves to reverse the maxim of him whose noble ambition for ever impelled him, “forgetting those things which are behind,” to “reach forth unto those things which are before.” Out of this primary error nearly all the *philosophy* (so to speak) of Romanism derives; for it all consists in the contrivance of maxims and principles such as may demonstrate (as it were *a priori*) the past history of the Church, dogmatical and practical, to be, in all respects, a model of absolute perfection. This, of course, can only be done by, in some way, attributing to men the peculiar and incommunicable characteristics of The Great Model Himself. It is thus that there has gradually been formed a sort of “heroic age” of Christianity, peopled by demigods, having in them a kind of inchoate divinity, and to be spoken of, not as blessed and venerable Christian men and women, but as objects awful and superhuman, breathing, while in this world, an atmosphere already midway between earth and heaven, and, when departed from this world, invocable in the same prayers that invoke God. It is thus that the sacred mystery of the indwelling of Christ and of the Holy Spirit is exaggerated into the Deification of Saints ; thus that such devices as the “Sacramental Principle” of our author (in his novel sense of the phrase) have their rise ; thus that we find again recommended the extravagant exaltation of the mystical sense of Scripture from its proper place (when not applied by special divine authority) as an illustration more or less pertinent, to the dangerous and delusive—but, for such purposes, convenient—

position of an *original and adequate* proof of doctrine. The source and principle of all such reasonings seems the same ; the misguided effort to make the past historical Church, through all its ages, a model and an authority coordinate with CHRIST Himself ; the very conception, in short, that is involved in Mr. Newman's opening assertion, that "Christianity" (that is—as his argument requires—Christianity in its true design, spirit, and doctrine) is to be studied "as a fact in history," that to know *what it is*, we must see it [not in the Life and the Teaching of its Author, not in the writings of His disciples, but] *in the world ;*" that "*history* is the true mode of determining the *character* of Christianity." Briefly,—we are in the New Testament presented with the true transcendant Model of all human perfections, embodied in the Holy One of God, illustrated and applied in the inspired writings. Towards this—all-sufficient labour for man's short life !—we are to strain ; all other examples of sanctity shining only by its reflected light, and, however profitable in many ways, never to be suffered to occupy His place, to stand upon His level, or to intercept the full, constant, unclouded view of Him. The object of all systems like the present is—never, indeed, avowedly, perhaps never even consciously,—to pervert this order ; but nevertheless, and in the practical effect, so to blend together the past human imitators of Christ with Christ Himself, that He and they may always be seen in one complex view ; or rather, that He may be seen only through them as the medium of beholding Him, that no ray of His light may be suffered to reach us except under the refraction of their subsequent comments and example ; a process



which, of course, unless they be really His equals, must reduce His brightness by the whole amount of their human density and dimness,—in other words, and without a figure, must, unless we falsify history to idealize our Saints, prevent the Christian Life and Teaching from ever rising higher than the average good men of past ages have reached, or ever getting free from the errors and misapprehensions they may have adopted.

This great fundamental and pervading mistake then,—the degradation of the Christian's habitual Standard of Perfection from the Ideal to the Actual, from the celestial Model suspended above and beyond us, to such exhibitions of holiness as past ages (the purer primitive being cited even less than the grosser modern), may have realized—must, it is clear, when once adopted as the one criterion of Faith and life, be—the most fatal of its evils!—applied *universally*; and, above all, be applied to the whole *practical* operation of the mediæval Church, and to *all* the recognised practical maxims, without exception, of its sainted instructors. Whether the system rest on the old ground of simple authority, or on the new ground of gradual development, selections and omissions are equally precluded; if the huge complex of dogma and practice was not right in every point, it *may* have been wrong in every point. Those who refer all—even the best and holiest spirits—to a standard above them, may,—indeed ought to—exercise discrimination in their approval; those who allow no standard at all but the mere *fact*, that certain divine men entitled Saints have so taught, and the Church so acted—cannot, on their own principle, but approve *all* in approving any. They cannot quote



St. Bernard, for example, as a being of gifts altogether unearthly and superhuman, whose very name is to be mentioned with awe, when he discourses—as he often does with such exquisite truth and power—of general Christian morality, and simply regard him (with us Anglicans) as an admirable but very fallible human theologian, when he stimulates the wild fanaticism of the Crusades. We cannot defend the papal primacy arrogated by Leo the Great, as a true development, simply because the claim was *made*, and assert that the absolute secular supremacy, asserted with much more success in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was not, on the same or deeper grounds, an equally genuine theological truth ;—even as we cannot, on the other hand, say that the latter was only intended in the divine purpose to be temporary, without admitting that the former *may* have been intended to be only temporary also.

Such is the manifest scope of the Development Theory when it applies to the Past ; it can defend any only on the principles on which it must defend all. It shares this indeed in common with the rest of the Roman theories. But it is one of the peculiarities of this unfortunate device, that, while it is in the volume before us devoted to defending the unchangeable authority of the Past, its inherent spirit and bearing really tend much more to indefinite alteration ; for it is in truth only on the principle of the legitimacy of endless alteration that it can defend the Past itself—that Past which was once all future. It is the principle of revolution enlisted in behalf of the principle of immutability ; perpetual motion demonstrating the absolute duty

of perpetual repose ; it is—to apply Mr. Robert Hall's designation of the Methodist leader—"the very quiescence of *turbulence*." The notion of Development itself is plainly unlimited in *time* : we have not, therefore (on this system), any grounds whatever for determining whether Christianity is even half-developed *yet*. Mr. Newman himself seems strongly to incline to the negative, if I may venture to interpret by ordinary rules a passage in one of his eloquent panegyrics of the Roman Communion. "Corruptions are to be found which sleep and are suspended ; and these are usually called decays ; such is not the case with Catholicity ; *it does not sleep, it is not stationary even now, &c.*"—p. 446. With a Church thus "ever learning and never able to come to the [full] knowledge of the truth," it is impossible to set any definite limits to the progression of doctrine. I have before referred to this topic in a different connexion ; it meets me here again. Half-Communion defended on the principle of concomitance, may hereafter become the model of a Baptism in the Name of One Person of the Trinity, the other Two being inferred "concomitantly" present, whenever one is invoked ; and the original divine command being not more peremptory against the latter alteration than against the former. The veneration of Images has been before now, on the highest individual<sup>a</sup> Roman authority,

<sup>a</sup> [The ascription of *Latria* to the Cross does not rest simply on the authority of an individual. It is fully sanctioned by the words "DEBETUR EI LATRIA," which occur both in the old Innocentian Pontifical, and in the reformed impression patronised by Popes Clement and Urban VIII.—(*Ord. ad recip. Imperator.* fol. clxxxv. Lugd. 1511.: p. 486. Antverp. 1663.)—G.]

elevated to a divine *Latria*<sup>e</sup>; the Cross is, as far as human language and gesture can express absolute adoration, adored in every Good Friday Service<sup>f</sup>; there may yet be some formal Œcumenical decree that shall compel avowed, unmitigated, unqualified Idolatry. The Blessed Virgin, already so wondrously elevated, may yet be pronounced (the Immaculate Conception, &c., are but the preludes of such a development), to have so shared in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, as to have become one with God in the most absolute sense, and to require the worship due to the Holy Trinity<sup>g</sup>; as perhaps, in right of maternity she may be pronounced mightier in Heaven (this too has been hinted<sup>h</sup>) than Christ Himself; yea, in virtue of the *θεοτόκος*,

<sup>e</sup> “Crucis effigies *latriâ* adoranda est.”—*Thomas*, 3 *P. Q.* 25, Art. 4.

<sup>f</sup> “After this, the Priest alone carries the Cross to a place prepared before the Altar; and on bended knees fixes it there. Then, *taking off his Shoes*, he draws near to adore the Cross (*ad adorandam Crucem*), three times bending his knees before he kisses it. This done, he retires and puts on his Shoes, &c. After him the Ministers of the Altar, and then the other Clergy and Laity, advancing in pairs, and thrice bending the knee, adore the Cross.”—*Missale Roman.* [Feria sexta in Parasceve, pp. 188–9. Antwerp. 1765.—G.] Alas! and these are the precious privileges men of learning and piety have forsaken the Church of England to enjoy!

<sup>g</sup> [She has actually been styled by the Jesuit Ferd. Quir. de Salazar “the completion of the whole Trinity!”—(*Expos. in Proverb. Salom.* Tom. i. p. 261. Lugd. 1636.)—G.]

<sup>h</sup> [It has been in fact many times expressly stated. A single example will suffice; namely, the notable words of an authorized Hymn, “O felix Puerpera, Nostra pians scelera, *Jure Matris impera* Redemptori,” found in the old Parisian and Roman Missals, as well as in those of Tournay, Liege, Amiens, and Artois.—G.]



*greater*<sup>i</sup> than even the pure Godhead ;—and all this may be *then* seen to be the simple development of past or existing beliefs, and contained in the popular worship and the devotional books of *this very age*, just as the present virgin-worship is now maintained to have been held in invisible solution in the *early* creeds and writings. If any one looks upon such modifications as improbable, I ask him to reflect—why *are* they so ? Not, assuredly, because they are contrary either to the genius of Romanism, or (still less) to the principle of Development ; but solely because the progress of general enlightenment *external to the Roman ecclesiastical system* (and, without pretending to champion that very variable progress as infallible, I will not be guilty of the treason against God's Providence involved in con-

<sup>i</sup> [“ Cum B. Virgo sit *mater Dei*, et Deus filius ejus ; et omnis filius sit naturaliter *inferior matre* et subditus ejus, et mater prælata et superior filio ; sequitur quod ipsa benedicta virgo sit *superior Deo*, et ipse Deus sit subditus ejus ratione humanitatis ab ea assumptæ.”—*Bernardin. de Bust. Marial.* Par. 9, Sermon. 2. Quoted by Ussher (*Works*, iii. 482. Edit. Elrington.)

This very quotation is produced as conveying the present authoritative teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, in a work entitled, *The Glories of Mary, Mother of God, by St. Alphonsus Liguori, and carefully revised by a Catholic Priest.* (Third ed. Dublin, 1837.) Similar statements occur almost at every page, of which the following may serve as specimens:—“ The King of Heaven, whose bounty is infinite, has given us his mother for our mother, and in her hands resigned (if we may so speak) His omnipotence in the sphere of grace.”—p. 85. “ When S. Mary, says St. Peter Damian, presents herself before Jesus, the Altar of reconciliation, she seems to *dictate* rather than supplicate ; and has more the air of a queen than a subject.”—p. 138. “ St. Germanus says to Mary, You, O holy Virgin, have *over God* the *authority of a mother*.”—p. 139.]

temning and maligning it), would be likely to prevent the dogmatic formations of the mediæval theology from being paralleled now. But let any man endeavour to conceive what would be the character of a religion advancing as much upon present Romanism, as Romanism advanced upon the religion of the New Testament and the early Churches ; and he may then form some estimate of the chances of safety for Christianity (if indeed, after such a series of revolutions, any faint trace of Christianity would survive), under the unrestricted dominion of the principle of Development. Take, for example, Aquinas's development<sup>k</sup> of Works of Supererogation and the transferable merits of the Saints out of the Unity of the Mystical Body, and imagine where a few more *such* strides would leave primitive Christianity. Or take our present instructor's favourite development of Purgatory out of Baptism, and Relic-worship out of Resurrection ; and conceive a similar generation out of Purgatory and Relic-Worship themselves, these secondary developments in their turn begetting their respective descendants, and all manner of collateral alliances<sup>l</sup> taking place between the various members of this immense and ever-growing population ; and then compute how much of the *family-likeness* of the original

<sup>k</sup> Supplem. III. 25, Art. 1, &c. [See Gieseler, ii. 359. note 17. What is called the Supplement of the third part of the *Summa* of Aquinas is merely an excerpt from his Commentary on the fourth book of the Master of the Sentences. In this work (*Dist.* xx. Qu. i. Art. iii. fol. 121, b. Venet. 1497.) the passage referred to may be seen.—G.]

<sup>l</sup> “Nor do these separate developments stand independent of each other, but by *cross relations* they are connected, and grow together while they grow from one.”—p. 154.



parent—the religion of the Apostles—would be likely to be discernible among the later generations of this huge promiscuous progeny !

It may, indeed, be urged, that the Church's infallible decision upon all points has dammed up the stream, and checked for ever the further progress of the current of innovation. But has not the Church, in *every* age, equally considered itself to possess all necessary doctrine ? Was it far in the fifth century when an Œcumenical Council prohibited<sup>m</sup> all additions to the Church's brief digest of necessary truths ; and was Pius IV. the less resolute to rend Europe in sunder, rather than leave to men's option a single one of that vast and various accumulation of theological inventions, hypotheses, and surmises, that had got currency in the long period between Ephesus and Trent ? How, again, can we tell whether there may not be a kind of development impossible to preclude because wholly *unsuspected* ? How do we know but the Creed of the Church may sprout out in some direction altogether novel ; some train of yet unimaginable doctrines about the Holy Ghost, or about the place, nature, and occupations of Heaven, or about the propriety of adding (though this, indeed, has been deliberately done already) to the number of Sacraments, or about the prerogatives of the glorified body, and the like,—all to be enjoined on pain of damnation, all essential to the very Idea of

<sup>m</sup> [The Seventh Canon of the Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431) contains this prohibition, *Τούτων τοίνυν ἀναγνωσθέντων, ὥρισεν ἡ ἁγία σύνοδος, ἑτέραν πίστιν μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι προφέρειν ἢ γοῦν συγγράφειν ἢ συντιθέναι παρὰ τὴν ὀρισθεῖσαν παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων τῶν ἐν τῇ Νικαέων συναχθέντων πόλει, σὺν ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, κ. τ. λ.*]



Christianity, all to be enforced by the developing theorist of that favoured day as truths self-evident to all genuine Catholics, and which only the blindness and indevotion of "protestant" infidelity can possibly reject?

But whatever provisions Mr. Newman's system may supply against such future consequences as these (which it is quite beyond my power to divine), it may be assumed that he prefers to have his theory viewed in his own application of it to the *past* actual history of the Christian Religion. In that point of view, to which I readily return, there are one or two very obvious considerations, which I shall now proceed to suggest, that appear to me very nearly decisive against the whole scheme when designed as an exclusive vindication of the claims of the Romish Communion.

I. Setting apart, for the present, as hitherto, the assumption of the exclusive infallibility of the Roman hierarchy, and all similar mere hypotheses, and continuing to view the Development theory simply and *per se*, I beg to inquire, in the first place, by what means the inventor of this system can fairly prevent its application to several *other* great and prominent events, or series of events, in the Christian history, as well as to the special formation of the Church and dogmatic system of Rome? How can he possibly demonstrate, in consonance with the spirit of his system and in analogy with the sort of facts he has himself professed to reduce under it, that these *other* events may not have been equally in the intention of God, and projected in the original design of Him Who sees the end from the beginning, to have their place, in due time, as ulterior developments of the original principles of Christianity?

I take, for instance, the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century. I ought, perhaps, to observe (to prevent idle cavils) that I am at present in no wise engaged in either vindicating or assailing that memorable revolution. The question is merely, whether the champion of the claims asserted at the Reformation, if fully indoctrinated in the theory of Development, can be fairly considered as departing from the spirit of *that* theory when he proceeds to discourse to something of the following effect.

From the very outset of Christianity we observe in it the combination of *two* powerful principles, the duty of individual Obedience and the duty of individual Inquiry. The accurate conciliation of these contrasted principles, the fixation of that precise medial point at which these two polar forces shall be blended or equilibrated, is indeed a great problem,—perhaps the hardest practical problem in Christian polity. The resolution of the parallel problem in *civil* legislation God has, we know, left to be determined in a great measure by human reason and circumstances (in constant subordination to His overruling providence); *perhaps* he may have chosen to act analogously in the dispensation of the Church. However this be, there can be no question whatever of the fact, that in the original records the seeds of *both* principles are involved; and that no single system, or portion of history, can be regarded as an adequate exponent and representative of the original design, which does not express both. If the New Testament abounds (as it amply does) with earnest admonitions to humility, obedience, subjection, and earnest denunciations of them that cause divisions,



it is equally certain that the Lord of the Church has bade the mingled multitudes who heard Him “beware of false prophets,” personally testing and judging them by their “fruits,”—that He subjected his own doctrine to the standard of Scripture examined and applied by His Jewish hearers,—that he asked them with sorrowful indignation, “why even of themselves they judged not what was right?”—nay, that His whole mission and office consisted in an appeal against established ecclesiastical authority, against that very authority of which it was said—what surely no so authentic voice from Heaven has ever said of Rome—“thou shalt not decline from the sentence which the Priests and the Judge shall show thee, to the right hand nor to the left; thou shalt observe to do according to *all* that they inform thee.” It is certain that His apostles, acting on the same principles, applauded those who individually “searched the Scriptures daily,” and so decided “whether these things were so;” that they hesitated not to exhort the whole mass<sup>n</sup> of their hearers to “prove all things;” that they besought them to “try the spirits whether they were of God;” that they desired that every man should be “fully persuaded in his own mind;” that they bade them “be ready to give an answer to every man that asked them a reason” for their hope, which necessarily implies a complete previous examination of all the *intellectual* grounds of faith. Nor,

<sup>n</sup> Unquestionably the whole body of the Faithful at Thessalonica; for they are the same to whom he had said just before, “we beseech you, brethren, to *know them which are over you in the Lord*, and admonish you.”—Ver. 12.



again, is there the least reason to doubt that this great principle (of course in due harmony with its correlative) was recognised and preserved in the early Church after its inspired guides had left it; the motives to belief, the refutations of heresy, were at that period invariably argumentative; derived now from the affirmations of Scripture, now from the testimony of natural reason, now from the uniform tradition of the Churches (at that time so decisive an evidence!) but *argumentative* still. Even he who with such vigour of thought and language fulminated his “Prescription against Heretics,” does not forget that “hoc exigere veritatem, cui nemo præscribere potest, non spatium temporum, non patrocinium personarum, non privilegium regionum”<sup>o</sup>. Even the holy martyr of Carthage, one surely not disposed to surrender the rights of ecclesiastical authority and the presumption in favour of settled practice, saw clearly that, after all, “non debemus<sup>p</sup> attendere quid aliud ante nos faciendum putaverit, sed quid qui ante omnes est Christus prior fecit; neque enim hominis

<sup>o</sup> [Read “patrocinia personarum,” and “privilegia regionum.” (Tertull. *De Virg. veland.* Cap. i.)—G.]

<sup>p</sup> [“Quare si solus Christus audiendus est, non debemus attendere quid aliud ante nos faciendum esse putaverit, sed quid qui ante omnes est Christus prior fecerit. Neque enim hominis consuetudinem sequi oportet, sed Dei veritatem, cum per Esaiam Prophetam Deus loquatur et dicat; *sine causa autem colunt me, mandata et doctrinas hominum docentes.* S. Cyp. *Epist.* lxii. *al.* lxiii. *Ad Cæcil.* In the context S. Cyprian is arguing against the Heretics called *Aquarians*, who used water only, instead of wine, in the Eucharist: “Quorundam consuetudinem, si qui in præteritum in calice dominico aquam solam offerendam putaverunt.”]

consuetudinem sequi oportet sed Dei veritatem.” And St. Cyprian’s illustrious friend and supporter<sup>a</sup> against the arrogance of a Roman bishop of that day, could use words which surely it can scarcely be deemed heretical for England to echo ; thus spake “Firmilian of blessed memory”—as the Churches of the East were wont to style him :—“quis tam vanus sit *ut veritati consuetudinem præferat*, aut qui perspecta luce tenebras non derelinquat? . . . vos dicere potestis, cognita veritate errorem vos consuetudinis reliquisse”<sup>r</sup>. And he adds the remarkable, the prophetic words (if we too may claim our mystical prophecies): “Cæterum nos veritati et consuetudinem jungimus, et consuetudini ROMANORUM consuetudinem, sed veritatis, opponimus; ab initio hoc tenentes quod a Christo et ab Apostolis [Apostolo] traditum est”<sup>s</sup>. The universal perusal and unpartici-

<sup>a</sup> [Firmilian, Metropolitan of Cæsarea in Cappadocia, supported S. Cyprian against Stephen on the question of rebaptization. His Letter to S. Cyprian is still extant.—*Inter Cypr. Epis.* 74, *al.* 75.]

<sup>r</sup> [Quod autem pertinet ad consuetudinem refutandam, quam videntur opponere veritati, quis tam vanus sit ut veritati consuetudinem præferat, aut qui perspecta luce tenebras non derelinquat? Nisi si et Judæos Christo adventante, id est, veritate, adjuvat in aliquo antiquissima consuetudo, quod relicta nova veritatis via in vetustate permanserint.]

<sup>s</sup> *Inter Opp. Cypr. Ep.* 74.\*

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\* [*Epist.* lxxv. p. 226. ed. Fell.—We must not forget that Firmilian’s Epistle was omitted by Manutius in the Roman edition of S. Cyprian’s works. Pamelius (in *Argum.*) conjectured that this was done by him “consultò;” but the following is the shameless confession of the real offender, Latinus Latinius: “Ego Latinus omisi, non Manutius; cùm Majorum exempla secutus, tùm hominis petulantiam detestatus.” (*Biblioth.* p. 117. Romæ, 1677.) Mr. Husenbeth would fain persuade himself that a “very learned divine” [Molkenbuhr] “has demonstrated the spuriousness of this Epistle by powerful arguments.” (*St. Cyprian vindicated*, p. 101. Norwich, 1839.) See the *Letters* between Bishop Bedell and Waddesworth, p. 336. Dublin, 1736.—G.]



pated supremacy of Holy Scripture bears upon the same inference. How the ardent and impassioned Chrysostom<sup>t</sup> has spoken upon this point, how Augustine<sup>u</sup>, how even Pope Gregory the First<sup>w</sup>, I need hardly remind any student of the ancient writers. Involved as was the early Church, and that for centuries (until, as it were, the whole fund of possible human extravagance, in all its varieties, had at last nearly exhausted itself), in the misery and the warfare of perpetual heresy, it is most remarkable that there is no trace of any suspicion on the part of the great prelates of those days, that the universal perusal of the written Word of God was the real source of the evil; or even if through human abuse they saw it sometimes became so, that the Church could dare to arrogate the right of preventing a practice enjoined by God Himself;—it being certain that there *can* be remedies for even great evils, more dangerous and sinful than the evils they are brought to

<sup>t</sup> [Vid. Chrysos. in Matt. Hom. 1; in 2 Timoth. Hom. 9; in Colos. Hom. 9; in Johan. Hom. 1: “Let us set time apart to be conversant in the Scripture, at least in the Gospels; let us frequently handle them, to imprint them on our minds; which because the Jews neglected, they were commanded to have their books in their hands. But let us not have them in our hands, but in our houses and in our hearts.”—Translated by Bishop Taylor, *Dissuas.* p. 463, ed. Cardwell.]

<sup>u</sup> [For St. Augustine’s opinion of the Scriptures as alone free from error, see Lib. iii. *Contr. Lit. Petiliani*, c. 6; *Lib. de Bono Viduit.* Cap. i.; *De Unit. Eccles.* c. 16; and numerous passages in his Epistles. Comp. Taylor’s *Lib. of Proph.* sect. viii. For a summary of the opinions of the primitive fathers on this important subject, see *Dissuas.* Part. ii. Book. i. sect. 2.]

<sup>w</sup> [See *Morals on the Book of Job*, by St. Gregory the Great, in Oxford Library of the Fathers, Vol. xxi. p. 344; xviii. 178.]



remedy. The *faith* of these men in divine protection was too secure and magnanimous to allow them to stoop to those questionable devices that undertake to mend God's defective provisions, and repair the neglects of His dormant providence. The first formal synodical prohibition of the Scriptures to the general body of the Faithful is commonly held to have dated in the Thirteenth Century<sup>x</sup>.

But now for the application. Let us then suppose, for argument sake, that the principle of Christian submission to those who watch for souls, involved as its natural, necessary, pre-ordained result, the realization of ecclesiastical despotism ; or even that (as Mr. Newman sticks not to affirm), "dogmatism involves infallibility."—p. 368. These involved elements, he himself maintains (directly against the Roman creed indeed, but apparently quite to his own satisfaction), evolved

<sup>x</sup> [Gieseler, ii. 392.—Mr. Lewis also tells us, that "the first synodical prohibition or restraint" of the liberty of Christians to use the Scriptures in their own language "was in a Synod held at Tholouse, A. D. 1228." (*Hist. of Eng. Trans. of Bible*, p. 2. Lond. 1739.) That this interdict extended to the *laity* only appears from the words of the Decree : "Prohibemus etiam ne libros Veteris et Novi Testamenti *laici* permittantur habere," &c. (D'Achery *Spicileg.* i. 711.) The year 1228 has been erroneously assigned by D'Achery and Lewis to this Synod, as it was really held in September, 1229. With regard to the origin of this injunction it is to be observed, that it was mainly intended to repress the anticlerical fanaticism of the Waldenses. See a marginal note by Pegna on one of the *Litteræ Apostolicæ* annexed to the *Directorium Inquisitorum*, p. 2 ; as also Eymer. *Dir.* Par. ii. Quæst. xiv. et *Schol.* xxx. ejusd. Par., and Pegna's remarks (p. 123.) upon the authority of this Council of Toulouse. In Usser. *De Scripturis et Sacris vernaculis*, pp. 151–2, the references are incorrectly given.—G.]

themselves slowly and gradually ; the form of Christianity was “first Catholic—then Papal”<sup>y</sup>. For a long period *both* the principles that I have named seem to have been equally energetic ; the prelates and other clergy of the Church assuming and realizing with perfect confidence, indeed, their high office as “the ambassadors” not of men to their brethren, but “of Christ” to men,—yet never claiming that “*dominion* over the faith” of their charges, which even an inspired Apostle rejected. At length, from a complication of causes, the principle of authority began perceptibly to weigh down its own side of the equipoise ; and from another complication of causes (Mr. Newman is willing to accept Barrow’s account as sufficiently accordant with his argument—p. 178), the western patriarch obtained a primacy long in dispute between him and the rival patriarch of the other imperial city ; and by degrees, a real supremacy ; and by degrees, a complete ordinary jurisdiction over a majority of the European Churches ; and by further degrees, a secular supremacy over Churches and kingdoms both. All this Mr. Newman regards, of course, as essentially involved in the New

<sup>y</sup> “Christianity developed in the form, first, of a Catholic, *then* of a Papal Church.”—p. 319. This unfortunate expression, which apparently imports that the Catholicity ceased when the Papacy began, will have, with some others, to be modified in future editions. Assuredly the Quesnels and the Fenelons have suffered the terrors of the Vatican for much less than may be found in every chapter of this performance ; a performance which will secure its numerous converts by teaching them (I speak most deliberately) a theory of Romanism, which it must be their first care to unlearn as a heresy, the moment they have entered the Communion into which it has beguiled them.



Testament account of Christianity, and wrought out by a Providence slowly but surely realizing its own pre-conceptions in the fulness of fore-ordained time. Grant it ; but on what principle are you now to *stop* the successive evolution of providential purposes ? What provision is contained in the *theory itself*—in the notion of a developing Christianity, that should oblige it to pause at this stage rather than at any other ? *Perhaps* the same Providence that developed Gregory VII. and Boniface VIII. out of one element of the Christian polity,—the element of authority and obedience—may (when *they* had sufficiently done their work, like others in the preparatory stages before them), have developed the Reformation leaders and *their* views, as the designed instruments of recovering for the world that other element of the same system—the element of individual inquiry and individual responsibility. *Perhaps* He who considered a stern and severe discipline to be the one best fitted for a succession of ignorant and barbarous centuries, may have equally considered that a more intellectual presentation of religion, one appealing for its authority more directly to the learning and the reason of those to whom the faith was to be delivered, was best fitted for the centuries—at least for certain races and countries in the centuries—next to succeed them. The two forms of the hypothesis but reflect each other. From the beginning “two nations” seem as it were “struggling in the womb” of Christianity ; their harmonious manifestation and perpetual alliance would be perfection ; but *that* once lost, this painful separate birth of the great principle of Personal Inquiry, “as of one born out of due time,” with all the agonising



throes that attended it, may have become inherently necessary. It was a mighty shock doubtless ; but to restore the balance of the heavens this thunder-storm might perhaps alone suffice. Meanwhile it is quite certain that no disciple of Development can deny the plausibility of such a statement, without grievously belying his own principles ; and it is in that point of view *alone* I here present it.—It is no valid answer to this, to say that the representative of the Principle of Authority rejected and opposed the new development when it came ; *its own* development long before was not achieved without a protracted struggle. Nor indeed (as a moment's reflection will show) *could*, unless by miracle, the lost principle have been recovered without, in the very nature of things, provoking hostility from the dominant one ; the crisis being more violent in proportion to the disease ; the more exaggerated the principle of authority, the more certain its resistance to be obstinate. Nor, again, will it at all discredit this new hypothesis—or rather this slight extension of our Author's—to allege (what I now neither concede nor deny) the follies, or the errors, or the vices, or the indifferent success, of the first Reformers : when has it ever been that providential purposes of mercy have not been more or less counteracted by the frailties of man ? Even that mighty Artist, Whose work makes the history of nations, is in a manner (if we may dare to say so), reduced to suit His designs to the poverty of His human materials. And, after all (whatever the advocates of the Papacy may say), candid bystanders, after honestly examining the records of the times, will determine how far the Church of the

mediaeval popes—nay, of the very contemporaries of the Reformation movement—has a fair right to press so very triumphantly on the blunders, or the extravagancies, or the vices, of even the least credible of the Continental Reformers. While—if the usual charges be advanced, of Socinian, or Rationalistic, or Infidel results, as ultimate consequences of the original *rejection* of authority, it must be remembered, that my hypothetical Protestant developer holds precisely the same opinion (in which he is steadily sustained by the most respectable division of the Roman obedience), on the papal despotism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, as parallel exaggerations of the principle of *maintaining* authority ; and that if the general principle of development be held capable of surviving the latter form of extravagance, it may be quite as fairly supposed not necessarily responsible for the former.

That as the Papacy had thus its beginning long subsequent to the full establishment of the Church of Christ in the World, so it may have been designed to have its end long before the Church's close ; that, even supposing it was ever a legitimate development of the Gospel, every argument which proves it so, must equally prove the possible legitimacy of its entire, or partial *cessation*,—will appear yet more manifest, if we recall the slow successive process by which the papal supremacy was *gradually* depressed, and the balance of ecclesiastical authority partially rectified within the Church of Rome, in the period preceding and following the Reformation ; and the perfect *correspondence* of this downward movement to the upper movement of the



power in its original growth<sup>z</sup>. The orb descends the western sky by a path accurately answering to that eastern arch of growing splendour and growing strength, by which it rose to its noontide culmination. What, indeed, was the continued object of Pisa, and Constance, and Basil<sup>a</sup>, but to replace the Papacy in the position it occupied, when having attained a primacy of honour and executive power, it yet saw and revered above it the great Councils of the United Christian Episcopate? The whole question of the grounds and origin of the papal authority was, at that period, boldly brought before the public, and that, not by irreverent Dissenters, but by the best and ablest men of the Church—such Romanist Reformers as Gerson, or the Cardinal of Cambray<sup>b</sup>, or Cusanus; and if the wild theories of Augustinus<sup>c</sup> or Turrecremata<sup>d</sup> (the Montalemberts and De

<sup>z</sup> [For an able sketch of the *Progress of the Papal Domination*, see Palmer's *Essay*, &c., Vol. ii.]

<sup>a</sup> [A. D. 1409, 1414, 1431.—While the Synod of Basil is ranked as the Eighteenth General Council by the French Benedictines in the *Art de vérifier les Dates*, its Acts were, through the influence of Cardinal Bellarmin, contemptuously omitted in the Roman edition of the General Councils, published by the Jesuit Sirmondus, “*ex typographia Vaticana*,” ann. 1608–1612. Vid. Richerii *Apolog. pro Joanne Gersonio*, p. 127. Lugd. Bat. 1676.—G.]

<sup>b</sup> [Petrus de Alliaco.—G.]

<sup>c</sup> [Vid. inf. p. 165. Augustinus Triumphus de Ancona. This monk maintained that it was the Pope's prerogative “*novum symbolum condere; novos articulos supra alios multiplicare*.”—*Summ. de Eccles. Pot.* q. 59, Art. 3.]

<sup>d</sup> [“It is easy to understand that it belongs to the authority of the Pope of Rome, as to the general and principal Master and Doctor of the whole world, to determine those things which are of



Maistres of their age)<sup>e</sup>, had a place in the literature of the times, one can but see in their very extravagancies the infatuation of a despotism already passing into dotage. Slowly and carefully did the French and German divines untwist the knot which centuries had been doubling and tightening; with such criticism as the age afforded (which, to be sure, was scanty and imperfect enough)<sup>f</sup> they laboured to explain historical texts and documents; even early in the fourteenth century the personal prerogative of St. Peter himself had been

faith, and by consequence to publish a symbol of faith.”—*Turrecrem.*, Lib. ii. Cap. 107. Quoted by Bp. Taylor, *Diss.* p. 280.]

<sup>e</sup> Mr. Newman, and his party universally, seem to have adopted this sect of the Roman theologians. It is worth remarking, that the foreign and isolated dependencies of all communities seem to have a tendency to adopt the extremes of the parent creed; the Irish Presbyterians, almost to a man, sympathize with the Free Kirk; the leaders of the Romish schism in England are Ultramontanes. The reason may partly be, that these extern sympathisers, having comparatively little practical connexion with the main body, escape all the practical inconveniences of the ultraisms they advocate, and so can afford to display the eloquence and energy that almost always belong to extreme principles, at a cheap cost.

[Augustinus Triumphus, an Augustinian monk of Ancona, flourished from 1274 to 1328. Johannes de Turrecremata, so called from *Torquemado*, the name of his birth-place in Spain, died in 1468. He maintained the absolute supremacy of the Pope at the Council of Basil.—See Du Pin. For specimens of the extravagancies of the Papal advocates in the fourteenth century, see *Gieseler*, iii. pp. 18–21, 45–47.]

<sup>f</sup> “Sunt, *meo judicio*,” is all that Cusanus can venture, “illa de Constantino apocrypha; sicut *fortassis* etiam quædam alia longa et magna scripta Sanctis Clementi et Anacleto Papæ attributa, in quibus volentes Romanam sedem, omni laude dignam, plus quam Ecclesiæ sanctæ expedit et decet, exaltare, se penitus fundant.”—

powerfully impugned by writers<sup>g</sup> of credit; and there is no question that in the middle of the fifteenth, had the mind of the Church been free to evolve and declare itself, the very claims of Leo<sup>h</sup>, who had mounted to almost this stage just a thousand years before, would have been thought barely excusable. Not to speak of the repeal of Annates, Reservations, Expectatives, &c. (to which, as themselves recent inventions, antiquity cannot be expected to furnish any parallel), the old usurpation of Appeals on which the African Church and the personal authority of St. Augustine had resisted the claims of Pope Zosimus and Pope Celestine, was, in a great measure, reversed at Basil; the old

*De Cathol. Concord.* iii. 2.\* The discourse of Laurentius Valla was, however, written as early as 1440.†

<sup>g</sup> [Ægidius Romanus, Marsilius Patavinus, Ockam.]

<sup>h</sup> [That these claims of S. Leo (A. D. 461) were the “germ of the present Roman system;” that they were *novel*, and resolutely resisted in Africa and the East, see fully proved by *Allies*, p. 249, *et seqq.*]

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\* [This extract is from Gieseler, iii. 190, with the exception of the omitted qualification “*aut quasi*” before “*fundant.*”—G.]

† [The date of Valla’s *Declamatio* is a matter of considerable interest, but there does not appear to be any reason for fixing upon this year. Gieseler (ii. 69.) only states that the author died in 1457. This is, however, a mistake, for Aug. 1, 1465, was the day of his death. From internal evidence it would seem that this treatise must have been composed at Naples, whither Laurentius fled in the year 1443. After this time, then, and previously to 1447, when, according to Spondanus, (*Annall. Baron. Contin.* ii. 3.) he received a private castigation from the Neapolitan Inquisitors, I believe that this most remarkable tract was written. Valla’s *Apologia pro se et contra Calumniatores*, in which he speaks of the virulence of his persecutors, and of the harbour to which he had come being utterly inopportune, was addressed to Pope Eugenius IV., and this Pontiff died in Feb. 1447. The *Apologia* was printed at Basle in 1518, and in the preceding year Ulric de Hutten dedicated to Pope Leo X. the first edition of the *De falsò credita et e mentita Constantini Donatione Declamatio*. The latter was republished A. D. 1535, by Orthuinus Gratius;—not in “the Collection of *Grotius*,” as we read in the English version of Du Pin. iii. 65. *Dubl.* 1723.—G.]



conflict of the Gallican Church and Rome in the fifth century, is revived in the Pragmatic Sanction of the fifteenth; the old theology of the coequal rights of episcopacy, unfolded as against the Roman claims by Jerome in his sterner mood, is the very foundation principle on which the reforming Councils build their case; nay, even the old claim of an Apostolic see (to which, as being the only plausible claimants of that envied honour in the entire western side of Christendom, the early Popes owed so much of their distinction), seems hardly to have escaped question<sup>i</sup>. It is true that the unscrupulous use of force, and the matchless diplomatic skill of the Roman Court, checked any effective explosion; afterwards swamped, with a subservient majority, the Council at Trent, and by its su-

<sup>i</sup> “Legant,” says Innocent I. triumphantly, “si in his provinciis (Italia, Gallia, Hispania, Africa, Sicilia, et insulis interjacentibus), alius Apostolorum invenitur aut legitur docuisse, &c.”—*Epist. ad Decentium*.<sup>\*</sup> As the primitive deposit of doctrine was understood to be carefully preserved in the separate Churches, on the separate responsibility of each Church, there was (even over and above the honour reflected from an Apostolic founder) a claim, not destitute of plausibility, to peculiar authenticity in the doctrine transmitted from an inspired teacher; and this is often alleged, even before the supposed Petrine prerogative of absolute authority was brought into full light. Its influence in the contest with *Constantinople* was manifest and decisive. Cusanus, however, treads rudely enough upon this delicate ground, when he hazards the bold hypothesis that if the Archbishop of *Treves* was elected by the general voice of the Church, he would possess a higher claim than the Roman Pontiff.—*De Concord. Lib. ii.* [Gieseler, iii. 189–90.—G.]

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<sup>\*</sup> [Gieseler, i. 261.—This Epistle has been by some condemned as counterfeit. Denison says that, “Innocentium istum producendo, innocens non erit Bellarminus.” (*De Auriculari Confessione*, p. 65. Oxon. 1621.)—G.]



perior organization, and powerful political connexions, (helped by the mismanagement of the continental Reformers—above all, by their fatal blunder of deserting the Constitution, and neglecting the standards of the Ancient Church), drove back the tide of the Reformation itself; but *had* the movement succeeded universally, Mr. Newman's theory would justify *that* configuration of events quite as cogently as it justifies the particular development to which he arbitrarily dedicates it; nor, on his principle—admitting as he must and does, that several of the Roman peculiarities are little earlier than the Reformation itself<sup>k</sup>—can there remain the smallest reason for regarding that as perpetually or universally obligatory, which he himself proclaims to have been the slow growth of events, and whose fluctuating existence, as, after centuries of gestation, it developed at last into visible birth, may quite as naturally develope into senility and death likewise.

We are thus, it appears, indebted to Mr. Newman for a theory triumphantly vindicating the principle of the Reformation. The admirers of that remarkable epoch would, at the same time, be more grateful for his assistance, if they could avoid seeing that unfortunately the theory may be made to vindicate every

<sup>k</sup> “It is equally certain, that the doctrine of *Justification* defined at Trent was, in some sense, *new* also.”—*Essay*, p. 26. I need not observe how many other doctrines there were in the system then deliberately ratified, which were substantially newer still. Think what must be the claim of the *rest* of the Tridentine “Catholic developments,” if the cautious, measured statements about Justification are admitted to have been, “in some sense,” the creation of doctors in the sixteenth century!

historical variety of religious revolution altogether as well.

But now for another slight modification of the principle of religious Development. Palpably the same argument which applies to *time* applies quite as irresistibly to *place* also. Regard, for example, in the light of this theory, the case of our own Anglican Church. It is a simple fact, that in proportion to the distance from Rome the bond of the Papacy has *always* slackened in strength and firmness; towards the North-West, especially, the interval is hardly less from the intense temperature of the Vatican to the climate of the Gallican Liberties, than from the latter to the independent Catholic Episcopacy of England. Surely it is no great license of supposition (for one whose digestion has been vigorous enough for the theory of Development itself) to conceive that this *gradual relaxation* and final liberation, according to the circumstances of various districts in the universal Church, may have been as really in the original scheme of Providence as the first formation and *equally gradual local extension* of the papal connexion; that Cranmer, and Ridley, and the rest, by whose ministry the connexion was dissolved, may have been as truly within the horizon of the divine contemplation and of the divine affections, as Gregory the First and Augustine of Canterbury. Surely the same Providence which has been pleased to permit—or, if you will have it so, to maintain—a perpetual papacy in the South of Europe, may have seen fit that a different development of the Christian polity—retaining all the essential but dismissing this circumstantial—should arise and flourish on English soil. The se-



paration was wrought through the partial instrumentality of a tyrannical king ; true—and the original concession of universal papal supremacy was obtained through flattering a murderer<sup>1</sup>; the Henry of Cranmer is but a feeble copy of the Phocas of Boniface. But, dismissing a topic, to which the advocates of the Pa-

<sup>1</sup> “ *Benignitatem vestræ pietatis ad imperiale fastigium pervenisse gaudemus. Latentur cæli et exultet terra ; et de vestris benignis actibus universæ reipublicæ populus nunc usque vehementer afflictus hilarescat, &c. &c.*” It is thus that St. Gregory the Great, to depress his rival at Constantinople,\* addressed the savage who had mounted to a throne of drunkenness and debauchery by the murder of his monarch and the whole royal seed, butchered before their

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\* [The account here given of S. Gregory’s motives and conduct is very far from fair ; and I would venture to say without doubt that Mr. Butler unsuspectingly adopted the malevolent statement of Gibbon. That the extract was derived from this source would seem altogether probable from the use of the “&c.,” and from the reading “universæ,” instead of “universus,” before “Reipublicæ.” (See *Decline and Fall*, iv. 299. ed. Milman.) It must be borne in mind that the character of the Emperor Maurice had become deeply degraded by extreme avarice, and unrelenting cruelty. Even in the sentence adduced the continual and vehement affliction of the people is spoken of ; and the disaffection and revolt of the imperial army could scarcely excite surprise after their discovery of the conspiracy formed for their destruction, and after Maurice had refused to part with a very trifling ransom in order to prevent the massacre of twelve thousand prisoners. Phocas having been elected Emperor, his liberality and kindness to his subjects were for a while conspicuous, and the contrast between him and his predecessor was not advantageous to the latter. S. Gregory traces a dispensation of Providence in the revolution ; and adores the wisdom of the Most High, who, as he reminds the usurper, “ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will.” At this time, remarks De Sainte-Marthe, the Benedictine editor, “non divinabat S. Gregorius mores ejus brevi mutatos iri in pejus, et Phocam postmodum obscenis se libidinibus mancipaturum, ac optimorum virorum cruore satiaturum. Imò etiamsi futurum id prævideret, de præsentî rerum statu, non de futuro, suis in Epistolis loqui debuit.” (S. Greg. Mag. *Opp.* ii. 1239. Paris. 1705. Compare Maimbourg, *Histoire du Pontificat de S. Gregoire le Grand*, p. 180. A Paris, 1686.) Not with much more reason, then, could we (after the example of the infidel Gibbon, and the sceptic Bayle,) accuse Pope Gregory of having in effect participated in the guilt of murder, than censure for the same sin those who peacefully submitted to the Prince of Orange, and acquiesced in the government of one whom they looked upon as a parricidal rebel.—G.]



pacy will be wise to draw as little attention as they can help, let us now reflect whether the student of *genuine* historical development—in other words, the reverential investigator of the path of Providence through events—may not in this English case discover matter for meditation more truly interesting than many of the

father's eyes. Boniface III. persevering in the same flattery of the same usurper, obtained,\* according to Baronius, the coveted title†. It is painful, though a painful necessity in times like these, to recall such guilt, especially in a character undoubtedly possessing so many admirable traits as the first Gregory. But when the Bishops who broke the Roman bond are assailed for their court connexions, it may be well to remember what were the court connexions of the Pope who *formed* it.

By the bye, as “developments” may be supposed usually to require a considerable *period* for their completion, Mr. Newman may usefully employ himself in solving the curious anomaly, of St. Gregory's rejection of the “*Universalis Episcopus*,” as a title betokening the precursor of Antichrist, and the *speedy* subsequent adoption of the substance, and even the literal words, of that designation, by his own successors. The cause of this *hot-bed* rapidity of growth in one of the Fundamentals of Roman Christianity after so protracted a delay, and in a century which has at length been unanimously decided by historical critics (the *tenth* used to bear the palm) to have been the “darkest” of the whole nineteen, would surely reward investigation.

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\* [The authenticity of this grant is not only questionable, but the assertion of Baronius and other Pontificians cannot be supported by a shadow of ancient evidence. With the subversion of this imaginary privilege falls the Faberian theory relative to the twelve hundred and sixty days.—G.]

† [Not “coveted” certainly by S. Gregory, for he rejected with horror the title of *Universal Pope*, when applied to himself, as much as when given to the Patriarch of Constantinople, as the “*invention of the first Apostate*,” and “*an anticipation of Anti-Christ*.”—See Allies (*Church of England cleared from the Charge of Schism*, pp. 356–8.) The statement that this “coveted title” was conferred by Phocas on Boniface III. rests “upon the sole authority of Baronius, for none of the ancient writers have mentioned it.”—Mosheim, *Hist. of Ch.*, cent. vii.]

boasted achievements and miraculous recoveries of the Papacy itself.

I have already hinted something of the analogies<sup>m</sup> of civil and ecclesiastical government; the disciple of St. Paul will not be slow to recognise a sacred character—of different degree and grounds, no doubt, but yet a sacred character—in both. In many particulars there is a strong resemblance in the right practical maxims of each; for the plain reason that in many particulars the objects of both, in their respective spheres, are literally the same. The due conciliation of liberty and order, a paternal spirit in government, the fair discussion and effective settlement (so far as expedient) of disputed questions, justice between man and man, and the like, are objects which the Civil and the Ecclesiastical polity equally propose to realize for their members, and usually attempt more or less to realize by very similar means. When we remember that it is chiefly to the Church that modern Europe owes the principle of Representative Government<sup>n</sup>—pronounced by many

<sup>m</sup> [Compare Leslie, *Case of the Regale and Pontificate stated*.—Works, vol. viii. p. 292, *et seqq.* (Oxf. 1832.) Abp. Laud, *Conference with Fisher*, pp. 169–176. (Oxford, 1839.) Hooker, *Eccles. Pol.* viii. 1, 2. (Ed. Keble.) Thorndike, *Review of the Right of the Church in a Christian State*.—Works, Vol. i. p. 662, (in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*.) ]

<sup>n</sup> It was not that Bishops at Councils were the mere delegates of their respective flocks, or even of their respective clergy (though into their original election, when their future presence at Councils was of course foreseen, the *spirit* of modern “constituency” must, to a certain degree, have entered)—but that the Bishops present and voting in the Councils were regarded as collectively the representatives of the entire Episcopate, and so of the whole Church.



philosophers the greatest advance man ever made in political discovery, certainly the characteristic principle of the best civil constitutions—the analogy becomes peculiarly close and striking. Now, if this resemblance of their respective means and objects hold in these two departments, is there *no presumption at all* that nations may perchance be found to see their way pretty nearly with the same comparative perspicacity in both? and when we hear the great Master of human wisdom bidding us with “pious admiration” observe<sup>o</sup>, “*eadem calcata vestigia ad errorem ducentia in divinis et humanis,*” may we expect no antecedent probability that those who, above all European races, have failed in securing even the commonest objects of Civil government, tolerable security of person and property, may have shown no superhuman sagacity in fixing and retaining their Ecclesiastical? If the Anglican Ecclesiastical constitution is singular (which however, in the sense intended, is not the case), so too is its Civil constitution; and *one* of these, at least, is the envy and admiration of the world. The principle which, for so many ages, made the strength and union of the Church—representative government—is the very principle which these British islanders have realized with unequalled perfection in their political system. The principle

Hence Councils came to be actually designated the “Church Representative.” Such “representation” may be compared to our own “Representative Peerage” of Ireland; elected for life, and thenceforward ordinarily irresponsible and irremoveable; and when convened for legislative purposes sitting as the representatives of their own order at large.

<sup>o</sup> De Augment. Scient. V. ii.



which formed the characteristic of the mediæval papacy—arbitrary monarchy—is the very principle whose subversion opened the way for this marvellous British constitution, and whose retention is still the characteristic of the imperfect constitutions of Europe. He who denies such considerations to be of any force, who regards such success in one most momentous department of practical wisdom to be no augury *at all* of success in another which is in many respects closely analogous to it, will probably be found to do so upon grounds that preclude all reasoning alike; he, however, least of all, can fairly take this course whose whole argument is framed upon *presumptions* infinitely more shifting and shadowy. Without, however, insisting further upon this in its argumentative application (which, possibly, our new guides will regard as something very profane), I may be allowed to invite those who *do* believe the Anglican Church (when fairly carried out according to her own express prescriptions) to be, after all, the nearest approach the frailty and perverseness of human nature have made to combine the primitive elements with the modern application, to suit the Church of Ambrose and Chrysostom—itself essentially unchanged—to the needs of a different race, a different climate, and, above all, a totally different stage of man's intellectual history—those who do believe, that, with whatever practical short-comings, for which we need to humble ourselves in the dust (who, alas! were *they* that undertook to shew us how to repair them, and how have they kept their plighted faith?) and notwithstanding the worse evil of the evasion of her own plain teaching by too many of her own

commissioned teachers,—this Church was never more than in these later years conspicuously graced with tokens of the divine blessing—organized anew through her colonial dependencies, augmenting and methodizing her missionary spirit, growing in the liberality and the self-denial of her members—*those* who so believe and so hope I may surely invite to recognise and adore this two-fold mercy of our God, and to remind them, that, in thus giving us a distinctive character in the World and in the Church, in the sphere of Time and in that of Eternity, in the organization of our Political and in that of our Ecclesiastical constitution, He has also charged us with a responsibility of as singular weight, and has made the Church history and the State history of Britain, perhaps, the two most awful and solemn chapters of all that, daily recorded, are yet to be pronounced on, in the Book of the final Judgment.

I must, however, resist the temptation of further digressing (if it be a digression) on this topic ; and return at once to the argument.

On the whole, then, it will, I imagine, be evident to every competent critic, that Mr. Newman's limitations of his system of progressive revelation are altogether *arbitrary* ; that it is quite as just to conceive a development of *all* Christianity as a development of the Roman Church ; that if it be urged that these contemporary developments contradict in different countries, it is no more than he himself admits of his alleged developments in different ages ; that these other candidates for the honour of legitimate "development" can trace themselves in Scripture at least as well—surely in some instances far better ; that many of their prin-



ciples will always be able to show themselves (at least inferentially) recognised in Antiquity with as much plausibility as the others (*e. g.* individual judgment as much as unquestioning obedience), whenever their respective defenders may chance to possess as much command as our present Author of the ancient sources; and that the objection of *late* evolution, long obscurity, conflict, and disorder, is perfectly preposterous from the reasoner who acknowledges the bloody struggle of the Image-Development for more than a century, and the protracted birth of the Virgin service, and the Half-Communion, and others. While, at worst, and supposing the Roman “developments” to be all genuine and divine, this theory, beyond all others, *palliates their rejection* ; for, after all, a Church which omits them (as the Anglican) is, on this view, no worse off than the whole Christian Church was, in what have been hitherto commonly regarded as the model ages of the faith ; and surely it would be somewhat hard measure, if *we* were to be unpardonable heretics for limiting our belief to the amount at which it is now conceded that the Fathers fixed their’s for centuries ! Assuredly, no view could be contrived more admirably calculated for justifying an Anglican in remaining exactly where he is ; others may possibly “do better,” but he at least (on this theory) is secure of “doing well.” More particularly,—we cannot but see that, as regards the Papacy, which so largely modified the external history of the Church for ages, he who gives it a beginning, *must* give it the possibility of an end ; he who allows that the Church could (for it *did*) exist without it, cannot argue it *necessary* to the Church ; he whose ground



for admitting its right to include the nations gradually, is just that it *did* so, cannot well refuse their right to exclude themselves from its control when they have *done* so likewise. What possible escape is there from this obvious and manifest application of his own principle? What, except a mere hypothetical assumption that that, *which in its own nature applies to all*, can be valid only when applied to one? It is true, if he can indeed establish an *a priori* exclusive claim of infallible guidance for all developments connected with the Bishop, or the City, of Rome, his point is gained; but, after all, it is gained by really abandoning the high ground of scientific theory, by giving up that universality of the principle which is of the very essence of a scientific proof, and contracting a *nominally* general conception so as to force it to suit a certain exclusive series of phenomena in history. While again, as I have already more than once observed, the admitted necessity of this collateral supposition of Roman Infallibility *in effect* leaves the whole controversy pretty much where it found it; for if *that* can, indeed, be established with the force, clearness, and precision fairly required for a proposition which, if true, would be of more importance than the whole Apostles' Creed put together, does not all further argument become little better than superfluous and trifling? Who would hesitate to receive *any* infallible decision, whether it were a development or not? Who would refuse to receive the truths contained in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians unless they could be shown to be developments from the First? or the truths in St. John's Gospel, unless they could be proved developments from the

sayings in St. Matthew's? If the Roman gift of infallibility be only to expound and apply, it has gone palpably beyond its commission; if it be to deduce logical inferences from primitive belief, let it produce the logical inferences and we will gladly receive them, even without the need of its authority; but if the original gift conferred the right of revealing essentially new doctrine, what avails a theory of development (professing to be universally applicable to all Roman doctrines), except to restrict the mysterious gift within narrower bounds than God intended? But this is to anticipate a subject to be hereafter considered. Meanwhile I must express the conviction, which alone concerns my immediate argument, that no "tests" that Mr. Newman has yet contrived, will ever prevent the *spirit* of the development theory from being of universal application to *all forms of Christian belief and feeling*; however temporarily restrained, the development principle will assuredly thus develope *itself*; every historical fact is a development of some sort; and every fact in the history of the Christian religion is a development (right or wrong) out of *some* Christian principle or some original Christian authority. Men will say—and how will this Theorist on his own principles answer them?—that if Rome got hold of certain truths and developed them after its own fashion, Luther and his contemporaries got hold of others and developed them after *their's*; both series of developments have taken place under the mysterious oversight of one divine Providence; *both* are events in the history of Christianity; nor, apart from all extrinsic grounds, has any one an *antecedent* right to affirm that, for example, Pope



Alexander VI. was a man beloved and inspired of God while actively busy in providing for his children and poisoning his Cardinals,—and Martin Luther a child of the devil, while (nearly at the same time) straining in sore perplexity for Christian truth, and groping in his solitude, huge and Cyclops-like, around the walls of that gloomy cavern of unquiet thought, of which his dim monastic cell was but the image. I say merely that, apart from satisfactory *separate* proof (and we have hardly had that yet), the former of these personages can scarcely be assumed, individually and *per se*, more likely to develope Christian principles correctly<sup>p</sup> than

<sup>p</sup> Leopold Ranke—among the most candid and conscientious of historians—attributes a most momentous “development of Christian Doctrine” to Alexander VI. “Alexander VI. being the first who officially declared that indulgences delivered souls out of Purgatory.”—*Hist. of Popes*, &c. Book i. Chap. ii. § 2. That Alexander asserted the power there can be no doubt. I think it will be found, however, that it had been assumed in papal bulls before him;\* and

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\* [Gieseler, iii. 325.—Professor Ranke is certainly mistaken, and not a little intricacy is connected with the investigation of this matter. Let us endeavour briefly to trace the assumption of this authority to a period antecedent to the year 1500, the date of Alexander’s Jubilee-bull. In the first place, Trithemius informs us that in 1490, Pope Innocent VIII. (not Innocent X., as Gieseler calls him,) sent plenary Indulgences into Germany, applicable not only to the living but the dead, and declared to be founded on such plenitude of power in the Pontiff that “*ipsum Purgatorium, si velit, penitus evacuare possit.*” (*Chronicon Hirsaugiense*, ii. 535.) Until this time, according to Trithemius, such Indulgences were “*raræ*,” and a belief in the truth of his assertion will naturally add to an inquirer’s diligence. We come next to the decisive *Declaratio* of Pope Sixtus IV., mentioned by Gieseler (*ubi sup.*) and Gabriel Biel, or Eggeling of Brunswick, (*Canon. Missæ Expos. Lect. lvii. Addit.*) which was put forth in the year 1477. This *Summaria Declaratio* should not be confounded with the Bull itself, which was issued in favour of the church of Saintes in Saintogne, 3 Non. Aug. 1476, and for which see (not the ordinary *Bullarium*, but) Euseb. Amort, *De Indulgentiis*, pp. 417–18. Venet. 1738. Dr. Kloss (*Catal.* p. 107. Lond. 1835.) possessed a copy of the former, and this has been carefully republished by that excellent preserver of Romanistic treasures, the Rev.



the latter. Both parties in this argument, admitting that God has permitted great and permanent error *somewhere*, the Romanist will impute the wrong development to the Reformation champion, the Reformer to the Romanist, and, as far as this accommodating theory is concerned, with, I dare say, a very pretty case on either side; while the philosophic Latitudinarian (to whom

the theological vindication of the principle is as old as Aquinas.\* That unhappily dexterous methodizer of all popular corruptions saw, that “non est aliqua ratio qua Ecclesia transferre possit communia merita quibus Indulgentiæ innituntur in vivos et non in mortuos.”—*Summa; Suppl.* p. iii. Qu. 71. Hales (whom Field with some justice calls “the first and greatest of the schoolmen,” for where he is sound he is excellent,) seems to have held the power effective only *per modum suffragii*—a distinction afterwards much controverted.

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Joseph Mendham. (*Venal Indulgences and Pardons*, Lond. 1839.) Without further delay we may take a leap backward to A. D. 1350, on the occasion of the Jubilee for which year Pope Clement VI. announced his dominion over Purgatory in the case of the souls of his absolved subjects. His language is full of arrogant impiety: “mandamus Angelis Paradisi quatenus animam illius à Purgatorio prorsus absolutam in Paradisi gloriam introducant.” (Baluzii *Vitæ Papp. Aven.* i. 310.) This passage is repeated as a “clausula” in the Bull of Pope Sixtus before spoken of; and the genuineness of the Clementine Constitution is proved by the testimony of Wesselus. (Contra Jac. Hoeck, Capp. vii. viii. *Farrago rerum Theol.* Basil. 1522. Drelincourt, *Du Jubilé*, p. 172. A Paris, 1627.) If we may believe Hen. Cornelius Agrippa with regard to the antiquity of absolutions for the dead, Boniface VIII., in the year 1300, “illas primus in Purgatorium extendit:” (*De incert. et vanit. Scientt.* Cap. lxi. sig. M iij. Colon. 1531. Cf. *Bibl. Patt.* vi. 546. Par. 1610.) and should we desire a fabulous conclusion to our pursuit, Gabriel Biel (loc. sup. cit.) provides it in the assurance that an Indulgence for the departed was granted by Pope Paschasius V. As such a Prelate, however, is merely an *ens rationis*, Bellarmin thinks it prudent to alter the name to Paschal I., who lived in the year 820. (*De Indulg.* i. xiv. 1549.)—G.]

\* [The references here to Aquinas and Alexander de Hales are from Gieseler, ii. 359–61. This writer attributes to the latter, and not to the former, the discovery of the *Thesaurus supererogationis perfectorum*, to be dispensed by the Popes alone. Aquinas perfected the doctrine of his predecessor.—G.]

this new view of the Christian Creed cannot fail to prove quite a treasure) will see in *both* manifestations collateral developments out of the inexhaustible bosom of original Christianity, suited by the wisdom and goodness of Providence to just the ages and the countries in which they have respectively emerged. Which of these employers of the argument is actually right, or whether all are wrong, I am not now canvassing; I again request it may be understood that I am at present delivering no judgment whatever on that very distinct question; I simply affirm, that all may, with perfect equality of claims, assert their respective interests in the all-proving, all-confuting "Theory of Development."

Condillac relates an anecdote of a theorist who imagined he had discovered a Principle adequate to explain all the phenomena of chemistry. He flew with his principle to a practical chemist, who heard him with exemplary patience, and then, after proper compliments to the discoverer's ingenuity, expressed his regret that there was still one difficulty in the way of applying the Principle,—namely, that all the *facts* were just the reverse of what the inventor had imagined. "Do tell me what they are, then," was the answer, "that I may at once make my doctrines explain them"<sup>a</sup>. This theorist ought to have given up the unmanageable regions of chemistry; so promising a genius should at once

<sup>a</sup> "*Hé bien, reprit le physicien, apprenez-les moi, afin que je les explique*"—that is, as Condillac understands it, "*parce qu'il croit avoir la raison de tous les phénomènes quels qu'ils puissent être*:"—and he justly enough adds, "*Il n'y a que des hypothèses vagues qui puissent donner une confiance mal fondée.*"—*Traité des Systèmes*, Ch. xii. Edit. 1803, Tom. 3. I should not be much surprised if



have betaken itself to theology; a little reflection might have suggested to so independent a speculator the "Theory of Development," which would have answered all his wishes—a theory which no fact is "stubborn" enough to resist, and which will, with equal cogency, demonstrate all—or their opposites, if required.

And now, for a moment, to throw aside polemics, let us, before closing the subject, recall the simple historical truth as regards the Papacy. That it *was* a gradual formation, few honest men will now dispute. He who would refer its *first* rise, with some of our ardent controversialists, to mere unmingled ambition, is as much (and more uncharitably) mistaken as he who sees in it the absolute and exclusive ordinance of Heaven. The government of the early Church was one resting on voluntary consent; rulers neither possessed, nor would, at that period, have desired, the command of physical force to support their judgments. In such a state of things the personal influence of bishops (as St. Cyprian), the comparative importance of Sees (as those of the imperial cities), would almost unavoidably give them a sort of habitual directive authority. And, in order to perpetuate that incidental influence, not only ambitious men (such as Stephen, or Damasus long after, seem to have been), but even meek and humble bishops, with a view to the convenience of recognised authority in difficult conjunctures, would be tempted to adopt very questionable arguments, which those who sought

Mr. Newman had yet to experience the truth of another little maxim of the cautious Abbé, that catches my eye as I turn over the leaves of the volume: "*L'Eglise n'approuve point les theologiens qui entreprennent de tout expliquer.*"—Ch. ii.



their favour would reiterate, and which, once current, would be sure to become at last traditionally venerable. But as, in reality, the only true ground for the assumption would still be its *utility*, so when that utility became clearly overbalanced by accompanying evils, the obligation would cease with it. That just such was the case in the Anglican separation, our divines have repeatedly demonstrated, and the world has not yet seen their refutation.

But such as I have described is, at all events, the real spirit and bearing of the hypothesis of Development, as applied to the history of Religion. It is the philosophy, not of one form of Christianity, but of all. This, of course, will be resolutely denied. There is but one possible true development in all the innumerable plans of Providence; a certain communion *says* it possesses it—therefore it *does* possess it; the immensity of the divine power and wisdom cannot overflow the limits assigned by the theology of the Vatican; the immensity of the divine love cannot conceivably include the objects of papal excommunication. Development is indefinite; its very essence is variety, modification, change: nevertheless, every development but one shall be heresy. Those Secretaries of Heaven who are familiar enough with the Counsels of the Most High to assure us He always purposed to reveal Christianity in successive fragments and portions, must, of course, be believed when they make this slight further demand upon our credulity. Nevertheless, even accepting this limitation, since they will have it so,—the history of the Church seems still to present a problem, the bearing of which upon this theory appears to demand

rather more attention than Mr. Newman has thought proper to give it.

II. It is well known how complicated a subject of controversy it has been made, to determine the precise amount of difference between the doctrines of the Greek and Latin Churches. The difficulty is increased—on the one hand by the general ignorance and depression of the Greek Church, which has left its prelates almost wholly incompetent to test their tenets and practices by a critical investigation of even their own ecclesiastical antiquities, and has made it easy to impose on them almost any modification of the tenets they profess to maintain—and on the other, by the disingenuousness of the Latins, who (especially through the indefatigable agency of the Jesuits) have spared neither money (miserably effective in this case), nor personal and political influence, to Latinize the more modern Greek theology, and who have laboured to pass off upon the learned world in the West these Latinized testimonies as the genuine and unprompted voice of the Oriental Churches<sup>r</sup>. This artifice has, indeed, been in some degree detected, partly by the internal evidence of the documents adduced, which abound with a phraseology manifestly borrowed from the Western Scholasticism<sup>s</sup>; partly by the evidence of travellers and divines (as Covel, &c.), who were themselves personally cognizant

<sup>r</sup> [Aymon declares that he has annihilated more than five hundred testimonies in his *Monumens authentiques de la Religion des Grecs, et de la fausseté de plusieurs Confessions de Foi des Chrétiens Orientaux*. 4to. A la Haye, 1708.—G.]

<sup>s</sup> The *μετουσίωσις*, so prominent in some of the testimonies adduced for the Greek Eucharistic doctrine, is a modernism, and a



of the intrigues employed, more particularly at one important stage of the process<sup>t</sup>. But the influence of

mere echo of the western “Transubstantiation.” In like manner the application of the Aristotelian *συμβεβηκότα* to the *species*, instead of the older *εἶδη*, betrays the adoption of the Latin hypothesis of *accidents*.

<sup>t</sup> This chiefly relates to the Transubstantiation\* Controversy. Arnauld and Nicole were very solicitous to enrich their collection of testimonies to the perpetuity of the Roman doctrine of the Eucharist with Oriental evidences. The political influence of the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Nointel (himself a favourer of Arnauld’s peculiar theological party) was largely employed to induce the eastern bishops to sign formularies framed by the Roman missionaries, which accordingly (as might be expected) was abundantly done.† The strong expressions of St. Chrysostom were flashed before the eyes of the poor Grecians till they were dazzled, and could no longer discern the vital difference between the *μετουσίωσις*, and any other compound of *μετά*.‡ But in truth the eastern doctrine had been, to a great extent, warped (as I have hinted above) before this period; the tide had probably set in for Transubstantiation, and the point was likely to be gained before long: not to mention the chances that are always in favour of an enthusiastic, half-informed race preferring the *extreme* on any controversy.

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\* [It is extremely difficult to ascertain how far the Romish idea of *Transubstantiation* has ever attained a place in Oriental theology. The word, in a Greek form, is used; but many who so use it expressly deny that they understand it in the Romish sense. The following is the language of Plato, Archbishop of Moscow, in his answer to M. Dutens on the doctrines of the Oriental Church: “*Ecclesia Catholica Orientalis et Græco-Russica, admittit quidem vocem Transubstantio, Græcè μετουσίωσις; non physicam illam transubstantiationem et carnalem, sed sacramentalem et mysticam; eodemque sensu hanc vocem Transubstantiatio accipit, quam quo antiquissimi Ecclesiæ Græcæ Patres tres voces μεταλλαγή, μετάθεσις, μεταστοιχείωσις accipiebant.*” Quoted by Palmer, *Treatise*, &c. i. 212: “It would seem,” says Mr. Palmer, “as if the term Transubstantiation was employed by him merely to signify a real change and a real presence, not to define its mode.”]

† [Covel’s *Account of the Greek Church*, p. 136. Camb. 1722.—G.]

‡ [See Gieseler, i. 294.—G.]



the more powerful, organized, wealthy, and learned Western Communion has at all times, even before the fall of the Eastern empire, been sufficient, in despite of the bitterness of the separation, to produce and perpetuate a strong tincture of the Roman theology among the Churches of the East; the ecclesiastics whom the papal Court have long maintained there—sometimes schismatically, in some districts with the consent of a rude and unlettered population—have always been active proselytists; the deeply superstitious tendency of both communions must often blend and identify their teaching, even amidst the most virulent hostility of the teachers; and these influences, constant and pervading, render it exceedingly difficult to disengage the genuine Greek doctrine from this subtle combination during the late centuries. Rome, too, has always had its Greek converts, whose writings have been dedicated to disguising the doctrines of their native Church, and on whom such authors as Leo Allatius, himself a Greek, Maimbourg, and even the much more respectable Simon, have, in a great measure, constructed their representations. It is thus that, to obtain the true traditional theology of the Eastern Catholics, the inquirer must go back to a period before the necessities of the falling Empire reduced the unfortunate Greek divines, at the entreaty or the command of their wretched despots, to consent to surrender almost anything if they might but obtain the support of the West against the advancing armies of the Turk; though even before that miserable time the intercourse through the Crusades, and the Latin rule at Jerusalem and Constantinople, could

hardly have been without their effect in partially Romanizing the speculative theology of the East<sup>u</sup>.

The details of the question would, therefore, require long and minute and elaborate inquiry. But the general features of the case as it stands even now, and has stood for eight or nine centuries back, are plain enough, and they are sufficient.

The theory of Development represents the doctrine of the Catholic Church as animated by an inward principle of growth, which constantly enlarges its bulk ; the expanding mass ever preserving the symmetry of truth, all parts harmonizing with each, and each with the whole. The connexion of the growing doctrine is subtle and intricate, rather felt than seen ; but felt so powerfully, that if you really receive one element you will be insensibly led into all ; the march of progressive theology has been mysterious, but it is uniform and irresistible. These doctrines are tied together by all manner of "cross-relations ;" they mutually presuppose each other ; in these profound mysteries "deep calleth unto deep ;" the doctrine of the Deity of the Redeemer is imperfect without the worship of the Holy Virgin ; the doctrine of the Resurrection is but a philosophic possibility, or a Socinian speculation, until it be adorned and sustained by the religious veneration of the

<sup>u</sup> The Orientals were a good deal interested by the scholastic theology of the Latins, congenial as it was to the character of their own subtle intellect. Aquinas (who himself took a prominent part in the Greek question) was wholly, or partially, translated into Greek in the fourteenth century. It is not easy to overvalue the influence a single work of such comprehensiveness and ability as the *Summa* would exercise over a fluctuating theology.



bones of the dead. To reply to this, that the connexion is not very evident to the intellect, and that it is perilous beyond expression to venture in matters so awful to supply corollaries at our own discretion—is mere rationalism, decorous infidelity; *facts* have proved that the general ecclesiastical mind is so led, and that suffices. Nay, then, let us come to facts. No disciple of this theory will, I presume, deny the Catholic training—as he would regard it—of the Eastern Church; no such reasoner will deny—he exults in affirming—that it progressively adopted to a large extent those very tenets and practices (at least the spirit of those) which the Romanist calls “Catholic developments,” which the colder Anglican regards as melancholy superstitions; but many of which, whatever be their real character and deserts, the East and West (from the similarity of the influences affecting both sides of Southern Christendom, and their frequent mutual intercourse), were alike led to embrace. Now it is most manifest, that exactly in proportion as these developments are held to have resembled (which is the very point the Roman writers labour so hard to prove), the certain and undeniable differences become more inexplicable *on this theory*; that exactly in proportion as it is maintained that Greece and Rome, and their respective dependencies, have shared the same universally vitalizing spirit, manifesting itself in the same theological formations, the same gradual budding, blossoming, and fructification of doctrines—in the same proportion does it become inconceivable how these conjoint growths should betray, after a certain stage, the most unequivocal indications of discrepancy; of discrepancy not superficial, but profound



and substantial; reaching to an irreconcilable opposition of views upon—to name no more—the Papacy, upon the great central development of Christianity, the bond on which the mystical virtue of unity, on which all else depends, *itself* wholly depends; the *summa rei Christianæ*; that very difference which above all others, leaves unhappy unbelieving England in the exile and abandonment of heresy.

It is quite idle to attempt to get rid of this by urging that the separation of the East and West (continued now for nearly half the duration of Christianity—for more than half, if we reckon from the Photian<sup>w</sup> controversy), is a mere “schism.” The “schism” is built on, and justifies itself by, a plain and palpable *heresy*, if Rome be indeed infallible; it affirms a principle which negatives the fundamental assertion of the whole Roman system. It is *not* as if Churches, admitting all the same doctrines, laboured under temporary disagreements about mutual rights and prerogatives: this is grossly to mistake the state of the quarrel of a thousand years between Greece and Rome. Rome affirms that it is essential to salvation that Christians be in communion with the Roman See, that See being Christ’s appointed test and centre of unity. Greece—the whole body of the *original* Churches of the East—affirms that this claim of the Roman See is an audacious, unscrip-

<sup>w</sup> [For an account of this “controversy” see Mosheim, Cent. ix. Gieseler, ii. p. 464, ed. Clark. Photius was chosen Patriarch of Constantinople in the year 858, by the Emperor Michael, in the place of Ignatius, whom he degraded. Pope Nicholas I. espoused the cause of Ignatius, and, in 862, excommunicated Photius as unlawfully elected, which was retorted by Photius in 866.]

tural, uncatholic usurpation ; for that Christian unity, and all the privileges therewith connected, have no necessary relation whatsoever to Rome or its Bishop. If the Roman system be true, it is impossible to name a more flagrant heresy than this. And this has in truth been the *perpetual* doctrine of the Greek Church ; whatever primatial privileges, after long and bitter disputes, may have been at last nominally conceded to Rome, *at no single period*, from the day that Paul planted the Church at Philippi to the present hour, has it ever been held by any one of the great Churches of the East, that connexion with the Roman See was necessary to salvation, or in any wise essential to the full reception and operation of Christianity.

After this, it is for my present purpose superfluous to insist upon other disagreements, for this is central and cardinal. Yet the reader will remember (it may be of service to some of those wavering brethren who sigh over English *isolation* to do so), that these Eastern Catholics still retain their peculiar doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit (though the doctrine of the Trinity is itself one of those, every step of which is here referred to a process of gradual but inevitable Catholic development); that they refuse (much more formally than England has ever done) all those “Œcumenical” Councils to which Rome refers for the consolidation of her most characteristic developments,—that is to say,—they distinctly reject the whole mass of those conciliar decrees which are the very instruments at once and monuments of nearly all the authoritative Roman developments—the very decrees which alone have made these things *binding* at all; that their accep-



tance of Transubstantiation has been positively denied by a large and most respectable party among themselves, and that their expressions, when they seem to favour it, bear every mark of modern and foreign influences ; that their veneration of the Eucharistic elements is affirmed to be *not* an adoration of a literal Divine Presence therein, and their rejection of the Half-Communion decisive and indignant; that their doctrine of the true sense of priestly absolution seems to be altogether distinct from that of Rome, and apparently coincides with the well-known expressions in our Communion Exhortation ; that they deny the Purgatorial Fire of the Trent Catechism ; that they reprehend as a gross error the figment of a *thesaurus meritorum* and its special development in papal indulgences and masses; that their doctrine of departed spirits is diametrically opposite to that of the Roman Church (a very characteristic distinction); that they differ completely on the question of celibacy—a matter also most important in principle, when we remember the *special theological grounds* (unquestionably heretical)<sup>x</sup>, on which the pro-

<sup>x</sup> [These “grounds” of prohibition seem to have been derived from the Gnostic heretics. “Many heretics there were in the ancient Church which prohibited marriage. . . . Such, saith Irenæus, was Saturninus, L. i. Ch. 22, who, with Simon Magus, was the father of the Gnostics. Of him Theodoret saith that he was the first among Christians that affirmed marriage to be the work of the Devil. . . . And, indeed, that this was generally the doctrine of the Gnostics, appears from Clem. Alex. Strom. i. 3, where, speaking of them, he saith, . . . Εἰσὶν οἱ πορνείαν ἀντικρὺς τὸν γάμον λέγουσι, καὶ ὑπὸ διαβόλου ταύτην παραδίδοσθαι δογματίζουσιν, ‘there are that affirm,’ and teach for doctrine, ‘all marriage to be fornication,’ that is, utterly unlawful, ‘and that it is brought in and delivered by



hibition was based by Siricius, by Innocent, by Gregory VII.; that their views on the Image and Picture Question are at palpable variance with Rome; their “mystery” of Confirmation different, their “mystery” of Unction different;—not to enumerate their Infant Eucharist and other peculiarities on which they are wont to contrast, and with no small pride, their beliefs and doctrines with those of the Roman Communion. It is indeed only wonderful, that with their ignorance, their superstitious tendencies, and their constant exposure to powerful Western influences and example, they have retained even these remains of differences formerly wider and more pervading.

the Devil.’”—*Hammond on Tim. I. iv. 3.* The Pontiffs alluded to in the text, in their injunctions of celibacy upon the clergy, seem to have approached the heresy of regarding the state of holy matrimony as *in se* impure. “Although,” says Dr. Todd, “the Church of Rome has taken higher ground in her estimation of marriage than Protestants have done, inasmuch as she makes matrimony a sacrament, and its bond indissoluble; yet, it must be confessed that controversialists and mystics of that communion, in their zeal to defend the necessity of clerical celibacy, and the merit of virginity, have often expressed themselves *as if they held marriage to be unclean*. Thus the celibacy of the clergy is defended on the ground of the obligation of purity in them that minister in holy things, and the marriage state is spoken of as inconsistent with *chastity*. For example, Pope Innocent I., in his Letter to Exuperius, Bishop of Thoulouse (*Decret. Gratiani*, p. 1, distinct. 82, c. 2, *Proposuisti*), reasons thus: “Nam si B. Paulus Apostolus ad Corinthios scribit, dicens, *abstinete vos ad tempus ut vacetis orationi*, et hoc utique laicis præcepit; multo magis sacerdotes, quibus et orandi et sacrificandi jure officio est, semper debebunt ab hujusmodi consortio abstinere, qui si contaminatus fuerit carnali concupiscentiâ, quo pudore vel sacrificare usurpabit, aut qua conscientiâ quove merito exaudiri se credit, cum dictum sit, *omnia munda mundis, coinquinatis autem et*

But omitting all inferior differences (though it is the very principle of Rome to admit *none* such to be compatible with unity and salvation) let the reader restrict himself to such as are principal and undeniable ; nay, to the rejection of the Roman Unity alone ; and let him ponder how this great Fact bears on the hypothesis before us. Here is a whole side of Catholic Christendom, a vast Church, ancient as Rome itself, and for a long period much greater in territorial extent, in number of episcopates, and in reputation for sanctity and learning ; the Church of innumerable recognised Saints and Martyrs ; the Church of all the General Councils

*infidelibus nihil mundum.*”—*Discourses on the Prophecies relating to Antichrist*, p. 334.

The same ground of enjoining celibacy, namely, the *impurity* of the married state, was advanced some years before by Pope Symmachus: (*Epistola Decretalis Symmachi Papæ ad Himerium Tarraconensem*, Hardouin. Conc., Tom. i. fol. 849,) “Plurimos enim Sacerdotes Christi atque Levitas, post longa consecrationis suæ tempora, tam de conjugiiis propriis, quam etiam de turpi coitu, sobolem didicimus procreasse, et *crimen* suum hac præscriptione defendere, quia in Vetere Testamento sacerdotibus ac ministris generandi facultas legitima attributa . . . . Hi vero qui illiciti privilegii excusatione nituntur ut sibi asserant veteri hoc lege concessum, noverint se ab omni ecclesiastico honore, quo indignè usi sunt, Apostolicæ sedis auctoritate dejectos, nec unquam posse veneranda attrectare mysteria, quibus se ipsi, dum *obscenis cupiditatibus* inhiant, privaverint.” The same idea is perpetuated by Gregory VII., who speaks of the marriage of the clergy as “inveteratum morbum *fornicationis* clericorum.”—*Epist.* ii. 30.]

[Lib. ii. Epist. xxx. apud Binius *Concill.* Tom. iii. P. ii. p. 289. Colon. Agripp. 1618.—In this letter Pope Gregory VII. commends King Henry IV. for his endeavours to extirpate Simony, and for his anxiety to correct “inveteratum morbum *fornicationis* Clericorum.” There is not any express mention of marriage.—G.]



for a thousand years. This Church, it is strenuously asserted, was for a long period in general accordance with Rome ; or, in Mr. Newman's phraseology, it was divinely brought through the same series of developments, and thus manifested the same abiding spirit. If all these developments infer one another, and infer those that are to follow ; if they be all the members of one divine system ; if we are, on that ground, to be permitted no choice, but forced to embrace the whole or none ; if the "historical" contemplation of Christianity is truly to tell us what it was meant to be, and the historical facts of the successive centuries are sufficient proof of obligatory doctrine,—I ask, in what conceivable way is this great historical phenomenon to be explained,—that a Church of this high and commanding character, possessing, quite as truly as Rome, the alleged infallible marks of divine guidance in the production of doctrine, developed (as they tell us), through exactly the same stages, and on exactly the same principles, as Rome itself, remains, and has remained through its entire history, utterly blind to the truth of several points made of momentous importance by Rome, and, above all, to *that* point on which the entire character and working of the Kingdom of Christ upon Earth is held to depend ! I do not hesitate to say, that this single consideration is absolutely fatal to the entire theory. The theory appeals to History, and History condemns and rejects it<sup>y</sup>.

<sup>y</sup> The only reference I remember to this important subject in the "Essay," is comprised in the following words, in which the reader will admire the easy flexibility of the theory ; the lion prostrates



It is not often that History furnishes a true *experimentum crucis*. When two plausible hypotheses are alleged, it is not always that, in a field where we can only observe, not experimentalize, we can lay our hand upon some discriminating fact which pronounces decisively for the one and utterly excludes the other. But this seems a perfect instance of that rare and precious test. Observe how it applies. To explain certain facts in the history of Christianity *two* suppositions are advanced. The *one* conceives that the Christian Creed was intended by its Founder to enlarge by successive incorporations of doctrines mutually connected and involved, and to form at last by these developments, internally necessary and inevitable, a harmonious system of organized truth ; and on the simple fact that doctrines *have* been incorporated, and that this hypothesis would make the incorporation legitimate, it demands our assent to the doctrines on pain of everlasting perdition. The *other* supposition, acknowledging that the fact of the existence of such doctrines and their gradual introduction, is historically true, is satisfied with conceiving that these doctrinal phenomena, in themselves no unlikely growth of human nature tampering with revealed teaching—may have been permitted by the same gracious Providence which has preserved the Church itself and the Fundamentals of Christianity in the world, but which has never promised wholly to suspend the operation of human folly,

his strongest antagonist with a casual sweep of the tail. “ Doctrine without its correspondent principle seems barren, if not lifeless ; *of which the Greek Church seems an instance.*”—p. 72. This is to determine Christianity “ historically.”

and absolutely prevent all error from gaining influence in His Church. Were Rome and England alone on the Earth, the rival suppositions might perhaps stand for a long while in presence of the facts ; the former pointing to her tenets and practices, as, though not directly commanded in Holy Writ, yet the sure unerring results of the Christian spirit in the world ; the latter professing itself unable to trace this inevitable connexion, and lamenting to detect in the process—as it deems—much more of human than divine. But *another* Witness demands to have her depositions recorded. If the Roman development be, indeed, the genuine growth of certain primitive principles, that growth will be uniform ; and the further the alleged growth has advanced, the more certainly may we count on the rest. If what the Anglican calls superstitions be but detached yet intimately connected portions of a vast scheme of Catholicity, then, surely, wherever this scheme, in all its alleged principles, has grown up exactly in the same way as it has done at Rome, and still exists in all its vigour, there must the *rest* of the Catholicity infallibly appear ; if *not*, the process is not one of internal, unerring development at all, and the other supposition [of the providential permission of error] at once takes its place as the true theory of the facts. On this principle let the Eastern Church be inspected. The history of this Greek Church furnishes one body of facts, which are said to identify its developments with those of Rome, and another which absolutely separates the two ; those first phenomena which resemble cannot then be, in any internal, natural, or necessary way, bound up with these others that differ. To revert to the great difference



already noted,—it is manifest that the principle of Unity can have no true divine or necessary connexion with a Roman papacy, or how should it fail to develope thus in the Catholic East as well as in the Catholic West? But “*circumstances* prevented it in the East.” Why then circumstances may have *produced* it in the West. Once admit the control of circumstances, and where will you limit it? or how will you escape gradually resolving your hypothesis into the very one you oppose, that is, into that simpler hypothesis of a special but permissive Providence which we Anglicans think quite sufficient to account for the facts? Meanwhile, by these facts, test your theory. If the West be right, the East is involved in error most damnable and deadly; if the East be right, the West builds its whole Church system upon a gross and presumptuous falsehood; either one or the other is fatally, mortally, in error;—and yet both these divisions grew up under the same series of developments, both possess the unfailing marks of Catholic teaching and spirit—monks, paintings, pompous vestments, relics, stern anathemas against heretics (including each other), and the rest; and “the Catholic developments” are all so exquisitely harmonious with each other, so intimately inwoven, so mutually correspondent, that the parts inevitably suppose the whole, nor can any Church enter into the spirit of *some* without being won to recognise the beauty and authority of the rest!

The theory of Development, then, which supposes, if I understand this Book, an internal principle in the Church of Christ at large, evolving important truths by uniform processes, cannot stand the test to which it



so urgently appeals ; it breaks down under—not recondite facts, but the most obvious and prominent fact in all Church History. That this mysterious growth of truth upon truth—this *exosmose* [exogenous] vegetation in Theology—should seem to answer for the history of the Roman Church, is indeed no great marvel ; for it was imagined chiefly as a vindication of that particular Church’s corruptions. But it answers for no other. This, however, is a common mistake ; we have it in every form in the new converts’ vindications of their change. They all “enter the Catholic Church.” No one, indeed, who remembers by what accidents (so to speak), and by how much of mere human policy, the religious profession of whole nations—papal and anti-papal—was determined at the great crisis of the Sixteenth Century, and how utterly incompetent the mass of Christians are to determine the matter upon argumentative grounds at all,—will regard the question of *mere numerical* majority of voices much more important in the modern balance of religions than it is in politics. But even on *this* ground these men strangely delude themselves and others. The proximity and the presumption of the Roman Communion unite to make men forget that—notwithstanding all the efforts of force and of intrigue—it is the Church of hardly half the nations of Europe, its predominance in these seeming (on the whole) to grow most remarkably in the inverse proportion of general intelligence and morality, and of such other imperfect colonies as—like other communions—it has continued to plant—in a great measure schismatically and in defiance of recognised authority, elsewhere. It is of this forgetfulness that

the present Author—himself no doubt the sincere enthusiastic victim of the pretensions he would impose on others—takes advantage, when he substitutes a fond hypothesis about the Roman Papacy and peculiarities for a theory of the Universal Church. But we have now seen that even that more limited object the system cannot really effect ; that *that* cannot be considered a divine, pre-ordained, and internally necessary development in one part of the Church, which under the same training and discipline is found totally to fail in another. To listen to the new converts—whose views, I must say, have really been somewhat too *rapidly* formed to give much promise of solidity—the Papacy is a sort of perpetual miracle that supersedes all further examination of the religion it teaches. They repose under the quiet shadow of that everlasting throne. The true genius of history looks coldly upon these pompous mystifications. The permanence of the Roman patriarchate is in some respects *less* wonderful than that of almost any other in Christendom ; *that is* to say, History can more *distinctly account for it* than it can for most others. The permanence of the Church at large is indeed divinely secured ; *there* is the miracle, if any ; not in the continuance of one among the special forms in which the great promise has been fulfilled ; though of course it is easy for dexterous declaimers thus to transfer the glory of the substantial truth to its circumstantial manifestation. But the real lover of truth knows no such antecedent preferences. Having fixed his belief immutably upon that which alone is immutable, he can afford to survey the subsequent historical developments of Christianity with an interest deep indeed but unbiassed.



God over all, and Events His ministers, he sees ; and he sees both *universally*. Circumstances, under God's high Providence, have moulded the religious history of the East ; circumstances have, under the same presiding Providence, formed the history of the West ; circumstances, under a Providence still more auspicious and benign, have secured her purer Catholicity to an empire nobler than either includes. Greece, Rome, England, in inherent authority all perfectly on a level, by a Common Standard equally and immeasurably above them all, shall all three be one day tried !

I feel that these disquisitions make a somewhat disproportionate demand upon your limited space. You would pardon me if you knew how much I purposely omit in order to abridge them. In selecting only what seem to me the simplest and most obvious illustrations of the hollowness of this system, I am at the same time well aware that I must be traversing ground familiar to its Author, and stating objections his sagacity cannot but have anticipated. Yet even he will excuse the critic who undertakes the humble task of directing public attention to difficulties for which, however manifest they be, it is quite certain he has no where in this Volume provided the solution. The fervour of his attachment to the religious system to whose support this theory is dedicated may be such as to have consumed all these obstacles in its blaze ; Faith glories in such sacrifices ; and since it could not make any other terms with the Reason than these (for certainly this theory *excludes* all the ordinary and received Roman systems), may have been resolved to take the Tridentine Creed even on this precarious hypothesis rather



than not at all. Faith, however, will not constitute argument, though it may supply the want of it; and those who have still command enough of their faculties to consider Romanism matter of reasoning, may be allowed to express their deliberate conviction that there is no solution for the palpable difficulties of this new scheme of the Christian Revelation, except such as will be found to involve additional assumptions as arbitrary as the old, and thus to complicate improbabilities instead of removing them.

This may perhaps appear more evident in the observations I hope to present in your next Number.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.

## LETTER V.

DEAR SIR,

I have spoken of the obvious applications which open in all, even the most opposite, directions, for those who adopt the hypothesis of a Developing energy perpetually moulding the original principles of Christianity into new forms of doctrine. The religion of the New Testament, thus regarded as not so much a body of definite doctrine as a prolific "Idea," is of course equally visible in *all* the diversified products of that Idea ; it becomes a Genus branching into many Species, a Species capable of many Varieties ; manifesting itself under endless modifications, even as the physiologist beholds a single fundamental Type governing all the manifold organisms in each division of the animal and vegetable Kingdoms. It thus becomes difficult to determine when the type begins to be *lost*, what degree of aberration will constitute a total departure from the Ideal of Christianity ; and it is a negation of the essential spirit and principle of the theory to affect to apply any rigorous test for discriminating among all the possible results of Christian teaching upon human minds. He who honestly accepts this theory of Reve-

lation, must feel that every such limitation is not only arbitrary, but contradictory ; to say that *only one* element, or group of elements, in Christianity, shall develop, is in substance to retract the principle of Development itself ; to say that *only one* selected age and locality of Christianity shall exhibit the true unfolded Idea, is to deny the Idea any true unfolding power. It will not do to lay your foundation with the Sceptic, and build your superstructure with the Romanist ! For the former, the religion “ *must* develop in some way ;” and for the latter, “ it *did* develop in this.” Absurd and unwarrantable restriction ! Why not develop “ some *ways*” as well as some *way* ? Why affirm that it did develop in this alone, when we all know it has in fact developed in twenty others ? How has the development of one century or one latitude, *merely as such*, the slightest internal prerogative over any other, past, present, or to come ? If Christianity be by divine promise everlasting and universal, and if this imaginary Development be the inseparable token of life, what antecedent prohibition is producible, which shall strike with sterility that Christianity, in one period or nation, whose pregnant womb is teeming with new and multiplied and unexpected births in another ? And then, to judge by their application, how sure, irrefragable, and instantaneous must be those “ tests,” how satisfactory a security for Christian Faith, which in this universal competition of developments, are brought to discriminate between the legitimate offspring and the spurious : how confidently an inquirer can rest his salvation upon the unerring accuracy and easy application of the philosophical “ test” that at once pronounces the



devotion of heart and soul to St. Mary, though unknown for centuries, to have been manifestly involved in the original Christian religion, and (for example) the Anglican Article on Justification to have been as manifestly excluded as a palpable heresy! How safe a position for a Christian to occupy, to have the "test" that does *this* the only barrier between him and infidelity!

I have been, even within my own limited studies, too habituated to observe that, if men are often inferior, they are also sometimes very much superior to their own theories, to desire or presume to intrude any inferences whatever from the contents of this volume as to Mr. Newman's own mental history; but, assuredly, this whole system might well be the system of a man whose Intellect was diseased with a radical tendency to Scepticism, while his better Heart owned the nobler necessity of Belief. However this may be, it is certain the system will never remain where he has placed it. He has brought, under Roman colours, the Rationalism of Germany among us; and though *he* may have forced the uncouth monster to labour at the Roman oar, he may rely there are those in England who will not be long in teaching the slave the secret of his strength, and the folly of his unnatural bondage. How it has come to pass that he has preferred to devote the rationalistic principles of his book to the exclusive service of Romanism, is doubtless to be traced to circumstantial influences distinct from mere argument, of which, as so often happens, he is probably himself altogether unconscious. Perhaps strong imaginative impressions, —or exclusive habits of Roman theological reading,

which would naturally make Rome and its affairs at last occupy the whole field of vision,—or that quick sense of the imperfections a man sees, which is so often united to the most delusive credulity as to the imagined perfections he does not see,—or again, the apparent symmetry and completeness of the Roman theory (so like the artificial work of man, so unlike the vast half-seen dispensations of God),—or, above all, that very weariness of a mind overwrought, which unfortunately, beyond any other state, makes it at last the easy prey of whatever system talks loudest and will promise most : I say that *some* extrinsic influences of this kind (without venturing more than the humblest conjecture as to their possible nature) must have directed and controlled the current of his thoughts, because he has manifestly not given to his principles their natural and unconstrained development. The natural result of the theory of the perpetual evolution of new doctrine under new circumstances, is unquestionably,—in *quiet* tempers, an easy latitudinarianism, welcoming all forms of the Christian, and almost of any other, religion as alike acceptable to God, whose repose is in the meagreness of its belief, settled in their very unsettledness ;—in more *ardent* and energetic dispositions, a doctrine of the perpetual expansion and intended progressiveness of Christianity, such as has so long been fashionable in Germany. But to attempt on such a principle to vindicate a system which equally excludes *both* these conceptions of Christianity,—which fortifies itself against the former with a rampart of exclusive anathemas and all the apparatus of a theology that affects to leave nothing undefined—which, in the face of the latter, invokes the



Past (or what it thinks to be the Past) as its sole authority and absolute model of perfection, is an undertaking which really seems likely to prove little but the very undecided state of the mind that conceived it, and the pressing difficulties of a cause for which a Heart altogether devoted to its service could only extort from its subservient Intellect this strange contradictory justification.

I. It happens that the literature of Philosophy has for many years back abounded with a species of disquisitions which, as they may remotely have occasioned the rise of such a theory of Christianity as this, so also present the most vivid and varied exemplifications of its inherent uncertainty and danger. I allude to that multitude of elaborate treatises with which the German press—and, of later years, the French—has enriched the learned world on the History of *Speculative Philosophy*. The explorers of this interesting though intricate region of inquiry, make it of course their object to detect as far as possible the leading Ideas in the original conception of each system, and to trace the modification of these ideas in the subsequent fortunes of the School. This is a perfectly legitimate subject of investigation ; and even when the positive results are scanty or doubtful, it enjoys the advantage which happily belongs to all elevating studies, that in them the mere search is often more truly beneficial than palpable success in other inquiries. Nor indeed is this consolation superfluous ; for in truth these innumerable theorists of the history of Speculation seldom do coincide, except in fixing the most general features of the different systems ; and many seem hardly to disguise their



belief that it is vain to think of tracing the perpetuity of any one fundamental Idea in almost any succession, —nay in almost any individual, though his entire remains—of the ancient teachers. The causes of this discrepancy in results are obvious enough. 1. The original Idea or Ideas (supposing we can detect them), were usually very *vague and undefined*. 2. The subsequent teachers in the school being thus under the control not of a definite, unalterable scheme of doctrine, but of these indefinite generalities, did *themselves alter* the doctrine they inherited, and that in direct proportion to their individual ability; so that it at last arrived at forms more or less irreconcilable with its first beginnings. 3. The very same writers sometimes appear to have themselves embraced *inconsistent* views, which give room for opposite theories as to their real opinions. 4. In some cases *different schools arose out of one* comprehensive teacher; some of these being at first nearly eclipsed by their companions, and not till long after fully asserting their place. 5. While it is not the least of these sources of variance, that the *modern* explorers themselves do constantly, whether unconsciously or purposely, modify the old records so as to enlist them in the support of their own modern views.—These causes will operate in varying degrees; but it is evident that the main ground, both of the variation of the doctrines, and of the difficulty of reducing them to any precise or uniform law of progress, will ever be the first I have named,—the fact that the Founder delivered to his pupils not any distinct scheme of unalterable doctrines (whenever he did pretend to do so the pretence being a failure, for the doctrines,

being really unproved, remained *essentially* alterable), but a body of undefined though active and energetic "Ideas." In other words, the reason why the elder philosophical schools were ever in fluctuation, and the determination of their fundamental principles remains to this day obscure and contested, was just because the original teaching and the subsequent growth *were conducted on the very principles which* the present author would persuade the world were those that regulated the revelation and history of Christian Doctrine<sup>a</sup>. As the Ionics had their single Physical Elements, and the Eleatics their principle of Unity, and the Pythagoreans their Principle of divine Numbers, so Christianity has its analogous fundamental Ideas and developable Principles, as undefined in their import, as progressive in their evolution. The Revelation was really (according to this system) a revelation of Ideas and Principles, *exemplified* in some chosen instances, which mere in-

<sup>a</sup> It is thus that Mr. Newman adopts the very dialect of philosophical speculation when speaking of the variations of Christian Doctrine. "On the subject of Purgatory, there were, to speak generally, *two schools of opinion*."—p. 18. "Two schools of opinion!" on a doctrine which is "the necessary complement of Baptism;" among canonized Saints and under the direct superintendence of an infallible authority, which is argued to exist at all solely *because* rival claims to development need to be decided, pp. 14, 131); "two schools of opinion," "*one of which resembled the present doctrine of the Roman Church*," on a question about which the same author believes that no man can entertain a doubt and be saved; on a doctrine which he argues (p. 423) to be indispensable to produce heroic endurance, though martyrs and confessors, it seems, could win eternal crowns by thousands without any distinct belief, say rather, in the vast majority of cases, undoubtedly without any belief at all about it!



stances the Christian Church was for ages dull enough to mistake for the Revelation itself; the truth being (as now at last has been fortunately discovered) that the Doctrines of the Creed were merely a sort of exhibition, in the way of *sample*, of the vast unfathomable “Ideas” that lay hidden behind them; a kind of temporary parables embodying the Ideas in an emphatic tangible form, until the time should come that men would find their way to the abstract Maxims themselves, and thence fetch new doctrines at their pleasure. It is like the transition from Arithmetic to Algebra; from single cases to theorems and formulas in theology. Thus,—to apply this to one or two instances,—we are henceforth to understand, that the original Revelation was *not* (except in the way of exemplification), “the dead shall rise,” but “there is a great sanctity about human bodies; and thus, as it is one of the leading exhibitions of the Principle, that the dead shall rise, so likewise every thing else shall be *equally* true that shall anywise appear to illustrate the sanctity of bodies, and be, by whatever means, connected with that Principle.” Or again, the real Revelation was *not* “Baptize,” or “Do this in remembrance,” but, “It is a principle of the Gospel to adopt ritual observances with spiritual significations and effects: therefore all manner of observances shall in virtue of this law be obligatory in the highest sense of Sacraments, whenever the Church shall appoint them; Baptism and the Eucharist being for the present given as striking specimens of this future process.” Or once more, the Revelation was not at all the simple and limited *fact* that the Holy Ghost shall dwell in the followers of Christ, but the “Principle”



of Divine Presences at large and in the abstract; inso-much that every possible aspect of a Divine Presence, and every conceivable consequence of that Presence in all its senses, even unto the divinizing of its subject, and the consequent right to religious worship, is therein included quite as really and as certainly, as the fact above noted, though (by some accident) that alone and its immediate accompaniments happen to be selected for special notice in Scripture. In short, the Revelation *itself* is contained in no existing Creed; the first approach to a *summary* of it is probably to be found in a work of the Nineteenth Century on the Development of Christian Doctrine; though scattered fragments of the original Teaching may, by persevering explorers, be here and there caught among the folios of the schoolmen. The Revelation itself was the declaration of a number of abstract principles of religion, some important *cases* of which constitute the Apostles' Creed; the doctrines of that Creed being only a few of the earlier growths of the "Idea" of Christianity, paradigms (as in Grammar or Arithmetic), by which the master would show his pupils how to work out new doctrines to an indefinite extent for themselves.

The reader may start at this, which I assure him I sincerely present as the import (so far as I can comprehend it) of the first half of the volume before me. But let him be tranquil: he is *not* among the *Lichtfreunde*, he is not perusing Hegel or Strauss. It is the leading Divine of the Roman Communion in England, the recognised champion and apologist of the whole group of its converts, who, with the strict and solemn anathemas of the Council of Trent in one hand, is with

the other sketching the outlines of a theory which deprives Christianity of a Creed, in order to elevate it to the dignity of a Philosophy. If the Apostles truly understood all Christianity, this, according to the new system, *must* have been the form in which they received it ; for this—a body of abstract Principles and of Doctrines expressly given as exemplifying others to come—alone, on that system, *is* complete Christianity. While, on the other hand, if they only knew the doctrines their records express, and their disciples inherited,—nay, even if they knew the general fact that other most important doctrines were to come, but had no distinct conception of those doctrines,—they then unquestionably did *not* know all Christianity, and they wrote what was untrue when they asserted or implied that they did.

I have already observed (Letter II.) how cautiously indeterminate are Mr. Newman's positions regarding the knowledge<sup>b</sup> the *Apostles* possessed of such fundamentals of Christianity as the *cultus* of Saints or the rescue of Souls from Purgatory. There is less delicacy required in conjecturing the condition of “the first centuries ;” and the following illustration helps us to estimate *their* unenviable state of perplexity :

“ The instance of Conscience, which has already served us in illustration, may assist us here. What Conscience is in the history of an individual mind, such was the dogmatic principle in the history of Christianity. Both in the one case and the other there is the gradual formation of a directing power out of a prin-

<sup>b</sup> [Vid. *supra*, pp. 73, 74.]

ciple. The natural voice of Conscience is far more imperative in testifying and enforcing a rule of duty, than successful in determining that duty in particular cases. It acts as a messenger from above, and says that there is a right and a wrong, and that the right must be followed ; but it is variously, and therefore erroneously, trained in the instance of various persons. It mistakes error for truth ; and yet we believe that, on the whole, and even in those cases where it is ill-instructed, if its voice be diligently obeyed, it will gradually be cleared, simplified, and perfected ; so that minds starting differently will, if honest, in course of time converge to one and the same truth. I would not imply that there is indistinctness *so great* as this in the knowledge of the first centuries," &c.—p. 348.

The indistinctness was not "*so great*," it seems ; but, if the "illustration" is to illustrate, the cases must have borne a general resemblance. We are therefore to conceive that the first centuries—of course avowed heretics are not now in question—had a sort of rule which taught them that there was "*a* right and a wrong" in religious belief, but gave them comparatively feeble light as to what was *the* right and the wrong ; they were more or less variously, and therefore more or less erroneously, trained ; they mistook error for truth (in whatever *degree*, which is in this place left undecided), but happily they could look forward (as honest ignorant men can do in matters of Duty), to some future period, when "in course of time," their descendants—at Lateran, at Florence, at Trent, as it might be—would in all probability eventually converge to some one and the same truth, whatever that truth might prove to be.



Thus the possessors of Revealed Religion, expressly given to supply the deficiencies and infirmities of Natural Reason and Conscience, remained in just the same position (or one closely analogous to it) as those who have Natural Reason and Conscience alone to guide them.

II. But of all the obvious objections to this theory, which I have already enumerated—above all, of the manifest facility with which (by simply detaching the one hypothesis of Roman infallibility, no more demonstrated in this volume than in any other it has been my fortune to see) it lends itself to the purposes of any school of theology indifferently, I cannot imagine the penetrating understanding of its author not to have been through the whole course of his work abundantly aware. Doubtless he has set aside all such intrusive suggestions with the general reply, that upon these low grounds of mere intellectual disputation, the question between all rival schemes is in some respects a choice of logical difficulties, and we must only select the *optimus qui minimis urgetur*. He will hardly deny that there *are* some difficulties in a theory which only one unproved assumption rescues from extravagant latitudinarianism,—a theory which can scarcely be said to be abused, rather *used* in its most obvious and natural application, when employed to sustain *any* variety of successive or even collateral forms of Christian Doctrine; but he will probably reply that *greater* difficulties will be found to attach to the ordinary views of the history of dogmatic theology, whether Roman or Anglican. Between the Roman theory (of perpetual tradition for all the disputed peculiarities) and Mr. New-

man's refutation of it, I shall not now undertake to decide ; but as regards what I presume to be the most usual way of conceiving the matter among English theologians, I would venture to sketch (I can at present *only* sketch) its outlines as follows ; and I confess I perceive nothing inconsistent or contradictory in its elements, and no uncertainty in its grounds, beyond that which belongs to every thing alike which rests on a basis, however firm, of moral probabilities,—an uncertainty (if it is to be called such) which no theory ever yet proposed (Roman or any other) has in any degree succeeded in showing us how to escape. I begin, then, by saying,—

1. The Apostles *knew* all doctrine at any time necessary for man's belief, growth in holiness, and ultimate salvation. And,

2. They *communicated* all that doctrine.

These are affirmations grounded on the express declarations of our Lord and the Apostles themselves ; to which, as I formerly drew attention, I need not now recur. The apostolic *knowledge*<sup>c</sup>, indeed, will hardly be *directly* denied. But to the delivery of it they themselves as distinctly testify<sup>d</sup>. Indeed, from the very

<sup>c</sup> [For an argument similar to that in the text respecting the Apostolic knowledge, see Taylor's *Dissuasive*, p. 279. Ed. Cardwell.]

<sup>d</sup> “Solent dicere (hæretici), Non omnia Apostolos *scisse* ; eâdem agitati dementiâ, qua rursus convertunt, Omnia quidem Apostolos *scisse*, sed non omnia omnibus *tradidisse* : in utroque Christum reprehensioni injicientes [subjicientes,—G.] qui aut minus instructos, aut parum simplices Apostolos miserit.”—*Tertull. De Præscript. [Hæret.]* Cap. xxii. He confutes these heretics by abundant scriptural proof. See also Cap. xxv. xxvi. xxvii. Compare Iren. III. iii. v. [See *Tertull. i.* 455. Oxf. trans. *Library of the Fathers*, x. 1842.—G.]

nature of the case, when we remember the abundant *time* the Apostles had for training and indoctrinating their disciples (from the Pentecost following the Ascension to the death of St. John),—the growth, sufficiently intimated, of many of these disciples in the discernment of spiritual mysteries, and the plain unquestionable manner in which they are all declared to be instructed in every thing necessary for the attainment of consummate glory,—the lofty and profound character of many of the Apostles' own writings (such as the Gospel and Revelation of St. John, the Epistle to the Ephesians, and to the Hebrews, and part of that to the Romans, &c.) we can scarcely doubt that it was not their intention to “keep back” anything that could be “profitable” to any class of their disciples. To which is to be added the important consideration,—that no *announcement* whatever is made of this momentous power of authorizing new doctrines, as distinct from the power (which we fully concede to be inherent in the very function of instruction) of reasoning out inferences, or exhibiting harmonies and contrasts of doctrine, by the ordinary use of the understanding; but, on the contrary, very manifest exclusions of any such subsequent revelations<sup>e</sup>.

<sup>e</sup> It is remarkable enough, that in 1 Cor. xiii. within the compass of a few verses, the cessation of supernatural inspiration is expressly predicted (prophecies shall fail, tongues shall cease, and knowledge vanish), and the *next* great accession of spiritual enlightenment distinctly referred to the *future world*. So in Ephes. i. 14, the promised Spirit then possessed was an earnest *until* “the redemption of the purchased possession;” no intervening stage of extraordinary spirituality or illumination foretokened. The same eager anticipation of the heavenly world as the true scene of the



Indeed, if any one were to take the trouble of reflecting calmly on the account given by the Apostles themselves of the state of spiritual attainment which the Christians they taught and exhorted had actually reached, and the further degree to which they ardently urged them to aspire as their proper privilege, as the natural result which the teaching they received was perfectly adequate, under divine blessing, to accomplish—he would be somewhat puzzled to determine what *more* the successors of these first believers could have fairly expected, either of doctrine to enlighten, or of holiness to sanctify. To convey this in the full measure of its irresistible force against the speculation I am combating, would require the transcription of a large proportion of the New Testament. Fortunately, it is a topic on which, above all others, I rejoice to think I can trust to the memory of most of my readers. I request them then to conceive Christianity maintained to have been a merely germinant Idea, or even a formal body of explicit doctrine, but only in its earliest stage of growth, among men characterized, as they cannot fail to remember the Saints of the first Churches were characterized by their inspired teachers; among men described as, in virtue of their justification, enjoying complete “peace with God,” “rejoicing in hope of His glory,” and glorying even in their “tribulations;” living “in the Spirit,” and by the Spirit “witnessed” to be “the children of God and joint-heirs with Christ;” being enfranchised by “the law of the Spirit of Life,”

development of the doctrine of faith into the fulness of immediate knowledge, is seen in 2 Cor. v. 2-7, 1 John, iii. 2, &c.

“more than conquerors,” and inseparable from the love of God in Christ ; “perfecting holiness ;” free citizens of a “kingdom which is righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost ;” so that “*all* things were their’s, and they Christ’s,” even as “Christ was God’s ;” “new creatures in Christ,” “crucified and risen with Christ,” and already, even on earth, “set in heavenly places with Him,” and enjoying a life “hid with Christ in God ;”—in short “*complete* in Christ :” “rejoicing with joy unspeakable and full of glory, receiving *the end of their faith*, even the salvation of their souls ;” “walking in the *Light*, even as God Himself is in the light ;” and so having “the love of God” in them “*perfected*,” inso-much that they “*could not sin* ;” “dwelling in God, and God in them.” And all these wonderful attainments traced directly to the power of the *teaching they had already received* ; they were thus “established *according to my gospel* and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery kept secret since the world began, but *now* made manifest ;” they had “heard the *word of truth*, the Gospel of their salvation ;” they had “received the *word of God*, which effectually *worked* in them ;” they had been “chosen to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and *belief of the truth*, to the obtaining of the glory of Christ,” on which account (“therefore”) they are in the immediate context besought to hold fast “the traditions they *had been taught* ;”—they were “enriched in all utterance and coming behind in no gift,” having “Christ made unto them *wisdom* ;” and so, “righteousness and sanctification and redemption ;” “*beholding with open face, as in a glass*, the glory of the Lord, and changed into the



same image ;” “blessed with *all* spiritual blessings” from God, Who “had *abounded* towards them in *all* wisdom and prudence, having made known unto them the mystery of His Will”—that “*now* unto the heavenly powers might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God ;” “taught in *all* wisdom,” and as “spiritual, judging all things,” “having received the Spirit of God, that *they might know* the things freely given to them of God,” insomuch that “they *needed not* that any man should *teach* them :” having received “*all* things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the *knowledge* of Him who had called them ;” having received “great and precious promises,” of such power that by them they were already capacitated to enjoy the greatest blessing conceivable to the thought or utterable by the language of man, even that of being “partakers of the Divine nature ;”—the old fathers waiting to be “made perfect” with *them* ; the prophets “propheying of the grace that came unto *them*, and ministering not unto themselves but unto them the very things *now* reported unto them by the preachers of the Gospel ;” the Apostolic Revelation being the great central Light of the last days to which the prophets looked forward as we look back ; already it was “*the Faith*,” “*the Truth*,” “*the Gospel*,” “*the Word*”—one, distinct, exclusive, complete. And when in the secrecy of prayer—the ineffable communion of such a spirit as Paul’s with his God—the great Apostle besought on behalf of the Church the gift of more and yet more of light and love, was it to some dim and shadowy *future* he pointed his glance, when that which was now but indistinctly known might be fully disclosed to the maturer saints



of ages to come? Not so; his prayer—surely the sublimest supplication that ever broke from human lips—was, “that YE, being rooted and grounded in love, may be able *to comprehend* with *all* saints, what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height; and to know the love of Christ, which passeth knowledge, THAT YE MIGHT BE FILLED WITH ALL THE FULNESS OF GOD!”

3. Whatever was essential to be known for man’s belief and salvation in respect of any particular doctrine (as, for instance, in the doctrine afterwards fitly named the Trinity<sup>f</sup>), was therefore undoubtedly delivered by the Apostles and received by their disciples. No *speculative* difficulties whatsoever, no difficulties

<sup>f</sup> I do not for a moment mean to insinuate that any real portion of that doctrine is non-essential; but it is, I conceive, our duty to distinguish between those elements which *are* really necessary to constitute the doctrine, and certain illustrations and inferences connected with the essential mystery itself, which, even though profoundly interesting, and authorized by eminent fathers, do not appear absolutely necessary to a *sufficient* conception of the doctrine.

Mr. Newman evidently regards the doctrine of the Trinity as a distant vision *towards which* the Church was slowly struggling for centuries; a heresy being sure to arise whenever (one would think a pardonable ambition!) she became too precipitate in her anxiety to attain to necessary and fundamental truth. “The efforts of Sabellius *to complete* the mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity failed; it *became a heresy*,” &c. (p. 352). Now in order to settle this point, is it unfair to request Mr. Newman, instead of thus clouding a most important question in vague phraseology, to propose to himself, and then state to others explicitly, and with the necessary proofs, *of what precise element of the doctrine* he considers a disciple of St. Paul or St. John was ignorant (not to raise the painful question about St. Paul and St. John themselves)? Let him speak out plainly. Was it the Unity of God? Was it the Divinity of Christ? His co-eternity as the Word and Son of God? The Divinity or Perso-

even about the exact amount of scriptural proof for special points, can be allowed in the least to disturb

nality of the Holy Ghost? Let him tell us this distinctly; people will then know his real opinions, and how to meet them.

Meanwhile it may be useful to observe, with a view to this point—that no one professes to maintain that the disciples of St. John habitually used such *words* as “hypostatic,” “consubstantiality,” &c.—what proportion of the whole multitude of perfectly orthodox believers on earth, even at *this* hour, habitually use them, or have ever used them? It may be further admitted, that when a doctrine has come to be *intellectually* analyzed and measured, certain relations may be seen to be involved in it, the distinct expression of which may become thenceforth useful and even necessary; and that until circumstances, usually heresy, have led to this close intellectual survey, these relations, though involved in the existing belief, and logically deducible therefrom, may not occupy a prominent position in the common expositions of the faith. In what precise *degree* this holds in such a statement of the doctrine of the Trinity as the Athanasian Creed, is another question; the *principle* is exemplified in every stage of the history of theology. Those—not even to investigate their expressed dogmatic belief—who were taught to equally *worship* the mysterious Three into Whose single Divine Name they had been baptized,—to look on them habitually as Protecting Powers equally because infinitely above them, separate in their special titles, offices, and agency, and so a real Three, yet One (as the very act of supreme Worship implied) in the One Godhead,—would probably see little in even that elaborate Creed beyond the careful intellectual exhibition of the truths necessarily involved in that Worship. They would easily see that to *contradict* explicitly any proposition of that Creed would be directly or indirectly to deny the faith; while at the same time they may have held, as the infinite majority of the Christian world have since held, the pure faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, without perpetually retaining a distinct explicit recollection of all the separate propositions that Creed contains. In fact, may we not be justified in saying, that that admirable Symbol—itsself among the most precious documents in the archives of the Church—is in its very nature ad-



the certainty of this proposition, expressed or implied as it is in every page of the apostolic writings. And

dressed to a class whose intellectual powers are cultivated? It is, in truth, only such who can understand the very import of several of its terms. This does not make it either less true in itself, or less necessary for those in view of whose mental needs it exists; but surely such a consideration implies this at least, that *whatever* it added to the original belief was not absolutely but *relatively* necessary; in short, that that creed gives us, as it were, the intellectual *edition* of the doctrine held from the beginning—the doctrine expressed (as mathematicians say) “in *terms* of” the pure intellect.

It would probably illustrate this process if any one were to reflect upon the quantity of minute and refined thought, and the extreme accuracy of expression, required to fix and secure, so as at once to discriminate them from all rival hypotheses, some of those elementary and fundamental notions of *simple Theism*, which yet no one doubts to be *the real belief*, not merely of all classes of Christians, but of the greater portion of the civilized world. For example, to fix the precise and formal notion of Creation out of Nothing (so as to distinguish it absolutely from, e. g., the hypothesis of Emanation); to state the precise relation of the Divine Power to the Divine Rectitude,—such, that the *Almighty* God *can* never do but what is right; to deliver with an accuracy liable to no evasion the exact relation of the Divine Omnipotence and Goodness to the existence of Moral Evil, &c. On all such subjects every ordinary Christian has a sufficiently decisive practical belief, a belief which would at once be shocked by any express assertion of its contradictory: he tells you, “God made all things from nothing;” “God can never do wrong;” “God makes no man sin, it is the Devil who tempts him, it is man’s own corrupt choice to do evil:” and yet it is easy to conceive how very different an aspect these simple but profound truths would assume in an *Athanasian Creed* of Theism; how novel might *appear* doctrines, before almost too universally recognised to be laboriously insisted on, if it became necessary to exhibit them guarded at all points against the subtlety of some Arius or Sabellius of *Natural Theology*.

I need not add, that the same general principle (of the distinction



therefore whatever *errors* are alleged [a disputed matter of fact, into which I do not now enter at<sup>s</sup> all] to occur in extant remains of Ante-Nicene Teachers, *either* did not affect necessary doctrine on the Divine Nature, *or* was a departure from the apostolic Teaching and the previous belief of the Church, for which those Teachers alone are answerable. And further (as insisted on below), if the alleged errors did affect necessary doctrine (or indeed if they were errors of any

between the belief of truths and the accurate and scientific statement of them against all direct and *indirect* impugners,) applies to all the maxims of the practical life. A perfect system of ethical principles would be the Athanasian Creed of that *common morality* which every good man already acknowledges and exemplifies.

<sup>s</sup> It must be remembered (so far as the matter of fact is concerned), that on this point Mr. Newman differs from, with a few remarkable exceptions, the divines reputed soundest in his own communion as well as in our's, and in substance agrees with the Arians; between whose judgment of the Ante-Nicene Fathers and that of Mr. Newman there appears no material difference, except that the latter carefully prefixes the title Saint before the Teachers whose dangerous errors he exposes, and adds a solemn disavowal of any imputation that they *meant* the heresies he cites them as *expressing*.

In a question of Criticism, which must stand on its own merits, it would be unfair to prejudge the case from its supporters; it is not unfair, however, but both just and important, to direct attention, to this instance among many, of the unfortunate tendency of Roman Controversy, which makes it, in every step *but its last*, exert all the powers of reasoning and erudition to do the work of either absolute Infidelity or of the more qualified unbelief of the Arian or Socinian. Every one knows that the work of the Roman Divine whose views Mr. Newman here adopts, has been, ever since its appearance, the arsenal of Arian polemics; and there is no reason to doubt that his own volume will in due time share the honour. Can he really

importance in any view), their existence uncorrected for so protracted a period is absolutely fatal to the Roman theory of Infallibility, unless on the supposition that the infallible Spirit never instructs except by Universal Councils, a supposition which would involve the Roman Church in hopeless embarrassment,—implying, for example, that Transubstantiation and Purgatory were mere current conjectures, destitute of all divine sanction, until the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. I observe,—

imagine that, so far as his statements have any effect at all, the majority of his readers will not rise from them *rather* persuaded that the Doctrine of the Trinity is either non-essential or altogether post-scriptural, than induced to become Romanists in order to believe it? Indeed, unless strangely short-sighted, they will see that the latter course would be far the more illogical of the two; they will conclude (what Mr. Newman altogether evades), that such error and such uncertainty, for *three hundred* long and important years of the Church—error and uncertainty which were at last (if even then) terminated, not by any spontaneous act of the Church itself—its only great act of that kind (at Antioch) was, it seems, a blunder, p. 13—but by the incidental excitement of a particular heresy arousing the incidental interference of a Civil Sovereign, who required a Council to be held to restore unanimity—that such facts as these are utterly incompatible with the Roman doctrine of *absolute and perpetual* infallible guidance! And this is, of course, the true reason why the Roman theologians in general have shrunk from adopting the desperate and self-destructive tactics of Petavius and his followers.

It is perhaps worth adding here, with regard to Petavius, that Nelson tells us (“Letters to a P. Priest”), Bossuet had informed him that Petavius altered and retracted before his death. Nelson even speaks of some “edition” in which this was done. Among the multitude of Roman defences of the Ante-Nicene orthodoxy, the reader may be referred to the ardent vindication of Le Nourry; *Apparât. ad Biblioth. Max. PP.* [Paris. 1703.—G.]



4. That the function of the early Councils<sup>h</sup> was, however, a very important one—namely, to *define received* doctrine, to *elucidate obscured* doctrine, to *condemn false* doctrine. But it was *not* to *reveal*<sup>i</sup> *new* doctrine. This is established: From the very *object and occasion* of their doctrinal definitions, the suppression of a heresy, which presupposes an *anterior* truth departed from, and requiring to be *restated*. 2. From their own express declarations, in which they allege (and, if infallible, cannot have falsely alleged) their objects to be exclusively as above, and distinctly, in their very condemnation of all novelties as false, disavow any mysterious faculty of evolving truths substantially new. 3. From the entire tenor of their proceedings, and the arguments on which their conclusions wholly rest, which are always the Written Word, and the continuous Belief of the Churches; both of them available only to fix doctrine already revealed, or

<sup>h</sup> [For a similar view of the functions of the early Councils, see Bishop Taylor's *Diss.*, p. 270, *et seqq.*; Archbishop Laud *Against Fisher*, pp. 25, 26. (Oxf. 1839); Leslie, *Works*, Vol. iii. p. 248. (Oxf. 1832); and for a statement of the manner in which the primitive Creed may legitimately be enlarged, not to declare new *credenda*, but to guard the essentials of the Faith against the perversions of heretics, see Waterland, *Works*, Vol. iii. p. 254, *et seqq.* See also S. Athanasius, *Treatises against Arianism*. Oxford Trans. pp. 80, 81.]

<sup>i</sup> [Thus S. Athanasius, speaking of the Nicene Fathers: "About the Faith they wrote not, 'it seemed good as follows,' but 'thus believes the Catholic Church;' and thereupon they confessed how the Faith lay, in order to show that their own sentiments were not novel but Apostolical; and what they wrote down was no discovery of their's, but is the same as was taught by the Apostles."—*Treatises against Arianism*. Oxf. Trans. p. 80.]



to ground logical inferences therefrom, so far as might seem expedient ; but neither of them capable of being thus made *the entire and exclusive sources of evidence* to a Council met to receive and issue new revelations.

Thus, the FIRST, the Council of Nice, declares (*Epist. Synod.*) [*Concill. Gen. i. 31–2. Romæ, 1608.—G.*] that it has “anathematized all these tenets [of Arius], not enduring *so much as to listen* to such impious sentiments, and such madness, and such blasphemous sayings ;” a tolerably clear intimation of the instantaneous perception of its error with which the Bishops met the new heresy<sup>k</sup>. And when deciding a dispute about

<sup>k</sup> I cannot here in fairness omit an argument of Mr. Newman’s, whose force, as I am sincerely perplexed to determine even its meaning, I must leave to some more sagacious reader fully to appreciate. “It is plain,” he says (p. 344), “that what the Christians of the first ages anathematized, included deductions from the Articles of Faith, that is, developments, as well as those Articles themselves. For since the reason they commonly gave for using the anathema was that the doctrine in question was strange and startling, *it follows that the truth which was its contradictory had also been unknown to them hitherto* ; which is also shown by their temporary perplexity, &c.” Probably there are few things which would “startle” us more than to hear a preacher from his pulpit gravely lay down and argue the proposition that there is no God ; how triumphant, according to this principle (if I indeed understand it), would be his rejoinder, that the very intensity of our shock proved the depth of our Atheism, demonstrating clearly that the being of a God was “unknown to us hitherto !”

The ignorance imputed to the orthodox in these loose, incautious words, would, of course, apply only to the case of some very remote and curious deduction ; but as *such* an error is the very last that could be described as peculiarly “startling,” I am still somewhat puzzled to harmonize Mr. Newman’s meaning. This uncertainty is increased by the fact that the expressions apparently cited to prove

ecclesiastical prerogative in a Canon<sup>1</sup>, which has since indirectly become of much controversial importance, they lay down, as every one will remember, their memorable maxim, which I presume it will hardly be said was *more* applicable to a question of discipline than to a fundamental of the Faith,—“Let the *ancient customs* be maintained.” Of the Creed of Nice and the subsequent completion at Constantinople, it has been shown, that *every single* expression is contained either in previous Creeds, or in other authentic records, antecedent to the Council<sup>m</sup>; the *homo-ousios* itself was a term in received use, and other phrases fully equivalent to it are easily adducible.

The SECOND, the Council of Constantinople, declares<sup>n</sup>, in reporting its proceedings to the Emperor, (*Epist. Synod.*) that it has “pronounced some short definitions *ratifying the faith of the Nicene Fathers*, and anathematizing the heretics who have sprung up contrary to it;” and in its Canons pronounces, that “the faith of the three hundred and eighteen Fathers assembled at Nicæa in Bithynia is not to be made void, but *shall continue established*, and that every heresy shall be anathematized, especially those of the Eunomians, Semiarrians, Sabellians, &c.”—*Canon 1*.

The THIRD, the Council of Ephesus, proclaims

the “perplexity” of the reprovers of the heresies (which indeed alone would be in point), “who ever heard the like?” &c., most distinctly evince that there was no perplexity at all.

<sup>1</sup> [Can. vi.—G.]

<sup>m</sup> The reader may consult a very learned and useful digest of this evidence in the Oxford Translation of Tertullian, p. 490.

<sup>n</sup> [*Concill. Gen.* i. pp. 86, 87.—G.]



(*Canon 7*)°, “that no person shall be allowed to propose, or to write, or to compose, any *other Creed besides that which was settled by the holy Fathers* who were assembled in the city of Nicæa with the Holy Ghost.” And it denounces deposition against any cleric, and anathema against any laic, who shall dare to do so. And, like the Council to which it appeals, it decides the claims of Provinces, by that which “has been heretofore, and *from the beginning*.”—*Canon 8*.

The FOURTH, the Council of Chalcedon, declaring (*Defin. of Faith in Act. v.*) that “our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ confirmed the knowledge of the Faith to His disciples,” but that “something *new* had been invented against the truth,” pronounces that it “*renews the unerring faith of the Fathers*, by publishing to all the Creed of the Three Hundred and Eighteen, and adding to them as of the same family the Fathers who have received the same form of religion, and particularly those Hundred and Fifty who assembled in the great city of Constantinople, and ratified the same Faith.” And it subjoins the remarkable expressions, that “this wise and saving Creed of the Divine Grace *would be sufficient for the full acknowledgment and confirmation of the true religion*; for it teaches *completely the perfect* doctrine concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and fully explains the Incarnation of the Lord to those who endeavoured to make void

° [The first six Canons are decisions contained in a circular Epistle written by the Ephesine Council. (*ubi sup.* p. 499.) What is called the seventh Canon is the *Decretum de Fide*, p. 442; and the eighth, which is found elsewhere, (497.) is a Synodical determination relative to the Bishops of Cyprus.—G.]



the preaching of the truth<sup>p</sup>, some daring to corrupt the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation for us<sup>q</sup>, and refusing to the Virgin the appellation of Theotocos, others bringing in a confusion and mixture, &c.; therefore, the present holy, great, and Œcumenical Synod, wishing to shut out all devices against the truth, and to *teach the doctrine which has been unalterably held from the beginning*, has in the first place decreed *that the faith of the three hundred and eighteen holy Fathers should remain free from assault*. Further, on account of those who in later times have contended against

<sup>p</sup> [As the translation of this passage is not correctly set down, it may be well to give the Latin version from Sirmondus. (ii. 315.) "Sufficeret quidem, ad plenam cognitionem et confirmationem pietatis, hoc sapiens et salutare divinæ gratiæ Symbolum; de Patre enim, et Filio, et Spiritu Sancto perfectionem docet, ac *Domini nostri inhumanationem fideliter accipientibus repræsentat*. Sed quoniam hi qui veritatis reprobare prædicationem conantur, per proprias hæreses novas [vanas] voces genuerunt; alii quidem mysterium *dispensationis* [οἰκονομίας] Domini, quæ propter nos facta est, corrumpere præsumentes . . . . et confirmat doctrinam, quæ de substantia Spiritus Sancti à Patribus centum quinquaginta *postea congregatis* in regia civitate tradita est, propter illos qui Spiritui Sancto repugnabant: quam illi omnibus notam fecerunt, non quasi aliquid deesset prioribus adjicientes, sed suum de Sancto Spiritu intellectum, contra illos qui dominationem Ejus respuere tentaverunt, *Scripturarum testimoniis* declarantes."—G.]

<sup>q</sup> Few of my reasons will require to be reminded how clearly this clause gives the true ground of the controversy about the title *theotocos*, the security, namely, of the single Personality\* of Christ, as against the gross disingenuousness (for they cannot be ignorant

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\* ["Quoniam, ut supra dictum est, jam in ejus sacrato utero sacrosanctum illud mysterium perpetratum est, quod *propter singularem quandam atque unicam Personæ unitatem*, sicut Verbum in carne caro, ita homo in Deo Deus est." (Vincent. Lir. *Advers. Hæres.* fol. 21, a. Conf. fol. 16, b. Paris. 1561.)—G.]

the Holy Spirit, it confirms the doctrine concerning the substance of the Spirit which was delivered by the hundred and fifty holy Fathers who were assembled in the royal city, which they published, *not as adding any thing that was wanting to the things which they had before received*, but declaring by written testimonies their sentiments concerning the Holy Spirit against those who endeavour to destroy His dominion.” And they then proceed to refer to the new heresy immediately before them ; and sanction with their conciliar authority the Letters of Cyril and Leo as orthodox expressions of the truth. Defining their belief<sup>r</sup>, they declare that “*we following the holy Fathers, all with one consent teach men to confess, &c. Even as the Prophets from the beginning have declared concerning Him, and the Lord Jesus Christ Himself hath taught us, and the Creed of the Holy Fathers has delivered to us.*” In their Canons<sup>s</sup> they pronounce that “the Canons which have been issued by the Holy Fathers in each Synod *up to the present time should continue in force.*”—*Canon 1.* And in giving Constantinople equal privileges with Rome, each declared to be exalted simply on the ground of its political posi-

of the real state of the case) of the Roman Controversialists in general. Mr. Newman, in his mysterious way, talks somewhere in his volume of this phrase as being the greatest addition ever made to the Christian belief. What he means I cannot pretend even to conjecture.

<sup>r</sup> [Ut sup. p. 316.—G.]

<sup>s</sup> [*Concill. Gener.* ii. 409, 414.—Canon xxviii. has not been inserted in the *Codex* of Dionysius Exiguus ; (p. 133. Lut. Paris. 1609.) and the fraudulent omission of it was continued by Isidorus Mercator, (*Merlini Conc.* Tom. i. fol. lxxiv. Colon. 1530.) and others. (Bp. Barlow's *Brutum Fulmen*, p. 64. Lond. 1681.)—G.]



tion, they repeat that they "*follow in all things* the decisions of the holy Fathers."—*Canon 28*.

Such are the grounds upon which the first four Œcumenical Councils professed to proceed. The reader will decide whether a modern theologian's opinion of their function, or their own conception of it, has the better claim to acceptance. He will reflect, too, whether if, in incorporating substantially new elements into the body of the Faith (by which I mean elements *as* new in their nature as Purgatory, or Virgin Worship, or the like, which alone will answer the requirements of this argument), they imagined themselves to be only re-stating and defining the Church's primitive belief,—whether *if* they thus palpably misapprehended their own work, and really drew conclusions which confute their own declared principle, their decisions in *any* point of view can continue any longer to be regarded as of moment.

It would be needless to allege citations to the same effect from subsequent Councils; the same general principles will be found decisively avowed in them also; urged indeed with such pertinacity, that even when (as at 2 Nice) an error most perilous and practically debasing to the character of Christian Worship received sanction, it was under the mistaken pretext of *tradition* it was established; and the occasion above all others on which a claim of the prerogative of expounding old doctrine into new revelation would have been, in the manifest default of Scripture warrant, the most convenient and appropriate, happens to be above all others the occasion on which traditional evidence was most strenuously celebrated. Centuries after, in the



Florentine Synod of the Fifteenth Age, the whole question of the legitimacy of additions to the Creed was ardently contested; abundant memorials of the discussions remain; and it is most observable that no approach seems to have been even then made by the acute and able managers of the controversy for the Latin Church, towards hazarding the claim now advanced or insinuated in its behalf.

5. It may nevertheless be fairly anticipated, that the Resolutions of Councils will in *the form and disposition* of the doctrine differ considerably from the arrangements and expressions of Holy Scripture. For, manifestly, the Council's statement of mere Scripture could effect no more than the Scripture itself had effected; and had the Scripture expressions availed to prevent dissension, no Council would have been held at all. And, therefore, it must be the very scope of the Council to express the ancient truth, *not* in the ancient words, but in that special form which shall directly meet the modern error<sup>t</sup>. And it may be added, that, in what-

<sup>t</sup> Which will naturally lead to a *peculiarly*—probably an *unprecedentedly*—*distinct* expression of the orthodox belief on the contested point. And thus the remarkable words of S. Paul (“there must be heresies among you, that they which are *approved* may be *made manifest*,” 1 Cor. ix. 19.) are almost as applicable to the indirect influence of heresy in bringing the received *doctrine*, as in bringing its defenders, into clearer manifestation.

Every one will remember how earnestly St. Athanasius\* assures us that the Nicene Council *desired to use the simple expressions of Scripture*, with simple negations of the Arian forms [τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν, τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογομένας [ὁμολογουμένας—G.] φωνὰς γράψαι,

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\* [Epist. de Decr. Nic. Syn. Opp. i. i. p. 224. edit. Bened.—G.]

ever degree the error is one which rather contradicts *inferences* from Scripture, or from the common Formulary of the Church's belief, than the very words of either ; in the same degree we must expect that the Council, to meet that false inference, shall have to put forth decisions which shall themselves be inferences also, and which therefore will appear still more removed from the *ipsissima verba* of Scripture, or the very and actual phraseology habitual in the Church. Nay, further, it is very possible and natural, when we consider the great amount of reflection devoted to the subject at issue, the earnest anxiety for correctness, and the varied gifts called into action, that a Council should, in the discharge of its office, come, by God's providence, to present Christian Doctrine in new *aspects and relations* of great interest ; even as by the same Divine blessing eminent Teachers in all ages have in their individual labours more or less achieved the same object, and brought the "new" as well as "the old" out of their treasures. It being still understood, that neither did the said Councils, however venerable, ever claim, nor do we concede to them, any absolute authority for such new aspects and relations of old Doctrine, except so far as the same may be justified upon intelligible grounds

κ. τ. λ.] ; but were necessitated [ἡναγκάσθησαν] to use this peculiar test-term [ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας], in order to avoid evasion. It seems the Council was so little aware of its high function of infallibly developing Scripture into new doctrine—of *completing* the mystery of the Trinity" beyond the feeble rudimental conceptions of S. John,—that it considered the Doctrine it declared to require no *positive* expressions but those of Holy Writ ; *negative* expressions must of course be as numerous as the heresies that evoke them.



of deduction from the primitive articles of the Faith, and by the warrant of Holy Scripture<sup>u</sup>.

6. But I think I am justified in adding, that, from the general promise of peculiar favour to all *united* Christian labours, a *farther* special measure of Divine blessing may be reverently anticipated for such Councils (as contrasted with mere individual research), when assembled under just conditions,—for example, as to *occasion*, (when their interposition seems urgently demanded by the conjuncture); as to *impartiality* (when the whole Church is honestly invited, and candidly heard); as to *object*, (the restoration of obscured or imperilled truth); as to *motive*, (when the greater glory of God is disinterestedly sought). And that these characteristics (even should some allowance be required

<sup>u</sup> The office of the rulers of the Christian Church in relation to Doctrine seems to be clearly exhibited in the remarkable passage, Ephes. iv. 11–16. Their objects are to be, the attainment of the Unity in Faith and Knowledge, which is the proper perfection of the Body of Christ,—the measure of the stature of His fulness (verse 13); the protection of the simple from deceptive teaching (ver. 14); and so, the increase of the Body itself edified in love (ver. 15, 16). The passage probably involves reference to a continued ministry (the general *ἔργον διακονίας* of verse 12), from the continuance (*μέχρι*) of the object to be realized; and indeed the very offices specified in verse 11 seem to be in substance perpetuated in the Bishops, eminent Doctors, Missionaries, Parochial Clergy, and School-Instructors of a modern fully organized Church. It is, in this view of the passage, remarkable how purely ministerial and conservative is the dogmatic function here described; “the faith” (emphatically “*the* faith”) and the knowledge are manifestly presupposed; it is the *unity* of doctrine, and the prevention of novelties, and the edifying of the growing Body, which are exhibited as the chief aim of “the stewards of the mysteries of Christ.”



for human infirmity) seem on the whole to belong to the early Councils, and fully justify the respect in which they have ever been held by the universal Church. While the same characters seem grievously lacking in those later assemblies of the Papal obedience, in which (not to speak of *motives*) the *occasion* was often an imaginary necessity ; the *partiality* manifest, a large portion of the Church being wholly unrepresented ; and the *object* (though this indeed was never distinctly avowed, so wholly modern is the new system that assumes it), not the elucidation or recovery of primitive truth, but the establishment of superadded doctrines, and the unjust and tyrannical excommunication of those who questioned them. That, consequently, we cannot, on the same grounds, anticipate any peculiar blessing as attaching to these assemblies.

But even beyond this strong claim to our respect, those who maintain (a question I do not now specially discuss) that the Lord must be understood to have pledged Himself in His promises to the preservation of all necessary doctrine in the Church—all such doctrine as is necessary to the *Being* of the Church—will naturally regard the early Councils as specially under providential control<sup>w</sup> in fixing and confirming it ; and will,

<sup>w</sup> Which yet, it must be carefully remembered, is altogether distinct from infallibility. The *special providential control* here intended, is that which may be properly conceived to guide the steps of any manifest instrument in the hands of God for maintaining or recovering Divine truth—an Athanasius, for example, or an Augustine. A Council is, in this respect, but a sort of *corporate* Athanasius, or Augustine ; meeting in the same unpresumptuous dependence on Divine assistance in which they wrote ; with, of course (as

on this account, give their decisions a measure of consideration to which later Synods can make no pretensions. But in such an inference, it must be still remembered that the Council is presumed to have enjoyed this degree of Divine favour because the doctrine is, on distinct grounds, known to be fundamental and true, not the doctrine known to be either true or fundamental, simply because the Council has so declared it. In order to deduce the latter proposition from the original principle (of the covenanted preservation of all necessary doctrine), the reasoner would be forced to assume

already observed), an additional degree of encouragement in the promise of peculiar blessing to united endeavours, but still an additional *degree* only. It is necessary to insist on this; for the confusion between a just *hope* of God's *special assistance* in the greater matters of a Council, and a gift of *inherent and absolute infallibility* in *all* matters, great and small, is the source of endless fallacies in the Romish controversies about Church authority in matter of Faith; arguments which really conclude for the *probability of the former*, being hastily conceived to make *the latter certain*.

Should a man argue that *so far* as the Church's retention of truth absolutely necessary and fundamental was *really* dependent on the decision of the Council of Nice (a matter fully known to God alone), a holy confidence is justifiable that God would not suffer it to go astray, I have no desire to contest an assertion which comes recommended by many consoling probabilities. But it must be remembered that the same gift of inerrability, under the same limitations, would belong to *any* Divine instrument, whether body or individual, on whom the same tremendous issue was permitted to rest; and that it would require a vision beyond man's to convert this hypothetical confidence into an absolute rule of Faith.

How far divine promises to "the Church" can be considered promises to *Councils* of its prelates, the reader will find very acutely canvassed in Dean Sherlock's "Discourse concerning the Nature, &c., of the Catholic Church."



that God has tied Himself to the *exclusive* means of a Council so and so constituted, in order to signify and to maintain fundamental truth ; an arbitrary supposition, altogether destitute of proof, besides being fatal (when we remember the small number and the long intervals of even all the *reputed* General Councils) to that security of *continuous* doctrine which yet is the very principle of the whole argument. It may be asked, then, whether we do not, in this account of the respect due to the greater Councils (from their providential office of fixing and fortifying fundamental truth), take away with one hand what we give with the other? By no means; for it is unquestionable that a man who believes a certain doctrine (as the Trinity) fundamental, and sees plainly that a Council (as that of Nice or the other Trinitarian Councils) was providentially employed as the main instrument in securing it, will justly attach a peculiar degree of veneration to its labours ; and exactly as we do in the case of all eminent *individual* servants of God—an analogy often luminous in the obscurities of this controversy—will regard its decisions as coming with a certain special presumption in their favour, a presumption of great force to minds of humility and prudence, in many points where *he* cannot readily follow the logical grounds on which the decision was originally made. On the precise *amount* of this special presumption it is quite impossible to lay down any universal rule ; quite as impossible as in the parallel instance of high individual authority. But while of course it could not (were there any real opposition of the two) for a moment stand against any express declaration of the written Word, of whose meaning



we could properly consider ourselves perfectly certain, it may yet exert a legitimate and most valuable practical influence in strengthening and tranquilizing the inquirer's belief. The recognition of this just claim of the early ecclesiastical decisions on fundamental doctrine (their disciplinary views are essentially variable with circumstances and times) to deep respect and gratitude, constitutes indeed the chief element of what is rightly understood by a "Catholic" spirit in theology; a phrase which, though it has been, and continues to be, beyond all others, misapplied in one direction or other, does not therefore cease to possess a real, and intelligible, and important meaning.

With regard, then, on the whole, to the ancient digests of Christian Doctrine, whether by collective Council or individual Teacher,—when we shall have set apart this peculiar species of authority on which I have just spoken, arising out of character and providential position, and real in its nature though hardly definable in its degree,—we shall probably perceive that the controversy truly at issue resolves itself into two questions, one regarding the *Obligation*, and the other the *Matter*, of these dogmatic decisions. 1. Is there any absolutely binding authority for those systematic exhibitions of Christian Doctrine beyond the authority due to a just and appropriate work of human Reason, making its comparisons, combinations, and deductions in dependence on God, and for the general benefit of the Church? 2. Can these more methodical forms of primitive belief ever rightly include any addition to the original deposit, of *essential doctrine before substantially unknown*; or any addition at all but that which is ob-

tained by the ordinary processes of reasoning, and in which every step of the process in each case is capable of being exhibited and tested by the universal canons of legitimate inference? These are the points really at issue; and on which, as on the one hand nothing approaching satisfactory proof has been offered for the Affirmative (which Affirmative, even if granted, would but *remotely prepare* the way for the theory of Romanism now before us), so on the other, the adoption of the Negative (which must be absolutely fatal to that theory) does not appear to deprive the Anglican theologian of one item of the interest or utility that belongs to the historical study of theology; while it certainly releases him from numerous and complicated embarrassments under which the opposite hypothesis labours in the attempt to make it quadrate with the actual facts of history.

On the nature of this whole work of *systematizing and applying doctrine*, by the Synods and Doctors of the Church, which seems to be the *reality* of that vague, unlimited process of innovation which the present author disguises under the term Development, and on the circumstances under which it takes rise, I should be glad to hazard some additional observations; indeed they are the natural complement of the statement I have already offered. But I must not intrude further for the present.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.

## LETTER VI.

DEAR SIR,

You have reminded me that I owe the balance of an account still undischarged to your readers. I had desisted from prolonging these criticisms, partly because I thought it hardly warrantable to continue making so disproportioned a demand on your space ; and partly, too, I may perhaps pardonably confess, because the argument itself under review, the more it was reflected on, really seemed more and more such as might be safely left without detailed reply. The very slight amount of controversy (slight, considering the acknowledged ability and singular position of its author) which the work has succeeded in producing, now abundantly evinces that the general verdict of the public is not far from coinciding with this impression. Force of style will always produce a sort of mechanical effect upon the imagination, but premises so manifestly devised to “argue a foregone conclusion,” and on a principle so obviously applicable to prove *any* conclusion, are not likely to give much disturbance to those who are not yet seduced into conceiving the imagination, or those vague preferences



which we are expected to dignify by the title of “moral” inspirations, the supreme arbiters in matter of faith.

While, however, this work can hardly be considered as very formidable in its polemical aspect, the hypothesis it advocates undoubtedly tends to suggest—as anything from a mind so fertile and ingenious might well be expected to suggest—some very interesting matters of consideration relative to the history of revealed truth. Among them is that general question about the process by which Christian doctrines have become gradually *systematized*<sup>a</sup>, to which, I believe, I alluded at the close of my last communication, and on which I shall now attempt to offer a few remarks; though the renewed consideration of it only impresses more forcibly how little my present limited space (not to speak of limitations of knowledge and faculties more difficult to be remedied) allows me to do justice to such a topic, or even to my own imperfect notions of it, peculiarly liable, as would be even the most careful and elaborate statements on so very delicate a subject, to misconception.

Before introducing this matter, let me, however, make room for it, by again repeating the concession often and cordially admitted or implied in my former communications. I have no disposition to conceal or question—

That theological knowledge is capable of a real movement in time, a true successive history, through the legitimate application of human reason. This

<sup>a</sup> [Vid. S. Cyril. Oxford Translation, p. 58.]

movement may probably be regarded as taking place in two principal ways :

The *first* is the process of *logical development*<sup>b</sup> (a very innocent term, which will answer as well as any other) of primitive truth into its consequences<sup>c</sup>, connexions, and applications ; the *reality* of that undefined, irregular operation of feeling and conjecture by which the present author labours to account for innovations which can neither be deduced by reason, nor have ever willingly recognised its authority.

The *second* is—positive discovery. Members of the English Church which (by a strange dispensation of Providence) has, since its lapse into “heresy,” done more to benefit Christianity in this way than all others put together, will not find much difficulty in conceiving many classes of these precious gifts of God to His Church conveyed through the ministration of human sagacity. Such are—

Unexpected confirmations or *illustrations of revealed doctrine* from new sources ; as from unobserved applications and collations of Holy Scripture ; or from profound investigations of natural religion, and the philosophy of morals, as in some parts of the researches of Bishop Warburton.

New proofs in support of *the evidences of religion* ; such as the conception and complete establishment of the analogical argument by Bishop Butler, or the invention and exquisite application of the test of undesigned coincidence by Paley.

<sup>b</sup> [That *deductions from* Scripture are as necessary as Scripture itself for a complete Rule of Faith, see Jackson, Vol. iv. p. 399.]

<sup>c</sup> [Comp. Field, *Of the Church*, Book iv. Ch. 12.]

Discoveries regarding *the form and circumstances of the revelation itself*; such as those of Bishops Lowth and Jebb on the remarkable structure of the poetical and sententious parts of Holy Writ.

Discoveries of *divine laws* in the government of the Church and world, so far as the same may lawfully be collected by observation and theory.

Discoveries, through events disclosing the *meaning of prophecy*, or correcting erroneous interpretations of Scripture. And others, either already exemplified in the history of divine learning, or which possibly may still remain unexplored and even unimagined, designed to reward the noble ambition of those who shall yet search for the "hid treasures" of wisdom.

Why Human Reason, which will hardly be deemed incompetent to the latter of these two divisions of theological labour, should be so to the *former*; or how the former process is not in fact performed by uninspired faculties in every thoughtful preacher's sermon; or how that which one thoughtful preacher can do without inspiration, one Church may not do; or how that which one Church may do, the whole family of Churches, the Catholic communion, may not do; or how the latter reasonable supposition should not, under divine Providence, sufficiently account for the history of dogmatic theology (besides, which is a special advantage, accounting for the errors also), Mr. Newman may perhaps some time or other find leisure to inform us more distinctly.

Meanwhile my immediate business is of course only with that division of the general subject upon which his treatise is engaged; the former of those specified



above, and just now alluded to ; that operation beginning with the earliest times, and in all times more or less actively manifested, by which, under God's high providence, divine truth is arranged, unfolded, applied, by the natural faculties of that human Intelligence which, hardly less than the human Affections, it was no doubt designed to nourish, awaken, and delight. And this will naturally justify a few remarks also on the nature of the *evidence* for doctrine derivable from the earlier records of this process. I trust I may depend upon the sagacity of your readers to see the important bearing of both those topics upon the theory of Mr. Newman, and the logic of Roman controversy in general.

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I.—1. I think, then, it will be easily seen, that from the very nature of the case it was unlikely that the form of Christian doctrine should continue exactly the same during the inspired and the subsequent uninspired period ; that it was inevitable that a great change should, in this respect, take place in the transition from direct divine instruction to the human conception of revealed truth. It would seem that that truth *must*, in the hands of its new trustees, acquire more of a systematic shape. Men who write by immediate inspired guidance are the last to *feel* the want of a systematic organization of their convictions ; their beliefs being suggested and preserved to them under direct divine operation, they are not personally sensible of the need as other men. They will probably draw up and set forth for the benefit of others, some brief collective statements of the capital truths of reli-

gion, as we see occasionally in the Epistles of St. Paul (such as 1 Cor. xv. 3-8; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Phil. ii. 6-11); or, as was exhibited in that common original—whatever it was, if not a portion of the Apostles' Creed itself—from which all the first summaries of the faith seem to have been derived; but they will not be pressed to do so by an interior necessity. "It is given unto them what they shall speak," according as they need it. But with the cessation of direct inspiration, with the close of this exalted intimacy with Heaven, another and an humbler state of things inevitably arises. The uninspired teacher will soon come to feel the necessity of some *formal scheme of doctrines* mutually related and rigorously defined, as a guide to his teaching. The Patriarchs, under supernatural guidance, might go forth "not knowing whither they went;" the ordinary traveller requires a map of the country. Walking by his own strength, the uninspired instructor must have a staff to steady him; he who could lean wholly upon the everlasting arms was independent of such aids. In this way of reflection we shall be led to see that the religion must almost necessarily assume more of a systematic and dogmatical exterior in the keeping of uninspired men; and it is manifest the process will be accelerated according as it has to repel heresy no longer by force of mere authority but by allegation of proof, and according as, becoming diffused among the cultivated and reflective classes, it has to meet their intellectual needs.

On the other hand, this view of the case tells against the direct inspiration of the elaborate definitions of doctrine that succeeded the original simple abstracts



of the faith. It cannot be denied that, though true in substance, they are very unlike all the genuine products of undoubted inspiration. Inspired teaching (explain it how we may) seems comparatively indifferent to (what seems to us so peculiarly important), close logical connexion, and the intellectual symmetry of doctrines. Even in the Jewish Church, when it began to outgrow its old institutes, and already its loftiest spirits caught the faint beams of the unrisen sun,—at a period when we can hardly doubt that numbers were busy upon the internal relations and ulterior scope of the national doctrines (as indeed the very multitude and complication of their traditional distinctions and decisions—a sort of scholastic theology in its own way—evinces), how little do their *inspired* instructors, the Prophets, minister to such a craving. And the same general character is palpably applicable to the instructions of the great Author and model of inspired teaching Himself, even when in some cases (as in conference with the Scribes) a methodical deduction of doctrine might seem peculiarly adapted to the conviction of His hearers. The necessity of confuting gainsayers at times forced one of the greatest of his inspired servants, St. Paul, to prosecute continuous argument; yet even with him how abrupt are the transitions, how intricate the connexion, how much is conveyed by assumptions such as inspiration alone can make without any violation of the canons of reasoning—for with it alone assertion is argument; in short, how utterly unlike is the whole texture of his exposition to the technical exactness of an ecclesiastical definition. The same may be said of some pas-



sages of St. John, supposed to have been similarly occasioned. Inspiration has ever left to human Reason the filling up of its outlines, the careful connexion of its more isolated truths; the two are as the lightning of Heaven, brilliant, penetrating, far-flashing, abrupt—compared with the feebler but *continuous* illumination of some earthly beacon.

But, as the inspired promulgation of truth, on the one hand, and its reduction to methodical system, and translation into a more scientific phraseology, on the other, however different in dignity, have *both* their uses, so I imagine that a little reflection will show it more beneficial that the unscientific statements should come *first*, and the precise logical version of them in its due time afterwards. And for this plain reason, that the logical phraseology is absolutely worthless except so far as its meaning is absolutely certain, and only thus (so far as we can see), could its *meaning be placed beyond doubt*. It is by recalling the history and scope of the heresies that the true import of the orthodox fixation of doctrine is ascertained; any other mode of determining which (as by etymology, popular usage, &c.) would have been undoubtedly found as unsatisfactory as in the parallel inquiries into the precise meaning of many of the technical terms of ancient philosophy or law. Can we doubt that had St. Paul, for example, originally, and prior to all controversy, delivered some sentences of the Nicene or Athanasian creeds in his Epistles, the meaning of these sentences, which now, discerned in the light of the controversy that produced them, appears so unquestionable, would have been, subsequently to the Apostle's day, disputed

by numbers unwilling, in the pride of the sensual understanding, to accept the doctrine<sup>d</sup>. And *then* hardly any conceivable remedy would have remained ; for where should the guardians of the truth have found plainer or preciser language to express it ? At all events since heresies, as predicted, were sure to arise (for the seeds of such are implanted in the perversity of man), and since they would have found little difficulty in distorting *any* language that Inspiration had adopted ; it does not appear that Inspiration would have gained much by descending from its usual style, which conveys the doctrine clearly enough to those who are willing to receive it ; while, through the intervention of the heresies, the phraseology finally adopted by common consent and authority, as best expressing the

<sup>d</sup> Even in the Nicene Creed itself, there is a point which the *Homo-ousios* is by some maintained to have left undetermined,\* though commonly supposed to imply it. The history of this dispute, however, would, I conceive, only illustrate the main point here insisted on (that controversy is almost indispensable for fixing the *sense* of Church definitions); for the ambiguity seems to have arisen from the distinction in question not having been prominent in the controversy at the Nicene stage, and so overlooked.

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\* [“The true reason,” says Waterland (Vol. i. 543-4), “why the Nicene Fathers laid so great a stress upon the *homo-ousion* was not because this alone was sufficient to make Father and Son one God, but because *they could not be so without it*. ‘Ὁμοούσιος the Son must be, or he could not be God at all, in the strict sense ; and yet, if he was barely ὁμοούσιος, like as one human person is to another, the *two* would be *two Gods*. And, therefore, the Nicene Fathers, not content to say only that the Son is ὁμοούσιος, insert likewise ‘God of God, Light of Light, begotten,’ &c., and ‘of the substance of the Father ;’ and this they are known to have declared over and over, to be ‘without any division ;’ all which taken together expresses a great deal more than ὁμοούσιος would do alone ; and are, as it were, so many qualifying clauses, on purpose to prevent any such misapprehension and misconstruction, as the word might otherwise be liable to.”]



original truth, was placed beyond the possibility of misconception. And thus *both* the depositories of doctrine were suitably provided for. Scripture (in which there are doubtless higher objects than *mere* perspicuity), was left to its native and transcendant style; ecclesiastical definitions (in which the *chief object* is perspicuity) were secured from misinterpretation by the only infallible means for fixing their purport. The revelation having been given by God himself, the rest of the process was in His high overruling providence distributed between the two great parties of His professing servants; the false and disloyal, who indirectly, by their gainsayings, gave the impulse; the faithful and devoted, who to meet the attack were led (and thus only, as I have argued, could have been with enduring benefit led), to methodize<sup>e</sup> their beliefs, and fortify them at all points against all assailants. It was after the Fall the flaming sword turned every way to guard the gates of paradise, and prohibit the unworthy, who had daringly tampered with its Knowledge, from tasting of its Life. Heresy<sup>f</sup>—and that not the rapid, transitory, obscure

<sup>e</sup> [“Quid unquam aliud Ecclesia Conciliorum decretis enisa est, nisi ut quod antea simpliciter credebatur, *hoc idem* postea diligentius crederetur?”—Vincent. Lirinens. (*Adv. Hæres.* c. 32.)]

<sup>f</sup> [“As to the primitive Churches, their constant way was to enlarge their creeds in proportion to the growth of *heresies*; that so every corruption arising to the Faith of Christ might have an immediate remedy.” “As more and more of the sacred truths, in process of time, came to be opposed or called in question, so Creeds have been enlarged in proportion.”—Waterland, *Works*, Vol. iii. pp. 249–254. (Oxford, 1843.) Compare Beveridge, *Codex Can. vind. Proæmium*, p. 25. (*Works*, Vol. xi. in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*.)]



heresy proper to the apostolic age, but a movement extensive, public, historical—was just the necessary preliminary to the authoritative restatement of the fundamentals of the faith. Nor was there any antecedent probability that this secondary work should either wait for or receive inspiration, in the high and peculiar sense of that gift ; such paraphrases of divine utterances in the feeble, cautious dialect of human reason, are eminently a work for man ; God would be honoured in the faculties that had offended Him ; a sanctified use of Reason was the appropriate corrective of Reason misused.

But now, though it be perfectly evident that this process of systematizing Divine Truth by Human Reason, may become not only useful but necessary, and, as both useful and necessary, a manifest *duty* on the part of those who are intrusted with the charge of teaching and defending it, yet it is also very evident, that, like many other imperative duties (which do not, therefore, cease to be duties), its discharge is accompanied with special difficulties ; and *that*, as for other reasons so for this, that it is nearly, if not altogether, impossible to propound any single *a priori* Canon which shall distinctly regulate and test its proper exercise in all cases. Suppose it granted that the Church is bound to introduce no *new* doctrine, yet there is a variety of senses in which a doctrine may be styled “new ;” and the discussion would probably be endless, whose object was to fix by any *one* inflexible and universal rule, at what precise stage in a complicated process of deduction the epithet should begin to be applied in the sense of *unwarrantable* innovation. It can hardly be questioned,

that *before* that point is reached, numerous instances are adducible in which *novelty* might be with equal innocence, because in different senses, affirmed or denied. For instance,—

A doctrine may be apparently new, which is new only in *the language expressing it*, as when a technical or scientific phraseology is employed instead of the previous simple and inartificial expression of the same substantial import; which naturally occurs (as we have seen), when some perverse interpretation of the common form of statement forces the orthodox to substitute some more precise philosophical equivalent capable of no second meaning.

Or it may be styled *new*, when, though so fully believed as to be always acted on (as the duty of a reverential manner in prayer, &c.), it happens to be for the first time *formally propounded to the intellect*; in which sense the common axioms of geometry are new; and the man who could never have made a rational use of his limbs without assuming it, learns a “new” truth, when informed that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.

Or a doctrine may appear new, when detached truths are carefully *grouped together, and some brief term for the first time employed* to keep them in that conjunction; as when the word Trinity is adopted to express the combination revealed in Scripture of the numerical singleness of the substance of Deity with the distinction of the three personal agents therein mysteriously comprised, and mutually related; or when a precise and methodical declaration is issued of the combination of the single Personality with the double nature.



Or it may seem new, when a truth involved in the public doctrine of the Church, and in a manner *assumed* by all who receive that doctrine in its integrity, though no special act may have yet separated it from the mass, is put forth *prominently and alone*, and thenceforth, of course, designated by some appropriate term; a truth which, however, is still rested upon this basis of plain inference, that to deny it can be shown to contradict some unquestionable principle, and ultimately to confound the harmony of the system of belief; such was the determination of the Monothelite Controversy.

Whether such statements of doctrine as these—novel only in their Phraseology, their formal Affirmation, their Combination, their Deduction—are to be called *new* or *old*, is a question rather of words than of things; as long as it is admitted by those who prefer to call them *new*, that these determinations, however unlike the exterior form and language of Scripture, really contained nothing essential to belief, sanctification, and salvation, which was not accepted from the beginning (a principle which, I need not reiterate from my last Letter, the framers themselves of these determinations energetically affirm); and so long as it is fully conceded by those who celebrate the exclusive claims of the original inspired documents, and so would prefer to proclaim all the Church's doctrines to be as truly *old* as they<sup>g</sup>, that the substance of divine truth, retaining its identity under many varieties of form, may lawfully and

<sup>g</sup> “ We look upon this tradition [of the Church in all ages] as nothing else but the Scripture unfolded; *not a new thing*, which is not in the Scripture, but the Scripture explained and made more evident.”—*Patrick on Tradition*, p. 18. (Ed. 1683).



usefully assume those varieties, and that all legitimate conclusions from truth, by whomsoever made, are themselves unquestionably true.

Nevertheless, while in the history of theology, it is thus easy enough to instance what was *not* essentially new, and unfortunately too easy likewise to instance what unquestionably *was*,—between these extremes a large territory of unauthorized, though often interesting, reasoning and speculation, has ever spread, in which it might sometimes be found perplexing enough to pronounce to which of these divisions particular points of theology belong. It is in this obscure border-land that the advocate of the unquestionable novelties delights to range ; endeavouring to draw his opponent into a position where he can avail himself of all the difficulties of the ground, and claiming as a victory to his own arms the mere bewilderment of an adversary who should never have suffered himself to be betrayed into these fastnesses at all. Such are some of the subtle problems connected with—though not essential to—the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Sacraments, of Original Sin, and the like ; the artful tactician skilfully exposing and heightening the difficulty of settling the question between novelty and antiquity *there* ; and then triumphantly challenging his opponent to say where he will halt and affirm that real novelty begins. His opponent should demur to the legitimacy of the question. It may be impossible—I would certainly advise all concerned to be cautious how they undertake—to lay down any general canon for determining this issue, in all cases alike. There is nothing more dangerous than to make the truth dependent on our theories of it. It may be

irresistibly manifest that certain alleged doctrines are real innovations, and yet no easy matter to achieve the very different object of furnishing some one universal test by which all innovations shall be instantly discriminated from ancient truths and their legitimate consequences. I shall have to return to this point presently.

2. I have hitherto been speaking principally (because it is the most immediately important) of the *Conciliar* determinations of antiquity. But, it must be remembered, that the spirit and language of these determinations were themselves, in no small degree, the results of a process of systematizing doctrine, which had already gone on from the earliest period in the hands of *individual* teachers. The Conciliar Definitions, if immediately occasioned by heresy, are also the monument of a very extensive and varied process of exposition by the orthodox. Councils were temporary and incidental; but systematic teaching was, in some form or other, inevitable from the beginning. It thus becomes a very interesting question to consider—if the original doctrine committed to the first disciples, and comprised in Scripture, was, in all ages, sure to be systematized in some way, what would be the probable characteristics of the *earlier* manifestations of this natural, inevitable process in the Christian Church?

Now it appears to me that in the prosecution of this work (of organizing doctrines into system), the early teachers would possess a considerable advantage, balanced by some disadvantages; and I doubt not that it is in the due comparative estimate of these characteristics that most of the skill of genuine criticism in the ancient theology consists. Their great *advantage*



would be their recent inheritance of the original doctrine, and that reverential solicitude for its correct transmission, always, except by heretical parties<sup>h</sup> (and sometimes, such was the prevalence of the feeling, even by them), strenuously professed; a solicitude the more earnest (and thence reflecting the more value upon their concurrent testimonies), that the preservation of the faith was for a considerable period almost wholly in the charge of the bishops of the Churches, with far less help than we habitually derive from the collective Scriptures. No one can doubt that the Canon was *gradually* fixed, and probably not wholly and finally fixed, before the beginning of the third century<sup>i</sup>; and it is manifest, on the very face of their writings, and from their own express affirmations, that the earlier teachers rested their teaching not alone on the inspired documents, but upon a distinct body of inherited doctrine,

<sup>h</sup> The general characteristic of heresy from the very beginning was the assertion of *either* secret traditions\* committed to the exclusive keeping of the heretical bodies, *or* new and refined developments of the apostolic teaching. Tertullian, who himself became a melancholy example of the latter, records in his better writings the prevalence of the former of these two remarkable contemporary anticipations of the very two forms of vindication now *at once* exhibited by the defenders of the Roman peculiarities.

<sup>i</sup> [Bishop Cosin proves that the Canon was determined at a much

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\* [Basilides, of the first or second century, and his partisans, claimed tradition in their favour. Valentinus, of the second century, and his disciples, “ fetched their doctrine by one Theodades, as they said, from the Apostle S. Paul.” The Marcionites pretended to derive their doctrines by tradition from the Apostle Matthias. The Artemonians of the third century pretended tradition from the Apostles themselves. The Arians claimed tradition equally with the Catholics. The Macedonians also pleaded tradition for their rejecting the Divinity of the Holy Ghost.—See Waterland, *Works*, iii. pp. 658–9.]



perfectly concordant and co-extensive (as we now fully see), but not verbally identical with Scripture. One of the most eminent of them, indeed, (S. Irenæus), in a well-known passage<sup>k</sup>, where he states the chief heads of this body of doctrine, starts, for argument sake, the supposition, that there had been *no* written instructions left by the Apostles, and insists that, in such a case [than which, ultimately, no doubt there could have been no greater misfortune to the Church], it would still have been men's duty to have adhered to the line of traditional belief, which had originated in the very *same* authority. The guides of the early Church, then, being circumstanced as I have described, we can hardly doubt that the anxiety to preserve traditional truth in all points, must have been more earnest and zealous than, with our ready recourse to the whole inspired volume, and our innumerable other

earlier period. "After the Apostles, *in whose time the whole Canon of Scripture was determined*, the hour was past, and the door was shut; no addition might be made, nor any other book taken in, but what they had first received, and left sacred to the Church. Which is not only acknowledged by S. Augustine, but likewise by the Doctors of the Church of Rome itself, both those that lived before the Council of Trent, and those that have written since."—*Scholas. Hist. of the Canon*, Works, (in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theol.*) Vol. iii. p. 31. The Bishop refers to Melchior Canus, who thus states the Apostolical origin of the Canon: "Non enim alios libros Canonicos habemus, sive veteris sive novi Testamenti, quam quos Apostoli probaverunt, atque Ecclesiæ tradiderunt."—(*De Loc. Theol.* p. 37.) The language of Bellarmine is equally explicit.—*De Verb. Dei*, Tom. i. col. 80.]

<sup>k</sup> S. Iren. iii. 4. [See Beaven's *Account of the Life and Writings of S. Irenæus*, pp. 142–156. Lond. 1841. Chillingworth's *Religion of Protestants*, Chap. ii. Works, pp. 121–2. Ib. 1742.—G.]

resources of confirmation and refutation, we can at once or easily conceive. And this reverential anxiety would naturally form a strong check upon undue impulses to systematize ; not to add, that these men's *earliest* systematic conceptions of divine truth may, with fair probability, claim an authority higher than their own ; furnished to them, very possibly, by their apostolic teachers for the purpose of teaching others, and thus, perhaps, transmitting to us the last declining beams of Inspiration itself.

On the other hand, I should expect of such men that they would evince a certain degree of *inexperience* in the human work of systematizing doctrine, which, not improbably, might betray them into (1.) occasional mistakes of its real internal connexions, into (2.) precipitancy, it might be too, in the filling up of the outlines of revealed doctrine by pure speculation ; into (3.) a laxity of phraseology (unaware as they were of the importance of every syllable of those rapid expressions of their's, on whose interpretation rival folios were yet to be written !), a laxity for which, in the infirmity of man, controversy seems to be the only sure corrective ; and sometimes (4.) into misconceptions of the most eligible methods of proof. To calculate on such abatements as these, really seems only to admit that, unless able and honest men invariably write under miraculous guidance, there must be *something* left for them to learn from experience. And we cannot fail to see, that the *ability* of the individual must not, in the just investigation of traditional doctrine, and its authority, occupy at all the same rank which it holds in the history of a human and progressive philosophy ;



it being certain, that in proportion to the ability, unless where we can presume a strong intellectual restraint, will be the temptation, to mingle the private speculations of the teacher with the original deposit committed to his charge. Such a case as that of Origen will at once occur to every reader as a palmary instance in point. At the same time, the *multitude* of consenting witnesses will proportionably correct this evil; that multitude (though even here the powerful personal influence of authoritative leaders must not be forgotten), tending to eliminate the private element in theology, and present us with the public tradition, as that alone in which all can be expected to coincide. And, if the systematic expositions of antiquity give us, as they surely do, this substantial sameness, we may justly see in their endless circumstantial peculiarities the proof of their genuineness,—in their very aberrations a mark of the independence of their testimony on the great truths in which they agree.

II. If this be at all a fair account of what we might anticipate, and may observe, in those writings in which the first uninspired teachers of Christianity undertook to dispense their awful trust to mankind,—undertook humbly but resolutely (for it was their duty, and it is our's), to connect by the links of human reason, and arrange in didactic order, and unfold in their logical consequences, those mighty elements of truth which inspiration had delivered, as it ever has done, briefly and in the mass,—I would venture again to suggest how it confirms the observation already made upon the inadmissibility of those *broad and universal maxims* so constantly hazarded in the controversial use of their



testimony. Such maxims are utterly inapplicable to the sort of complex evidence with which divines, whether Anglican or, if they would honestly confess it, Roman, have really to deal in establishing doctrines. The evidence of Antiquity, like the evidence of Scripture itself, is *not* accurately the same in amount for all those doctrines which, nevertheless, we are bound with equal and unhesitating cordiality to receive. Let me dwell for a moment on this, a perpetual source of unnecessary perplexity.

I would say, that while, no doubt (as a simple matter of fact), the common doctrinal tradition of antiquity is found to tally with the received interpretation of Scripture in all essential matters, and the soundest scriptural criticism in its turn confirms that venerable tradition ; that while (to adopt the philosophical phraseology of our times), that old inherited *theory* of doctrine is found to embrace all the *phenomena* of Scripture texts, and the latter to fall in with, and marshal themselves readily under that old theory,—yet, from the very nature of the evidence, no single universal rule can be strictly enforced to define the *precise amount* of testimony to be fairly required in every instance for the proof of this, from the extant remains of antiquity. Whatever we can plainly see to be true and important, no doubt, *was* always held, but the *quantity of proof now actually adducible* to establish this, if always sufficient, may yet differ considerably in different cases. We can as little fix under a single inflexible formula the necessary amount of uninspired confirmation as of original inspired proof, for any theological proposition ; when men shall have agreed how

many verses of Scripture shall be required to make a doctrine certain or fundamental, they may settle how many corroborative Fathers or Synodical Canons shall be deemed exactly sufficient to sustain it in that rank. The custom of treating all points of belief as if they must necessarily possess the same precise amount of producible documentary evidence (in rivalry of the affected simplicity of the Roman "rule"), instead of being content with demanding for them all (what they all ought really to obtain, and what alone concerns us as Christians), the same amount of *habitual acceptance and practical influence*, is a common weakness with defenders of Catholic truth, and easily taken advantage of (see p. 8, &c.) by a dexterous disputant like the author before us. It is really inconsistent with the very nature of complex historical proof; nor does this position expose primitive Catholicity to any objection whatsoever, which cannot with the greatest ease be retorted upon Romanism, so far as it ventures to rest its "rule" upon that species of proof. It is true we are accustomed, with no unworthy pride, to employ some general expressions that seem to import this universal equality of evidence, but it is *as* general expressions they must be interpreted. The *semper, ubique, &c.*, expresses what no doubt is a matter of *fact* as to all important doctrine, and is commonly affirmed as such by our divines, in refuting those peculiarities which now at last are ingenuously confessed to be Vincentian heresies; but I conceive that such a rule, as applied to the remaining *writings* of antiquity, can as little be interpreted with absolute metaphysical strictness, as the analogous assertion that a doctrine is



“universally delivered in the New Testament” can be understood to import that it is expressly stated, or even implied, in every single document of the twenty-seven contained in the Holy Volume. The Bishops of England, in the remarkable Canon of 1571<sup>1</sup>, limiting the doctrine to be taught by preachers, with judicious reserve employed the general expressions<sup>m</sup>, “quod ex illâ ipsâ doctrinâ *Catholici patres et veteres episcopi* collegierint,” without thinking it necessary to exhibit the criterion in any more rigorous form ; without, that is, undertaking to pronounce on the complicated questions of criticism—*how many* of these Fathers and Prelates, at any one time, and for each specific tenet ; who precisely *were* “Catholic Fathers ;” and still more, at what period “*ancient* Bishops” must be considered as giving place to mediæval or modern ; content, and rightly content, with a general standard, and a general injunction of reverence for the old traditional “collection” from Scripture doctrine, and reserving their stricter obligation for where it is justly required to the letter, for the Articles, Liturgy, and Ordinal that follow in

<sup>1</sup> [Sparrow’s *Collection*, p. 238. Lond. 1671. *Booke of certaine Canons*, p. 23. Lond. Iohn Daye, 1571. In the latter very rare volume this celebrated ordinance appears in the original *English*. —G.]

<sup>m</sup> [“Imprimis vero videbunt (concionatores) ne quid unquam doceant pro concione, quod a populo religiosè teneri et credi velint, nisi quod consentaneum sit doctrinæ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, quodque ex illâ ipsâ doctrinâ Catholici Patres et veteres Episcopi collegierint.” This Canon is styled by Bishop Cosin, “The Golden Rule of our Church, the Doctrine of Holy Scripture, and the Interpretation thereof by the ancient Fathers.”—(*Works*, Vol. iii. p. 317, in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*.)



the Canon. The plain truth is, that to multiply ideal standards is only to multiply advantages for the adversary; each tenet claiming to be a portion of the Christian Faith must first be decided (by the few who are qualified, and no others have a right, to entertain such inquiries at all) on its own exclusive evidence; whether it reach a conceived standard or not, if it be *proven*, it demands to be believed. If Scripture furnish sufficient proof, it is idle to complain that it does not furnish more; if antiquity incline the balance of probability to the belief that the doctrine in question was the doctrine received, it is equally idle to demand farther evidence from that source, or feebly continue to dwell upon difficulties which, once fairly overbalanced, should be suffered to disturb the calculation no more. The prudent inquirer knows, that the precise amount of evidence required for doctrine has been nowhere revealed, and can only be determined inductively, as a conclusion, in each instance, *from* the inquiry, not as a preliminary *to* it; he will try every case by its individual merits, remembering that the true and only question is—*for this specific doctrine* (whatever it may be), is there evidence enough to make a reasonable man accept it as a real portion of the truth of God?

For (I repeat) it is to be observed—and I think very important to be observed,—that, even among the most momentous doctrines, we have no antecedent reason whatsoever to presume that all would be sustainable by exactly the same amount of proof; that some one *may* really be more evident than some other; and yet, that (on this supposition) no right-

mindful man who remembers the conditions of all human belief and duty, would think of permitting himself practically to doubt either, or attempt to suggest such a course to others, by invidiously exhibiting the supposed lack of absolute, or inferiority of relative, proof. Both are certain enough to ground the duty of belief and action, and even of equally energetic action<sup>n</sup>, and this once clear, it becomes the direct duty of one who must either act or not—with whom *inaction is itself a real choice*—to discountenance any tendency to dwell upon the positive or comparative uncertainty of either.

<sup>n</sup> I say advisedly, of *equally* energetic action ; for it may be, that the less certain demands (from the immense importance of the issue, &c.) action *so* energetic that the other *cannot* exceed it. A matter so manifest when stated, can hardly need illustration. If a man had a very strong chance of a large estate by expending a trifling sum of money, he would not hesitate to do so; were the prospect even to brighten by some additional chance of success, it would not be physically possible for him to be more eager in staking his pittance than he had been already. He would stare at the friend who should admonish him, that active energy requiring to be directly as probability of success, he was now bound to hasten to his agent with a new velocity, accurately graduated to correspond to the new accession of probability. Simple as this is, it is upon forgetting it that half the Romish arguments for the necessity of absolute certainty in religion are founded. Faith, as a practical principle, may retain its habitual confidence, and so its equal operative influence, under very different degrees in the mathematical estimate of probabilities. It should never be forgotten, by those who are perpetually demanding infallible certainty in all matters of faith, that it is infallibly certain that we ought to act, and act strenuously, *upon moral certainty*. Now, has any man a right to demand more infallibility than *an infallibly certain rule of action*? [See Jackson's *Works*, i. 608—13. (“Proportion of Certainty in Assent of Christian Faith.”) Lond. 1673.—G.]



I can easily understand that such a representation as this may appear cold and unsatisfactory when contrasted with the pompous claims of instant and absolute certainty in religion, which are so triumphantly advanced by the advocates of Romanism, as the exclusive privilege of their communion. The apparent plausibility of these exclusive claims seems usually traceable to a fallacy of no great depth ; an ambiguity of the word “faith,” and a dexterous, sometimes perhaps an unconscious, alternate substitution, according to occasion, of the two very distinguishable ideas which are conveyed by it. This important word, and all the synonymous and connected terms,—Belief, Conviction, Certainty, and the like,—are theologically employed in two different senses,—for a purely *intellectual* conviction, and for an *habitual practical* assent. The nature of the former of these mental states is to admit (and, doubtless, in many instances pardonably) many degrees of conviction—as of evidence—below the highest; of the latter, to admit habitually no hesitation or indecision at all ; and this apparent inconsistency is not only paralleled by the most ordinary facts of every day’s experience, but strictly justifiable upon the soundest principles of logic and philosophy. And both these concurrent forms of belief are *universal* phenomena, applicable to all practical matters dependent on testimony, and so to *all* modifications, whether true or false, of revealed religion. Thus (having first excluded those special *spiritual* influences, which, in this case, to assume for any one party, would be to assume the question at issue),—as regards the *former* notion of faith, all systems of belief must consent to



claim by the same general title, however different the real merits of their claim ; none can pretend to rise beyond the simple ground of historical, or other, evidence of strong probability, and the species of belief, it produces ; if, to apply the principle to the matter immediately in hand, the Romanist is dull or daring enough to attempt evading this, he may be asked to account for the mere *fact* of infidelity in any province of his Church ; to explain how, if by virtue of his position he possesses *a kind* of intellectual proof of the Christian Religion that admits of no possibility of doubt, it has actually come to pass that it *has* been and *is* doubted by thousands of deists within his communion ; to reflect, in which of the Christian Churches, for example, arose the great and popular school of unbelief which poisoned all the literature of the eighteenth century ? In the *latter* sense, again, all systems of belief, as before, stand on the same basis ; for all, whether right or wrong, equally claim *unqualified* influence, unhesitating practical “faith,” as the proper consequence of the assent, to whatever degree informed or convinced, if it but be, on the whole, the assent of the understanding. So that, in that purely *intellectual* sense of belief, in which it weighs and accepts what it takes to be high testimonial proof, and in that *practical* sense in which it imports habitual influential assurance, it is not easy to see how *any* one division of Christianity can claim to occupy a different basis from any other. The comparative *justice* of their respective claims is, indeed, another and a very different question ; but the only point that now concerns us is this, and it seems sufficiently manifest,—that all alike, the

pettiest subdivision of American Independency, no more, and no less, than the Church of the Vatican<sup>o</sup>, appeal, if they profess to reason at all, to the merely moral certainty of historical proof for the understandings, while they demand unhesitating practical affiance from the hearts, of their adherents.

Now it will be intelligible enough, that if a skilful controversialist can contrive so to perplex this distinction as, whenever it is his object to expose *uncertainty*, to insist largely upon the intellectual difficulties of the “faith” he rejects, and, whenever it suits his purpose to magnify the *security* of “faith,” to dwell on the fullness of that practical assurance of which I have spoken; if he can manage by this artifice to throw into the shade at once the real deficiencies of his own grounds of intellectual certainty (deficiencies at the least as unquestionable as his antagonist’s) and the real practical assurance of his antagonist’s faith (at the least as vigorous and unhesitating as his own), he may thus, by a sort of logical sleight-of-hand, succeed in exhibiting to the dazzled eyes of his admiring disciples an *uniform* impression of some sublime and unalterable stability of faith which it is the exclusive privilege of his own communion to afford. Simple as is this sophism, the substance of voluminous treatises of school divines on this endless topic, seems to resolve into nothing better<sup>p</sup>. It is hence, too, that, as another mo-

<sup>o</sup> I say this, to avoid all discussion of that “assent inevident” and “assent obscure,” by which some of the schoolmen have, with a miserably obvious aim, laboured to mystify the nature of Faith.\*

<sup>p</sup> An unsteady hold of the same manifest distinction (no doubt

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\* [Jackson, ut sup., pp. 608, 618.—G.]



dification of the same fallacy, when Romanists argue the uncertainty of the common process of determining religious truth by evidence, they conceive of *inquiring* men, forgetting that to *such* men their own rule (which must circuitously travel to the same point in the end) could not bring one whit more real satisfaction ; and when, on the other hand, they declaim on the ease and excellence of their own, they conceive of *uninquiring* men, forgetting that to such men, whose belief is contingent on the circumstances of their position, all rules are alike.

Our present Author was of course obliged by the nature of his general argument to attempt to contribute something to this question of continuous Infallible Authority. His contribution, however [Chap. ii. Sect. 2], is remarkably brief, and on the whole, hardly worthy of his genius. We are, probably, to attribute it to the humility of the catechumen, that he has not yet permitted himself to be original upon this venerable common-place. However it be explained, there is certainly no part of his argument in which he has been more signally ineffective than in this, by far the most indispensable of all. I shall endeavour to offer a few observations upon it in another communication.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.

exhibiting itself in a style of eloquent disquisition, considerably more agreeable than school divinity), seems to be at the bottom of our author's unsatisfactory chapter about Faith and Reason, pp. 327-337.



## LETTER VII.



DEAR SIR,

I have to offer you a few remarks on that indispensable portion of Mr. Newman's argument, in which he attempts to sustain his hypothesis of Development by the auxiliary hypothesis of a "*Developing Authority* in Christianity."

I am not aware that I do any real injustice to the course of this author's reasoning, when I exhibit it somewhat unceremoniously in this fashion. Certain doctrines and practices exist which have little or no express authority in Scripture or countenance in Ecclesiastical Antiquity. They are attractive, or at least connected with a system which has become so ; and it would be exceedingly pleasant to be able to believe and to justify them. They may be justified by *supposing* the Christian revelation designed to be communicated to men in the way of successive additions in the course of ages. Therefore it *was* so designed. But as endless additions are conceivable, and numerous opposing additions have actually been made, it would be useful that there were some authority to decide among them. Therefore there *is* such an authority.

Connecting the commencing and closing links of the chain, we obtain the highly satisfactory inference : certain agreeable tenets exist ; therefore they are infallibly guaranteed, and infallibly certain.

The author may object to this : he may urge that I omit a collateral link ; his *independent* proofs (pp. 94–114) of the probability of development in Christianity. I will insert it, when I can discover a single candid reader of either communion who will declare that he honestly believes that this argument about the *likelihood* of developments (in the present extent and import of the term) would ever have been concocted *except in view of the very peculiarities to be accounted for*<sup>a</sup>, and in consequence of the felt impossibility of accounting for them without such assumption ; who will declare his belief that (to reduce the matter to an intelligible test), if the doctrine of the universal Christian Church now stood precisely as it stood in the first ages, Mr. Newman, or any other speculative divine, would ever have prospectively demanded for that Church any *future*

<sup>a</sup> “An hypothesis to account for *a difficulty*,” as he himself candidly confesses, p. 27. But how did the difficulty arise which only this hypothesis can save ? He compares his hypothesis (as I believe I have before noticed), to “the explanation given by astronomers of the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies.” What should we have thought of some astronomer of superhuman powers, who should first contrive to derange the heavenly bodies, and then gravely devise an astronomical hypothesis to account for the difficulty ; or a geologist (to take another of his illustrations, p. 28, and a more manageable one) who should take for natural strata the fragments of a mine dislocated and disordered by the workmen, and set about inventing an hypothesis to account for the sadly “difficult” facts he had to deal with ?

right of “development,” beyond that right, or duty, of logical inference and practical application, which, in common with those ages, I have every where abundantly conceded and claimed. Nay, I will grant his antecedent argument, when Mr. Newman *himself* shall distinctly state his conviction that any prelate or doctor of the Nicene age, who should have professed to regard the doctrine of the Trinity as a matter of Church revelation, neither known nor intended to be known in the first ages, and resting for its real security on the infallible authority of the Church alone—would have escaped the instant anathema of that very Church as a scoffing Arian. Is *this* too much to ask—too much to demand of one who, in deserting the principles of Catholicism, still, at least, clings to the name,—that he should distinctly affirm a belief that his book would not have been condemned as heterodox by the saints he prays to ? And yet I am perfectly willing to abide the issue. Mr. Newman is deep—few of our time more so—in Athanasius and Hilary; let him tranquilly reflect what either of these holy men—what Basil, again, or Nazianzen,—would have thought of the *follower* who had dared to insinuate that the truth they dedicated their time and toil to establishing on Scripture warrant, and confirming by inherited tradition, was, after all, the tardy growth of their own age ; a truth which Sabellius was a heretic for attempting too hastily to anticipate (p. 352)—a heretic for presuming to penetrate what Athanasius was a saint for defending ; in itself only one hypothesis among many, and demanding but provisional acceptance until—if even then—a Church



decision—a Roman decision—should fix and authorize the floating mass of conjecture<sup>b</sup>.

It is idle, then, to speak of probabilities prior to the facts, which *in times prior to the facts* would have been dismissed by all men as dangerous and chimerical; idle to speak of arguments as *independent*, which are, themselves, attempts at illustrating an arbitrary hypothesis, and derive all the little plausibility they possess solely from their understood subservience to the object the hypothesis is brought to maintain. I will not admit that to be in itself and antecedently probable which Athanasius or Augustine would never have suspected as *possible*. I will not admit that light to be “independent” which is wholly reflected from the object it is brought to illumine; or consent to admit for “antecedent” proof the forecast shadow of the fact itself to be proved!

But when, instead of this imposing scheme of probabilities, independently constructed in dependance on

<sup>b</sup> Not such was the opinion of one whose singularly solid judgment gives great weight to his testimony as to a matter of fact on which the written and traditional evidence must have been more abundant in his day than it can be in our's. “Who, before the profane Pelagius, ever claimed such power for the will as to deny that the grace of God was necessary to aid it in the particular acts of obedience? Who, before his marvellous [“prodigiosum”] disciple Celestius, ever denied that the whole human race was brought under the guilt of Adam's sin? *Who, before the blasphemer* [“sacrillegum”] *Arius*, dared to divide in his creed the Unity of the Trinity? *Who, before the wretched* [“sceleratum”] *Sabellius*, to confuse the Trinity of the Unity?”—*Vincent. Lirin. Commonit.* c. 34. [foll. 32–3. Paris. 1561.—There is nothing in the original corresponding to the words “in his creed.”—G.]

the very innovations they were to recommend, we substitute the manifest, the hardly disguised fact, that the probability of the hypothesis is solely to be found in the service it can render towards making the innovations tolerable, we find the whole argument revolve in as pretty a circle as any the schools can furnish. I believe certain doctrines, because of infallible authority. I believe infallible authority, because of its antecedent necessity. I believe it antecedently necessary, because of developments wanting to be directed. I believe developments to want direction, because they must exist in great variety. I believe they must exist, because certain doctrines exist which I cannot otherwise prove to be part of the Christian religion. I believe them to be part of the Christian religion, because of infallible authority. This again, as before, I conclude from its antecedent necessity. And so on, the theological *cycloid* is anew described, as the circle rotates *in omne volubilis ævum*.

But it is time to proceed to some closer examination of our author's arguments for his DEVELOPING AUTHORITY.

It is to be carefully observed in this question of Infallible Authority, that the infallibility to be made good is *not* any infallible authority of the diffusive, or even the representative, universal Church, as such, (though, even on this ground, as we shall presently see, the peculiar positions of the author would be almost equally inconclusive). It would be a waste of time to go about proving that no such universal voice has spoken collectively for ages. The infallibility exclusively at issue in this controversy is that which is alleged to be by



special divine gift vested in the Church in connexion with the bishop of the city of Rome. The localization of the gift, its concentration in and around a particular patriarchate, its identification with the decisions or opinions of one exclusive line of prelates, uttering itself by one fixed and definite organ (whether Pope, or Pope and Western Council), as distinct from all others, or from all together,—*this* is the thing to be proved essential to all revealed religion (p. 124),—the thing without which, sternly rejected though it be by fully one half of those now on earth, who name the name of Christ, it is to be proved antecedently impossible for Christianity to exist. This, I say, must be carefully remembered as the real question; because Mr. Newman, in that inspired abandonment which is the privilege of genius, has unfortunately chanced to overlook it. Humbler inquirers will find time to observe that, from the very nature of the new theory, even granting that a special promise protects the Christian Church at large in the possession of fundamental truths, the real argument has not even *begun*, until the author has instructed us at what time this Christian Church at large formally, or even constructively, consigned—or how it could ever have had the power to consign, and that in new and *enlarged* terms—its corporate gift to the Church of the western patriarch. Unless he can do this—which I may take the liberty of reminding him he perfectly well knows he cannot do,—the unity of his professing historical development is shattered to pieces; and with—to go no further—the whole Eastern Church resolutely, amid all its many weaknesses, denying the transference, what is it, to speak plainly, but a



gross imposition on the part of those advocates whom Mr. Newman has too confidingly followed, to keep assuming that there is any connexion at all between the alleged infallibility of the consenting Universal Church (whatever that amounts to), and the perpetual inspiration of any single<sup>c</sup> communion within it, as long as all the rest strenuously disclaim the usurpation?—Does he, then, intend by his authoritative sanction of developments the voice of *the* Church? It has never once delivered sentence in his favour. Does he intend the infallible decision of the *Roman* Church? Let him but distinctly *say* this, and steadily keep to it; and his hypothesis of a developing authority rises in all the unenviable singularity (I can hardly recall another theological invention that has contrived to combine *both*) of being at once an assumption of the point to be proved, and even then internally inconsistent; of purchasing contradiction at the price of begging the question.

I shall endeavour to explain this more exactly. Let me first view the theory in connexion with the doctrine really in question, the *local* Infallibility; and afterwards

<sup>c</sup> [Archbishop Bramhall points out the same assumption in the argument of *La Milletière*. “I presume this is one of the idiotisms of your language, in which by the *Church* you always understand the *Roman* Church, making *Roman* and *Catholic* to be *convertibles*. . . There is a vast difference between the Catholic Church, and a patriarchal Church. The Catholic Church can never fail; any patriarchal Church may apostate and fail. We have a promise that the candle shall not be put out; we have no promise that the candlesticks shall not be removed.”—*Works*, Vol. i. p. 43, in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*. Compare Leslie, *Works*, Vol. i. p. 386, *seqq.*, iii. p. 91. Oxford, 1832.]

more generally, in its relation to infallible guidance *in general*. I shall dedicate this Letter to the former.

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I. In assuming that Christian Doctrine was to “develop,” that the Apostles’ Creed was originally intended in due season to expand into the Creed of Pius IV., Mr. Newman admits that many opposing developments of the New Testament were possible or probable; and as one only series, among innumerable coexistent lines of development, could be *true*, and this true series of value only as we could be *ascertained* of its truth, he concludes that an infallible guide must have been provided to pilot the mind of the Church through these tempests of conflicting developments, and give us the requisite assurance. Correct development alone is to be accepted as divine; and this alone can secure its correctness. This infallible guide, we have seen, is to be heard in the decisions of the Western Patriarch in a council of his prelates; if the theory is ever to prove its point, no other is in question, for no other will ever involve the conclusion to which the whole theory is subordinate—the claims of the existing papal supremacy. Now Mr. Newman admits,—abundantly admits,—what indeed it would be perfectly idle to deny in the present state of historical knowledge,—that the Roman primacy and its prerogatives were themselves a subsequent formation; “the Church was first Catholic, *then* Papal,” is his own memorable affirmation. In other words, the Roman infallibility—the infallibility denied by England and the East, by the Church of Andrewes and Taylor, by the Church of Chrysostom



and Basil—is admitted to share, along with the Worship of Images, the Trinity, Original Sin, and other Church revelations, the character of a gradually developed doctrine, a slow, however sure, discovery in fundamental truth. That is to say,—the security of development resolves into that which is *itself* a development; we are satisfied that development is a divine law, and that an otherwise uncertain body of doctrine is legitimately developed, because the chief development in the whole mass of uncertainty says so. We must first assume the whole line of developments perfectly correct, in order to be sure of the Roman infallibility—for it is but one among them; and we must first assume the Roman infallibility certain, in order to pronounce the developments perfectly correct—for it is this very necessity that makes the infallibility indispensable.

II. That this collateral security for the development process is thus not (as Mr. Newman seems strangely to have persuaded himself) “external to the developments” (p. 117), but itself included among them, and, therefore, no more authorized to guide them than they to guide themselves; that a development directive of all others cannot claim authority on this pretext of the uncertainty of all developments, without itself requiring an antecedent guarantee, to be similarly warranted, without end; that thus mutually confronted, the Development and the Infallibility hang their heads like two detected witnesses, who appeal to *each other* for a character;—all this, no doubt, appears *more* palpable when the infallibility is understood (as it ever ought in this controversy to be understood) in its peculiar Roman sense; for few at this time of day will have the courage



to maintain that *that* can be regarded as more really primitive than any other of the developments to be defended. But it must not be forgotten that, in truth, the same fallacy is involved in every view in which the development hypothesis is connected with the alleged necessity of a *visible, unerring guide*, of whatever kind, corporate or individual, local or universal. For as the authority of such a tribunal was assuredly never, even once, the ground on which the primitive teachers rested their dogmatic determinations, we are still forced to view the *recognition* of such an arbiter of faith (wherever situated), the public admission of it for a sole and all-sufficing medium of proof in theological reasonings, as itself a development, and a late one ; and we are again brought, as before, to the inevitable paralogism of an infallible development, the child of the Church's later years, authorizing its own elder brethren, and *that* belief obtaining currency and acceptance at a period comparatively modern, without which we are, nevertheless, expected to admit that no previous belief, in the long chronology of development, could ever have been safe or certain !

III. But besides this manifest confusion inherent in the attempt to make a tardy infallibility the regulator of antecedent development, it is impossible not to observe how poorly the speculation matches with the historical facts. The [Roman] infallible tribunal is maintained to be required from the variety and discordance of developments. Now no person, moderately informed in the history of the Church, can fail to see that the probability founded in this alleged want was infinitely stronger at a period before the Roman authority arose

at all ; that authority having been first commonly acknowledged in the West at a time when the controversies here held to necessitate it were beginning to disappear in the growing barbarism of the age, and to be lost in the fiercer tumults that accompanied the formation of the new political divisions of Europe. If an infallible See was ever required to direct doctrinal development, it was at the very period when, it is now hardly denied, the gift was never claimed or suspected ; the history of fundamental development was closed before the authority was recognised, without which, we are now instructed, that no right development can ever proceed. Through all the endless perplexities of the Gnostic reveries, through the imposing austerities of Montanism, through the important and difficult discussions connected with the question of Heretical Baptisms, through the conflict with Manicheism, through the various stages of the long Trinitarian controversy—from Theodotus and Artemon, from Noetus and Praxeas and Sabellius, to the Council of Chalcedon, and later—not to add the practical difficulties of Novatianism, Donatism, and other incessant schisms—the Church, under that Divine Providence which has guaranteed its indefectible perpetuity, made its way, altogether unassisted<sup>d</sup> by the “Developing Authority” of an infal-

<sup>d</sup> [“It is most prodigious that, in the disputes managed by the Fathers against heretics, (the Gnostics, Valentinians, Marcionites, Montanists, Manichees, Paulianists, Arians, &c.), they should not, even in the first place, allege and urge the sentence of the universal Pastor and Judge, as a most evidently conclusive argument, as the most efficacious and compendious method of convincing and silencing them. . . . Whereas divers of the Fathers purposely do treat on methods of confuting heretics, it is strange they should be so blind or dull as



libre See. The labour was great, but the Church knew no way of abridging it; the responsibility was tremendous, but the Church knew no way of evading it. Not even once, through all those periods of trial, not once through the fifty or sixty enormous folios that still remain as the memorials of the men who preached, and wrote, and struggled through those critical times, is mention made of this ultimate court of appeal, whose judgment was to be the unerring test of truth, whose voice an echo from the inmost sanctuary of heaven. No where is Athanasius heard to proclaim "Rome has decided for the consubstantial Son, and infidels alone can now prolong the dispute;" never once declares Augustine, "Rome has pronounced against Pelagius<sup>e</sup>, and further argument is superfluous." Both, like all their contemporaries, go to work with their Bibles in the most unequivocally "Protestant" fashion, and appeal to the common belief of their predecessors, like simple Catholics who knew no better. Their Scripture texts are not confirmations, but principles. The Syrian exegetics, against which our author deals such unmeasured reprobation<sup>f</sup>, (as if a revelation in human language

not to hit on this most proper and obvious way of referring debates to the decision of him, to whose office of universal Pastor and Judge it did belong."—Barrow. (*Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy*, p. 171. Ed. Cardwell.)]

<sup>e</sup> [S. Prosper, (*Carmen de Ingratis*,) whatever interpretation be put upon his words, has said, with reference to Pelagianism :

..... "Pestem subeuntem prima recidit  
Sedes Roma Petri : quæ pastoralis honoris  
Facta caput mundo, quidquid non possidet armis  
Religione tenet."—G.]

<sup>f</sup> See p. 282, &c. The simple fact appears to be, that the Syrian



is not to be fairly examined by the laws of language,) were never declined by such Catholic disciples of the

critical school instructed quite *as many* Catholic doctors as heterodox teachers; a pretty manifest indication, one would think, that Scriptural criticism *can* exist and flourish without any inherent heretical tendency; that the heresy, when it does come, is rather in the soil than in the seed. I can hardly regard it as very respectful to Revelation to maintain that “comments, clear, natural, methodical, apposite, and logically exact” (p. 284), naturally lead to heresy; or that “Nestorianism is founded on the literal interpretation of Scripture” (p. 290), for any mind that would not have got at heterodoxy under any interpretation.

Of course hypercriticism in Scripture interpretation is an abuse; and just so is extravagant submission to human authority an abuse; and an ingenious disquisition on the evils of the one proves, for the point at issue, precisely as much as a similar display of rhetoric on the evils of the other.

The writer of the following sentence does not seem to have contemplated the task of biblical criticism with these apprehensions. “Præmunitus scientiâ linguarum, ne in verbis locutionibusque ignotis hæreat; præmunitus etiam cognitione quarundem rerum necessariarum, ne vim naturamve earum quæ propter similitudinem adhibentur, ignoret; adjuvante etiam codicum veritate, quam sollers emendationis diligentia procuravit; veniat ita instructus ad ambigua Scripturarum discutienda atque solvenda,” &c.—*S. August. De Doctrin. Christ. Lib. iii. Cap. 1.* [*Opp. Tom. iii. i. 33. ed. Ben. Amst. —G.*]

Mr. Newman observes (p. 287), “that the Syrian critics tended as to Nestorianism, so by a parallel movement to Sacramentarianism;” and attempts to evade under this pretext the well-known testimony attributed to St. Chrysostom, and that of Theodoret, against the Roman dogma. He ought to have carried the speculation a step farther. The truth is, that the Nestorian and *Eutychian* heresies seem remarkably enough reflected in the rival errors about the Holy Supper; the cold symbolism of the one party, the transubstantiation of the other. And we all know how irresistibly the recognized fact of the permanence of the elements in the Eucharist was employed

school as Chrysostom, or Cyril of Jerusalem, or Ephrem, or Basil, whenever they thought that biblical criticism could be turned to a Catholic account. There is no one of the dogmatic treatises of those times (allowance made for peculiarities of style and incidental allusions nowise relevant to the present question) which might not have been the production of our Hammond, or Pearson, or Taylor; there is not one of them, say Athanasius's Discourses against the Arians, Augustine's general summaries of the faith in his work on Catechizing, or the like, that could by any possibility be conceived written, as it stands, by Romish divines<sup>g</sup>. I will not now insist how fatal, beyond all hope of evasion, is this universal blank<sup>h</sup> in one of the alleged essentials of Christianity and Christian Church membership to the Roman pretensions to antiquity. It is unnecessary to argue what is at last confessed; but I must now beg to press it as

for the very purpose of denying the *Personal Transubstantiation* imagined by Eutyches for our Lord Himself; employed by a Pope in the fifth century to condemn by anticipation the doctrine of his own Church in the thirteenth. [Gelasius Papa I. *De duabus Naturis in Christo*: Scripta Veterum Latina, fol. 84, b. ed. Simler. Tiguri, 1571.—G.]

<sup>g</sup> A convenient, though imaginary, test, which I beg my reader carefully to remember in reference to a similar supposition of Mr. Newman's to which I shall have presently to introduce him.

<sup>h</sup> ["It is matter of amazement, if the Pope were such as they would have him to be, that in so many bulky volumes of ancient Fathers, living through many ages after Christ, in those vast treasures of learning and knowledge, wherein all sorts of truth are displayed, all sorts of duty are pressed, this momentous point of doctrine and practice should nowhere be expressed in clear and peremptory terms."—Barrow. (*Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy*, p. 174. ed. Cardwell.)]



a consideration no less fatal to the new shift than to the old. If the need of this central infallibility infer—make even plausible—the fact of its existence, how is it that the fact never arose until the need had in a great measure ceased? The controversies, which Rome has actually undertaken by her authority to decide, were incomparably less important than those which the Church contrived to decide without it. “Popes are summoned into action at the call of the dogmatic principle” (p. 348). Whatever this precisely means (and doubtless it is a highly satisfactory account of the origin of a power which no man can doubt, and be saved), how is it to be explained that the dogmatic principle never dreamed of calling for “Popes” until the best and hardest of its work was well nigh done? One might add that, as at all times, the genius of the East was more inclined than that of the West to theological disputation, if the *need* of the tribunal be the argument of its existence, the tribunal was strangely misplaced. But in truth its origin was very different.

IV. The first development of the Roman supremacy was not doctrinal, but disciplinary; it was not as an inspired arbiter of faith, but as an ecclesiastical sovereignty, that (except incidentally) it strove to enforce its precedence. From the very nature of the disputes that accompanied its claims to power, which were necessarily to a considerable degree theological, claims to primacy among the Christian dioceses would be (as in St. Leo) naturally attended with lofty celebrations of the unshaken orthodoxy of the See; but the real object of ambition was not doctrinal ascendancy, but something very much more congenial (it is to be feared) to



the temper of “those firm-minded Latins.” The supposed necessity of a single central tribunal of theology, in any distinct or matured form, was the conception of a far later age ; it arose when the ecclesiastical usurpation began to be disliked on doctrinal grounds, and when it thus became absolutely necessary either to give up the supremacy of power or to assert a parallel supremacy of inspired knowledge. There cannot be a greater historical mistake than to date the dogmatic supremacy of Rome as if it synchronized with its ecclesiastical monarchy ; the distinct recognition of this mysterious gift really ranks among the latest of those developments, which, nevertheless, if this perilous advocate is to be credited, were in all probability (a probability so great that the chance of the infallible gift itself rests upon it<sup>i</sup>) a tissue of mistakes, until this tardy luminary arose, to light the Church to doing what was done before it appeared.

V. And how completely, at whatever time its rise be dated, the history of dogma, in connexion with this local infallible directory, contradicts the superficial fancy of a *regular and consistent development* of seminal truths<sup>k</sup> into maturer doctrine, I am sure I need hardly remind any intelligent student of historical theology.

<sup>i</sup> For since the probability of the Infallible Gift is grounded on its utility or necessity to prevent error, it must of course be exactly equal to the probability that as long as it was wanting there would be, and *was*, error.

<sup>k</sup> As Stapleton expresses it, (in a violent effort to explain away St. Augustine’s celebrated saying about subsequent plenary Councils frequently correcting their predecessors’ decisions): “Concilia posteriora ‘emendant,’ id est, perfectius *explicant* (!) fidem in *semine antiquæ doctrinæ latentem*,” &c.—*Relect. Controv.* vi. q. 3. A. 4;

What shall we say of a “development” that *formally denies* the earlier truth out of which it is said to spring; and what shall we say of the infallibility that guarantees *both*? Take the establishment of the Canon of Holy Scripture; a great and momentous object, surely, for the exhibition of this supernatural prudence, and one which we are perpetually told could never otherwise have been securely attained. Yet it is notorious (not to speak of the universal and uniform belief of the Eastern Church, the express declarations<sup>1</sup> of such men as Eusebius and Athanasius, and Epiphanius and Nazianzen, in opposition to the ultimate Roman decision,) that St. Jerome<sup>m</sup> (whom St. Hilary<sup>n</sup> corroborates,) confessedly the highest authority in such matters in the Latin Church, repeatedly and energetically denies the canonicity of books sanctioned at Trent; it is notorious

[*Princip. Fidei doct. Relectio*, p. 612. Antverp. 1596.—G.] where Mr. Newman may find some anticipation of his theory by a very voluminous, and sometimes an acute controversialist.

<sup>1</sup> [For a full account of these “express declarations” of Eusebius, Athanasius, Epiphanius, and Nazianzen, see Cosin’s *Scholastical History of the Canon. Works* (in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*), Vol. iii. Numb. liii. lv. lxiv. lxvi.]

<sup>m</sup> [“Nonnulli Scriptorum veterum hunc (librum Sapientiæ) esse Judæi Philonis affirmant. Sicut ergo Judith, et Tobiae, et Machabæorum libros legit quidem Ecclesia, sed eos inter Canonicas Scripturas non recipit; sic et hæc duo volumina legat ad ædificationem plebis, non ad auctoritatem Ecclesiasticorum dogmatum confirmandam.”—*S. Hier. Præf. in Lib. Salom.*, Tom. ix. Col. 1296. Twelve other testimonies against the Tridentine addition to the Canon are produced by Bishop Cosin, *ubi sup.* out of the writings of Jerome.]

<sup>n</sup> [St. Hilary gives a catalogue of the canonical books, according to the Jewish division into twenty-two books.—*S. Hilar. Prol. Explanat. in Psal.*, pp. 335, 336.]



that Pope Gregory the Great himself, at a much later period, has done the same°. Take, again, the common belief of the separate *locus refrigerii* for the souls of the blessed<sup>p</sup>, *developing* into a positive doctrine of their present sovereignty with Christ in supreme glory. Take

° See Stillingfleet on all this question of the Canon, “Council of Trent Examined,” &c. [Page 36. edit. 2. Lond. 1688.—G.] The holy Pope employs, I may add, nearly the language of our Article; his expression having been, perhaps, formed like our own on St. Jerome: “Libris, licet non canonicis, sed tamen ad ædificationem plebis [Ecclesiæ.—G.] editis.”—*Moral. in Job. lib. xix. s. 34.* [Opp. Tom. i. col. 622. edit. Ben.—G.] Compare the decision of Canus: “Oportet judicem vivum in Ecclesiâ esse, qui fidei controversias decidere possit. (Siquidem Deus in necessariis Ecclesiæ suæ non defuit.) At librum esse canonicum necne, *fidem maxime tangit.*”—*De Loc. Theol.* 11. [ii. p. 30. Lugd. 1704.—G.] vii. (quoted, Thorndike, “Princ. of Chr. Truth, 1. ii. §. 4.) [page 23. *Works*, Vol. ii. P. i. Library of Anglo-Cath. Theol. Oxf. 1845.—G.] Of course the old subterfuge of the pope *quatenus* “private doctor,” may be employed to salve this difficulty; but what shall be done with his manifest *testimony*, even as a private doctor, to the belief—at the lowest, the uncertainty, in despite of previous alleged decisions—of his Church on this important point, and at so late a period of her infallible legislation?

<sup>p</sup> “Fideles omnes reservabuntur in sinu scilicet interim Abrahæ collocati, quo adire impios interjectum chaos inhibet, quousque introeundi rursum in regnum cœlorum tempus adveniat.”—*Hil. in Ps. cxx.* [. . . “futuri boni exspectatio est, cùm exeuntes de corpore ad introitum illum regni cœlestis per custodiam Domini fideles omnes reservabuntur,” &c. (S. Hilarii *Opp.* 383. ed. Bened.)—G.] And this seems to have been, on the whole, the customary conjecture of the times. Pope John XXII., long after, fell into the *heresy*, and had in some imperfect way, when dying, to recant it, of reviving the supposition that the fulness of the Beatific Vision is postponed till after the Judgment. [For the last sentence in this note, and the reference to Fleury, compare Maclaine’s Mosheim, Cent. xiv. ii. ii. §. 9.—G.] (See Fleury, xciv. xxi.)



the admission of the impossibility of penitential satisfaction after death<sup>q</sup>, *developing* into an elaborate system of purgatorial pains, and their remission. The universal belief, that none but God ought to be the object of religious supplication<sup>r</sup>, *developing* into the worship of

<sup>q</sup> “Quod munus\* [apparently the “purgatio salubri satisfactione” which he has just before mentioned] in corpore non receperit, *consequi exutus carne non poterit*,” &c.—*Leo M. Ep. xci.* [aliàs lxxxiii.—G.] *ad Theodor.*

<sup>r</sup> *St. Augustin. De verâ Relig. c. lv.* [*Opp. Tom. i. 587.*—G.] *De Civit. Dei, Lib. xxii. c. 10*: “Suo ordine nominantur, *non invocantur.*” [“Suo loco et ordine nominantur, non tamen à Sacerdote, qui sacrificat, invocantur.” (col. 1355. Basil. 1570.)—G.] So the Greeks commonly; *Origen. c. Cels. V. iv.* [p. 239. Cantab. 1658.—G.] *Athanas. contr. Arian. III. xxv. §. 6.* [*Orat. iii. cont. Arian. §. 12. p. 561. ed. Ben.*—G.] *S. Chrysost. et Theod. on Col. ii.* [and Theod. on Col. iii. 17, (*Opp. Tom. ii. 138. Colon. Agripp. 1573.*) as the Oxford editor presently mentioned informs us; and he, be it remembered, was Mr. Newman himself.—G.] Passages of plain doctrinal explanation, which no bursts of oratory, or passing conjectures of writers inexperienced in the peril of all conjectures on such matters, (as the single word so often cited from St. Ambrose†), can properly coun-

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\* [There is not any such reading as this either in an old (Colon. Agr. 1569.) or in Quesnel's (Lugd. 1700.) edition of S. Leo's works. The word “manens,” not “munus,” is found in both, as well as in the Canon Law, to which part of this Epistle has been transferred. (*Decret. ii. Par. Caus. xxxiii. Quæst. iii. De Pœn. Dist. i. Cap. xlix.*) It is access to sacramental communion, by means of reconciliation, that the Pontiff declares cannot be obtained by any one after death.—G.]

† [See Gieseler, i. 288.—It is an erroneous and mischievous assertion of this writer, that S. Ambrose “is the first who seems to recommend” the worship of Angels. In proof of his supposition he adduces these words, to which Professor Butler evidently alludes, from C. ix. *De Viduis*: “obsecrandi sunt Angeli [pro nobis,] qui nobis ad præsidium dati sunt.” (S. Amb. *Opp. iv. 505.*) This passage exhibits more than a “passing conjecture” of S. Ambrose, but much less than a recommendation of the propriety of rendering religious *worship* to Angels. As well might it be said that Jacob prayed to an Angel when he desired that a ministering Spirit might be employed to “bless the lads;” or that David invoked a created being when he used the denunciation, “Let the Angel of the Lord persecute them;” or

real or imaginary saints. The custom of commending to God's merciful care the Virgin Mother, with other saints departed this life<sup>s</sup>, *developing* into praying *to* her

terbalance; even if *any* amount of traditional testimony could disturb the assurance Holy Scripture must convey to every candid mind on the question. The late Editor of the Oxford English Athanasius thinks it necessary to warn us that such places as I have referred to do not contain "the whole doctrine of Origen, &c. on the *cultus angelorum*;" and that of "course they are not inconsistent with such texts as 1 Tim. v. 21," [*Select Treatises*, &c. pp. 417, 418]; as if that text *did*, in any conceivable way, warrant any such *cultus*! and "*such* texts," as if the place were one of a large class of proofs, and not notably peculiar. Perhaps the commentator meant to include among "such texts" as demonstrate the *cultus angelorum*, the "let no man beguile you in worshiping of angels" (the very *cultus* itself without a shadow of difference, except that *θησκεία* is Greek, and *cultus* is Latin), of Col. ii. 18; and the "See thou do it not," of Rev. xix. 10; xxii. 8.

It is a real pity that this very profound, able, and diligent performance, which recals in our days the learned labours of St. Maur and the Oratory, should be stained by such unhappy blemishes as these.

<sup>s</sup> Customary in the Liturgies: \* "Be mindful, Lord, of thy Saints, who have pleased Thee in their generations, &c., patriarchs, pro-

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that we worship the "Angels of the Lord," and the "Spirits and Souls of the Righteous," when we publicly read the *Benedicite*. Assuredly a very great distinction should be made between the Romish direct solicitation of assistance from Angels and Saints, and the earnest expression of a wish that Angelical protection may be granted through the favour of God, according to His promise, and that the heavenly host may *pray for us*, which is all that S. Ambrose intended. "Tu, vidua," (he continues,) "invenis qui pro te supplicent, si quasi verè vidua et desolata in Deum speres, instes obsecrationibus, insistas orationibus," &c. The true doctrine of S. Ambrose is contained in his solemn declaration, "Sed tamen TU SOLUS, DOMINE, INVOCANDUS ES." (*Conc. de obitu Theod. Imp. Opp.* v. 122.) Compare Tyler's *Worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary*, p. 254. Lond. 1846. Palmer's *Fifth Letter to Wiseman*, p. 50. Oxford, 1841.—G.]

\* [Vid. Renaudotii *Liturg. Collect.* i. 18. Paris. 1716. Taylor's *Dissuasive from Popery*, Part ii. Book ii. Sect. ii. p. 504. Lond. 1673.—G.]



as all but supreme in heaven. The abhorrence of Images, whose veneration was condemned so late as by Gregory the Great on the eve of the seventh century<sup>t</sup>, *developing* into their erection as objects of public prostration in Christian churches. The belief of the equality of bishops<sup>u</sup>, *developing* into papal supremacy by original divine right. The belief of the danger and impiety of half-communion<sup>w</sup>, *developing* into making it

phets, and every just spirit departed hence in the faith of Christ ; especially of the holy, glorious, Virgin," &c. And after a celebration, in the glowing style of the age, of the amazing favour done her in the Incarnation, whereby, as they say, "her womb was made the seat of Him whom the Heavens cannot contain," St. John the Baptist, St. Stephen the proto-martyr, and sometimes the saint by whom the Church had been first founded, are similarly commended to divine protection. Sometimes God is besought to hear the prayers offered to him on behalf of the Church militant by His departed servants, (See *Cyrril. Catech. Mystagog.* v. 6.) [p. 539. Paris. 1609.—G.] as being still one with us in the mystical communion of the Body of Christ; an introduction of a later date, so far as extant liturgies attest, into the public service of some churches ; and perhaps an instance of that too ambitious "intrusion into things not seen," hardly pardonable in private speculation, quite unjustifiable in public offices, but essentially and manifestly distinct from the Roman Invocation.

<sup>t</sup> "Adorare [adorari verò.—G.] Imagines modis omnibus veta."—*Epist.* ix. 9. [*Epistt.* Lib. xi. Indict. iv. Ep. xiii. Opp. Tom. ii. 1101. edit. Bened.—G.] He had himself, however, criminally departed from primitive prudence in tolerating them in the churches as memorials, against the universal judgment of earlier times.

<sup>u</sup> See *Epist.* of Roman Clergy to S. Cyprian. [*Ep.* xxx. p. 56. ed. Fell.—G.] So *Pope Symmachus* ad Æonium Arelat. [*Binii Concilia*, Tom. ii. P. i. p. 511. Colon. Agripp. 1618.—G.] So again *Greg. M.* *Epist.* vi. 30. [*S. Greg. Epistt.* Lib. ix. Indict. ii. Ep. lix. Opp. ii. 976.—G.]

<sup>w</sup> Pope Gelasius in *Decret.* iii. P. de Consecr. Dist. ii. §. 12. [Cap.



heresy to deny it. The assertion of papal secular supremacy by Gregory, and Innocent, and Boniface (as real a development as the religious *papacy* itself), *developing* into a still later abdication of it. The condemnation of the peculiarities of Montanism, *developing* (according to this author, p. 351) into their universal dissemination and adoption. Nay, the condemnation of *the very principle* of “development” by the Roman representatives, in common with others, at the Council of Ephesus, *developing* into its triumphant establishment. These are only brief and transient hints, but they are easily verified and easily enlarged; and do they not, even as they stand, suffice to establish the exquisite harmony of the progressive development, and the value of the infallible developer? Who can pardon Sabellius for allowing his untimely ardour for truth to hurry him too fast for such a guide?

Nor this alone—but, as if purposely to preclude the notion of an infallibility concentrated around the Roman See, it is remarkable how, notwithstanding the comparative disinclination to the subtleties of controversy so characteristic of the Western Church, the names of several of its Popes *did*, unfortunately, get so far entangled in the history of heresies as, in Mr. Newman’s gentle confession, to “leave to posterity the

xii.—G.] “Comperimus autem,” &c., “quia divisio unius ejusdemque sacramenti [mysterii.—G.] *sine grandi sacrilegio non potest provenire.*” [Bp. Taylor, ut sup. p. 303.—G.]

*Concil. Trident.* Sess. xxi. Canon 2: “Si quis dixerit sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam non justis causis et rationibus adductam fuisse, ut laicos, atque etiam clericos non conficientes, sub panis tantummodo specie communicaret, aut in eo errasse; *anathema sit!*”

burden of their defence.” Liberius, Zosimus, Vigilius, Honorius, represent the infallible accuracy of the papacy of the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries, and in the most pressing and important controversies of their respective times. *Such* accuracy upon the points on which we agree, may well dispose us to yield to the same authority upon those on which we differ.

VI. The Roman authority has not, then, very efficiently discharged its office of infallible superintendent of developments. But (as I intimated in a former letter) there *is* a real and important sense in which Christianity does admit of varieties which may, if we please it, be termed developments, and these distinct, too, from mere logical deductions; I mean those allowable *adaptations* which, in the second of these Letters, I have included, with other facts of the same kind, under the general head of “historical developments,” by which it justifiably meets and admits the diversities of individual and national character. It is one of the peculiar excellencies of this universal dispensation that it can bear all climates. But it usually receives, as the healthiest constitutions will, the outward complexion of the climate it inhabits. Here then it is that the local<sup>x</sup> “developing authority” now in question, so far from

<sup>x</sup> [Compare Barrow. “Whereas all the world in design and obligation is Christian (the utmost parts of the earth being granted in possession to our Lord, and His Gospel extending to every creature under heaven), and may in effect become such, when God pleaseth, by acceptance of the Gospel; . . . it is thence hugely incommodious that all the Church should depend upon an authority resident in one place, and to be managed by one person.”—*Treatise of the Pope’s Supremacy*, p. 190. Ed. Cardwell.]



being necessary or even expedient, is almost invariably mischievous in its operation. Instead of assisting such developments, it cramps, and fetters, and distorts them. We may be assured, (however indirectly useful now and again), it was never designed as a permanent divine provision in that dispensation, when “*all* flesh should come to worship” before the Lord; when “the isles afar off, that had not heard His fame nor seen His glory,” should be brought to hear and to behold; “when the abundance of the sea should be converted, and the forces of the Gentiles” won to the Church of God.

The Christianity, for example, of the North and South of Europe, will ever tend to characteristical differences of exterior; and this may help us to do more charitable justice to *both*. I have little sympathy with the narrow superciliousness that objects to the Italian his preference of a symbolical and picturesque religion; his imaginative temperament, his tendency to reduce the abstract to the concrete, and all to visible form, will make *any* religion in his hands assume that aspect. Who could even conceive the “platform” of the Scotch Kirk taking permanent root, and becoming the recognised worship, in Naples, or Florence, or Rome? This may seem an extreme case, but it would be only a higher degree of what is too natural and customary with us all, the attempt to refer all the varieties of perspective under which the same great Object is beheld to our own exclusive point of standing. The true objection to this Southern Christianity, as it has stood for ages, is not that it delights in gorgeous temples and pompous processions, in the popular legend and the ready miracle; these things, so far as they are weak-



nesses, are probably no worse than our own, though they may be somewhat different from our own ; they are inherent in the very nature of the people, and he miserably underrates the native energy of Christianity who deems it must expire under the burden of this gaudy costume. The real objection is twofold. We object, in the *first* place, that these teachers have suffered the imagination not merely to adorn doctrines but to invent them ; we permit it to colour as brightly as it may the original outline of the faith ; and willingly abjure the bigotry of making our distaste, however decided, for such florid decorations, an authoritative standard to others ; but we cannot tolerate the audacity that has dared to alter the outlines themselves. Our *second* objection is to the arrogance which not only idolizes those peculiarities which to a certain extent we have as little desire to assail as to imitate, but insists upon *imposing them*, and the unhappy dogmas that accompany them, upon the world on pain of universal anathema. The very liberality which concedes to national temperament its fair (because its inevitable) influence in colouring the exterior of Christianity, is just what obliges us to resist the presumption which would make these local prepossessions a law to the world. *Hanc veniam petimus damusque vicissim*. Now it is in this view that the subject connects with the general question under discussion. For it is thus that Rome is not the protectress, but the narrow and timid enemy of all legitimate local “developments” of Christianity. A central infallibility of this kind—the infallibility of a given latitude and longitude—is essentially incompatible with the free and healthy expansion of an

universal religion. The "Developing Authority" for the globe is a petty Italian Prince, who has spent his life in the cloisters of a monastery or the cabals of a conclave ; a respectable ecclesiastic of rather limited faculties<sup>y</sup> is the legislator of a planet ; the destined religion of a thousand millions, or more, of immortals, is to be *Roman Catholic*. The God of the Gospel, who is also the God of Nature and her laws, can hardly have intended this.

But it has succeeded ! Emphatically I deny it. In this very incompatibility was rooted the movement of the Sixteenth century ; a movement, observe, which commenced the very moment that the opposing temperaments of the North and South found room fairly to exhibit themselves in the world of intelligence ; for till then the semi-barbarous North had taken its religion almost altogether upon trust ; instructed by missionaries, and largely officered by functionaries, in the interest of Rome ; receiving its entire ecclesiastical literature from the South, and possessing neither means nor inclination to detect an old and learned imposition. And even granting that, to a certain extent, this Roman monarchy has as yet kept together, and is likely for a considerable period to do so, how precarious and

<sup>y</sup> The present occupant of the position is regarded as an exception ; and the journalists are exhausted in devising expressions for an admiration which too surely testifies to the novelty of the object that excites it. Awkwardly enough, the good works of Pius IX. are without exception borrowed from heterodox models ; the supernatural wisdom of the Roman See rises to its highest manifestation in venturing a feeble, though very praiseworthy, imitation of the ordinary spirit and policy of heretical nations.



uncertain is it to argue from the history of some thirty or forty generations of men, to the real design and ultimate fortunes of a dispensation such as the Christian, that may extend (for aught any living man can tell) to *ten* times the number ; that yet, dating its annals by a “year of *our Lord*” comprising a hundred centuries, may have abandoned Europe to feebleness and barbarism, and erected its proudest patriarchates in Australia or Japan. As the case now stands, the Roman supremacy has retained in adherence nations whose physical temperament and habits naturally united them around a common centre ; it has even among these become gradually less and less powerful, exactly in proportion as the *natural* influences diminish in power ; it has for ages wholly failed where alone supernatural interference might have been plausibly inferred from success.

This inherent incompatibility of a single human monarchy with the diversities of national position and temper, points at once to the true and only Sovereign<sup>z</sup> for the Universal Church of God, in HIM who took not on Him so much the nature of *a* man as of humanity ; who, though He was pleased to assume that nature from a Jewish stock, has not borne with Him to Heaven the special influences of any clime or class, but, universal Himself as Mankind, can feel for all, and understand all, and appropriately distribute to the needs of all.

VII. This is a subject far too extensive for my present purpose, and I shall restrict myself to a brief attempt to illustrate one further observation which may

<sup>z</sup> [Compare Barrow, pp. 176, seqq.]



be thought of some importance. It is to this very principle of *local developments* of Christianity, their similarity in the same, their discrepancy in different regions, that Roman Controversy really owes almost all its plausibility in discussions about antiquity. It has been perpetually observed that the strength of the Roman case consists in the attractive resemblance which it exteriorly presents to the Church of the Fathers, even under unquestionable changes of substantial doctrine. The chief force of the very work before me consists in its highly coloured representations of this; its danger, too, for the majority of readers are superficial, and this is precisely an argument for superficial thinkers<sup>a</sup>. Now it is the incidental good fortune of the Roman centre of influence, that it occupies the very ground which itself was the theatre of ancient ecclesiastical history.

<sup>a</sup> Some parts of Mr. Newman's labours in this way are, I must, however, confess, greatly beyond the "superficial thinker." Much of his "Application of the First Test" really requires no small sharpness to penetrate its aim at all. The patient reader is at length rewarded by discovering that a series of rapid and clever sketches of early Church history is entirely intended to demonstrate a perfect resemblance between our Restored Catholicity and the doings of the Arians (p. 273, &c.), the Nestorians (p. 291, &c.), the Eutychians (p. 308, &c.), and others; the Church of Hooker and Herbert thus affording a sort of concentrated essence of all the heresies—and even the mutually opposed heresies—that have gone before it. I am not sure that this is quite creditable. The real and great abilities of Mr. Newman might, methinks, find some more dignified occupation than allegorizing history into polemical puzzles, twisting the pages of Eusebius and Theodoret into prophetic enigmas; a vexatious and often inexpressibly unfair mode of attack, which might, without any material loss, have been left where it was found—to infidelity and Gibbon.

Besides other results of this, which Italian ecclesiastics know well how to turn to use, we can at once perceive that whatever *be* the influence of race and clime, these it must inherit ; *these*, at least, must be the same, and operate in the same way, for both. If, then, there was anything of this kind to affect Hilary, or Jerome, or Leo, or Augustine himself, or their Eastern contemporaries too,—if there was anything in these secret but potent local influences, that predisposed to certain modes of life, that heightened men's habitual views of the pomp and splendour proper to religious services, that inclined to dreamy conjecture about matters supernatural, that tended, if not carefully controlled, to enthusiastic extremes, that modified the style of oratory and exposition, that gave a warm, imaginative colouring to all things religious,—if, I say, there was in those glowing Southern climes, whether of verdure or of wilderness, any *tendency* at all to beget such a tone of thought and action as this,—and if the holy men of old were men, not angels, and so, liable to the influences that necessarily move men,—and this the more readily that they had no *past*, and no *diversified* experience to preach caution,—is it not natural that the Christian movement they directed should have exhibited some exterior influences from a source so constant and powerful ; and is it not equally natural that with those exterior influences, under any amount whatever of interior change, the Church and population *of the same clime, temper, and habits*, should habitually sympathize, and so sympathizing, that it should diffuse the same external garb of Christianity through the sphere of its authority, as long as an equally powerful opposing tendency



suffered that authority to flourish? And lastly, where that opposing tendency—a national character of colder and more cautious texture—existed,—is it impossible that the divine and immortal elements of Christianity might be more accurately possessed and more reverently treasured; and yet the *external* form of religion be far less similar than in the last case to that exhibited in those earlier writers, whom, nevertheless, all equally agree to regard with respect and affection?

This consideration supplies the true key to the difficulty which Mr. Newman starts against us, in a charmingly-written passage of his book (p. 138), where he imagines Athanasius and Ambrose at Oxford, or elsewhere; and triumphantly urges that “it cannot be doubted what communion they would mistake for their own.” Not to hint what would be the probable judgment of the two Saints with regard to even the *exterior* of innumerable matters that they might see without leaving Italy itself, I will candidly admit that I should be by no means confident of a verdict, if the illustrious strangers were forced to a decision within an hour after their arrival. The modifying influences of an interval of fifteen hundred years are not to be judged by even Saints in an hour. A certain antique style of expression familiar to their ears, nay, the old Latin phraseology itself; the monastic circle in which they were wont so often to find retreat and refreshment; the pomp of services grateful to the glowing imaginations of Alexandria and Milan;—these things, and the like, would attract; for who is there among us that does not attribute something more than is due to such habitual associations as these? But Athanasius and Ambrose



were both men of distinguished intellectual powers ; and with a reasonable time for inquiry I should have no doubt at all of the issue ; there could *never* have been a doubt, were it not for the external resemblance I have noted and accounted for ; and in such hands a very short time would suffice to penetrate that. And even as regards the first immediate aspect of Romanism, Mr. Newman will never persuade me that St. Athanasius would have joined “the unlettered crowd before the altar,” when he heard that crowd utter the prayer of enthusiastic devotion to creatures—to *himself*,—he who has so emphatically declared that “Angels themselves are not worshipped but worshippers, and God alone to be adored”<sup>b</sup>, and built on the exclusiveness of the right the proof of the divinity of his Lord ; or that Ambrose, who proclaims that “the Church knows no such idle forms of images”<sup>c</sup>, would have willingly bowed his mitred head to the dressed and painted statue of a holy woman. But as Mr. Newman indulges his fancy in imagining the Saints of the Fourth Century upon their travels, he will pardon me for reminding him that an appeal lies to mightier authorities still. Ambrose and Athanasius vail before Paul ; I conduct the Apostle from an English country Church, with its noble and intelligible liturgy, and the expressive simplicity of

<sup>b</sup> Orat. contr. Arian. II. Ch. xvi. §. 7. [“Therefore to God alone appertains worship, and this the very Angels know, that though they excel other beings in glory, yet they are all creatures and not to be worshipped.” (S. Ath. *Opp.* i. i. 491. Orat. ii. cont. Ar. §. 23.)—G.]

<sup>c</sup> De Fugâ Sæculi, §. 27. [Cap. v. *Opp.* i. 358. Lut. Par. 1661.—“Ecclesia inanes ideas, et vanas nescit Simulacrorum figuras.”—G.]

its ritual, and the chastened ardours of its Communion,—to the procession of the Host, and the incensing priests chanting in “an unknown tongue,” and the crowd of worshippers prostrate before the God beneath the canopy,—and I confidently ask—which communion would HE mistake for his own?

I cannot but think that it will by this time be tolerably evident *whose* is the narrow and confined theory of development; which view of Christianity it is that limits it to a single exclusive type, and fetters its growing limbs, and freezes its vital energies. Had it not been, indeed, for this iron ligature compressing the Roman theology as soon as it had reached a certain stage, and never since allowing it to expand, it might possibly have developed into simplicity; for there are “developments” in organized bodies that consist in throwing off excrescences as well as in adopting foreign material; and no one will say that the former is not in itself as conceivable as the latter. But, to view the case more generally—Christianity is in nothing more signally divine than in its marvellous power of adaptation; inflexible as to substantial truth, nothing is more happily flexible as to circumstantial attire. Now here is the essential error of the present theory. The author has got hold of this great truth of legitimate variation; but he has got hold of it (as we say) by the wrong end. To this, however, he is bound by the articles of his service; for it is precisely the error of the Roman Church herself. Christianity, unalterable in doctrine, admits considerable variation in its external presentation; Romanism just reverses this,—it alters the doctrine, and insists rigorously on a single exterior of ceremony,



and a single type of the Saintly life. Catholicism is the religion of a world; Roman Catholicism is the religion of a tribe or race of man<sup>d</sup>. It has spread, doubtless, and doubtless it will still spread; but its diffusiveness is in the *truth* it holds in solution; and its remoter sway invariably weakens and expires in proportion as its dependencies become civilized. Not at all that Romanism is hostile to a civilization of a cer-

<sup>d</sup> Mr. Newman insists at considerable length (p. 248, &c.) on the appropriation of the title "Catholic" by the South-Western Church of Europe. I am not aware that this has ever been a fact, to the exclusion of the orthodox Eastern communion; though certainly, as far as we of this Church are concerned, it is sometimes permitted to approach nearer to a fact than it ought. With a sad recollection, no doubt, of the mutual jealousies of Dominican, and Franciscan, and the rest, he pities those who, instead of the common and glorious title of Catholic, are styled by the names of *men*. Yet after all, which was the Body that first dared to contract the majestic universality of the title? Is it in itself much more sectarian to glory in the name of a man than in that of a town? Let it be remembered that *local* denominations for heretical sects (Cataphryges, &c.) were not at all uncommon in Antiquity.

I am afraid I cannot retract this charge even under such overpowering proofs of the primitiveness of this famous *prænomen* as the fact that Gregory of Tours (towards the end of the *sixth* century) found it absolutely necessary to explain to the world ["for they call men of our religion Romans,"—*Newman*, p. 276,] that certain barbarians contemptuously distinguished the Western Christians by the name of their chief city.

Stapleton, in treating this old topic, boldly commences: "Apud veteres pro eodem habita fuit Ecclesia Romana et Ecclesia Catholica;" but his more modest *reason* is, that "ejus communio erat evidenter et certissimè cum tota Catholica."\*—*Relect. Controv.* I. v. 3.

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\* ["Sola Romana Ecclesia adèd est Catholica, ut apud veteres pro eodem habita fuerit Romana Ecclesia, fides, societas, et Catholica Ecclesia, fides, societas."— . . . "sed quia ejus communio erat evidenter et certissimè cum tota Ecclesia Catholica," &c.—(*Principior. Fid. doct. Relect.* pp. 150, 151. Antv. 1596.)—G.]



tain kind. But civilization, viewed abstractedly and on the whole, is the development of humanity ; it invariably calls out the distinctive genius of peoples ; and the thorough assertion of that distinctive genius is fatal to the permanent domination of any foreign influence whether political or religious.

VIII. Accordingly, the only solid claim the Papacy ever could advance—its expediency, is a claim which really contradicts its *permanence*. That the Church should monopolize power in the mediæval period, was not so much blameworthy as it was inevitable ; the power must be where the knowledge is ; and it is best it should be there. For my own part, I can never believe that it was not on the whole better that Churchmen should govern mediæval Europe, than the weak and ignorant tyrants who occupied its thrones, and their semi-barbarian feudal nobles. This will not, indeed, excuse criminal ambition and secularity, but it will tend to explain its success, and tend to vindicate the mercy of Providence in permitting it. In the same way, the ascetic Saint of the middle ages was often the appropriate holy man of that time ; the temptation, to a Church of great wealth, and power almost absolute, would ever be to luxury and love of ease ; while the gross state of domestic society, and the separation of the clergy from even such influences as it could afford to refine and civilize, may have necessitated a model of ecclesiastical piety which would now be unnatural and extravagant. The work of the stern Carthusian and his fellows may, it is probable, be achieved in other days by other means ; but he was—perhaps is—a memorial of unworldliness not without real value in his time and place. But neither the Pope nor the Monk

is an immortal element in the Church of the New Covenant ; seen beside that great Idea and the essential truth on which it reposes, Canterbury is as genuine a reality as Rome, and George Herbert's holy parsonage as true a development as the Grande Chartreuse. Let us never dare to tamper with the immutable, in order to eternalize the temporary ; let us beware of altering the landmarks of that Truth which " was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be," in order to give a preposterous perpetuity to such accidents as a papacy and the special theology that grew up to maintain it. Above all, in the advocate of Christian Development is this unpardonable ; arbitrarily to fix what his own principle admits to fluctuate ; arbitrarily to arrest in mid-flow, and congeal into one cold unyielding mass, the majestic stream whose free and abounding current he has himself undertaken to trace and celebrate ; arbitrarily to suppose (again to return to the immediate question), that a Power, often useful as a common and stable centre of intelligence in the long and turbulent transition period of Europe, had any claim to the same kind of attachment when, in the general diffusion of knowledge, and the formation of separate centres of national life, the conditions that alone gave it value had expired ; and to fancy he has *proved* this (and not proved precisely the contrary), when he has elaborately shown how out of those conditions it naturally enough arose.

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The foregoing observations are directed to the specific theory of infallibility which is maintained by the Roman theologians ; that, namely, which concentrates the infallible gift in or around a special line of prelates



and a special locality ; which, whatever *other* conditions it contemplates for the exercise of the power (and I do not at all forget its endless variations on the subject, or how the oracle, infallible in all else, has marvellously continued to this day unable to identify itself), at least makes the Roman element some way or other essential. To this papal conception of Church Infallibility Mr. Newman fully subscribes ; *this*, and no other, is his real “Developing Authority.” “*All Catholics*,” he proclaims from Bellarmine (p. 125), “agree that the *Pope* with General Council, cannot err, &c., and that *the Pope*, when determining anything in a doubtful matter, by himself or with his own particular Council, whether it is possible for him to err or not, is to be *obeyed* by all the faithful.” *This* notion, then, I have been justified in comparing with the hypothesis of development ; suggesting how manifestly, as itself a posterior formation, it assumes the great question at issue—the legitimacy of post-Scriptural essentials of Christianity, and the infallible certainty with which they successively arose ; that is, assumes the very certainty it is introduced to confer ;—and again, how little the history of dogmas attests its necessity ; and, after all, how really hostile such a directory—local, limited, prepossessed by circumstances and position, must ever be to the fair and free expansion of Christianity, to the genuine “development” of its inherent energies among the diversified tribes of mankind.

Still, it may be urged that I have hardly done justice to the theory in restricting its application to the *Roman* form of developing authority, and detaching the latter from the trunk on which it grew. The Ro-



man infallibility, it will be said, is not to be viewed as an isolated phenomenon ; no doubt it *was* a late evolution of Christianity ; but the Catholic Church, in the exercise of its corporate infallibility, grew to be identified, in the course of centuries, with the Roman, and so became, as it were, gradually transfigured into the Roman, retaining all its original gifts and graces. Before this vague conception (which I presume to be the common one with the few among Romanists who are permitted to be *aware* of the total absence of infallible papacy from the records of antiquity) can be received, not merely as justifying anathemas against all who doubt it, but as commonly intelligible,—it will be necessary (as I have partly intimated before in this letter) to make some attempt to satisfy the following plain inquiries.

1. What were the exact nature and limits of *this primitive Catholic* Infallibility,—to what doctrines (fundamental only, or detailed) did it extend, and how were its decisions collected ? What has Scripture intimated about it ; and how far were the early doctors of the Church accustomed to rely upon it as a sufficient test of truth, and a bar to all further discussion ?

2. Supposing the nature and extent of this Catholic Gift settled and conceded, did the possession of the Gift involve the totally distinct *privilege of consigning it to* any communion less than that Universal Church in which it is supposed to have been originally vested ?

3. Supposing the special privilege demonstrated, of thus alienating the Gift, and confining it under conditions confessedly unknown to antiquity,—*at what time, and by what recorded process*, DID the Universal Church

ever consign the benefits of its corporate blessing to any particular communion,—as the Roman?

These are three very material inquiries; of which not one but all must be solved, before we can admit the Catholic and the Roman senses of the divine superintendence of the Church's Faith to be convertible. And even supposing them all answered and substantiated; that the *fact and amount* of the Infallibility were distinctly settled, that the *right to transfer* it were made good, and that the records of that momentous Council of the Church Universal were exhibited in which the solemn transference was *made*,—I cannot but think that another legitimate subject of inquiry would still remain, to something of the following effect:

4. Supposing that the Church Universal ever *did* make the transference, that in the recesses of some unexplored chronicler of the seventh or eighth century the deed of conveyance should even be detected and dragged to light,—does not the right to make the consignment apparently *involve the right to withdraw it*; or can the Church of one age and region, by a purely arbitrary act, bind irrevocably the Church of all ages and all regions? And if the corporate gift were transferable only by corporate consent, and the transference perpetually dependent thereon,—is not the manifest cessation of that consent a signal that the gift has lapsed back to its original depository. How can it be proved that the Catholic infallibility which is maintained by mere force of common consent to have developed into Rome, may not,—rather, must not—by subsequent dissent of the parties, develope back into a purely Catholic endowment again?



But I must not tempt my readers' patience by pushing this into farther minutiae. They cannot but know how little has ever really been done to establish the requisite proofs of this portentous development, to forge the indispensable connecting links between the Christianity that was "first Catholic, then Papal." A few strong expressions in the epistles of Roman bishops about the unequalled majesty and mightiness of their See,—arrogations which, whenever they involved any *actual* usurpation of supreme preeminence, seem to have been constantly resisted,—witness the failure of even *such* a man as Leo<sup>e</sup> at Chalcedon<sup>f</sup>; and the rejection—or what is as good, the *equal*<sup>g</sup> arrogation—of which by

<sup>e</sup> [See an able account of the Pontificate of Leo in *Allies* (*Church of England Guarded*, &c., Chap. iv.) In that Pontiff's mode of stating his own Primacy, Mr. Allies conceives that the "germ of something very like the present Papal system, without, however, such a wonderful concentration and absorption of all power, is discernible."]

<sup>f</sup> [For a full discussion of the proceedings at Chalcedon, in their bearing upon Leo's claims, see *Allies*, *ubi sup.* "It is much to be observed," concludes Mr. Allies, "that the acts and the words of the Council give no countenance to the present Papal theory, for they declare that in *whatever sense* Rome is *first*, in *that same sense* Constantinople is *second*. If the *primus inter pares* becomes a monarch, it is not a development but an usurpation."—p. 302.]

<sup>g</sup> ["At the end of this period (A. D. 451), the four Patriarchs of the East were held in their patriarchates for ecclesiastical centres, to which the other bishops had to attach themselves for maintenance of ecclesiastical unity, and, in conjunction with their patriarchal synod, they formed the highest tribunal of appeal in all ecclesiastical matters of the patriarchate."—*Gieseler*, i. Pt. ii. pp. 191–2. Mr. Allies has shown that the same kind of evidence, which is relied on by Romanists to prove the papal supremacy, may be adduced in favour of the Patriarch of Constantinople and other eastern Patri-



others, we should probably discover much more amply if all the records of the rival Patriarchates had been as carefully preserved and skilfully edited by their own servants, as those of the Latin Church ;—a few flattering compliments to the throne of Peter from ecclesiastics endeavouring to ingratiate themselves with an influential Bishop, and in an age when such flattering courtesies to great Prelates were universal<sup>h</sup>; such are the testimonies on which we are to rely in proof that a transition into a new and unalterable form of being, was, at one time or other, effected, under divine command, by the conjoint energy of the whole Church; that

archs. They received the same titles of respect; they were the highest tribunal of appeal in their provinces; they occupied the same place in the eastern liturgies as the Pope in the Roman. “The *similar authority* exercised by other bishops, especially that of Constantinople, nay, solemnly committed to him by the largest Œcumenical Council, (Canons of Chalcedon, 9 and 17,) is carefully put out of view.”—*Allies*, p. 342.]

<sup>h</sup> It is one of the incurable evils of a controversy like this, which deals with enormous masses of historical documents, that, usually consisting in the array of rival regiments of quotation, it is hardly ever conducted with perfect fairness, and can never possibly be brought to an end. To some readers the mere title of “blessed and holy Pope,” applied to an early Roman Bishop, brings all the associations of the triple crown and the Vatican; because their little bundle of “testimonies from Antiquity” does not enable them to turn the page and find the same paternal designation applied to a Patriarch of Alexandria or Constantinople. (Sirmond, if I remember rightly, shows that the word was first authoritatively limited to the Roman Prelate by Gregory VII. in 1079).\* We must remem-

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\* [The statement here made is founded on a note in Gieseler, i. 339, and this writer has inaccurately named the year 1075 as the date of the peculiar application of the title “Papa” to the Bishop of Rome. Sirmondus wishes to make it appear that

a great vital and essential transformation of the mystical Body of Christ took place, from which thenceforth no member can insulate itself and retain life. No doubt the Papacy is a Fact—a “great Fact” if you please it ; but it is no very unlikely fact, under any hypothesis as to its cause ;—nor perhaps, as a *mere historical* phenomenon viewed on ordinary human principles, is the permanence of Rome as a sacred locality more really wonderful than that of Medina or Cairouan, for some twelve hundred years back, not to speak of Jerusalem itself ; or the permanent throne of its Pope more inexplicable (still as a mere historical fact) than that which bears to it so curious an analogy, the popedom of the

ber that in the early times it was universal to insist with extraordinary pertinacity upon the rights of sees and the order of episcopal precedence ; to a somewhat unhappy degree, indeed, when we recall our Lord’s memorable injunction to His disciples contending for supremacy. Now this being the case, it naturally followed, first, that the celebration of the special claims of a see became an obvious mode of adulation on the part of clients or supplicants of influential bishops ; and, secondly, that in that age any *recognised supreme* authority would have exhibited itself with a prominence impossible to be mistaken. Lavish as they were in titles of respect in all their public acts, we may conjecture how profusely they would have decorated the ecclesiastical sovereign with all the insignia of his office : when the most ordinary bishop was “the most blessed Lord, the bishop beloved of God,” &c., how would language have been exhausted in addressing or describing the Vicar of Christ !\*

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Ennodius, early in the sixth century, specially assigned this appellation to the Roman Pontiff ; (Not. in Ennod. *Epistt.* iv. i. Sirmondi *Opp.* i. 857. Venet. 1728.) and it was A. D. 1076 that Hildebrand’s appropriation of the name took place. (Binii *Concill.* Tom. iii. Par. ii. p. 398.)—G.]

\* [Respecting this title see before, p. 83. Bingham has plainly shown that all Bishops were anciently styled “Vicars of Christ.” (*Antiqq.* Book ii. Chapter ii. Section x.)—G.]



far East—the long successive line and mystic sacerdotal sovereignty of the Thibetian Lama<sup>i</sup>.

<sup>i</sup> Of whom travellers tell us that “he is esteemed *the Vicegerent of the only God*, the mediator between mortals and the Supreme. They [the vast population and innumerable tribes of Eastern Tartary and Thibet] view him as perpetually absorbed in religious duty, and when called on to attend to the concerns of mortals, as being employed only in the benign office of distributing comfort and consolation, forgiveness and mercy. He is also the centre of all *civil government*, &c. He is the head of the whole system, which is a regular gradation from the most venerated Lama, through the whole order of Gylongs, to the young noviciate. . . . For the performance of daily service in the temple of Teshoo Loomboo, there are 3700 gylongs or priests. . . . Youth intended for the service of the monastery are received into the establishment at the age of eight or ten years. They are then called *tuppa*, and are occupied in receiving instruction suited to their age. At fifteen they are usually admitted into the order of *tohba*, if found sufficiently qualified; and thence into the order of *gylong* between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-four. They are then eligible to the superintendence of some endowed monastery, of which there are multitudes spread all over Thibet, with lands assigned them for their support; their promotion depending on their interest or their character. In this station as chief of a flock, they are honoured with the appellation of lama. Those who enter the religious order are enjoined sobriety, celibacy, and all the austere practices of the cloister. [Immense numbers of mendicant brethren also live on the charity of the devout.] There is a considerable number of nunneries as well as monasteries; and the strictest prohibitions exist against any woman even accidentally passing a night within the walls of the one, or a man within those of the other. The ecclesiastical class who hold intercourse with heaven are entirely divided from the lay class, who carry on the business of the world, and no interference ever interrupts the regulated duties of the clergy. Their religion is divided into two sects; . . . the *red* differ from the sectaries of the yellow in admitting the marriage of the priests, but the latter are considered as the more orthodox, as well as possessed of greater in-



The difficulties of the hypothesis of Infallible Development are not, however, confined to its application in

fluence. . . . . But the spiritual influence of the lamas has been much weakened by that of their earthly protectors, the emperors of China," &c. [From a summary in the *Encycl. Britann.*, Vol. xxi. p. 257. Seventh edit.]

I had not designed to have extended this quotation so far; opening as it does a new and distinct field of thought; but I have really been drawn on from sentence to sentence by the singular force of the analogy it suggests. Peruse it as it stands; make even allowance for some exaggeration (in truth the resemblance might be drawn closer—even to such characteristics as ritual service in a sacred tongue not understood by the votaries, &c.), and what reflections does it awaken! Far should I be from commenting harshly upon disciplinary societies or practices which have been thought valuable by men whom I am not worthy to praise, but I would strenuously resist the artful and seductive eloquence which is now employed to make them essentials of Christianity, as if exclusively exhibiting the workings of its peculiar and matchless spirit. How does the instance before us apply? Here is nearly, if not altogether, the most degrading, and immoral, and often pitiless idolatry on the face of the earth; one, observe, which, however some slight details may, possibly, have been affected at some time or other by Christian intercourse, could never have got at its general polity and discipline—its Papacy, its monasteries, its celibacy, and the rest—by awkwardly parodying any Western model; one which, in mere multitude of votaries, is perhaps nearly equal, if all its varieties be added together, to all Christendom twice over. Can any man, with the free use of his reason, believe that to be essential to the Christian Church, *a form of thought and practice so peculiarly and eminently Christian that those who lose it forfeit all the special excellencies of Christian sanctity*,—which in its fullest vigour has so grown up and flourished as to constitute an essential and indispensable characteristic in the most powerful and extensive province in the whole kingdom of Satan? And let me observe that it would be a great mistake to despatch this coincidence as *external* only; if the asceticism of these votaries differ from that of the Roman monastics, it is in being much more rigorous in practice, and much more subtle, refined, and

that peculiar *Roman* sense of Infallibility which has been the subject of this Letter. They will be found, I imagine, in every attempt to combine the notion of a Development capable of covering the doctrines to be defended, with *any consistent sense whatever* of perpetual infallible guidance of the Christian Church. To this I shall venture to request the attention of your readers in another Number of this Journal.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.

exalted in the mysticism which forms its doctrinal and philosophic basis. The tone of thought itself, and the practical life that embodies it, are in no wise peculiar to Christianity. No doubt—God forbid I should deny—that Christianity has frequently animated the institute of the solitary and the cenobite with a far better spirit, and can turn all those things to its own blessed profit; but since it is clear, that the grossest superstition on earth can quite as readily, instinctively, congenially, *permanently*, do so, is it not palpable that they are of no necessary and inherent excellence, but to be estimated in each case by the degree in which they subserve some ulterior and extrinsic end? Test by this rule the rapturous encomiums I allude to, scattered in this Volume and elsewhere; they will almost universally be found encomiums not of the object to be gained (which can be gained in many ways), but of the visible machinery itself, as if it were something *peculiarly and incommunicably Christian*, the one true and exclusive development of the religion of Christ; that which alone exhibits it, that which it alone can exhibit. The silent cell, the stern rule, the superhuman indifference to physical pain, the heroic penitence,—or again, the majestic sacerdotal monarchy, the ritual pomp, the vast array of ecclesiastical strength,—these, in and for themselves, are the things which are triumphantly contrasted with the mean and timid rationality of our Anglican spirit. I confess I cannot but think that such a description as I have quoted (and the points of resemblance might be easily multiplied), is fairly calculated to administer a salutary check to this strain of unbridled exultation.

## LETTER VIII.

DEAR SIR,

I have promised to consider the hypothesis of Development in connexion with the doctrine of Church Infallibility *in general*. I shall endeavour in the following paragraphs to perform this task.

This supposition of Development, so long as it remained on German ground, served, or might serve, an important end. It answered admirably to give a sort of superficial *unity* to any of those innumerable “Histories of Dogmas,” which, rivalling each other in daring plunges for originality, form a regular and stated portion of the academic labours of theological lecturers in that country<sup>a</sup>. The cool speculative indifference—say

<sup>a</sup> The taste for this species of German manufacture has manifestly set in of late; especially in Scotland, and among the teachers of the English Dissenting Academies. The translators of these works are not very likely to heed the advices or warnings of the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*; they are, however, shrewd enough to interpret a plain and palpable “sign of the times;”—let them study the “Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,” and then calmly reflect *what* party they are now likely to benefit most by multiplying among us treatises to expose the ignorance and superstition of early Christianity, and the precariousness of all evidence,



rather, the shocking frigidity—with which these teachers undertake, in presence of their young and uninformed hearers, to demonstrate on the venerable frame of the old Christian Creed, might be animated into some degree of warmth by the announcement of a great general law of *progress*, redeeming the tedious historic detail from utter confusion, regulating its tardy growth, and preparing its triumphant maturity; the possible Future might receive the homage which was denied to the ignorant and blundering Past. Whether the development were to proceed, as some might maintain, by successive additions, or, as others and the greater number, by successive ejections, of doctrine; whether by taking on new integuments, or by stripping off the old, or (as in the only producible analogy—that of Judaism) by both; whether the Creed of the martyrs were to be made to expand into that of Aquinas, or contract into that of Paulus<sup>b</sup>;—was indeed to be altogether determined by the accidental position and circumstances of the teacher; for *the principle itself* is absolutely *indifferent* to either application; both have been largely exemplified in the history of Christianity; and neither form of the theory can claim any antecedent authority

either for the canon of Scripture or the fundamentals of received doctrine, derived from that source. I do not hesitate to affirm that under the form this controversy must now assume, there is not one of these works (superficial as they often are, with all their affectation of elaborate research) which is not of more real utility to the cause of *Romanism* in England than reprints of Bossuet and Bellarmine.

<sup>b</sup> [Dr. H. E. G. Paulus, the “Coryphæus of Rationalism,” Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, was born A. D. 1761. For an account of him, see Hagenbach, *History of Doctrines*, ii. p. 381. An

above the other, so long as no clause of the original revelation pre-signifies in *which* direction the Gospel of Christ was intended to travel into perfect truth. But this easy flexibility of the principle would, of course, only make more precious a discovery which was so happily at the service of all parties; so long as temporary effect was the real object of competition, so long as the instructor was satisfied to secure the crowded lecture-room and the admiring train,—no doubt, a theory (however really illusive, because equally pliable to all facts, and even all possibilities) would soon become universally popular for this very reason, that it afforded to every school alike an endless field for ingenuity in devising the connexions of doctrines with each other, and with that Ideal of consummate truth in the remote future, to whose ultimate realization (different though it must be to every school respectively) all partial movements in the history of theology were at last to be seen to contribute.

But the case becomes very different when, along with this principle of indefinite transition from doctrine to doctrine, is maintained the concomitant gift and exercise of a *perpetual and rigorous infallibility*.

interesting and learned series of Essays on the German Rationalism will be found in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*, commencing December, 1848, contributed by the Rev. William Lee, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Dublin. “The Commentary of Dr. Paulus,” says Mr. Lee, (*Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*, December, 1848, p. 178.) “published in 1800, first brought into general notice the so-called ‘Rationalistic’ Theory, which professed to explain the Scripture narrative by showing that what is there recorded relates to merely natural events.”]

It is true that there is no contradiction in the abstract conception of a knowledge that shall always be right and yet always increasing ; the progress of a pure science,—of Geometry, for example, or Algebra,—is an unequivocal instance in point ; perhaps (speaking with reverent timidity of a subject so greatly beyond our faculties as the mental history of the Incarnate Son) such too may have been the human knowledge of Him who, while incapable of error, yet “increased in wisdom and stature.” But this sort of movement in which every step shall be a step gained, perpetual advancement without a falter,—this light ever equally pure and intense in quality, and increasing in quantity only because, while maintaining that equal brilliance, the sphere itself of its radiance is perpetually enlarging,—this is essentially inapplicable to the history of the doctrines really in question in this controversy. Such a notion is inapplicable, in the *first* place, *from the very scope and nature of those doctrines themselves*, in which partial knowledge must have involved either grievous positive error, or omissions of essential duty quite incompatible with any tolerable notion of the state in which the original revelation left its recipients. While again, *secondly*, the internal infallibility is supposed to *be manifested and embodied in a corresponding authority*, with a view to which the infallibility itself has been given ; but no real exercise of authority over the Church’s faith can ever be made compatible with the process of doctrinal development imagined in this author’s pages. I shall endeavour in this communication to illustrate both these considerations.



Let me, first, however, be permitted to premise one or two observations on the *state of the question* now directly at issue.

I. We are now viewing this question less as one to be determined by the strict criterion of plain, positive testimony, than as a competition of *rival hypotheses*. This is to descend from a vantage-post, and give the author the choice of his own ground and weapons. He constantly impresses on his reader, as the main recommendation of his scheme, that we must all have *some* hypothesis or other about the Church and its history<sup>c</sup>. It is possible that, in insisting so earnestly upon this, he extends to inferior minds an intellectual necessity peculiar to faculties like his own. But let it be granted; and assuming that we must have—at least that many of us are apt to carry about us—some such favourite master-key to unlock the manifold difficulties of God's providence in the story of the Church, let me again recall what I have partly exhibited already, and once more place side by side the hypotheses that are advanced to satisfy the phenomena of Christian history.

<sup>c</sup> “Those who find fault with the explanation here offered of the historical phenomena of Christianity, will find it their duty to *provide one of their own*.”—p. 29. This is “*an hypothesis* to account for a difficulty.”—p. 27. “*Some hypothesis* all parties, all controversialists, all historians must adopt, if they would treat of Christianity at all.”—p. 129. “The question is—which of all *these theories* is the simplest, the most natural, the most persuasive? Certainly the notion of development under infallible authority is not a less grave, a less winning *hypothesis*” than others here exclusively specified as being the received notions of those who reject it, namely, “chance and the coincidence of events, or the oriental philosophy, or the working of Antichrist.”—pp. 129, 130.

The problem in this view may, I suppose, be stated thus :—Given a revelation such as that which our Lord and His Apostles delivered, to connect with it as its practical results in the world, *by some general view of the way it was meant to operate*, the actual facts of Church history since its date.

For this purpose, perhaps others also, but at least the three following hypotheses are offered by divines:

The FIRST supposes<sup>d</sup> that all the essentials of Christian belief were known to the Apostles, and by them delivered to their disciples ; being, in fact, contained, in a sufficiently clear though unsystematic form, in the writings of the New Testament.

That the reason of man, rightly exerted under God's blessing, is capable of exhibiting these truths in various new forms, by comparison and deduction ; all which new forms, standing the usual tests of sound reasoning, become, of course, to those to whom they are made known, as authoritative as the principles from which they are drawn.

That in this way, though no new doctrine in itself necessary to salvation is anywise to be anticipated, yet the general Church of Christ, or particular branches thereof, may, in fact, possess a fuller light upon different points in different ages ; even as any *individual* believer, by divine grace, increases his spiritual knowledge in different points at different times, through social conference or private meditation.

That whereas the same process (of discussion and

<sup>d</sup> [Compare *Appendix* to Bishop Jebb's Sermons, where will be found a noble expansion of the views stated in this first hypothesis.]

reflexion) by which spiritual knowledge is thus increased, is also, from human weakness, liable to error of greater or less magnitude, God has made no promise to his *Church at large* that it should be secure from all degree of error,—often the just and appropriate punishment of its own moral guilt,—any more than from all *sinfulness*, itself a powerful cause of doctrinal error ; and no promise to any *individual* Church that it should be secure from even the greatest. And that thence great varieties may be expected in the comparative *enlightenment*, no less than in the comparative *holiness*, of the Church in various ages and places.

To which is added by many—and, I would hope, justly—the comfortable belief that, nevertheless, God's promises of abiding stability to his Church warrant a holy confidence that, however it may sin, and for its sin be more or less given over, in the sinning member, or even in all its members, for a time, to its own devices (a judicial abandonment perpetually testified for a law of the divine operation in the former Church of God), He would not, and will not ever suffer it, *universally and as one body*, totally to fall away by directly denying that faith which is *essential to the very being* of the Church of Christ on earth.

The SECOND hypothesis supposes all the essentials of Christian belief known by the Apostles and delivered to their disciples ; but that several of them were preserved only by an extra-scriptural tradition, continuous from the apostolic age ; which tradition, and all other theological truths, the Church in connexion with the See of Rome has an exclusive divine gift of infallibly declaring ; all matters so declared, whatever their im-



portance, becoming thence obligatory, on pain of separation from the body of Christ.

The THIRD hypothesis (arising, at length, out of the overwhelming difficulty of establishing the apostolic *tradition* assumed in the last, just as the last itself, long before, arose out of the similar difficulty of establishing the same doctrine from *Scripture*<sup>e</sup>), supposes that the full scheme of Christian truth was not known at all (to the Apostles it would seem<sup>f</sup>—or, however) to the first disciples, and even to many generations of the Fathers that followed them; but was, in slow succession of ages, progressively discovered and completed, under the infallible inspiration of the Church, more especially of the Bishop of the Roman See and the doctors in connexion therewith. Thus disclaiming, in behalf of the Roman Church's infallibility, that Church's *own infallible* settlement of its standard of faith.

Now there is one fact which must strike every one

<sup>e</sup> There is no novelty in this double transition. The following observable passage of Athanasius will show the respectable precedent it may claim :—

Τῶν δ' Αρειομανιτῶν τὴν ἀλογίαν καὶ νῦν ἐπέγνω. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὗτ' εὐλογον, οὔτε πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἐκ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ῥητὸν ἐχούσης τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτῶν, ἀεὶ μὲν προφάσεις ἀναισχύντους ἐπορίζοντο καὶ σοφίσματα πιθανά. νῦν δὲ καὶ διαβάλλειν τοὺς πατέρας τετολμήκασι. —*De Sentent. Dionys.*, p. 243, *Edit. Benedict.* [*Opp.* Tom. i. P. i. Paris. 1698.—G.]

<sup>f</sup> [“Who then of sound mind can believe that they [the Apostles] were ignorant of anything, whom the Lord appointed as masters, keeping them undivided in attendance, in discipleship, in companionship; to whom, when they were alone, He expounded all things that were dark, saying, that to them it was given to know the mysteries, which the people were not permitted to understand?”—*Tert. (De Præscrip. Hær., in Lib. of the Fathers, Vol. x. p. 454.)*]

in reviewing these three suppositions ; namely, that in comparing them with the actual working of the religion of Christ in the world, the first has the advantage—the great philosophical advantage in any hypothesis—of explaining the leading phenomena on the fewest *assumptions*. The objection to the *Roman* scheme as a key to Church history, is, that it does indeed give account of some of the facts, but it is by an hypothesis which has no root in the original revelation ; which, after all, is little more than a statement of the facts themselves which it professes to explain (the rise and progress of the Roman claims and power), and that it leaves others (the history of the Church antecedent to its own power, of the Oriental, Anglican, and other Churches since) wholly unprovided for. The objection to the new—the *Rationalistic-Roman*—hypothesis is like the last ; its principle has no independent basis, irrespectively of its service to explain the facts, and is then little more than a statement of the particular facts it explains (the growth of certain new doctrines in one large province of the Church) ; besides the additional difficulties of being apparently precluded by the very terms of the original revelation (always representing itself as once for all sufficient and complete), and being chargeable with grave internal inconsistencies (as we shall presently see) in the supposition itself. But the *first* view assumes no principle at all beyond what all must admit to exist, to be (in the dialect of Newton) “*veræ causæ*” anterior to, and independently of any temporary application whatever ; to wit, *the Revelation* itself,—and the *agency of human reason*,—and the *special superintendence of Providence*, trying, rewarding,



punishing, but ever and equally in mercy, justice, and wisdom, governing—his universal Church.

II. So much for the *comparative* claims of the new theory, as solving difficulties no other supposition can effectually overcome. I have now to weigh (still considering it simply as an hypothesis) its *positive* merits, the internal consistency of this combination of the two suppositions, of perpetual Infallibility, and constant Progression of doctrines, in the Church of Christ.

1. In the first place, it is obvious enough,—even granting this progression of doctrine, and even granting its uncertainty and danger without special direction,—that, unless we imagine the “development” to be a mere *euphemism* used to disguise revolutions of doctrine as fundamental as the first inspired teaching itself, the alleged *infallible* guidance is still no necessary inference. That providential superintendence, which guides the course of an earnest individual explorer of religious truth (a principle of divine government perfectly distinct from infallibility, but everywhere strangely forgotten in this work), may be conceived to oversee the theological movement of the Church at large; to leave it liable, indeed, in case of wilfulness, negligence, and presumption, to error, but justly hopeful of truth; and never advancing into either error or truth without a high divine purpose of good, under the control of that great transcendent maxim of Christian Providence (far more certain than any infallibility, and really comprising all the practical consolations infallibility could ever bring), that in every dispensation alike, whether of mercy or judgment, “*all things work together for good to them that love God.*”—This, I say, is still a sufficient



supposition, even though we should concede the Development Process to be the real law of divine enlightenment : that process does not necessitate infallibility at all more certainly than any *other* progression of important knowledge does. If you imagine it must, it is only because at that instant you are unconsciously exchanging the notion of "development" for that of absolute and unqualified new revelation.

But, assuming the Infallibility into alliance with the Development, let us reflect how the two suppositions hang together. I am much mistaken or this ponderous auxiliary will be found, like the elephants of old, somewhat apt to charge back upon its own lines ; or like those allies invoked by distressed nations, who have sometimes remained to destroy the liberties they came to succour.

2. I observe, then, that very manifestly the progressive discovery of doctrine imagined in this theory supposes gross *errors of omission* antecedent to the discovery ; and with those errors serious errors of practice necessarily involved ; both utterly incompatible with a perpetuity of infallible guidance. This is a topic upon which I must limit myself to suggesting or recapitulating heads of inquiry. To several of these, indeed, I have had occasion to refer already ; they now, however, re-appear under a new aspect, and in a new relation to the general argument ; and even as mere facts they cannot be too urgently and repeatedly impressed upon the reader.

Regard, then, for example, the belief of the absolute Divinity of our Lord and the Holy Spirit, and any other essentials of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. If this

great belief (as our author seems, though somewhat indistinctly and irresolutely, to intimate) were only gathered by degrees, then, before its full revelation, men, under infallible direction, must either *not* have given supreme adoration to the three Holy Persons, or done so *criminally*, because without any divine authority.

Regard the Doctrine of the Corrupt and Guilty State of every Man by Nature. If this doctrine (p. 19, &c.) was only gradually discovered, then not only was the real value of Redemption, and the real excellence of the sinless Humanity of Christ, unknown, but men must even have baptized the Church's children without any real intelligence of the meaning of the rite they employed ; and this in a Church strictly, absolutely, and in all things, even as now, infallible.

Regard the Doctrine of the legitimacy and utility of the Invocation of Saints and Angels in religious worship. If this important doctrine, which must have been always as true as it ever was, became only gradually known to Christians, then an absolutely infallible Church must have been for ages defrauding these creatures of their due ; and, what is more important, losing in the most trying times all the advantages of the practice ; and, what is as singular as either, carrying on its warfare *more* triumphantly and successfully before it began to claim these succours than these succours ever afterwards enabled it to do. But this is far from the whole. The Church not only forgot them by ignorance, but insulted them by refusal. For (notwithstanding all the natural temptations to practices of this kind, and the degree in which the first seeds of corrup-



tion are apt to deceive the wisest, until they have seen them in the blossom and in the fruit) the earlier writings do happen to abound with disavowals of religious devotion addressed to any being but the One that “heareth prayer.” And all this—both the loss and the insult—must, of course, apply with tenfold force to (what appears to have first shown itself above ground at a much later period than addresses to Angels, or to Martyrs at their tombs<sup>s</sup>), to the worship of the Mother of our Lord, the all-powerful “Queen of Heaven.”

Regard the Doctrine (nearly connected with the last) of the Separate State of the Blessed. The prac-

<sup>s</sup> Of all these practices of creature-worship, the addresses, or respectful homage, to Angels was, no doubt, the most plausible; as these holy creatures, in their capacity of “ministers to the heirs of salvation,” might possibly be considered present in the assemblies of Christians, and with good men in their distresses. Accordingly it is in this form that these unauthorized practices probably first appeared, arising, no doubt, in the first instance, out of an inward feeling of *respect for a holy presence*, (see such expressions as that in Origen c. Cels. viii. p. 385, Edit. 1677, &c.) [p. 400. ed. Spencer. Cantab. 1658.—G.] which afterwards may have passed into some direct form of address; and this, too, (it is remarkable,) is the special form of the general error which, as if foreseeing its seductiveness to even holy men, inspiration has explicitly recorded and forbidden in the person of St. John himself,—of St. John, too, who *saw* (what we can never pretend) the angel he sought to worship. The utterly unwarrantable invocation of martyrs began in a similar notion of their *presence* at their tombs; and, however vain and imaginary, was quite distinct from that “deification” (to employ our author’s phrase) of the spirits of the dead, by imagining them capable of hearing and helping their votaries at all times and places, which long afterwards so miserably darkened the Church, by eclipsing the glory of the one ever-present and ever-sympathizing Friend of Man.



tical bearing of this doctrine became in many ways important. Yet here the Church, infallible then as now, commonly admitted and acted on a belief the direct contradictory of the existing alleged development. What claim has the development beyond its own seed, the superstructure more than the basis? Whether does the infallibility end with the ancient doctrine or begin with the modern?

Regard the doctrine of Purgatorial Pains, and their remission by the present suffrages of the Church Militant, or the authority of the Roman Bishop. Here the Church, by numbers of its influential doctors, unquestionably taught a doctrine directly contradictory to this authoritative development; though some of them, after the lapse of ages, began to hint something *like* a part of it as a confessed conjecture; but, meanwhile, in the exercise of its sovereign and immutable infallibility, universally and notoriously neglected for centuries a work of piety, equally and urgently obligatory at all times, in behalf of wretched and suffering spirits<sup>h</sup>.

Consider, again, the fearful impiety of neglecting, for so many successive ages, to worship with supreme *latria*,—with the absolute worship of God—the Eucharistic elements. Consider the doubtful infallibility of Apostles who neglected, of a Church that was unable,

<sup>h</sup> Even in the Roman Canon of the Mass, (a venerable relic, which, with some corruptions, bears remarkable testimony against several of the mediæval innovations,) there is no mention whatever of the souls in Purgatory, but a commemoration alone of those who “have gone before us with the sign of faith, and sleep in the sleep of peace.” [“qui nos præcesserunt cum signo fidei, et dormiunt in somno pacis.” (*Commemoratio pro defunctis*.)—G.]

to instruct its disciples, on this great, imperative duty of religion ; a duty which grows as necessarily out of the infallible truth on which it is based as the worship of the Deity in any case grows out of His existence.

Consider the use of Images as objects of religious veneration ; so infallibly necessary *now*, that a Church cannot be admitted to that communion and fellowship on which salvation irrevocably depends, which rejects them ; so unnecessary under the infallibility of *that* day, that their use was commonly execrated and condemned.

Consider similarly (for I must abridge) the necessity of five additional Means of supernatural Grace,—of grace deep and mysterious as that which gives and sustains the regenerate Life,—either not used as means of grace at all, in the seed-time of development, or used with an inferior degree of respect which would now be a sinful, and must then have been a strangely ignorant, irreverence. Consider the extraordinary reverence and universal submission due to the succession of St. Peter, which, if inherent in the See, must have been due to St. Clement of Rome, as absolutely as to Innocent III., but which was so inexplicably neglected by the earlier infallibility. And consider, to crown the heap of perplexity, that the earlier Church did unquestionably, and (according to the hypothesis under examination) infallibly, believe and assert itself to be in the full possession of all needful doctrine, independent of any kind or degree of enlargement (beyond the inevitable accessions of experience and reason) before the second coming of its Lord.

3. These are difficulties of some moment in the hypothesis which combines perpetual Infallibility and



perpetual Development ; difficulties as regards the Past. Are there none as regards the Future ? If the infallible development of any given age must look back with some misgivings upon the equally infallible Past it abandons, how must it regard the infallible Future that may similarly abandon *it* ?

It is manifest that a developing Church, honestly realizing its own position, can never pretend to state the complete truth on any subject. Not merely the complete truth, absolutely considered, which is probably beyond human faculties under any earthly enlightenment ; but the complete amount of that truth which is to be expected under the existing dispensation, and which, it is commonly imagined, the children of the Church have a right to demand from their spiritual mother. Its best decisions can be but provisional. Granting it can pronounce "the truth, and nothing but the truth," it can never rise to the calm assurance of "the whole truth." For, indeed, it can never absolutely *limit* a proposition ; if it could limit any one, there can be no internal reason why it should not be equally empowered to limit all ; and then where is room reserved for "development" ? Once enter thoroughly into the spirit of this theory, and where is the extravagance of the mocker's supposition, who scoffingly professed his desire that the number of the Holy Persons could be *increased*, in order to give more scope to faith ? The Church has as yet only seen its way to a Trinity of Divine Persons ; but there *was* a time (we are apparently to understand) when it knew not of so many ; and there may be a time when it shall know of more. Nay, is not the discovery—for such it surely, such it



now *avowedly*<sup>i</sup> was, of that “wonder in heaven,” as Mr. Newman justly styles it, the Virgin and her “deification,” almost as great a stride in advance of apostolic teaching as the direct revelation of a new divine agent; or rather, in the sense in which the “deification” must needs be understood<sup>k</sup>, is it not all but the *very same*?

<sup>i</sup> The Arian controversy “*discovered a new sphere*, if we may so speak, in the realms of light, *to which the Church had not yet assigned its inhabitant.*”—P. 405. Were not the subject so exceedingly melancholy, there would surely be something to move a smile in this grave assumption of the Church having a function to “discover” new regions in heaven, and “assign inhabitants” to them at its earliest convenience!

<sup>k</sup> I need scarcely stop to say (indeed I believe I noticed the subject before), that the sense in which St. Athanasius repeatedly speaks of Christ as “deifying” the nature of man (ἐθεοποίησεν) by assuming it,—(e. g. in answer to an Arian objection, he writes that “the Word was not impaired in receiving a body, but *rather* He deified that which He put on,”—*Orat. c. Arian. I.* §. 42.) [p. 446. *Opp.* i. i.—G.] and as exalting us all in Himself as members of His body, so that the heavenly powers are no longer amazed at seeing human beings introduced among them [*ibid.*],—that all this has no resemblance at all to the extravagant sense of a literal participation of the prerogatives of Godhead (unless we are to construe Athanasius’s strong, but justifiable, figure into gross Eutychianism), and the still more monstrous inferences of worship which Mr. Newman labours (pp. 402, 403) to extort from this simple and very innocent sentiment. St. Athanasius, indeed, manifestly refers not to any special divinizing of saints in glory (which alone would suit the purpose); but to a gift, in *one* sense belonging to human nature in the abstract, to all mankind, as sharing in that common humanity which was so wondrously made the shrine of God; in *another* and higher sense, to the collective body of the regenerate, his thoughts evidently running much more upon the *present* than the future state of the latter. Finely applying 1 Cor. xiv. 25, he observes: “Because of our relationship to His Body, we, too, have become

But I have enlarged sufficiently upon this in a former letter. I am now viewing the same topic strictly in its

God's temple, and, in consequence, are made God's sons; so that even in us the Lord is *now* worshiped, and beholders report, as the Apostle says, 'that God is in them of a truth.'" What is to be thought of the perspicacity which discovers in this passage (which might issue, for aught I can see, from the most ultra-Protestant pulpit in Europe) "a doctrine which both interprets and accounts for the invocation of saints and the observance of relics?"

To speak plainly,—more plainly than I should ever desire to speak of one whose superiority in learning and abilities those are not least willing to admit, who the most distinctly recognise in him one more of the thousand instances which Church history furnishes of the melancholy perversion of both,—I really do not believe the entire literature of theology can produce a more prodigious sample of rhetorical sophistication than the whole discussion in the place I have alluded to; in which the author labours to show that the Arian controversy led the Church to perceive the propriety of worshiping departed spirits, and deifying the Virgin. The reader has already had a slight specimen of the argument on the former topic. On the latter, the reasoning is to this effect. Because the Arian devotion to the Son, however nominally boundless, was not enough to satisfy the orthodox, as long as He was not also confessed to be very and substantial God, *therefore* that boundless degree of devotion may be properly given to a creature, without practically making that creature God, or encroaching upon the rights of God. Try it in a parallel case. To take up arms, and perform all other duties of loyalty in defence of the king, is not enough as long as you continue steadily to deny him to be the legitimate king; *therefore*, any man has a perfect right to devote all those same exertions, which are the king's due, to some other personage, without any imputation upon that man's exclusive loyalty to the throne! Try it again. Owing a benefactor a large sum of money, I am strictly bound to pay the whole; *therefore*, so long as I refrain from squandering the entire, I may make a present of half my means of paying it to some one else, without defrauding my creditor. No doubt the Catholics said, and said justly, that that adoration was to count for



connexion with infallibility, and the formal decrees in which infallibility is embodied. Now it is most certain

nothing which still denied the perfect Godhead of its object ; but does the commentator on Athanasius require to be reminded that they also argued that the adoration itself was inconsistent and unwarrantable which was offered to any *but* the Godhead ? The error of the Arian was twofold. He denied the proper Deity of the Son, and he gave (or some of the party gave) an adoration to the Son so contemplated, which, on that supposition, became an infringement on the rights of the Father. The adoration did not infer the belief of Godhead, *only because* the Arian persisted in denying the Godhead ; of *itself and naturally* (like the parallel extravagancies of Bonaventure and Alphonsus) it *did* infer that belief,—because of the denial the devotion was *insufficient* ; but also, because of that same denial, the devotion was *preposterous and contradictory*. In short, the Lord demands two forms of submission, which are God's, and God's alone ; the Intellect confessing Him to be truly divine, and the Heart and Will adoring Him as such. The Arian (we are supposing) gave the latter, and refused the former. How can it possibly be pretended, that when the Nicene Doctors denied this to be *sufficient*, they, even in the remotest way of inference, sanctioned the monstrous principle, that such adoration was not, after all, the exclusive right of God ? that because it is wrong to refuse God *all* His due, it can ever be, therefore, allowable to give others the greater *part* of it ?

I do not know that it is worth while to follow out so plain a matter any farther. It will probably be found that the source of the fallacy is in the confusion between the *objects* of worship and man's *capacities* of adoration. It is true that the Infinite must be infinitely beyond the greatest creature ; the two are incommensurable. But it is false (indeed contradictory) that a finite mind can make a *proportionate* distinction in its affections ; man's religious faculties, like all his other faculties, are limited ; just because he *is* finite he has but (so to speak) a certain amount, or fund, of devotion to expend ; and it is hence that what is unduly given to another is necessarily withdrawn from that “jealous God,” to whom



—certain as a mere matter of fact—that *if* the modern Church of the Developments be alone continuously identical with the Church of Antiquity, the one Church Catholic has actually reversed its own feelings, or decisions, on several points of momentous importance at issue between England and Rome. We have only then to invert the point of view in each of the instances cited in the last article ; to stand at the remoter end of the vista, where the younger Church actually stood ; and reflect how *that* Church could have been justified in establishing dogmatic canons *on these points*, and arming them with terrific anathemas ; *then* to reflect that just such a Church, comparatively young and inexperienced, may *the present* be in relation to the “ Church of the Future ;” that even as Laodicea denouncing angel-worship, or Nice slighting the Roman Bishop, are to Lateran and Trent, just so may Lateran and Trent be in their turn to the developments of councils yet to come. What right has such an instructress as this to deal in the canon and the curse ? How can she profess to utter the fulness of eternal verity, whose conjectural truth of one century is but the formless embryo of the truth of another ? Methinks that, after all, it is of *such* a teacher, “ the stammering lips of ambiguous formularies ” are the appropriate organs<sup>1</sup> ; the first lesson of

all the wealth of the religious affections, and all the corresponding fulness of adoration, are exclusively due.

<sup>1</sup> I am not aware that the obvious remark has been distinctly made, that the effort to show that the English Articles were “ patient of ” a Roman sense, could never have been imagined practicable, except through, *at least*, an equal ambiguity in the Roman decrees

her infallibility must be, never to dare profess or exercise it!

It is evident, then, that in such points as those at issue in this controversy—points of vital moment both in the doctrinal scheme and the practical life of religion—points, in all of which there must have *ever* been a right and a wrong, and both from the first of tremendous importance—that in such points, I say, if the development be infallible, it must have been preceded by perilous error; and that, as there is no period at which the development-process can be determined to cease, the antecedent period of possible error is similarly protracted to an indefinite duration. The infallible development is itself immersed in an abyss of fallibilities; it is fallible in relation to the *past* and the *future*, if

themselves. Both were to be brought to meet midway; because *both* were held to admit of compromise. And this the detail of the attempt itself (of February, 1841) actually proves; in which (if I remember rightly a performance not very well calculated to secure a place in the recollection, and which always appeared to me not more singular in any other respect than in its marvellous inferiority to the admitted abilities of its author) reference is continually made to the Tridentine judgments; the author, in his capacity of mediator, endeavouring to disprove their imagined hostility; in short, endeavouring to demonstrate that they “stammer” pretty much like ourselves. In this point of view, the contemptuous expression quoted in the text was, at least, somewhat *misplaced* where it first appeared. An infallible Church must always assume a certain external air of decisiveness; this is the infallible *style*, and as cheap and easy as any other verbal artifice; but, as regards the substance of the decisions,—that the expression is far more applicable to the Council of Trent than to that of London, few who have ever candidly studied the history of both, and the decrees of both, will entertain the smallest doubt.



these be infallible (which, however, fortunately for it, are similarly fallible in relation to each other); while, as regards the *present*—the instant of its hasty and trembling utterance—it cannot dare profess to speak the full truth without usurping the rights of the Church unborn, and thereby implicitly destroying *its own*.

It is, I hope, unnecessary to insist further upon the *internal consistency* of the conjoint hypotheses of Infallibility and Development; the theological student will have little difficulty in filling for himself the outlines which alone I have here space to design. I proceed at once to that other aspect of the same supposition which I have intimated above—the *practical* working of Infallible Development as an ecclesiastical principle.

II. The end and use of Infallibility is *absolute authoritative guidance*; but the *lowest* exercise of authority is incompatible with the consistent adoption of this theory. A developing Church, fully conscious of its position, can neither itself rigorously affirm nor restrain others from affirming. I have no pleasure in attempting to invest a very grave subject with ridicule; but surely a Church which avows itself as much an explorer as any bold critic within its domain, which represents itself as sailing down the ocean of successive centuries, upon a voyage of theological discovery,—now falling in with the unsuspected region of Saint-Worship,—now touching upon the gloomy shores of the intermediate Purgatorial realm,—now obtaining a dim—a clearer—a full and distinct view (as of some Mount of Transfiguration in the far horizon), of the ineffable glories of the deified St. Mary,—nay, discovering



*facts* about the past existence of that blessed person, utterly hidden for centuries from the most persevering inquirers (as her deathless Assumption to heaven, to which, by celebrating its festival, a Church incapable of error is as unequivocally bound as to the fact of the Incarnation)—a Church which thus admits that it is but an humble student in the mysterious volume of unknown possible development—what claim *can* it consistently make, of submission to its definitive uncertainties?

But we have to sift this a little more closely. The supreme unerring Authority which demands the obedience of individual members of the Church, may be viewed either as an authority *controlling* the belief and judgment of the Church at large, and that too, dependently, or independently,—or as the *organ* and mouth-piece which simply utters that belief and judgment. I will briefly examine the present hypothesis in relation to each of these conceptions of the exercise of a Supreme Authority in matters of Faith. In doing so I must confess to making some little demand upon the steady attention of my readers ; a demand which, however, they may be inclined to concede, when they remember that they are now in front of the last and inmost citadel of the new fortress. Disclaimed as is the system by history,—nay, by the common notorious facts of history,—we are now inquiring whether it can pass muster on even the poor ground of a merely conceivable hypothesis ; whether it is in itself compatible with any notion at all of Church Infallibility ; or (as we are now to discuss) with any notion at all of such Authority as that Infallibility implies ; or even with any notion

at all of *any* real ecclesiastical authority of *whatever kind*. But this very question, just because it is so entirely abstract and hypothetical, may possibly require a little of that stricter attention which purely abstract reasonings commonly claim.

1. It is admitted, it is involved, in this theory, that the Supreme Authority, wherever it reside, is not qualified to treat an undeveloped, or insufficiently developed subject; if it were, the whole hypothesis would be superfluous. The conception of infallibility, and the authority corresponding thereto, with which we have to deal, must therefore be so understood as to be compatible with this condition. If, for example, any early Council, such as that of Nice, could have been properly expected to utter a deliverance upon the Papal Supremacy (supposing the question proposed to it), with full mediæval orthodoxy, then the papal supremacy, when it *was* actually proclaimed, was no development, which necessarily presupposes a previous comparative obscurity, but a direct unconditional inspiration, appertaining to any infallible Council as such; and all the labour is wasted which is devoted to exhibiting, or conjecturing, how circumstances *gradually* opened the mind of the Church to the apprehension of this great fundamental truth. Since, then, what the authority cannot rightly do it certainly has no right to do, it is strictly bound to pronounce on no subject until that subject has been thoroughly ripened for decision by development; now the authority, in its capacity of authority, has really but a temporary and occasional existence, whether prelates in council or Pope *ex cathedra*; and the development process must, therefore, be understood as that



which *perpetually proceeds in the Church at large*. Hence, even though the Pope and collective Roman bishops were supposed alone to possess the infallible directive authority ; and still more on any other theory of that obscure and undecided question ; yet it is an essential assumption in this hypothesis that the authority finally decisive and obligatory, however supreme over all others, is yet never independent of the general movement of opinion in the Church, but in even its highest exercise influenced and predisposed thereby. Otherwise (I repeat) the decision is no result or index of “development ;” Mr. Newman gives way to the Council of Trent ; and the old notion of direct inspiration, irrespective of times and circumstances, resumes its place. And plainly, the more energetic that universal movement, the more likely are its true character and bearings to become palpable, and to be influential for good upon the ultimate decision ; if there be indeed a spirit that *agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet*, the more unconstrained the motions of the body, the more irresistibly and unequivocally will this pervading spirit exhibit its influence. How then does the case stand ? Before a certain indefinite period the guides of the Church are supposed to have known little or nothing with certainty upon the question at issue, for if they did, the basis of the new theory disappears, the doctrine is no “development.” At a certain period these same guides, or their descendants, are to pronounce infallibly upon it. But dependent as they are indefinitely but really (by virtue of the system under examination), upon the general progression of thought in the Church, and at a certain assignable date maintained to be absolutely in-



competent to meet the question supposed to be at issue, by what signal shall they know *when* discussion ought to cease, when the preliminary operation of the Church's mind is complete, and their own function is to begin? They are not absolutely infallible *until* they have met in assembly, and are actually deciding the question; and they are certain not to decide even then with infallible correctness unless their meeting has taken place at the exact crisis of consummate development in relation to the question (whatever it be) that is at stake. The mere consent to meet, in obedience to the command of a Constantine or a Theodosius, a Leo or an Innocent, will hardly be held an inspired revelation; and yet it is certain that infallibility itself must fail—fail as Nice or Constantinople would *confessedly* have failed on the question of Images or the Half-Communion—if it undertake to decide on any candidate doctrine one hour before that critical moment when the Church by its doctors and debates has been brought to a certain point upon its march of progressive development. Any primitive Œcumenical Council, it is now hardly denied—it is *assumed*,—would have gone wrong upon most of the Roman peculiarities: the power of infallible decision must therefore strictly *depend on the age—nay, on the year, month, and day, of the Council*; and all that infinite multitude of Roman theologians are henceforth to be disavowed, who in their simplicity have held that a plenary Council is inherently competent, at *any* moment that it is duly constituted, to decide all questions of importance agitated in the Church. The infallibility being thus absolutely dependent on the epoch of the Council, unless each individual

personage, antecedent to any combined session, have been in the most absolute sense of inspiration inspired to determine this precise period,—unless the *dates* of the Councils accepted by the Church of Rome are all held to have been the results of immediate revelation from Heaven to the Emperors and Popes who convened them,—the time of assembly as really a supernatural communication as the doctrine determined,—unless (for example) Trent was known to have become specially infallible in 1545, while it could have had no certainty of infallibility in 1544,—such Councils could not, *in consistency with this theory*, have claimed unerring insight, or without tyranny authoritatively interfered to suppress the delivery of views which *might* have been, for aught they could know, the necessary preliminaries of some great approaching ecclesiastical development. And no assembly which has not claimed a specific inspiration upon this point,—not a mere providential leading, not an ordinary spiritual instinct, but absolute supernatural inspiration in the highest sense, fixing the precise day and hour of congregation, *in* which divine illumination—*before* which only obscurity and error—was to be expected,—that is, no assembly (so far as I know) ever yet by any party held and reputed a Catholic Council, could, on the terms of an hypothesis which wholly rests the infallibility on the date, have exercised the smallest degree of legitimate authority over the teaching of the Church's doctors or the consciences of its members.

It is no answer to this, to plead (as some possibly may), the general principle that *whenever* the Council meets, in the Fourth century or the Sixteenth, it will



pronounce, if not the *same* truth, yet exclusively what *is* true ; and that this is equally supposable under all hypotheses as to the stationary or progressive discovery of the truth itself. This is a generality plausible only while general ; practically it is quite inapplicable as a solution of the difficulty. Were the Councils of the Church to meet without cause or object, to await vague and fortuitous inspirations upon subjects which neither they nor others could anticipate, it might be conceivable that, though knowledge were necessarily gradual, yet at *all* periods a Council might be able to enunciate *a* complete truth of some sort. But it is notorious that this has never been the real history of Church decisions. The verdict which the Council is to pronounce is *already limited* to fixed points of inquiry ; the question in dispute already exists ; the points to be decided have already agitated the Church ; the Council does not meet to cast about for new revelations<sup>m</sup> on unknown topics ; it assembles to make a distinct and definite deliverance on previous distinct and definite issues. The question pre-exists, it has called the Council into

<sup>m</sup> [“ The benefit derived by the Church from Councils ” is thus well stated by Dr. Hammond, in a manner very similar to the views of Professor Butler : “ In a word, that which was before the constant belief of the whole Church, received from the Apostles’ times and preaching, and by conciliar discussions and search found to be so, is thus delivered down to us by those Councils, and testified by them to be that which they found in the Church universally. This, I suppose, is the meaning of the ἀνακρινέτωσαν ἀλλήλους τὰ δόγματα τῆς εὐσεβείας, in the thirty-seventh Apostolical Canon : ‘ Let them, in their Councils, discuss and examine the doctrines of piety ; inquire and discern what have been delivered to them as such ; ’ and then : τὰς ἐμπιπτούσας ἐκκλησιαστικὰς ἀντιλογίας διαλυνέτωσαν, ‘ Let them



existence, and the Council must now either resign all claim to authority, or select as its own some one of two or three possible answers. Meanwhile the development of the question is (we will suppose) only a few years old ; its development-period (which may be one of a century or two) has little more than commenced ; infallibility itself, on this theory, *cannot* compass the truth at such a date in the history of the doctrine ;—it is therefore perfectly idle to pretend that under these circumstances the supposed Council, “whatever it utter, will utter the truth ;” *it must utter an answer to a given question* (for to that end alone is it convened), *to which, on the development scheme, it is simply impossible for it at that time to utter a correct answer.* And the same disqualification must obviously vitiate all conciliar authority (or papal, or any other), upon all possible doctrines, except at or after certain unrevealed epochs ; *then alone* can any authority utter the truth, if the truth be the result of development ; then alone can any developed doctrine be communicated to man ; and the Council that dares lay hold of any before the myste-

answer or satisfy the incidental objections which shall happen to be made to them in the Church.’ *And so no new doctrine* ever received from their authority or power of defining, but the *ancient, Apostolical, Catholic, pious doctrine* testified to us.”—(*Parænesis, Minor Theological Works*, p. 340, in *Lib. of Anglo-Catholic Theology*.)

So also Leslie : “Neither you nor we think that Councils can add any one article to the Creed, or take away any ; but, upon the arising of any new heresy, a Council is the best evidence of the faith received in those Churches of which it is composed. Thus they are witnesses and guards of the faith, but neither the authors nor masters of it.”—*Answer to the Bishop of Meaux* : (*Works*, Vol. iii. p. 248. Oxford, 1832.)]

rious hour that closes its "development" (when unfortunately the Council itself becomes nearly superfluous), may be "infallible," indeed,—the verbal concession cannot well be escaped, for no theologian up to this day ever yet made the *date* of a General Council an essential requisite to its infallibility,—but nevertheless, if development be the law of all infallible revelation, it will, every assignable date up to that hour of final development, most infallibly err.

2. It may be urged, however, that all this statement represents the supreme controlling authority as too constantly *dependent* on the general movement of development in the mass of the Church. The theory itself seems to me to involve this even more completely than I have done ; if the development be the ordinary precondition of enlightenment, the decretory infallibility which is to terminate doubt and discussion must surely attend, at least as much as guide, its motions. But I am willing to exhibit the merits of the system in any form its author and his admirers may prefer. We shall now then regard the supreme authority as asserting a more direct and independent right to control and modify general development ; and observe how much the hypothesis will have gained by this variation.

There are now two distinct parties to be contemplated ; the Developing Church and the Judicial Authority ; both equally and independently inspired. Should they always necessarily and perfectly *harmonize*, there can be no need, and no use, of the judicial authority at all ; the body of the Church is then its own judge ; it is autonomous, self-luminous, self-controlling, self-sufficient. Those who will not hear its voice are not very



likely to listen to any other which only echoes it. But should they in anywise *differ*; should the developing Church really *need* control, direction, authoritative guidance, what then becomes of the supernatural inspiration of *the development itself*; and with it of the sanctity and glory of that movement of spiritual knowledge by which the private doctors of the Church have become the legislators of its new and better Faith, the divinely inspired Bezaleels of its architecture of dogma, the Evangelists of a mediæval gospel? As I have already observed, the seat of development must be the body of the Church, the general congregation of the faithful; for it alone has permanent existence to allow of continuous progression. How then shall any distinct authority presume to interfere with that which is *itself* essentially divine? How can it venture to do so without infringing not only on individual rights, but on the rights of the Church's corporate inspiration? The daily and hourly development, itself the working and expression of a Divine Spirit, is essentially as authoritative as any decision that can ever be pronounced upon it; the progressive popular belief is itself the revelation of God, or this theory is a dream, for this very position it is the entire object of the theory to illustrate and establish. If indeed this current opinion have been anything less than divine, what claim has it to come in among us primitive Catholics, and demand to overlay our ancient faith, and supersede our interpretations of Scripture, and reconstruct our Creed, and dictate our whole conception of Christianity? This current opinion was itself notoriously the formative principle of the papal religion, which cannot be divine unless *it*



was so. It was never in the *canons of Councils* that mediæval Christianity was shaped and completed ; it was by the growth of popular opinion among unlettered races, by the habits of the monastic, and the teaching of the priest, and the treatise of the schoolman, that it was really formed, continued, consolidated. If mediæval Christianity (distinctly such,—as distinguished from *e. g.* the Christianity of the Common Prayer-Book), be indeed the one exclusive ideal which He conceived who spake the Sermon on the Mount,—then not council-decrees, but *these* instruments—the schoolman, and the priest, and the monk, and the popular notion,—must have been as directly inspired as John and Paul ; for these were they that made it. Who can pretend that any single Council is as answerable for the formation of modern Romanism as the *Summa* of Aquinas ? All parties must admit,—*this* theory at least does not question, but affirms it,—that the existing theology of an Italian priest is not the very and identical theology expressed in the New Testament ; the supplementary Creed, then, if binding, must surely be as truly inspired as the original ; yet that supplementary creed was never in the first instance the creation of any Council or other recognised authority of the Church ; its very authors can in few cases be traced with certainty ; yet assuredly, if that superadded mass of doctrine be as divine as the sermons of Christ, its unknown authors must have been in each case in the highest sense inspired to reveal it. The divinity of Bellarmine's Controversies, taken altogether, is surely as great an advance on the Epistles of St. Paul, as *these* on the prophecies of Isaiah. If we demand inspiration to guarantee St.

Paul's doctrine of Justification or the Resurrection of the Body, we can certainly require no less on behalf of those (whoever they were, for no man can completely say) who first propounded each specific tenet in the whole huge mass of the Roman dogmatic. To this natural and obvious demand the theory of a divine process of development gives the fullest sanction ; it supposes the doctrines gradually introduced, and *introduced by the special agency of the Spirit of God*. But now—I beseech its votaries to reflect,—for to this I return,—over such a Church, itself the organ of perpetual and increasing inspiration,—over the individual writers and speculators of such a Church, the instruments—and, more perplexing, the unknown instruments—of Heaven in disclosing its ever-growing revelations<sup>n</sup>,—what legitimate *control* can any ecclesiastical authority affect

<sup>n</sup> It is worth observing, that the *principle* of individual inspirations and their authority is recognised in 5 *Lateran*, one of the titular Œcumenical Councils of the Roman Church. “Si quibusdam eorum Dominus futura quædam in Dei Ecclesiâ inspiratione quapiam revelaverit, ut per Amos Prophetam Ipse promittit, et Paulus ap. [Apostolus,] prædicatorum princeps, Spiritum, inquit, nolite restinguere, [extinguere,] Prophetas [prophetias] nolite spernere, hos, &c., impediri minimè volumus.”—Sess. xi. [*Concill. Gener.* Tom. iv. ii. p. 163. Romæ, 1612.—G.] This was designed for the peculiar case of prophecy; but in truth the Roman doctrinal system can only stand upon its universal and perpetual application to private teaching of all kinds; upon a constant canonization of the “private spirit” as fully coordinate with Scripture. For unquestionably in that “private spirit,” and nothing else, *began every single one* of its peculiarities.\*

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\* [Compare Mr. Newman's able reasoning upon this subject, in his *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church*: Instances of the abuse of Private Judgment, pp. 209–223. Lond. 1837.—G.]



to exercise? How shall either of the collateral authorities—the developing Church and the independent Council—assume to govern the other? If the condition of thought with which the council deals be the product of inspiration, a progressive product too, perpetually advancing in depth and importance, what indeed is it but palpably “quenching the Spirit,” to interpose and extinguish, instead of reverently observing and cherishing it?

3. If then, neither as *dependently* controlling, nor as *independently* controlling, can any ordinary conception of Supreme Ecclesiastical Authority be made consistent with the genuine operation of contemporary ecclesiastical Development, perhaps such a development may at least be conciliated with that *other* notion which regards the infallible authority (wherever situated) simply as an *organ declarative* of the Church’s belief, expressing that belief, not dictating it. But applied to any actual conjuncture, and, strictly understood (as it must be, to separate it from the other suppositions just dismissed), *this* notion of the Authority will be found quite as unmanageable as the former. The Authority exists to decide. The Church is therefore supposed to require a directive voice. It requires direction because involved in difficulty, and agitated with diversity of opinion. Now it is manifest that the organ of such a Church, *simply as representative of its state of belief at the given instant*, must be as uncertain, hesitating, and unfixed as the Church itself; the echo—if but an echo—must be limited to transmitting the very discords that create it; an authority, which should thus reproduce to the developing Church the picture of its own



confusion (and an organ or index of its judgment can do no more), is manifestly an authority only in name ; it can govern or pacify the Church, no more than the mirrored image of the agonized sufferer can still the agonies it reflects.

I have thus attempted briefly to review the various relations of a Supreme Authority to a Developing Church, under any notion that can be framed of the former ; and I imagine your readers will now be able to estimate how much trouble it must yet cost the importer of the Development theory to tame this wild colt of Rationalism into the steady paces and heavy harness of old-fashioned Roman theology. Fully and fairly carried out, the notion of perpetual, undetermined Development by unassignable authors in unassignable ways, by authors inspired to announce new fundamentals, and so to teach Councils themselves, without any outward token of their own inspiration, and in the midst of a Church which, though inspired itself, is strangely unable to receive their doctrine without tumult and division,—is inconsistent with even the lowest degree of that “authority” which “the Church hath in matters of faith.” But I have really not even yet noticed the worst practical difficulties the consistent reception of this doctrine would involve.

4. For, it will be observed, the foregoing observations have exclusive reference to the exercise of authority in the regular way of Councils. The difficulty is enormously increased by reflecting how, on the one hand, authority, if essential to the Church, must have long preceded the existence of Councils (which, in fact, were *themselves*, according to Mr. Newman (p. 348), a

development); and how, on the other, its subsequent exercise, through the medium of Councils, has, in the Roman Church, been exceedingly rare and reluctant. Take the case as it lies within modern experience. For near three centuries past, centuries in intellectual and moral interest, importance, and difficulty, far exceeding any ever before traversed by the Roman Church,—she has been synodically dumb; a petty occasional Congregation at Rome, for which she herself does not dare to claim conciliar dignity, has been the only authoritative effort of this destined Light of the Nations to direct the vastest movement of minds the world's history has yet recorded. She issued infallible dictates at her ease to the mediæval ages, when she knew herself *safe* from antagonist or scrutiny; how significant the silence of her infallibility from the hour that the cold, calm eye of general intelligence was fixed upon her! But to my argument. In the *interval*, then, of Councils°—infinitely the greater portion of the Church's history—there remains *no authority on earth external to the developing process itself*, except on the ultra-montane figment of the Pope's personal infallibility, and even that, too, somewhat tardy in its oracles. Meanwhile, busy and incessant, the fermentation proceeds; the work of ecclesiastical development is itself awful and divine; it

° [So Leslie: "Suppose you were agreed among yourselves concerning your Councils, and that they were infallible, yet they are not a *living infallible judge* always in being; you have not had one since that of Trent, which began in the year 1545, and concluded in the year 1563; . . . and there may not be another in twice that time, if ever. Where then is the living Judge always in being?"—(*Works*, Vol. iii. p. 58. Oxford, 1832.)]

heaves with the breath of inspiration ; it is pregnant with an unknown and mighty future. What individual prelate or local Synod shall risk meddling with a movement of the general mind, so tremendous in its vastness, so delicate in its complication ? Who shall dare, with canon and inhibition, to cross the mysterious march of God through the souls of His saints ? The narrow stream of true doctrine (it is here admitted) winds through swamps of choking heresies, at times is almost lost among them ; they beset it with calumnies, and mock it with counterfeits, and it has no standard to confront them with, no model to appeal to, for it is forced to grope for a standard, not in the immutable Past, but *the possible Future*, and to confess itself an innovator even as they ? But an authoritative innovator ? No doubt ; and for that very reason *subject to no authority beyond itself*. That Development, which is itself Inspiration alive and in motion, I have already shown, can recognise no legitimate superior on earth ; *beyond* the Church, none will be pretended ; and *within* the Church (the rare case of Councils apart) all individual authority is lost and consumed in the collective majesty of the Developing Church itself.

It is manifest, then, that on this hypothesis, honestly carried into action, authoritative guidance of any possible kind must ever be simply despotic and contradictory ; the individual believer, however sorely perplexed, may ask an opinion, but not a judgment ; no prelate or pastor can legitimately interfere with a divine evolution of doctrine, except to join with the rest in the common scramble of controversy, out of which it is at length to arise ; to attempt to repress or control it is



blasphemy against that Providence which alone has authority to direct, urge, or limit its march. Authority, of whatever kind, *within* a developing Church, would indeed be the arrogation of a controlling power to countervail the very laws and conditions of *its own* being, to arrest the very process upon which the perfection of its own living organization depends; it would be as if the body, or the head of the body, were to bid a single limb not dare to enlarge, and threaten it with amputation for disobedience, while avowing that the body *could not continue to exist, except* in incessant growth. On the one hand, the Church cannot know (for her knowledge is maintained to be but gradual, and new developments admitted to be “startling”) that the movement she dreads and silences may not be the painful and difficult opening of a new theological development; on the other, the private divine, to whom the suspected speculation occurs, cannot know but that he may be the instrument of Heaven selected to herald and proclaim the new light; on which supposition it would become his duty to resist the jealous interference that would retard the dawn of unrisen truth. So feebly (I must again warn the reader) is the essential Rationalism of this theory concealed under the flimsy veil of an affected and verbal Catholicity.

These objections may perhaps seem speculative as the speculation they oppose, while thus viewed generally and on a large scale. Come then (before I close the topic) to plain intelligible matter of daily practical duty. Regard for one moment the position of *an individual speculator*, under this theory of the perpetual development of doctrine, by the mind of the Church.

Suppose him even a devoted Romanist, and I desire to know what conceivable authority this theory supplies to govern him, to repress his wildest heretical fantasies, over and above what is admitted on any theory of philosophic rationalism?

A strong and novel fancy enters his thoughts. He recurs to the past records of the Church. It may be, he finds nothing there absolutely to preclude it; nothing at the worst, which he himself cannot (remembering what an infallible Church has already done in this way) sufficiently interpret as permissive. If so, it may be *true*, and not only true, but (tremendous to think!) it may be *a great fundamental, unrevealed truth*, a truth like the Trinity and Original Sin, which grew up in just this indirect way; or like the worship of the Virgin, or the Papal supremacy, which, when they first occurred to some private doctor, had no whit better authority. The growing conviction that his precious treasure may be the first glorious gleam of a coming development, is not very likely to diminish his eagerness to cherish and promulgate it. His priest, his bishop, has plainly no authority to interfere; a bishop might as justly have suppressed the *first* mention of Purgatory or Image-worship; manifestly nothing under absolute infallibility has any lawful right to overbear what *may* be as important a development as either. To apply to Rome in every such private case would be impracticable and ridiculous; the repose of Rome is not to be disturbed to satisfy the uncertainty of every individual conscience; and, after all, Rome itself is admitted not to be final and absolute in the matter. Where, then, shall he

apply? What restraining authority exists on earth to control him? An *Œcumenical Council*, a new *Lateran* or *Trent*, must be called; or this man is justified, by virtue of the theory of development, in living and dying in his private heresy, as long as he believes it *may* be unrevealed truth. No other conceivable remedy exists; and even supposing the absurdity got over, of convoking such an assembly to cure every individual dreamer's crotchets, the Œcumenical Council itself must deal timidly enough with one who may be the chosen of God; when it remembers that (by virtue of the same theory) half the Councils of the Church would confessedly have gone astray on half the doctrines it now believes!

Justified, therefore, in his independence, our developmentist goes forth "to open the mind of the Church" to his dogma. It spreads—spreads justly, if prelates but understand their duty, for how shall they venture to deny the possibility of the new apostle's mission? Whatever their personal opinion of the doctrine, they cannot forget how the best and gravest prelates of the eighth century were as deeply persuaded of the peril of Image-worship as they, yet *that* development ultimately justified itself by its success. Discussion arises, discussion for years, and millions die in the new belief unwarned, unhindered; for where is the authority that shall dare to interdict its diffusion; or who is there whose duty is not rather to watch and wait upon the providential movement, "lest haply he be found fighting against God?"

Such is the position, such the rights and privileges, of an individual explorer, under the warrant of the



theory of development. But if, after all, in humble terror of such results, the individual member of the developing Church, avoiding, as our author contrives to do, by some secret, unconscious evasion, the legitimate result of his own doctrine, binds himself to receive *the Church's* successive fluctuations, rather than his own, as invariable and infallible, where is the material difference? It is but this, that he substitutes *for himself* the Church at large, as the organ of equally unfixed doctrinal progression; the Church Catholic herself becomes a huge *corporate* Rationalist, under whose capricious arbitration he lives in the bondage, without the security, of a slave.

III. And hence it is, that I have before so often intimated, and now must once more distinctly and finally reiterate, that the system of this book is inherently and incurably *sceptical*. Sceptical it assuredly is, if a doctrine may deserve that evil name (and I am quite alive to the responsibility of affixing it), which involves in a doubt dark as that of utter infidelity, all the plain historical grounds of a Christian man's belief, and gives him absolutely no proof at all in return. This indeed has ever been in various degrees a characteristic of the more daring champions of Romanism; though hardly ever so undisguisedly exhibited as now. For, in fact, it is the very consummation of that credulity which is the *intoxication* of intelligent faith, that it exults in adopting the premises of the Infidel, and is delighted to show how it can reach to undoubting conviction by the very path which timid reason dreads as the precipice of unbelief. It despises the slow and feeble digestion which cannot convert perilous poison

to nutritive food ; it thinks scorn of the man who cannot extort his predetermined conclusion from any data at all, or is afraid of the company of the Gibbons and Voltaires the whole way to the one last step. "I will make every other proof so vain," is its vaunt, "that you must be either Satan's or mine!" The writer of this volume has ever been rather too much addicted to what he has himself styled this "kill or cure" method of proof ; his present performance differs in this only from the ingenious mischief of his former of the same kind, that he has in this case unfortunately forgotten altogether the "cure." One by one he detaches from under us (to apply Moore's beautiful fiction) every foothold ; and at length leaves his bewildered disciple clinging with the hands alone, the weak relaxing hands, to the chain that suspends him over the abyss<sup>p</sup>. "Scripture?" It is so ambiguous and esoteric, that "plain and logical" comments are certain to lead to heresy. "Primitive belief?" Christian truth, in the sense required, is *not* primitive. Roman authority? It is forced to rest upon the unproved *assumption* that a claim never made for centuries *may* yet be indispensable to salvation. Universal and perpetual Church infallibility? It is hardly disguised,—it is most surely involved, as I have demonstrated,—that it cannot be made to fit the facts of Roman theological history without contradiction. While, under *all* suppositions alike—even universal infallibility, wheresoever placed,—the guide of faith is but an explorer of truth, gaining on it by degrees, slowly and painfully

<sup>p</sup> The Epicurean ; Chap. vii.

making her way to its complete comprehension : she does not see truth, she only feels after it ; she has the gifted touch of the blind indeed, but that is all ; she will come to know it in its integrity some time or other, but in the mean time she cannot profess to give more than fragments and samples of the will and the truth of God. We may *call* her “ infallible ;” but infallibility is no more than a word, though a long one ; the *word* can work no charm. If in reality the Church is sure to go wrong (as the theory insists) unless there be infallibility to direct it ; if the infallibility that directs it (as again the theory involves) be itself completely dependent on, and directed by, the movement of the Church—*guided* by that which it alone can *guide* ;—if the general development urgently demand a superintending authority to keep it from confusion and error ; and yet that superintending authority (as the new doctrine maintains, and all history attests) only gives utterance to the general development itself of the age in which it happens to speak ;—once more—if the original Scripture revelation be an inscrutable enigma which might lead to anything, and prove anything, and be consistent with anything, until expounded by an authority which that incomprehensible revelation alone can guarantee, and which, after it has been guaranteed, is itself essentially mutable, confessedly unrecognized for ages, and to this day unable distinctly to define itself ; in what but utter unbelief can such a medley of conflicting suppositions end, except so far as the mercy of Heaven may confound the logic of its authors, and force them to break the laws of reasoning, that they may keep the laws of God ? Such, mean-



while, is unquestionably the present position of this theory: if it is to be further prosecuted,—if a “school” of development theology is to be founded in our age, he must be strangely dull, or strangely devoted, who can doubt where it must end; who can doubt what must be the last miserable result of a scheme which first discredits all the old grounds of belief, and *so far* unquestionably cooperates with the Infidel, in order to exalt in their place a specific source of authority; and then, by virtue of the very reasoning brought to establish that authority, implies that the authority itself is shifting, changeable, uncertain,—and so far teaches the disciple, what I am quite ready to believe it has not taught the master,—to take the *second* step with the Infidel as well as the first.

Your readers may, however, feel some curiosity to learn what the Author himself has been able to do with this question of infallible authority. To the very few and very feeble contributions which he has added to the labours of his predecessors on the topic, I had intended to direct their attention in this letter. I have, however, already transgressed my limits; and must reserve the subject for another occasion.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Your's faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.

## LETTER IX.

DEAR SIR,

Circumstances,—some of which few parochial ministers in Ireland, at the present absorbing season<sup>a</sup>, will be at a loss to conjecture,—have prevented me from completing the examination, which I had undertaken in your pages some months since, of the arguments of Mr. Newman in support of his hypothesis of an Infallible Developing Authority resident in the Roman Church. Your readers will require to be reminded, that I had endeavoured to investigate that supposition,—first, as it assumed or argued a certain local centre of authoritative development,—the specifically *Roman* aspect of the hypothesis (Letter VII.); and secondly (Letter VIII.), in its relations to the wider notion of Church Infallibility in general. The objections which I then enumerated were drawn chiefly from the nature of the hypothesis itself, either as compared with historical facts, or as analyzed into its own constituent elements. It would, however, be scarcely satisfactory to those of your readers who may feel any

<sup>a</sup> [Written in March, 1847, when the memorable famine was prevailing.]

interest in the discussion, to omit a more distinct reference to the arguments, or surmises, by which the Author himself attempts to give plausibility to the doctrine of Infallible Authority.

Why it is that so large a measure of attention is due to *this* topic will manifestly discover itself as I proceed, and the explanation will incidentally introduce some of the Author's chief collateral reasonings. In referring to which,—and, indeed, through all this communication,—I must express a wish that my readers would first consult the Second and Third Chapters of the volume itself; in justice to the Author, whose manifold plausibilities of style must be wholly lost in these rapid allusions; in justice to myself, whose observations must appear somewhat obscure and disconnected, when not perused as a running commentary upon the original, in which the secret of their connexion is to be found.

The general object of the whole of the first or theoretical part of the treatise (to which, except in passing references, I have intentionally confined myself throughout) is, as I have already repeatedly implied, to evince that *the mere existence* of beliefs and practices must be admitted as almost irresistible evidence in their favour; that we are bound to assume that *if* we knew more, all difficulties would be removed; and that, wherever deficiency or indistinctness as to Roman doctrine appear in the language, whether of Holy Writ or of uninspired authorities, we are bound to *interpret* all such records by later dogmas, their alleged developments; to read them in the light of subsequent ages; to understand them as *tendencies* to the maturer theology of Popes and schoolmen; to reform the *anamorphosis* of such imper-



fect artists as Paul and John,—or such inexperienced copyists as Justin and Irenæus, and Tertullian and Clement,—by reflecting its rude and distorted perspective from the harmonizing mirror of mediæval doctrine. Attempts are made, in the part of the Essay which I am now about to examine, to illustrate or confirm this view,—in itself so attractive to natural indolence, so comfortable to wearied scepticism,—by such suggestions as follow:—by citing instances in which some authors have omitted, for no reason we can now determine, facts they might have been expected to mention (p. 139, &c.); to which plain persons will probably reply, that such omissions, so far as they go, *are* arguments against the reality of the facts, but arguments in the supposed cases outweighed by stronger evidence;—by urging, that in *common* matters we take things for granted when there is any presumption in their favour (p. 148); which is, no doubt, often true, and sometimes necessary; but inasmuch as it *also* takes place in every ordinary instance of erroneous belief, may possibly not be considered absolutely conclusive for truth;—by observing, that we submit our reason on competent authority to interpretations not otherwise probable (p. 150); an analogy not precisely in point, when the question at issue is just the competency of the authority alleged;—by citing Bishop Butler's statements about *general* completions of prophecy sufficiently valid in despite of difficulties of detail (p. 151); which will vindicate the details of Romanism, when mediæval Christianity “in general” shall have first been proved the subject of scriptural prophecy;—by quoting the same writer to show (p. 156), that “the truth of reli-

gion must be judged by all the evidence taken together," a maxim which may be discussed when anybody is found to dispute it. Or again,—in order to establish the necessity of interpreting ancient hints by modern dogmas, we are reminded (as usual) of the uncertainty of the Canon of Scripture, and the absolute necessity of "infallibility" to prove it (pp. 143, 160);—when will this immortal sophism have closed the cycle of its resurrections? We are shown how very improbable it was that Roman doctrine *could* "arise" or "be recognised" till long after the first ages (p. 145),—a proposition which I am certainly not inclined to question. We are informed, that "we are to choose between this theology and none" (p. 147); an affirmation which will possibly require no further comment, than to vouch my perfect seriousness in stating, that it *is* actually advanced by the author. And again, that "all will agree that St. Paul resembles Alfonso Liguori, or a Carmelite friar, more than any other class of men" (p. 147),—an observation which, I fear, I must be reduced to attest by a similar warrant;—or, that those who disclaim Origen's notions about praying to angels (supposing the fact admitted), act "in like manner" with those who deny that "I and the Father are one" is an assertion of Our Blessed Lord's divinity (p. 153); or, that no one can admit the Eucharist without implicitly admitting "the virtue of relics" (p. 154), (for of such fantastic texture is the staple of his argument composed); or Baptism without Indulgences; or Original Sin without (though this connexion is indeed a very ancient dream) the consequent merit of Celibacy. To these speculations of an author who (p. 157) accuses Barrow of logi-



cal deficiency<sup>b</sup>, is added an elaborate attempt to bring together some adumbrations in the early ages of the Half-Communion and the Papal Supremacy (pp. 161, 177)<sup>c</sup>. And finally, a somewhat desultory section of

<sup>b</sup> The charge against Barrow seems to be, that he took the papal argument in pieces, and undertook to destroy its separate constituents separately, instead of first combining all the alleged proofs into one aggregate probability for a papal supremacy. But this appears hasty and ill-considered criticism. Barrow does no more than analyze the argument with great distinctness, into the suppositions which are conjointly necessary (and by the adversary admitted to be necessary) to prove the conclusion, and successively refute every one of them. If a reasoner may not lawfully do this, what *may* he lawfully do to confute error?

Barrow argues largely from *omissions*; but surely, when the opposing evidences,—as our present Author clearly concedes,—are inconsiderable, there is hardly any other mode of refutation left. For we cannot expect *positive disclamations* to be adducible till the claim has first been made. The validity of the received logical maxim, of reasoning “from the remotion of the consequent to the remotion of the antecedent,” has never been questioned; and what else is the “argument from omissions,” whenever the fact omitted is an inevitable consequence of the disputed supposition?

At the same time it may, I think, be admitted, that Barrow’s treatise is more brilliant and forcible in the assault than the defence; the attack is so triumphant, that he seems to have hardly thought it necessary to canvass specifically every passage adduced by the Roman writers. A more complete collection and analysis of such passages would be a valuable and an easy supplement in any future edition.

<sup>c</sup> The perplexity of our Author, in dealing with the question of the primitive evidence for the Papacy, discovers itself in an amusing variety of *expressions* on the subject, scattered over the volume, a few of which, lying near each other in the part now under consideration, I shall here submit to the reader.

I need not remind him, that the whole body of Roman controver-



“parallel instances” (pp. 179–202), of the same way of reasoning “when *facts are scarce*,”—a “method *delicate*

sialists (a few of the ultra-Gallican school hardly excepted) invariably aim at demonstrating that the presidency of Peter was universally acknowledged by the Apostles, and unequivocally transmitted by him to the Bishops of the diocese of Rome;—that this was notorious, and acted upon by the common consent of the Universal Church from the beginning of Christianity.

The writer of the following sentences belongs to the same Church which reckons Cardinal Bellarmine as the greatest of her controversialists, and Cardinal Baronius as the most authoritative of her historians; he is dealing with a question which has been concurrently characterized as the “*summa rei Christianæ*,” he is the favoured disciple and champion of a Communion which (unlike the perishable sects around it) exults in harbouring no difference of judgment on any point of importance to Christian belief and practice. Under the auspices of this author the latest edition of unchangeable Romanism runs thus:

“Nor would a *Pope arise*, but in proportion as the Church was consolidated.”—p. 145.

“The Pope’s authority *was not and could not be* in operation” in the age of Ignatius: “first the power of the Bishop awoke, *then* the power of the Pope.”—p. 165.

“St. Peter’s prerogative would *remain a mere letter*, till the complication of ecclesiastical matters became the cause of *ascertaining* it.”—p. 166.

“The *regalia Petri* might sleep . . . not as an obsolete, *for it never had been operative*, but as a mysterious privilege, &c.”—p. 166.

“*Œcumenical* disturbances *gave rise* to Popes.”—p. 167. “The papal supremacy *was not formally acknowledged* [he has just said that Popes had not yet “*risen*” *at all*] in the second century, no more than the doctrine of the Holy Trinity till the fourth;” from which it seems inevitably to follow, that, as the most he can say of the former, previous to the “formal acknowledgment,” is, that “a certain *element* was at work, or [at least] in existence” (p. 165); so, if the analogy is to hold good, “a certain element” is all the

*and doubtful* when used in proof of" what he styles "the Catholic Creed ;"—the apparent scope—certainly

Church must be permitted to have known of the Trinity before the fourth century!

"The papacy *began to form, as soon as the Empire relaxed* its tyrannous oppression."—p. 167. [Wicked Protestants will mutter their 2 Thess. ii. 6.]

But, on turning a few pages (p. 170), we are thrown again into hopeless perplexity; for our clear and consistent author, arguing that an earthly monarchical head is absolutely essential to the kingdom of Christ, boldly affirms, of an "element" which for centuries "had never been operative," that, "at least this is the experience of EIGHTEEN HUNDRED years."

I may be permitted to exchange these citations (which are of little interest, except as evincing the ill-disguised awkwardness of the position in which this theory places its hesitating contriver) for an observation, which has sometimes struck me in reflecting on the sort of complimentary and respectful mention of the Roman See, so frequently found in the African and Western writers of the fourth and fifth centuries. The dignity of that See would not only receive the acknowledgments due to its actual superiority of rank at the time (respectful acknowledgments, which, if other and weightier circumstances had not long rendered it impossible, the bishops of England would of course be just as willing to tender, as Augustine or Jerome in their day), but by a very natural illusion it would be celebrated, as if by a sort of *immutable* prerogative, the ecclesiastical president of the rest. And this because the ancient writers must have conceived and described the Church under an unduly *limited* notion of its destined dimensions, and as if it were to be concentrated for ever around certain chief localities familiar to their experience, from their actual *unacquaintance with the real extent of the habitable world*; something on the same principle (though, of course, not so great a degree of it) as the ancient philosophers went astray in their speculations, whenever the subject demanded a knowledge of the *real extent of the physical universe*. In the latter case, we readily make allowance for the inevitable confinement of views which must have given all—even their deepest metaphysical—speculations a sort of



the inevitable result—of which is, to evince the absurd or arbitrary hypotheses to which speculators have been led, through adopting the mode of argument employed by the Author himself. The reader may be surprised at this ; but no controversialist knows better than Mr. Newman the value of boundless candour in a damaged case. There is no more profitable study for the controversial practitioner, than that prudential precipitancy with which our Author everywhere prodigally grants what he cannot possibly deny. Meanwhile, what can be a more distinct condemnation of his own cherished “method” of taking all for truth in the first instance, and harmonizing facts subsequently as we best may, than his own words (p. 185), which I beg to suggest as a general epigraph or *moral*, to be appended to the next edition of the Essay : “Such is the looseness of reasoning, and the negligence of facts, which

*geocentric* limitation ; we “correct” for the mental position of the observer. Just so, can we not understand, that nothing could be more natural than for a writer to assume, that, *e. g.*, Rome was pointed out by inherent, unalterable claims for the leading ecclesiastical station of the world, when his notion of “the world” was really little more than the Roman Empire itself, and a few outlying barbarian territories?

On the other hand,—if I may add an observation, to which I have no space to do justice,—I have often been accustomed to regard the singular superiority to all these same local limitations in our Lord’s discourses and actions, as one of the most unequivocal proofs of His superhuman inspiration. His whole teaching is, in its very tone and style, a sort of perpetual implied *prophecy* of the universality of the kingdom He came to establish ; it could not have come from any one who did not beforehand inwardly know, that the system he taught was *already* irrevocably secure of universal extension.



ALL writers more or less exhibit, who consider that they are in possession *of a sure hypothesis* on which to interpret evidence and employ argument."

Now, to the general principles,—for I will not delay longer upon these feeblenesses or inconsistencies of detail,—that moral evidence is to be taken cumulatively; that we must often, in practical matters, be content with proofs of indifferent quality<sup>d</sup>; that we must be satisfied with even small probabilities in complicated historical discussions, and the like;—we have but to answer, that, no doubt, all this is true enough, but it is *applicable* only under certain very obvious qualifications. In the FIRST place, the case ought to be one where *no better evidence* can be had, or where there is *no other competitor* for our acceptance, or no *extrinsic standard* whatever to appeal to. If it be certain that God has given religion to man, and if there be but one form of religion adducible, either in the terms of the original revelation of His Will, or in the subsequent human workings of that revelation up to this hour, no doubt we must take it, subject to whatever difficulties of detail; for, on this

<sup>d</sup> "If such ['conclusions, independent of definite facts'], are allowable where speculation is harmless, why may they not be a duty *where action is imperative?*"—p. 196. Here is one of those confused applications of a sound maxim, with which all this part of the volume abounds. We reply, certainly *not*, where (as we contend, and he is bound to disprove) such conclusions are overbalanced by *greater improbabilities*. We are obliged to act upon slight probability, doubtless, but not upon *any* slight probability indifferently. Where there are contending probabilities, the *excess*, after deducting the opposing claims, however slight it be, constitutes a proper and sufficient ground of action; let him prove this *excess*, and we are satisfied.

supposition, to reject the details, would be to reject the religion altogether. But to assume this the real state of the question, is so manifestly to assume the question itself, that I must not waste time in exposing sophistry so transparent. Or, again, **SECONDLY**, such conjectural and hypothetic supplements to historical records as are here contended for, whereby an historian assumes the privilege of filling outlines, and connecting detached facts, according to his own estimate of probabilities, are admissible and welcome, when the subject is one of little more than speculative curiosity, but manifestly unsatisfactory (unless, indeed, no other choice be left) where interests of unbounded importance are dependent on the decision. It can never be anything more than ingenious trifling, to vindicate a method of determining Christian faith,—and an exclusive method of doing so, for it implicitly discards all others,—by such parallel cases, as (p. 194, &c.) the conjectures of historians about the formation of the Greek mythology, or about the original connexion of Religion and Trade; whilst it must be obvious, that such a process is equally open to all parties; that its results must entirely depend on the comparative *artistic* skill of the advocates; and, since, surely, no one will pretend that the portraits of historic personages and their deeds in *Waverley* or *Ivanhoe* are not incomparably more genuine *history*, than a novel which should imagine, *e. g.*, a supreme papacy (dominant or developed) in the second century,—can only end in making the Christian Rule of Faith the premium of a competition of *historical romances*. But **THIRDLY**,—and which is the main point,—all such reasonings are allowable in reply to objections, when a



strong *positive case has already been substantiated on its own direct proofs*. In other words, and as regards the special question here at issue ; when the distinctive Roman system,—the body of teaching progressively added to the primitive scheme and its equivalent, that of the English Prayer Book,—has been first proved divine by its proper evidence, such possibilities as these are fairly adduced in reply to attendant difficulties ; for then (which is just their proper place) they help the imagination to realize what the understanding has already taught the man he ought, at all events, to believe. And this brings us to the point from which I set out. For, in this case, the “direct evidence” for the Roman scheme is simply the warrant,—whatever that may amount to,—for the presupposition of Roman *infallibility* ; the course and scope of the argument is really this,—*on supposition* of infallible direction fully proven, such and such introductions would not be absolutely contradictory to it ; or,—with *a strong antecedent persuasion* of Roman infallibility, such and such innovations will not appear monstrous or impossible. Remove this basis, and the whole edifice of speculation and conjecture crumbles into dust<sup>e</sup>.

<sup>e</sup> Sometimes the Author admits this, sometimes he seems to disguise or forget it, but everywhere equally it is indispensable. “It will be said,” he observes, in one place (p. 170), after speculating why nothing is said about Supreme Popes in the first ages, “that all this is theory. Certainly it is ; it is a theory to account for facts as they lie in the history, to account for so much being told us about the papal authority in early times, and not more ; a theory to reconcile what is and what is not recorded about it, &c.”

One might ask, *why* is any “theory” wanting? What is there to “reconcile?” Why not be content with *the facts as they stand*?



The reader will now perceive why this special topic demands so searching an investigation. He will see that, though the Author has given so miserably disproportionate a measure of consideration to the question, it is, and ever must be, the sole decisive issue on which the entire argument depends.

I proceed, therefore, to consider what proofs of any such infallible directory of developments are exhibited in the chapter which the Author of this work has devoted to the subject.

1. The First proof,—or probability,—is that general presumption alluded to on a former occasion. On supposition of “developments” of the sort contended for, the “tests” (on the elaboration of which three-fourths

Who ever heard of a “theory” to account for the laws of the Roman Republic not mentioning the edicts of the Emperors? Conceive the papacy,—in other words the absolute necessity to salvation, of subjection to the Bishop of the Roman diocese,—an essential element of the Gospel; conceive the absolute monarchy of Nero, or of Trajan, an essential element in the original Roman constitution, and no doubt there does arise, in both cases equally, a difficulty to “reconcile,” but *only* then.

Accordingly, the Author in this place adds, what he seems too often elsewhere to forget, “supposing there be OTHERWISE good reason for saying that the papal supremacy is part of Christianity, there is nothing in the early history of the Church to contradict it.” Passing over the preposterous assertion in the latter clause, we may admit that here at last the real question is raised. We eagerly read on for the promised proofs, on which, he tells us, “all depends.” They entirely consist of—“a presumption.” This is not very satisfactory. But of what does this all-supporting presumption itself consist? Of “two parts;” first, that it was *likely* there would be a supreme monarch (and, p. 171, an infallible one) over the Church; and secondly, that the Roman bishop has *actually* assumed the position; in other words, of a conjecture, and of the fact itself which is

of the present volume are expended) being to the majority practically useless for the purpose (p. 117), nothing but an infallible authority is *competent to decide* among such innumerable growths of human feeling or fancy. Those who deny that any addition to Revelation can absolutely oblige the Church of God, except such as from that Revelation is logically deduced, and by that Revelation can therefore be at any time logically verified, are not very likely to be much disturbed by an argument which vanishes with the hypothesis which grounds it,—an argument founded on a difficulty which is itself a portion of the very hypothesis we reject.—While, again, *either* Reason *or* mere Sympathy is to decide the Christian inquirer. If mere human

on its trial. But I am precipitate; there is a further supplementary presumption,—“the probability that all TRUE developments of doctrine which have been permitted, and THIS in the number, have been divinely approved.” When to the *a priori* conjecture, and the statement of *the fact* under investigation, we have added this quiet assumption of the *whole question itself* at issue, the sternest stickler for logical accuracy must be satisfied.

But the real objects of the “reconcilement” are unfortunately too manifest throughout. The aim of the theory is simply to *reconcile* a predetermination to embrace Romanism, from whatever complication of sympathies arising, with the glaring difficulties of the Roman theology itself. This indeed the “theory” effectually does; a slight praise, for what imaginable theory would not? This the theory does, even at the expense of maintaining that the “rock” upon which the Church of Christ was “*built*,” was actually not in existence till the edifice,—then centuries old,—had stood all the shocks of its fiercest persecutions, and all the convulsions of its most perilous heresies! Those ingenious little architects of the insect world, who build *down* from the roof, are hardly aware what lofty authority they may claim.



*reason* can demonstrate the infallibility, it is not inadequate to demonstrate the developments; both because the infallibility is itself one of them (comp. pp. 347, 348), and because no reasoner in his senses ever yet admitted the infallibility without a previous collateral estimate of the “developments” it professes to warrant; the character of these developments being itself a main element in determining whether the infallibility be genuine; the theological authority of the Roman bishop, when (for example) he proclaims the Virgin Mary “the whole ground of a Christian’s hope,” inevitably depending for acceptance, in a great degree, on our judgment of the dogma thus commended, and being hardly capable of being received, if that dogma be contradictory to all our most mature and deliberate convictions of the nature and operation of the Christianity of the Scriptures. But if, on the other alternative, those indefinite *sympathies*, on which the Author seems chiefly to rely, be the means or organ of embracing the developing authority, why should *they* not address themselves as directly and spontaneously to the developments it authorizes, without any need of the authorizing medium at all? Feelings do not usually wait for warrant of law or obligation of authority. He who adopts Roman theology because he *likes* the Roman authority, may surely as well adopt Roman theology because he likes *itself*.

The great principle upon which I have just insisted,—that a Revelation of fundamental religious truths being once given to man, all clear conclusions from these truths are virtually warranted by the authority that warranted the Revelation itself (and, therefore,



require no other),—is stated with sufficient accuracy in a passage which, strangely enough, is found under the first head of the Author's argument for the necessity of a new and *distinct external* authority. "If," he says (p. 118), "there are certain great truths, or proprieties, or observances, *naturally and legitimately resulting from the doctrines originally professed*, it is but reasonable to include these true results in the idea of the Revelation, to consider them parts of it, and, if the Revelation be not only true, but guaranteed as true, to anticipate that they will be guaranteed *inclusively*." I have no comment to make upon this passage, except to express my uncertainty as to the object of the Author in inserting it. This "inclusive" guarantee of all "legitimate results" is precisely what I contend for; the security which every fundamental truth gives to its corollaries; a security independent of an authority which would *itself* require to be similarly secured; resting on two unshaken pillars, the certainty of the original truth, and,—under God's superintending providence,—that validity of the processes of human reason, which may indeed be questioned, but questioned only to involve *all* evidence alike in confusion.

2. When, a little after, as his Second and Third heads of argument, Mr. Newman urges that it is unreasonable to object against an infallibility *resting on moral certainty*, he appears to misconceive the real nature of the objection he undertakes to refute, or at least to exchange it very gratuitously for another. Nobody objects to an infallible *authority* commending itself to our acceptance on historical evidence. To do so were to question the infallible authority of Christ

himself, which is received on that evidence. But every just reasoner objects to an infallible *certainty* ultimately reposing on such evidence,—to an infallible certainty resolving into moral certainty. The objection to which alone he was bound to reply, is one which itself originally holds the position of reply to a hollow pretence of the Romish logicians. This pretence is, that their theory alone admits of a genuine act of “divine faith,” because it alone provides its disciple with the means of absolute, unquestioning certainty<sup>e</sup>. To this the answer is obvious and complete ; that if that certainty rest on the mere authority of priest or teacher, it is no better certainty than is produced in any other of ten thousand parallel instances of belief on authority; that if it depend in anywise on examination, it is in kind no better certainty than what any similar case of belief on examination can furnish. To this,—the only

<sup>e</sup> Compare Bellarmine: “Sciendum est enim, propositionem fidei concludi tali syllogismo : ‘Quicquid Deus revelavit in SS. [Scripturis :—G.] est verum : hoc Deus revelavit in SS. [Scripturis :] ergo hoc est verum. De [Ex—G.] propositionibus hujus syllogismi prima certe [certa] est apud omnes, secunda apud Catholicos est etiam firmissima, nititur enim testimonio Ecclesiæ, Concilii, *vel Pontificis*, de quibus habemus in Scripturis APERTAS promissiones, quod errare non possint. Actor. xv. *Visum est Spiritui Sancto et nobis*. [Et] Luc. xxii. *Rogavi pro te, ut non deficiat fides tua*. At apud hæreticos nititur solis conjecturis, vel judicio proprii spiritus, qui plerumque videtur bonus, et est malus. Et cùm conclusio sequatur debiliorem partem, fit necessariò, ut *tota fides hæreticorum sit conjecturalis et incerta*.” *De Verb. Dei Interpret.* III. x. Resp. ad Arg. 16. [Arg. 15.—*Disputt.* Tom. i. 198. Ingolst. 1601.—G.] Whether the whole scope of the *new* theory,—“the character of the evidence,” “the method of conducting the inquiry” (Chap. III. Sect. ii. iii.),—be not to prove that all the grounds of faith in the Christian developments *must* inevitably be, *in kind*, thus “conjec-



real question at issue,—Mr. Newman's reply is altogether irrelevant; that an infallible Instructor may safely repose his claims to authority on moral evidence,—that the absolute reality of *objective* truth or objective infallibility is nowise impaired by admitting that doubt may possibly affect its *subjective* apprehension,—is so far from being an answer to the objection, that it is itself the very principle on which the objection proceeds.

And, therefore, when Mr. Newman undertakes, in his Fourth paragraph, to meet the *objection* that the supposed infallibility would “destroy probation” by “dissipating *doubt*,” he contemplates an antagonist (whoever he be) whom I, at least, am little concerned to uphold. With the Inquirer into the ultimate grounds of Christian Faith (and an *inquirer* alone we are contemplating when we speak of “doubt”), to whom the mere supposition that the Roman papacy was infallible,

tural and uncertain,” the candid critic will determine for himself. It is instructive enough to observe Bellarmine's “*apertæ promissiones*,” characterized by the new teacher as “certain announcements in Scripture, *more or less obscure and needing a comment*.”—p. 171.

The student who feels any interest in threading the labyrinths of perplexity, in which the Romish doctors have involved themselves, in the vain attempt to demonstrate that their scheme affords a *species of certainty* otherwise unattainable, will find abundance of passages cited and acutely analyzed in Dr. Jackson's Second and Third Books on the Creed. May I take the opportunity, in this place, of regretting that the managers of the Clarendon Press publications, in issuing the late voluminous edition of Jackson, have been content (Index excepted) with a bare republication of the old folios, without any attempt to verify or complete quotations, and hardly any to correct typographical inaccuracies? The late admirable editions of Hooker, Bramhall, and others, have justly made us fastidious of these barren reprints.



—the *supposition*,—for, if believed to be fully proved, it can effect no more than any *other* theory believed to be as fully proven, and we are now speaking of special and peculiar effects,—to whom, then, this supposition can at once dissipate all “doubt,” whose moral discipline it can even endanger by making him *too* completely satisfied,—I have certainly too little in common, to be able even to comprehend his state of mind. Uninquiring minds, no doubt, the hypothesis may lull ; but Rome must be content to share *this* prerogative with Canterbury or Constantinople,—nay, with Berlin or Geneva,—for all equally can keep those in submission who have never desired to rebel. But that the *inquiring* mind, which cannot be satisfied with relying on the infallibility of Christ, should at once be appeased by supposing the infallibility of His alleged Vicar,—that he who is sceptical about receiving the doctrine of the New Testament, and its practical illustration in the life and teaching of the Apostolic Churches, should be cured by the assumption of a huge *additional* hypothesis of doctrine and discipline, claiming equal or greater authority, and grounding itself chiefly on the doubtful interpretation of some two or three passages of that doubted New Testament itself,—this is a process too anomalous, according to all the ordinary standards of reasoning, to be worth employing in the controversy, either for objection on the one side, or triumph on the other. Faith in Roman infallibility, it must be repeated, can neutralize doubt neither more nor less than *the same measure of faith* in any other authority. If the prevention of doubt were in itself the sole aim of authority in matters religious, Johanna Southcote might

take rank with Pius IX. Unhesitating faith is a duty only where the object of faith is obligatory ; but *there* indeed it is a duty ; and though doubt and discussion have unquestionably their moral uses, and the attempt at their absolute extinction may be narrow and injudicious, yet let the right to dictate our belief be proved, and I, for my own part, shall be little disposed to disturb the advocates of the papacy by objecting that they have made religion *too easy* to believe.

3. But Mr. Newman remembers (p. 122) that an authority whom he himself will hardly deny to have (by some unaccountable accident) surpassed in the very heart of an heretical communion the sainted casuists of Rome herself,—that the great English writer on the theory of Religion has foreclosed all these specious anticipations of what God must do or will do, in that memorable chapter of his work (*Analogy*, II. iii.), in which he argues that “we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it were to be expected God would give mankind by revelation, upon supposition of His affording one; or how far, or in what way, He would interpose miraculously to qualify them to whom He should originally make the Revelation for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and to secure its being transmitted to posterity.” And, again, that “we are not in any sort able to judge whether it were to have been expected that the Revelation should have been committed to writing, or left to be handed down, and, consequently, corrupted, by verbal tradition, and, at length, sunk under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree



they evidently are, to act as they will." Mr. Newman considers that "this reasoning does not here apply," because "it contemplates only the abstract hypothesis of revelation, not the fact of an existing revelation of a particular kind, which may, of course, in various ways modify our state of knowledge by settling some of those very points on which, before it was given, we had no means of deciding." Now, let us weigh the value of this answer. If, by "the existing Revelation," settling certain "points," we are to understand (as we must, to make the observation even remotely pertinent), that the existing revelation has settled, or materially contributed to settle, *the question now before us* (*scil.* whether God did or did not purpose to establish a perpetual tribunal to govern an ever-growing revelation), this is a decisive reply indeed ; but then it is also an assumption of the point to be proved, and ends all further discussion. But if the existing revelation have *not* settled *this* question, then we may be pardoned for asking, in what conceivable way the spirit of Bishop Butler's maxim can be shown not to apply as well to the actual Revelation already given, as to any hypothetical revelation before it has been given ? Suppose the existing Revelation not to have anywhere preappointed the alleged infallible tribunal,—and the probability that, because the Apostles were inspired, any supposed line of prelates (or their communion) would be perpetually inspired as well, seems about as strong as the probability that, because St. Peter raised the dead, the same gift would be the perpetual appanage of some special succession among the Christian prelacy. The Miracle of Knowledge and the Miracle of Power were both



equally necessary at first, both equally uncalled for (though, for even spiritual purposes, both might often seem equally desirable) afterwards. But we do not press this. We are content to occupy an humbler position; to maintain that men have no data at all for constructing probabilities on the subject; and that equally as regards *a* revelation in the abstract, or *the* revelation in the concrete.—And it is just as vain to allege that, even as Creation implies Preservation (p. 124), so the inspiration of the Apostles must imply *perpetual* infallibility; unless it can be shown that Christianity can be preserved in no *other* way than by the infallible tribunal,—that the effects of miraculous interposition can only be upheld by miracle,—an assumption contradicted by the very analogy (of Creation) to which it appeals. Indeed the chief force of Butler's reasoning lies in its irresistible demonstration that *this* very notion is a prejudice; “*upon supposition of his affording*” a revelation: and, again, “*upon supposition God should afford men some additional instruction by revelation,*” are his own words. It is on the hypothesis that a revelation is *given* that he argues we have no sort of right to conclude, from our poor and imperfect anticipations, what ought or ought not to be its characteristics; nay, that “it is highly credible beforehand,” “it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, which we should be apt to fancy we had great *objection* against the credibility of. And it must be at once manifest that everything he has said in reply to the popular infidel objection against Christianity, on account of supposed deficiency in the *evidence of its truth*, is accurately applicable to the similar Romanist objections to every

scheme of Christianity but their own, on account of alleged absence of certainty as to its *meaning and interpretation*.

It would appear, indeed, as if Mr. Newman himself was not wholly satisfied with this perplexing topic of Analogy ; for he subjoins an opinion, that as Analogy tells against anticipating a revelation at all, “ *we cannot regulate our antecedent view of the character of a revelation by a test which applied simply overthrows the very notion of a revelation altogether.*” To which he adds in the next page, that “ *the circumstance that a work (scil. supernatural revelation) has begun, makes it more probable than not that it will proceed.*” Analogy being thus applied to do the very thing which it “ *cannot*” do,—and that antecedent view of revelation regulated by analogy which analogy “ *cannot regulate,*”—I may be permitted to spare myself and my reader trouble, by leaving Mr. Newman’s paragraphs to settle the question with each other.

It will have occurred to every one, and I need only allude to it in closing the topic, that the only analogous case in the least directive as to the course likely to be employed by the Supreme Dispenser in issuing and preserving a revelation, is that furnished by the *Jewish Church*. This was a Church, too, in which, as essentially *preparatory*, as having “ *nothing perfect,*” but being constantly progressive to a great future manifestation, all the principles of “ *development*” would be exhibited on a peculiarly luminous stage. Accordingly, there is not one argument, or conjecture, advanced by the Author for his infallible tribunal, which would not be equally, or more than equally, applicable in the



Jewish instance<sup>f</sup>. Now, whether the purposes of God to reveal, preserve, and unfold Divine truth, could or could not be secured by His Providence, in perfect compatibility with gross errors, and frequent failures, and even final apostacy, in the ruling powers of that which, for more than fourteen hundred years, was the sole Church of God on earth, *they* will decide who have recalled the history of the providential preservation and yet incurable frailties of Israel; how that Church to which “were committed the oracles of God” as truly as to any Christian keeping, discharged its trust, they may learn from the writer who argues it all but impossible to conceive a developing revelation without *infallibility*, and who tells us (p. 319) that Judaism,—the very depository, instrument, and organ of development,—“*became corrupt*, as soon and in proportion as it fancied itself self-sufficient.” The whole latter history of Jewish theology, its divarication into Pharisaism, Sadducism, Essenism,—while preserving, or professing, unqualified respect for the original Mosaic institute,—presents indeed so astonishingly vivid an analogy to the parallel corruptions of Christianity,—its exaggerations in the direction of Ritualism, Rationalism, and Mysticism, without explicit rejection of the chief fundamentals of the faith,—that surely the most prominent lesson of experience is lost upon those who, with such an example, can still speculate upon the antecedent impossibility or improbability of doctrinal corruption in the Church of God.

4. It is next urged by our Author (p. 124), that,

<sup>f</sup> [Compare Leslie, *Works*, Vol. iii. pp. 37, *seqq.*]



inasmuch as it is the main distinction between Natural Religion and Revealed, “that the one has a subjective authority, and the other an objective,” and that the very essence of revealed religion is the supremacy of an external authority ; therefore it must not only be at first delivered on such authority, but *always* proposed to us by some visible external authority of equal and absolute infallibility. Why it is that the reverent preservation and reception of *the original external authority* might not suffice for this purpose ;—How it is to be explained that, as a mere matter of *fact*, men by thousands have, without the condition insisted on by Mr. Newman, lived and died in the clearest conviction of the reality of revealed religion as distinguished from a religion of mere natural conscience ;—How it is that the great majority of members of even the Roman Communion unquestionably realize the very same awful truth (so far as they realize it at all), without ever thinking of that remote and to them invisible charter of infallibility, for whose absolute necessity to all real apprehension of revealed religion our Author argues ;—How (as he appears to confess) the whole Catholic Church lived through its earlier ages, when a faith in revelation enduring enough to stand the fires of martyrdom was needed, without any distinct knowledge of this indispensable oracle ;—These are questions whose solution it has not yet suited our ingenious advocate to undertake.

But, in fact, there is great inaccuracy in the fundamental idea of the paragraph from which I am citing ; that the distinction between Natural Religion and Revealed lies in this, that the one has a “subjective”

authority, and the other an “objective ;” “in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of Conscience ;” and that, as “the supremacy of Conscience is the essence of Natural Religion,” so “the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed.” Not to insist upon the extraordinary assumption that “Natural *Religion*” does not include the recognition of God’s Being and objective authority, as well as the bare subjective authority of Conscience,—the whole statement is only a new instance of the common confusion between the Rule of Right and the Obligation of the Rule. When Revealed Religion supervenes upon Natural, the rule, no doubt, is enlarged, but the nature of the obligation does not alter, it never can alter, it is still, as it was and must be, the authority of Conscience. “The substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of Conscience” is ambiguous, as the word Law itself is ambiguous ; if it mean that a new *subject-matter* of duty, and additional reasons for the discharge of duty, are “substituted” for the limited code of Conscience, the expression is true ; but if it mean, as the context appears to intend, that an *authority* is substituted in the room of Conscience, to supersede Conscience, or not referrible to Conscience, it is grievously false. The error, so long as it is confined to the case of the Supreme Being alone, though it be an error, is seldom of much practical moment ; but it becomes not only false, but most sophistical and dangerous, when it is extended to “Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop ;” as if these could ever be authorities properly coordinate with Conscience, or possess any authority at all over human



actions except *through* the Conscience. The special evil of such a doctrine—or sentiment—is this, that it invariably tends to exalting the human authority *above* the Conscience ; from blending the error (which is very analogous in the field of *morals* to the ultra-mysticism about Faith in the region of *intellect*) with just general impressions of the real superiority of Revealed to Natural Religion. What precious fruit it may at last bear, even when the binding power of Conscience is still recognised as at least nominally supreme, the reader will remember in such passages as Bellarmine's<sup>g</sup> “ Si Papa erraret præcipiendo vitia, vel prohibendo virtutes, teneretur Ecclesia credere vitia esse bona, et virtutes malas, *nisi vellet contra conscientiam peccare*”<sup>h</sup>.

<sup>g</sup> [*De Rom. Pont. Lib. iv. Cap. v. Disp. i. 974.*—Independently of the proof afforded by the context, we cannot in justice refuse to admit as certain the explanation which Bellarmin has elsewhere given of his meaning in this place ; namely, that he was not speaking of things “*per se bona vel mala*,” but merely “*de actibus dubiis virtutum aut vitiorum.*” (*Recognit. libror. p. 19. Ingolstad. 1608.*) —G.] [See a full discussion of this point in Wordsworth's *Letters to M. Gordon*, Sequel, Let. ii. Bellarmine's qualification, “*de actibus dubiis*,” seems to leave his rule in full force, that *whatever the Pope commands must be done*. For what room is left for doubt where an *Infallible* authority commands? And if the Infallible authority availed only so far as to make us *doubt* if it must not be in the right, then the rule becomes applicable: “*Tenetur enim in rebus dubiis Ecclesia acquiescere judicio Summi Pontificis, et facere quod ille præcipit, et non facere quod ille prohibet, ac ne forte contra conscientiam agat tenetur credere bonum esse quod ille præcepit, malum quod ille prohibet.*”—*Bell. de Pont. iv. 6. ed. Paris, 1620.*]

<sup>h</sup> Use is made more than once in this volume of certain supposed analogies of *Conscience*. Sometimes Conscience is brought to illus-



5. I must not detain my readers by minutely citing or analyzing the remainder of this section on the “Developing Authority,” which consists of little more than diversified expressions of the value of infallible guidance, and the pleasure of possessing it ;—that, for example, the “common sense of mankind” feels that “the very idea of Revelation implies a present infallible informant,” which, if it mean a living individual or company incapable of error, is false ; if it mean anything else, is not to the purpose ; and, whichever it mean, adduces what is no ultimate standard of religious truth :—that “the claim” is peculiarly “*welcome* at a time like the present ;” though “by the Church of England a hollow uniformity is preferred to an infallible chair ;” as if the “preferences” of the Church

trate the growth of the Church itself, sometimes the obedience of the individual member. It is strange enough that our Author, however, has not observed that his comparison of obedience in all cases to Conscience, and obedience in all cases to the Pope, is liable to one rather startling difficulty.

“It may be objected, indeed, that Conscience is not infallible ; it is true, but still it is ever to be obeyed. And this is just the prerogative which controversialists assign to the See of Peter ; it is not in all cases infallible, it may err beyond its special province, but it has, in all cases, a claim on our obedience.”—p. 124.

My difficulty is this : suppose the two members of the comparison, to *both* of which unqualified obedience is due, should happen to be *themselves* at variance ! The case of Berengarius,

“’twixt Conscience staggering and the Pope,”

may have been very sinful, but is surely in no wise *inconceivable*.

I am, I confess, wholly unable to suggest any solution for a difficulty which might match the far-famed *Pseudomenos* itself. If, in

of England, or any other Church, can be of the least use in helping us to determine the purposes of God ; or as if any wise person would allow himself to speculate in “ preferences ” on such a subject ; or as if the Church of England, if it preferred at all, would *not*, in all likelihood, prefer infallibility, were it to be had :— and, finally, that the hypothesis of infallibility is *as* “ winning ” an hypothesis as “ Chance, or the Oriental philosophy, or the working of Antichrist ; ” a plea which I have the courage to leave unanswered, to operate in its full force upon the reader.

such a case, Conscience must give way, then so must the Holy See that controls it, for just such, and no more, is the prerogative of the latter ; if the Holy See is to yield in the collision, then so must the Conscience that *opposes* it, and victor and vanquished are mingled in one inextricable *melée*.

In truth, however, this is no mere dialectical puzzle. It exposes the radical falsity of the whole comparison. The reason why Conscience is always to be followed is such as can apply to no other authority in the same sense. The final decision of deliberate Reason in matter of Obligation is to be always obeyed, because, from the very nature and necessity of the case, there *never can* be any higher standard of action ; if any higher could be imagined, it would instantly enter into the calculation of Reason, and become only a new element in a new final decision of the moral reason itself. Manifestly nothing can ever be higher than that which, in its own nature, is highest of all ; nothing can claim authority to supersede that which, by inherent and indefeasible prerogative, judges every other authority whatever.

The confusion of this ultimate standard with any external authority probably arises, certainly derives all its plausibility, from some vague notions of Conscience itself, as if it were a sort of inspiration altogether detached from reason, and so itself a kind of *external and superadded* element of human nature.



This, however, the assertion just dismissed will suggest ; and it is an observation perpetually applicable in Roman controversy. The chief force of the proposed hypothesis lies in contrasting it with an opposite *extreme* as gratuitous as itself. Is there, indeed, to the student of the history of Christianity, no medium between Roman infallibility and “Chance” or Antichrist ? Does this Author imagine that that providential superintendence which the most superficial reader of *profane* history admits to have guided and controlled the minutest facts in the story of nations, is not held to have controlled with infinitely more solicitude, and overruled to its own mysterious ends, every turn in the fortunes of Christianity ? No doubt, through each successive year of the Church’s annals, there is a most true and profound sense in which “whatever was right ;” right, in its relation to the universal system and ultimate ends of divine wisdom ; right, as, finally and on the whole, productive of a greater amount of good than any other arrangement of events ; right, as, in many cases, productive of even much immediate good, and as remedying evil, if sometimes by evil, yet by the only remedy the conjuncture admitted (even as poisons are among the profounder resources of medicine) ; and yet not therefore right in and for itself, not naturally and necessarily right, above all, not *permanently obligatory*. It is a most groundless notion,—which the whole scope of this book tends to nothing else but, by innumerable feats and fetches of eloquent sophistry, to insinuate,—that the history of the Church and its beliefs must lose all interest, and its teachers from age to age all sympathy, if we cease to suppose



its progress a perpetual miracle ; that we have no option between regarding it as accursed of God and regarding it as absolutely incapable of error. Is it not possible for men to read the story of the *universal* Church as an Anglican (for example) reads the story of *his own* ? Experience sufficiently manifests that it is not necessary a Church decision should be absolutely inspired, or believed to be so, in order to be of great service in limiting the sphere of speculation, and in influencing the subsequent tone and language of theological instruction. There are many topics at all times,—how many at this hour!—on which, while the general belief is sound, men of original minds are tempted to indulge in unguarded speculation, until the subject has been so fixed and defined by authority, and the peril of unlicensed conjecture exposed, and the course of straying argument met and turned back, that, either through conviction, or modesty, or even mere dread of general disapprobation, such writers learn to avoid the question, regard it,—and justly,—as foreclosed, and direct their intellectual activity into some different and more profitable channel. Instances of this may, no doubt, be observed here and there on the outskirts of even the doctrine of the Trinity (as in passages of Tertullian and others), previous to the conciliar discussion and settlement ; nothing short of miracle could have kept men of warm fancy, comparatively inexperienced in the danger of the indulgence, from sometimes mingling the private speculation with the public tradition ; and a public reconsideration and settlement would be the natural remedy for the natural failing. But all this pacific and corrective influence of doctrinal legislation

needs no absolute infallibility, and, assuredly, was never once in those days thought to require or infer it<sup>i</sup>. It is

<sup>i</sup> An author who may be considered a fair representative of the current opinion of divines at a very advanced period of Christian antiquity (far in the fifth century,\*) could *conceive* the Church becoming the *lupanar errorum*, with only an earnest ejaculation to God it might never be so; and could calmly give directions under the supposition—"Quid si novella aliqua contagio non jam portunculam tantum, *sed totam pariter Ecclesiam* commaculare conetur?" To which he replies, not by referring his disciple to the decision of the existing Church, still less of any particular prelate, or conclave of prelates, selected from its pastors, but by directing the individual inquirer to appeal from the confused and conflicting tribunals of the day to an authority equally distinct from them all;—"tum [tunc—G.] item providebit ut *antiquitati* inhæreat."—*Vincent. Lirinens. Common. Cap. 4.* Mr. Newman, who has no doubt long arrived at the point which Cornelius Mussus had reached,† when he broke out into his famous avowal of "preferring one Pope above a thousand Jeromes and Augustines,"—probably looks with something like contempt from the height of his Development Theory upon the narrow and limited dogmas of Vincentius; and can now endure with perfect tranquillity the thunders of such sentences as—"Adnunciare aliquid Christianis Catholicis *præter id quod acceperunt*, nunquam licuit, nunquam [nusquam—G.] licet, nunquam licebit; et anathematizare [anathemare—G.] eos qui adnuncient aliquid *præterquam quod semel acceptum est*, nunquam non oportuit, nusquam non oportet, nusquam [nunquam—G.] non oportebit."—*Cap. 14.* Or again,—"*Mirari satis nequeo tantam [tanquam—G.] quorundam hominum vesaniam, tantam excæcatæ mentis impietatem, tantam postremo errandi libidinem, ut contenti non sint tradita semel et accepta antiquitus credendi regula; sed nova et [ac—G.] nova*

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\* [The exact date of the treatise of Vincentius is ascertained from his own statement, (fol. 40, a. Paris. 1561.) that it was written three years after the holding of the Council of Ephesus; consequently, A. D. 434.—G.]

† ["Ego, ut ingenuè fatear, plus uni Summo Pontifici crederem, in his quæ fidei mysteria tangunt, quàm mille Augustinis, Hieronymis, Gregoriis." (Cornel. Mussus, Episc. Bitunt., *In Epist. ad Rom.*, Cap. xiv. p. 606. Venet. 1588.)—G.]



no more than has taken place, in a greater or less degree, in *every* religious communion in which men have acted in the way of common council; allowing, of course, for the great superiority of importance attaching to assemblies conceived to represent the whole Chris-

*in diem quærant* [quærant—G.], *semperque aliquid gestiunt* [gestiant—G.] *religioni* ADDERE, mutare, detrahere. Quasi non cœleste dogma sit, quod semel revelatum esse sufficiat; sed terrena institutio, *quæ aliter perfici nisi assidua emendatione*, immo potius reprehensione, non possit" [posset.—G.]—*Cap. 26*. It is manifest that the spirit of all this, in reality, is quite as applicable to a *Church* as to an individual; though, no doubt, the venerable monastic of Lerins would have shuddered to dwell on the painful possibility of such an application. A permanent corruption of the doctrine of the general Church by the gradual incorporation of unwarrantable human imaginations, would probably have worn to most men of that day the sort of "impossibility" which the Roman law attributed to certain flagrant forms of guilt, that are unfortunately not at all the less real for all that grave compliment to human nature. It is also quite evident that the validity and the authority (as representing the current judgment) of the maxims of the Commonitorium, are not in the least affected by any doubts that may be raised—into which I do not here enter at all—as to the Author's *own* application of his principles; no more than in any other parallel case of correct traditional rules, and defective present practice, an inconsistency than which none surely is more common. Vincentius supplies us with the correct *major* proposition, which remains one and the same in every age; though each successive century may unconsciously bring a different *minor* to subsume under the principle; and though even his own should be held by no means immaculate.

In what sense St. Vincent admitted of doctrinal "development," with what caution he limited it to the expansion and elucidation of the very and original doctrines themselves, as distinguished from all extraneous accretions, may be seen, in Chap. 28–31 of his treatise.

The question thus incidentally glanced at,—how far the age of Vincentius really acted up to its own maxims,—recalls an objec-



tian interest of their time. I insist upon this, because,—as I have before intimated,—the clear and steady apprehension of this single distinction at once dissipates all the eloquent subtleties of our present theorist. Absolute infallibility, I repeat, is nowhere demanded

tion to which, at the risk of unduly lengthening this note, I must here devote a few paragraphs.

It is urged then, that, admitting as we all do, that the doctors of the Fifth Century saw their way on the whole with laudable clearness and precision through the Trinitarian controversy, and some others of great importance, it seems strange and improbable that they, or some among them, could have at the same time indiscreetly begun to countenance superstitious innovations on the primitive scheme of Christian doctrine and practice. Mr. Newman, accordingly, (who really seems to regard it as something little short of *miraculous*, that these men could have agreed so well in collecting the doctrine of the Trinity from Scripture), often and forcibly presses this view. Divines who could achieve such wonders as to escape the successive seductions of Arianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism,—can we believe them capable of any possible indiscretion in any possible department of Christian belief and worship? Unhappily nothing can be conceived more accordant with all which experience teaches us of the ordinary history of opinion. Do we really require to be reminded, that the *speculations* of men can be mutually inconsistent, as truly as their speculation and *practice* perpetually are? Are we expected to demonstrate with all the formality of methodical proof, that men who are sound upon a fundamental tenet, *may* yet indulge themselves in imprudent and dangerous fancies upon others; that they may sometimes tolerate what they do not wholly approve, sometimes approve what they have not wholly examined, sometimes examine what (from the thousand indirect sources of error and weakness) they fail rightly to resolve? How, indeed, if this be not possible, has *any* error or corruption ever entered into any system of truth? For all truth is internally harmonious and consistent; and there is hardly any error upon any subject which will not be found to have indirectly contradicted some principle of truth already received by the very reasoner who

either by the actual *history* of the Christian Church, or by its possible *ideal*. Divine superintendence, and all the solicitude of the closest special providence, is its true, precious, and sufficing gift ; as keys to ecclesiastical history, the former, contradicted at every turn,

unconsciously introduces it. If we do *not* grant any corruption of the truth to be in itself possible, the controversy is at an end, extinguished in the absurdity of so preposterous a negative ; if we *do*, what becomes of an argument which in substance denies it, by denying the possibility of that which must take place in every case whatever in which corruption is successful ? All corruption of a true principle by false details is but an instance of this, and is impossible, if *this* be so.

The whole force of the Author's reasoning upon this matter rests upon two very gross exaggerations ; first, upon a great and culpable exaggeration of the difficulty of systematically propounding the fundamentals of Christianity, and the credit due to those who have correctly done so ; and secondly, upon an exaggeration, not so great indeed, but yet an exaggeration, of the degree in which any real and effective support *is* given to the mediæval corruptions by the teachers in question ;—the exaggeration which converts into the “evidence of antiquity,” some dozens of scattered, and often very weak and fanciful expressions, collected by the diligence of centuries of devoted advocates, out of an hundred massive folios,—and sometimes out of the obscurest and least authoritative productions comprised in these folios ; collected out of the writings of an age, when amid the universal and rapid decay of all the nobler intellectual pursuits, it is a marvel of providential superintendence, that ten thousand such weaknesses are not in every volume adducible ; collected out of volumes which themselves, for the most part, contain elsewhere contradictions, qualifications, explanations of the judgment they are for the moment betrayed into expressing, and which usually claim no authority whatever for any such judgments beyond the reasons they adduce,—an authority from which an appeal, of course, perpetually lies to reason better instructed, and ampler experience ; collected, more than half of them, out of rhetorical effusions moulded in the most ardent forms of imaginative eloquence,



really accounts for nothing ; the latter,—mysterious often, but ever consoling,—welcomes every fact, disguises none, gives interest to all :—as practical principles,—the one is the refuge of despairing scepticism, which dreads the smallest doubt, because it knows the rapidity of the contagion ; the other,—the calm confi-

from which the candid critic will feel himself about as much justified in drawing theological deductions, as he would from the much less impassioned language of ordinary poetry.

I have sometimes thought that it would be a task almost as useful as amusing, to expose these artifices of controversial citation, by submitting to the same process some Anglican theologian, whose anti-papal views are undoubted. I would suggest for this purpose the writer who, perhaps, among all our great divines, bears the strongest resemblance to an ancient Father, in the voluminous extent, the miscellaneous purport, the peculiar combination of imaginativeness and subtlety, which mark his compositions,—Bishop Jeremy Taylor. Of Taylor's views on the Roman controversy, his polemical treatises leave little doubt ; and yet, I do not hesitate to say, that any one who will take the trouble may frame a *catena* of passages from the various and diversified writings of Taylor, which, if they had been discovered in any author of the age of Augustine, would, beyond all doubt, be found transcribed into the collections of Bellarmine or of Berington. If this be in even *any* degree possible in a writer living in the midst of controversy upon the very questions concerned,—after all the degrading practical consequences of the mediæval theology had been fully evolved and exemplified,—how infinitely more may it be anticipated in writers moving for the first time on the outer borders of these dangerous and seductive topics, at a period when attractive appearances of devotion or edification were alone visible ; when everything might seem justifiable that could arouse a flagging piety, and stimulate a gross and ignorant age ;—when, though not indeed obligatory, they might be thought at least,—and at times,—and under circumstances,—and with great watchfulness of intention,—and when human weakness was to be provided for,—permissible.



dence of healthy faith,—which asks no more of God than such amount of reasonable evidence for the things of the *future* world, as men are found willing to risk their lives on in the things of *this*.

While again, on the other hand,—if one must be betrayed into speculating about possible *ideals*, about what, to our imperfect apprehension, might seem best and worthiest of God,—it surprises me that the present Author has not felt how infinitely more *sublime* a view of the Christian Revelation is presented by conceiving it originally delivered to the world in its full, consummate perfection, than by this cumbrous and complicated hypothesis of perpetual supplements and infallible guarantees. How incomparably more wonderful appears the compass of that wisdom which “once for all delivers” to mankind a brief system of belief and practice, of such depth and power, that comprised within it, and capable of being educed and applied according to the needs of man in the simple exercise of reason, shall be found all that, in all the changes of society, shall ever be required for the perfect education of humanity,—than that which is displayed in furnishing supplementary revelations as circumstances arise, and providing a perpetual inspiration to watch and adjust the variations of the system. Every man can understand this in the obvious parallel of the working of a machine ; the machine is perfect in proportion as it is self-regulative. Every man can understand it in the instance of any general theorem ; the formula is admirable in proportion as it involves the greatest multitude of special cases, and requires only to be applied to the circumstances to reproduce

its one unchanged law in the temporary form of these new conditions. The true glory of the Gospel is that of *original* maturity, simplicity, and comprehensiveness,—not (though under *any* form we had been bound to unutterable gratitude for the blessing) that of progressive enlargement and gradual completion. Christianity was not designed to become known at last, by striking, from age to age, a precarious and difficult average among hesitating teachers; it was not to be nursed through an infancy and childhood of centuries into a slow and imperfect adolescence. Christianity was born full-grown. Its authentic stamp of divinity is this,—that its Author so marvellously “knew what was in man,” that no revolution of man’s history could take His Dispensation by surprise; that He should so lay down (if I may venture a figure intelligible to mathematicians) the *equation of the human heart*, that in that single comprehensive provision all the possible varieties of individual and social man were for ever foreseen and included.

To the reflective mind *this* aspect of the characteristic excellency of the Christian Revelation will open views which I cannot but think infinitely superior, both in speculative interest and in practical profit, to any which are ever likely to be suggested by the opposite hypothesis of doctrinal development. But to the reflective mind I must, for the present, be content to leave them.

I am, my dear Sir,

Your’s faithfully,

W. ARCHER BUTLER.







1st part of 2nd of Development in History - 56-57-58-  
Intellectual & practical - I. Examples - 57-58.

2nd part of Examples - P. 60 - Development of Human History - 62.

History - "Development of P. in Revolution" - 65.

Human "Principles" - by H. G. Wells - 68.

Human Development - H. G. Wells called J. C.!!! 77-78  
Note -

History of Man - 25-50 - Human Development - 87-100.

History, History by Development - 93-97 - Cont. Analogy - 98-100.

Medieval History - 100-101 or 102 Important - 109 note.






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